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Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
Why have tender-based weapon purchases in Ukraine come to the brink of collapse and how is this being resolved? Billions of hryvnias for weapons procurement got stuck because competency centers weren’t launched, but the problem with technical specifications (TS) was partially resolved within a few days. Executive Director of the Ukrainian Arms Council Ihor Fedirko told RBC-Ukraine why the tender system is stalling and whether Brave1 will become Ukraine’s DARPA. Key points: Source of the crisis: the European Union provided Ukraine a reparations loan for military equipment on the condition that purchases be made exclusively through tenders, and special competency centers between the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff were to coordinate preparation of technical requirements (TS) for those tenders. Consequences: without ready TS, procurement specialists didn’t know what exactly to tender, so only four TS were prepared in six months. Emergency fix: within a few days 80–85% of the missing TS appeared. Authorities are trying to fully level the situation: part of the tender funds were pre-shifted to direct purchases to avoid failure of frontline supplies. Brave1: according to Fedirko, this is the best thing that has happened in Ukraine’s defense technology sector and a potential first step toward a DARPA analogue. Why the arms tenders stalled – Tell us, please, how events unfolded before you wrote about the possible crisis in arms deliveries to the military in six months? – First, the EU requires that purchases financed by the reparations loan it provides for our military equipment be carried out exclusively through tenders. Those funds were allocated specifically for tender purchases. This is a rather interesting requirement from the EU, given that the states currently in the EU during World War I and World War II never conducted purchases via tenders. But the requirement exists, and we comply. For this, a joint construct between the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff was created – so-called competency centers. At that time the competency centers system had not been fully launched. Some centers existed only formally, but they had no directors, insufficient staff, or established processes. They were supposed to coordinate work between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense to collect a huge knowledge and data base coming from the front — so the minister of defense would have something to rely on: analytics made directly from field data. Frankly, I thought Brave1 would become that mechanism, but they decided to create a separate structure. Initially they wanted to create 6 centers, then 2 more were added, but to be honest I was never given a precise answer as to how many there should be. At least at the Saturday meeting there was talk of 7–8 such centers. But heads of those centers have not been appointed, and formally the centers have not been created at all. Moreover, their goals, purpose, and tasks have been revised several times — I think as early as February. Three or four times their whole concept was changed: the purpose of creation, main tasks, and what final product they should deliver. As far as I understand, there’s still no clear understanding. Read also: In a few months there will be a crisis at the front: why the defense industry is sounding the alarm over broken procurement – Who is responsible for drafting the TS? – We were told that the competency centers were not directly responsible for the TS. The General Staff is fully responsible for the TS. The idea was that TS would be passed on to the Defense Procurement Agency (AOZ) through these competency centers. As I understand it, competency centers were to review them, somehow verify them, sign them and forward them to AOZ for procurement. Because the centers were not actually created and no one was pushing the TS preparation process, we found ourselves in a situation where European money is gradually arriving in accounts. We promised to spend these funds specifically via tender procedures that are not supported by basic documents. What are procurement officers to rely on? They need to understand what to buy, and they don’t know. As a result, in six months we managed to prepare only 4 TS for four types of systems, for which tenders have already been held. Within those tenders winners were decided for 17 lots, but in some of them contractors refuse to sign agreements or fulfill obligations for particular lots. They miscalculated their production capacities. In addition, tenders were run at the end of summer: three months for procurement and another three months for assembly. So the final delivery date is already 2027 year. Plus there must be a quality inspection when accepting weapons into storage — that’s also a very complex process. Therefore some manufacturers understand that even if they can handle assembly, they cannot cope with the bureaucracy. In addition, we still have penalties for delayed fulfillment of military contracts — and no one wants that. For every day of delay a penalty of 0,1% of