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Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
Brother-2. A deputy’s brother won the election against a minister’s brother
The by-election to the Verkhovna Rada in electoral district No.85 put an end to the “Nasalyk era” in Kalush. A sea of candidates, more than half of them technical, an “elite” political landing force, and money flowing like a river: the district had never seen so much vote-buying. And, as the result showed, vote-buying remains the most effective political mechanism. And if it’s “seasoned” with skillful PR management, a winner can be “molded” almost from scratch in a very short time. Why did Nasalyk lose the election, and how might this affect Kalush itself, how did Viktor Shevchenko win, and what were the disappointments and revelations of the election?
Viktor Shevchenko: there is money
Viktor Shevchenko at the district election commission after the vote. His team claimed there was an instruction to falsify the election results, since the CEC published the count of 96,38% of protocols for Kalush and then “stalled” for a day.
Viktor Shevchenko is the brother of People’s Deputy Oleksandr Shevchenko, a member of the political force UKROP. Viktor himself is a stranger to the district. The plus is the lack of compromising material as such, aside from the political and business ties to the well-known oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky. The minus is an almost complete information vacuum around the candidate until the start of the campaign.
The candidate’s brother, Oleksandr Shevchenko, became a People’s Deputy in 2014 in electoral district No.83 (centered in Ivano-Frankivsk). Last year he ran for mayor of Ivano-Frankivsk against People’s Deputy Ihor Nasalyk. Nasalyk made it to the second round; Shevchenko did not. From there began a big political—and personal—confrontation.
Viktor Shevchenko copied his elder brother’s electoral technologies in Kalush. Open sources indicate that over the past four years charitable projects from Bukovel TV and Oleksandr Shevchenko personally involved over 60 000 people. One social program provided free trips to Bukovel. Until now—only for residents of Ivano-Frankivsk. But with the start of the campaign that luxury became available to residents of the Kalush district as well. From Kalush, Rohatyn and Halych districts dozens of buses ran daily to Bukovel. Rumor has it, even on the “day of silence.”
Although Ivano-Frankivsk residents have used Shevchenko’s “social” programs for years, he did not even make it to the second round in the Ivano-Frankivsk mayoral race. But he conquered Kalush on the first try—not only with free tourist trips but also with free concerts and feasts in villages of the Kalush district. Shevchenko’s team worked coherently on multiple “fronts”: although Viktor Shevchenko did not put up a single billboard in Kalush (not for lack of funds, of course, but rather for lack of advertising space — ed.), the agitation campaign was in full swing and multifaceted. Suddenly, thanks to taxi drivers, rumors began to spread that Shevchenko was repairing all the roads in the city. People began talking about the candidate on the streets, on public transport, and in cafés. Two compromising segments about the Minister of Energy and Coal Industry Ihor Nasalyk—brother of Shevchenko’s main rival, Serhiy Nasalyk—appeared one after another on a central TV channel.
Shevchenko’s campaign had less impact on Kalush city. Villages, however, motivated their choices differently: some voted out of gratitude or a sense of obligation; some didn’t care about the outcome, and “this one at least took us to Bukovel.” Some were simply afraid of “being punished” or “getting a bill” for the trip. Likely, Viktor Shevchenko’s result reflects not only voters’ preferences: varied election-day technologies were also at play.
According to Shevchenko’s headquarters, the candidate’s rating at the start of the campaign was 2,7%. Meanwhile almost half of voters were ready to vote for Nasalyk. Successful electoral moves, polling, a wide network of agitators and the “social” program increased Viktor Shevchenko’s rating eightfold.
Both the free tourist trips and the free concerts can be seen as indirect vote-buying. Surprisingly, neither law enforcement nor rivals reacted. “ATO” veterans effectively disrupted Nadia Savchenko’s campaign in favor of candidate Olga Sikora. But they completely ignored the “charitable programs” of Viktor Shevchenko, Volodymyr Tsvil, and Mykola Hoshovskyi. Serhiy Nasalyk did not react either.
Serhiy Nasalyk: the end of the Nasalyk era in Kalush?
Serhiy Nasalyk with deputy Mykola Shynkar and Rohatyn City Council secretary Halyna Bohun
Serhiy Nasalyk was the candidate from the BPP Solidarity, brother of the Minister of Energy and Coal Industry, former People’s Deputy and former mayor of Kalush Ihor Nasalyk. Serhiy Nasalyk’s defeat is first and foremost a personal defeat for Ihor Nasalyk. To understand it, one should recall Ihor Nasalyk’s role in Kalush. In 2006 he became Kalush’s mayor and held that post until 2014, when he was elected People’s Deputy.
