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Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
For almost five years of full-scale war, we keep hearing the same discussion. Do the West still have tools capable of forcing Russia to change its behavior? Are sanctions already effectively exhausted? Is everything that could be done economically and politically already done, and will the outcome of the war be decided solely on the battlefield?
In my view, the answer is fairly obvious – no. the West has far from exhausted its options to pressure Russia. The problem lies elsewhere. There is no political will to use these tools with sufficient severity and simultaneity. Read more in an exclusive column for 24 Channel.
Russian assets are still not confiscated
Let’s begin with the most obvious example. Russian assets remain frozen in Europe. Half a year ago, there was active discussion about confiscating them and using this money to support Ukraine, in particular to buy weapons.
That would have been not only an additional financial resource for the Ukrainian army. It would have been a fundamentally important signal to Russia: aggression has a real material price, and the money of the aggressor state can be used to defend the state it attacked.
But this decision was never made. Instead, Ukraine was granted a large loan of 90 billions at the expense of future Russian reparations, which are still unknown when and in what amount they will be paid. In other words, one of the most powerful financial pressure tools has not been used to its full potential.
Russia is still earning in Europe
A second example – energy. The European Union has done a lot during the war to reduce dependence on Russian energy resources. But a complete rejection is still not in place.
Russian liquefied gas remains, among other things. The separate story is Rosatom, which continues to cooperate with a number of European countries.
There are Russian precious metals. There is a whole list of areas where sanctions potential is far from exhausted.
Therefore, saying that the West has already imposed all possible sanctions on Russia is simply incorrect.
There is another tool that Moscow truly fears
This is secondary sanctions. Russia has learned to bypass a large part of direct Western restrictions.
It redirects trade. Works through intermediaries. Sells energy resources to countries that have not joined the sanctions. Uses a huge shadow fleet.
Therefore, the next level of pressure is no longer only about sanctions against Russia itself. It concerns the price of cooperating with Russia for others.
If a company, a bank, or a state helps Moscow circumvent restrictions or continues funding the Russian economy through energy purchases, they must also understand the consequences.
That is why the American bill to strengthen sanctions is so important. And that is why secondary sanctions can be much more painful for Moscow than another addition to the list of Russian enterprises that have long learned how to operate under restrictions.
The shadow fleet still sails
Another story is the Russian shadow fleet.
We are talking about hundreds of ships, with the help of which Russia continues to export oil, bypass the established restrictions, and receive money for its economy.
Yes, some ships are seized. Yes, sanctions are gradually expanding. But the system itself continues to operate. And as long as it operates, Russia continues to receive revenue.
So again the problem is not that the West does not know where the weak spot is. It is known. The question is only how far partners are willing to go.
Why aren’t they doing this? And now we come to the main point.
The European Union and the United States apply economic pressure on Russia very cautiously. They do not want a sharp drop or an uncontrollable collapse of the Russian regime.
Western logic largely lies in another: gradually increasing the price of war, creating more and more problems for the Kremlin, and thereby pushing it toward negotiations.
On paper, this may seem rational. But there is one problem. Russia perceives this caution not as a reason to stop, but as an opportunity to continue the war.
Moscow has enormous resource bases. It is aided by Iran. It receives support from North Korea. A highly important economic partner remains China.
Therefore, if pressure is increased slowly, Russia gains time to adapt to each new restriction. To find a new route. A new intermediary company. A new tanker. A new market.
Time itself becomes a resource for the Kremlin
This is perhaps the main problem of the current sanctions policy. Each separate restriction can work. But Russia gets the opportunity to adapt to it before the next one is introduced. And then the war can last for months. And under certain conditions – years.
So the question today must be posed differently. Not "are there sanctions remaining against Russia?". There are. Not "do the West have the means to inflict significantly more damage on the Russian economy?". They do.
The question is whether the West is ready to use them simultaneously and at such scale that the Kremlin cannot adapt.
Confiscation of assets. Stricter energy restrictions. Rosatom. Precious metals. Secondary sanctions. Real blow to the shadow fleet. These are not hypothetical tools of the future. They exist already.
Russia must be convinced not by words
Putin today does not show readiness to renounce his war aims. Therefore diplomacy alone will not force the Kremlin to change its position.
Negotiations become possible when the continuation of the war costs more than its termination. And that should be the goal of sanctions policy.
Not gradually creating inconveniences for Russia. But changing the very math of the war for the Kremlin. So that the next year of the war is more dangerous for the Russian regime than deciding to end it.
The West still has tools for this. The question is only when political will will appear to use them not one by one and cautiously, but in a way that Russia finally feels their cumulative power.
Document: PDF proof of the original version of the news item "Захід може вдарити по Росії значно сильніше: чому він цього не робить". It records the publication content at the moment of the first scan, the preservation date and the source: Channel 24.