the product’s value is charged for the delayed delivery. For delays longer than 30 days an additional fine of 7% is applied. So for a month the penalty would be about 3%, and for example, after 45 days cumulative sanctions would reach 11,5%. Under tender competition, the margin per lot may be only 3–5%. But again — on Saturday morning, almost magically, 80–85% of all missing TS appeared. However, by Saturday morning AOZ had not yet received them to carry out preparatory work for tenders. They were promised online that the TS would be delivered shortly. There were also delays in signing some contracts for certain nomenclature — and those too were miraculously signed on Saturday. According to former minister Mykhailo Fedorov, in four months of 2026 year the Ministry of Defense purchased more drones than in the entire 2025 year. But that happened thanks to direct purchases and decentralized procurement through military units, the electronic points system, DOT Chain and other mechanisms. So at first glance everything looks fine: everything is being procured, everything is moving. But at the same time a huge amount of money was waiting to launch the tender procedure, and the former minister announced a full transition to tender procurement, emphasizing its benefits — we even heard figures about savings on ammunition of 155 mm caliber. At first glance it all looks correct. And the associations’ position is not to abolish tenders entirely and return to the old system. We are saying something else: to switch completely to a new system while forbidding the previous one before the new system is ready — that’s wrong. As far as I understand, the Ministry of Defense, realizing there would be issues, a week before that shifted a significant sum from tender funds to direct purchases to avoid a real failure in supplies. I think later they will have to explain to European partners how it happened that part of the funds went to direct purchases. The main thing is that the front receives what it ordered through all channels: decentralized, direct and tender procurements. Photo: Ihor Fedirko (facebook.com/ihor.fedirko) Read also: MoD agreed most TS after meeting with weapons manufacturers, - director of the Arms Council – If the problem was solved so urgently on Saturday, what will happen next? Will problems accumulate again and require another emergency fix, or will the situation gradually normalize? – I think the first and most important task for all of us is to ask AOZ whether they actually received the TS, when they will announce tenders for those TS and what delivery dates they will specify in the tenders. If they set delivery dates, say, for January–February 2027, that will be telling. I understand there is a fiscal year, transitional contracts can be signed, but I haven’t heard about a transitional tender. So I think now they will likely split tenders into smaller lots so mid-size companies can participate and get work. Or another option will work — and I think it will: large manufacturers will take big lots but involve almost everyone on the market in cooperation — small and medium companies — assigning them TS for drones for assembly. So the whole country will work on subcontracting terms. Both market models are clear and workable. The only question is that it would be extremely difficult for the state to administer fragmentation into many small lots. Therefore I think the second option will be implemented. But right now everything depends on AOZ. And we know Arsen Zhumadilov plans to leave his position, and another person is being considered to replace him. Does that person have the same procurement experience as Zhumadilov and will they withstand the pressure? Again, we’re talking about huge sums, large procurements, competing interests. We understand this is a gigantic system — with an estimated budget of hundreds of billions of hryvnias per year. The question is whether a change in leadership will break the system. That will be our main challenge. – You mentioned a six-month timeframe after which problems may arise. My industry interlocutors spoke of a shorter period — one to two months. Can we say that the threat is gone, or is it still relevant? – We don’t live by tenders alone — we have a decentralized system and direct purchases, and they continue. There is nomenclature that cannot be procured through tenders if the product is urgently needed by the army. For example, anti-personnel mines that the Armed Forces currently need en masse. Therefore for some categories a supply failure would come much sooner — indeed, in about two months. But I predicted that if we postpone deliveries until the beginning of 2027 year and add another 2–3 months for the usual ramp-up at the start of the year (last year it took five months — during that time the market for non-rocket weapons was basically idle, and then from May everything accelerated), we could enter February with a serious failure. At the same time manufacturers need to pay salaries, rent, etc. I was really afraid we could fail precisely in that period. I think the Ministry of Defense sees that risk too. Will Brave1 become Ukraine’s DARPA – There has been talk that Ukraine