Until 2006 Ihor Nasalyk was elected People’s Deputy from the Kalush district twice: first in 1998, when he twice defeated his nearest rival; second in 2002, when he achieved the highest result in the region, beating his nearest rival by more than 12 times. Later: in 2006 during the mayoral election Ihor Nasalyk twice outpaced his closest rival Ihor Ochkur; in 2010 90% of Kalush voters who came to the polls voted for Nasalyk; in 2014 in the parliamentary elections Ihor Nasalyk received the support of half the voters, outpacing his nearest rival threefold.
What didn’t work this time? Of course, it was not Ihor Nasalyk himself running but his younger brother Serhiy Nasalyk, who is known in Rohatyn because he has run his business there for years and served as Rohatyn’s mayor, but is completely unknown in Kalush. Serhiy Nasalyk barely appeared in Kalush during his brother’s mayoralty. However, tracing Serhiy Nasalyk’s political and public activity reveals synchronization with his older brother. Serhiy was involved in most of his brother’s projects—until 2015 he was the authorized person of the Rohatyn district organization of UP, was a co-founder of the Rohatyn district organization of the political party EKO+25% (a political project through which Ihor Nasalyk tried to enter the Verkhovna Rada in 2006), is a co-founder of the Rohatyn district organization of the NGO Voice of the Nation, and ran from BPP Solidarity, which was also Ihor Nasalyk’s idea. Strangely, the minister stepped on the same rake twice: last year, government support rather contributed to defeat than victory in the Ivano-Frankivsk mayoral election.
It’s unlikely Serhiy decided to run on his own: they needed to hold onto the district. The family name was supposed to play the decisive role for voters.
Unease was signaled by Serhiy Nasalyk’s first agitation trips to Kalush. First, vote-buying here didn’t come from a single source and proved more effective than administrative resources; second, Ihor Nasalyk’s appointment as minister was accompanied by higher tariffs and the “Rotterdam” scandal, and two TV segments on a central channel sufficiently publicized the “achievements” of the newly appointed minister. So it was unrealistic to expect voters in Kalush to ask Serhiy Nasalyk about Rohatyn. On the other hand, Serhiy Nasalyk could hardly explain to voters the tariff hikes and his brother’s “coal” negotiations with the DNR.
Ihor Nasalyk’s tactic of dispersing votes in Kalush backfired in Rohatyn: the self-nominated surgeon and ATO veteran Mykhailo Hlahovych scored over 8% in Rohatyn. Perhaps those votes would have belonged to Nasalyk.
Nasalyk’s election headquarters, de facto led by long-time election operative, deputy mayor of Rohatyn and former head of the internal policy department of Kalush City Council Mykola Shynkar, failed to demonstrate successful management. The headquarters took a constant defensive tack and only multiplied reply statements to provocations from rivals. The agitation campaign itself was not very successful and sometimes even contradictory: it started with a billboard slogan “I do not promise what I cannot fulfill” and ended with promises to “urgently double the minimum wage and pensions.” The candidate’s image was built only around successful management in Rohatyn.
Throughout the campaign there was practically no visual link between Serhiy Nasalyk and Ihor Nasalyk. The elder Nasalyk (perhaps for lack of time) distanced himself from his brother’s campaign, and Serhiy’s team proved unable to cope on its own. In the end, a candidate who was considered a favorite at the start ran one of the least public campaigns. At least, across these elections—no VIP agitators. Was there vote-buying? At least, it was not very public.
Ihor Nasalyk often ran a “economy-class” campaign, relying mostly on charisma. Saving on professional polling sooner or later had to turn against Nasalyk. This time they failed to factor in—or factored in too late—that heavyweight players, not just “local” politicians, entered the race. Acting “blindly” with a worn, years-old scheme is too little to win. Nasalyk’s campaign lacked professionals, methods, creative ideas and effective agitation maneuvers. The Shevchenko headquarters gave Nasalyk’s team a PR masterclass, making loud promo out of repairing the road in Rohatyn. Overall, comparing Serhiy Nasalyk’s campaign and Viktor Shevchenko’s is like comparing a modern functional computer with an old mainframe.