needs its own DARPA (the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), and it should be based on Brave1. In your view, can Brave1 take on that mission? – I’ll say more: we conducted research on how to create a DARPA analogue under Ukrainian conditions. We prepared it over a long period, assembled a large working group of many specialists, and were advised by former DARPA head Anthony Tether, who led that institution for almost eight years. He was the main consultant on the research. The main obstacle we saw is our legal system. Legally Ukraine is simply not ready for such a format. DARPA is huge money with minimal accountability. They literally have a written right to error or failure: if a team receives funds and does not achieve the result, they are not persecuted. I believe Brave1 is already a sort of minimal DARPA. And I’m convinced that Brave1 and only Brave1 can be the first stage of such a project in the country. I don’t know any other technological institution here with the right to grant, with schools, with training. It’s already much more than an accelerator — although we commonly call it an accelerator. In my opinion the best thing that happened to the tech sphere in Ukrainian defense is Brave1. Photo: Ihor Fedirko (RBC-Ukraine infographic) – The question is that to transform Brave1 into DARPA it needs a clear legal form. – We proposed creating a separate central executive body with a special status. Among the models we studied the experience of the National Space Agency, which at one time had broader powers in forming and implementing state policy. It must necessarily be a symbiosis of presidential and governmental verticals: on one hand funding is needed, on the other political will. It has to be a structure whose head can freely approach the top state officials and propose ideas. I don’t know such examples here. We considered various options: we wanted to make it a separate military unit — so it would have direct access, its own testing ground, the right to conduct tests. Then the idea transformed: they decided to negotiate with existing testing ranges. Then they again wanted to turn it into an agency — but an agency without special status here worked only once in our history: it seems it was the aerospace agency that had the right to form policy, effectively equating it to a ministry. Without that the whole construct will simply not work. Such a structure will attract scrutiny because it will involve huge funds invested up front and the results will be seen only in about five years. – So the story of transforming Brave1 into a full-fledged DARPA is unrealistic under Ukrainian conditions, and AOZ is in limbo — it’s unclear whether there will be a new director. So hope remains for procurement under the existing TS? – Exactly. A large sum of money has already been reallocated to direct purchases — and that should level the situation by 100%. As far as I know, the TS were indeed handed over to AOZ, but I have information that some were returned for revision. You must understand: it’s impossible in two nights to do what previously took six months. I’ll be honest, I have concerns about the quality of the TS that did pass. But I think AOZ has already accepted some of them, and work on them continues. Only AOZ can save the situation. We cannot constantly move these funds between procurement mechanisms, because the EU will twist our arms again: a promise was made, and in six months we did not fully fulfill it. Speaking about the Armed Forces — I already feel better work from the Ministry with the new commander-in-chief, and I think competency centers will eventually be launched and staffed. I know the staff list provides for about a hundred people, and now only about a dozen work there. So people still need to be found — and not bureaucrats, but engineers and specialists who can aggregate information and prepare quality reports. The idea is good. – In a personnel crisis is it hard to find such people? – Over these years the army — often by the fighters’ own choice — has taken many talented engineers who are now somewhere on the front lines. We still don’t have a full description, the actual passport of the army — that is, which specialists and in what numbers are currently serving. And the number of IT specialists among military personnel is large. The army now has an incredible number of very good engineers. And if we sort out the combat service personnel system, I think among them we will find specialists willing to work with technologies in the Ministry of Defense. I’m convinced of this. – But it’s also difficult to involve such specialists from the army? – Yes, it’s hard. Sometimes the idea is voiced to try to gather a group from those in combat service, say ten thousand people, and direct them to work in the defense-industrial complex. There are companies that would like to implement this, but as always a balance is needed.
Document: PDF proof of the original version of the news item "Чи стане Brave1 українською DARPA та чи буде зброя на фронті: інтервʼю з CEO Ради зброярів". It records the publication content at the moment of the first scan, the preservation date and the source: RBC-Ukraine.