Olga Sikora: VIP agitators
Olga Sikora with Nadia Savchenko
Former People’s Deputy and candidate from Batkivshchyna Olga Sikora had one of the most powerful VIP landing forces supporting her. Besides prominent party members, Hero of Ukraine Nadia Savchenko came to campaign for her. Sikora’s campaign operated on two tracks: Batkivshchyna’s national messages about cutting tariffs and internal HQ work to “disqualify” opponents.
At the last moment nearly two dozen candidates registered in the district who were considered technical. The party and the candidate disowned them, but the precinct commission members the district election commission contacted gave food for thought. Such a large “technical” army was intended to ensure control in precinct election commissions. This technique was replicated in some other districts where by-elections took place.
Batkivshchyna was interested in increasing its capacities through the by-election. Therefore, candidates received not only PR but also financial support.
Likely with help from a campaign, footage appeared on Channel Plus of Ihor Nasalyk’s negotiations with DNR leaders. It’s not that Sikora’s and Shevchenko’s teams were linked; rather, it was a situational coalition against a common “enemy.”
Nadia Savchenko’s visit to support Olga Sikora opened huge prospects for the candidate. However opponents were alert. As a result, Savchenko’s campaign tour was disrupted—not least because of Olga Sikora herself, who is not a flexible politician, does not know how to react to “non-standard situations,” and simply cannot stand criticism.
The candidate almost repeated her result from the 2014 elections in Halych and Kalush districts, which, given the number of candidates, can be considered an achievement. Sikora also increased her result in Kalush. Maybe because her campaign was relatively tolerant overall and attracted a lot of political grandees. In Kalush district Olga Sikora outperformed Serhiy Nasalyk with voter support. To achieve that result the campaign had to work hard. And not only that.
Ihor Nasalyk has long been an opponent of Olga Sikora—their relationship intensified after Sikora defeated the candidate from the Party of Regions supported by Ihor Nasalyk in the 2012 elections.
Sikora’s campaigns are usually built as an alternative to Nasalyk. But in this election Sikora had no direct opponent, since Serhiy Nasalyk’s “fault” was only that he is Ihor Nasalyk’s brother, and no other compromising material was found on him. Officially. In general, there were several waves of kompromat against the pro-government candidate in Kalush.
Working against Olga Sikora was the fact that she had already been a People’s Deputy and during that time was involved in several high-profile scandals, including being caught button-pressing. Her campaigns chronically and critically lack positive messaging and horizon-expanding initiatives.
Mykola Hoshovskyi: there is money-2
Mykola Hoshovskyi attracted increased attention from OPORA
Unexpectedly, right after the leading contenders came the candidate from the PATRIOT party, Mykola Hoshovskyi. He served as a prosecutor in Ivano-Frankivsk, Zakarpattia, Chernivtsi and Lviv regions. In 2014 he was dismissed under the Law of Ukraine “On Purification of Power” and banned from holding office for ten years. His campaign headquarters were run by people who managed the Party of Regions’ headquarters in 2012.
Mykola Hoshovskyi is from Dovhe Voynylovo. He placed third in Kalush, Rohatyn and Halych districts. He lost ground only in Kalush city, so overall he is fourth. Where did such a result come from for a prosecutor unknown to the wider public and dismissed for lustration—i.e., “belonging to Yanukovych’s regime”?
Hoshovskyi did not run a loud public campaign, appeared moderately in the media, and did not order billboards. The candidate chose old but proven methods. In the week before the election the civic network OPORA appealed to law enforcement to check facts of voter bribery by the candidate.
In addition, the candidate actively worked with churches, notably donating relics of saints to Kalush district churches. On election day Mykola Hoshovskyi made (or promised to make) a mass donation to the district’s churches. Priests thanked the generous benefactor in church and fed the faithful with the information they needed. After church, as usual, parishioners head to the polling stations.
Interestingly, neither Shevchenko nor Hoshovskyi made it into the favorites among Kalush city voters. Apparently city and village voters differ mentally.
Oksana Tebeshevska: a result as a matter of course?
Oksana Tebeshevska—a constant participant in public gatherings in Kalush and Kalush district. At the opening of the memorial to fallen UPA soldiers at Vysochanka
The VO Svoboda candidate and regional council deputy Oksana Tebeshevska gained roughly the result expected of her. When Svoboda’s political leaders Oleh Tyahnybok and Ruslan Koshulynskyi did not take part in the election, it became clear the party abandoned the fight for the district. Nevertheless, Tebeshevska herself did a colossal job given her political and financial capabilities: she held numerous meetings with voters, not relying solely on the party brand. The brand, by the way, helped: Svoboda leader Oleh Tyahnybok came to campaign for Oksana Tebeshevska. Although perhaps if his visit had been planned closer to the election and taken the form of a tour rather than a one-off event, the result might have been somewhat stronger.
Oksana Tebeshevska roughly repeated Svoboda’s result in the district from the early elections in 2014.
A revelation of the election
The revelation of the election was the candidate from Syla Liudey (Power of the People) Andrian Volhin. An ATO veteran and lawyer by profession, Volhin is a “parachute” candidate in the district: he is from Ivano-Frankivsk and serves on the Ivano-Frankivsk City Council. Little known in Kalush before the election, Volhin took fourth place overall and sixth in Kalush district, placing immediately after Serhiy Nasalyk.
Donbas fighter Andrian Volhin, who survived the Ilovaisk cauldron and captivity by separatists, returned to Ivano-Frankivsk
Volhin ran a modest campaign but had powerful ATO veteran support. The team worked carefully, meeting voters on streets, in courtyards and at enterprises.
Oleh Savka from the Rukh party placed seventh overall, but support from Kalush residents put him in third place in the city. Savka’s team consisted mostly of the youthful Rukh wing, and the Rukh youth NGO is one of the most effective in Kalush.
Initially Oleh Savka was considered one of Ihor Nasalyk’s technical candidates. But compromising publications circulated by Nasalyk’s headquarters before the election disproved that assumption. Savka’s campaign was not as modest as last year’s local campaign, yet it was not ostentatious. The campaign emphasized the methods Rukh uses election to election—maximum face-to-face interaction with voters—plus “elite” agitators.
Shortly before the election agitation leaflets appeared in Kalush calling Savka a “religious obscurantist” who “yearns for power.” This showed opponents regarded him as a real contender.
At the end of 2013 young people burned Yanukovych’s portrait at a rally. Law enforcement opened a criminal case against Oleh Savka (left) and student Viktor Velychkovskyi. Under public pressure and in the spirit of the Maidan victory the case was closed.
However Savka’s result also has a negative trend: in last year’s local elections his political force received …?????% of votes. Savka headed the city council list and a “coup” occurred in the local organization replacing “old” faces with new ones. The new team must build political muscles.
Outsiders
Angela Yarovata from the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko received more votes than the independent Volodymyr Tsvil—one of the candidates most notable for vote-buying.
Angela Yarovata with Oleh Lyashko. Lyashko did not come to Kalush, though he promised to visit later.
Yarovata was seen as a candidate who would rally the most radical electorate and take votes from Olga Sikora. Kalush voters did not rank the radical candidate even in the top ten. In Kalush district Yarovata ranked ninth. It’s worth recalling the pitchforks distributed to villagers and a concert by a well-known band in Kalush that took place in the heat and drew minimal audience. Deputies campaigned for Angela, but Lyashko himself did not come.
Independent Sviatoslav Kavinsky’s campaign was “wave-like”: he started long before the election, then quieted down and restarted. He communicated too little to voters, and his billboards bore messages not everyone understood. Although Kavinsky is from Kalush, he lived for many years in Crimea.
The billboard slogan “I’m coming at you” some voters interpreted as “I’m coming to the elections”
Independents Oleh Nyzhnyk and Roman Korol, nominated by UNA-UNSO, received roughly equal support. Both had several billboards in Kalush, but their campaigns, if they existed, were very inconspicuous.
Oleh Nyzhnyk heads the public health center “Sport for All.” The center organizes mountain trips and backyard competitions.
No one noticed Roman Korol’s campaign in Kalush.
The Republican Party nominee, information analyst Ihor Tkach, did not reach even one percent. He ran almost exclusively a media campaign focused on kompromat against the main players. Ihor Tkach sharply criticized Nasalyk, Sikora, Hoshovskyi and Yarovata. He considered Viktor Shevchenko a technical candidate.
For Ihor Nasalyk this is a double defeat. Soon a reshuffle of the political chessboard can be expected, and the next local elections could strip him of his influence in the city altogether. This is critical for Nasalyk, since removing the CHP from the Ukrinterenergo structure and international half-billion loans for Kalush indicate Ihor Nasalyk’s projects were only gaining momentum. Retaking the district will be an extremely difficult task—the train has left the station.
P.S. 37 candidates—independents and representatives of various political forces—took part in the by-election to the Verkhovna Rada. The results of those who scored more than 1% were analyzed.
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