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Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
Anatoliy Hrytsenko: “There Is No Greater Threat to Ukraine Than Ourselves”
At a time when many members of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine and deputies of the Verkhovna Rada found themselves on islands far from Ukraine, cut off from the Motherland by warm seas and oceans, last Thursday’s meeting of the parliamentary Committee on National Security and Defense became a forum where representatives of different political forces, Ukrainian state bodies and security services, and heads of other Verkhovna Rada committees, without journalists and TV cameras, were able to professionally discuss the situation in the Caucasus related to the military actions between Russia and Georgia, as well as how to minimize possible negative consequences for our country.
On the eve of that meeting we met with the head of the Committee on National Security and Defense, Anatoliy HRYTSENKO, to put to him questions that, in our view, many Ukrainians are asking today.
On the eve of that meeting we met with the head of the Committee on National Security and Defense, Anatoliy HRYTSENKO, to put to him questions that, in our view, many Ukrainians are asking today. “Let’s be blunt — this is a war” — Anatoliy Stepanovych, what we watched for several days with horror in Georgia the West timidly calls Russia going beyond a peacekeeping mission. Russia speaks of Georgian aggression against South Ossetia and ethnic cleansing. What label would you give to what’s happening? — To localize the conflict and especially its consequences, regional and global, we need an assessment of what happened. And we must step away from the “us–them” coordinate system, because the situation is complex, not black-and-white, and cannot be judged unequivocally in terms of “aggressor” and “victim of aggression.” It was entirely predictable that after the Kosovo precedent, the frozen conflicts on Georgian territory — in South Ossetia and Abkhazia — would sooner or later explode. They have exploded now. In South Ossetia the conflict moved into a hot phase, and that must be acknowledged, with President Saakashvili’s decision to use force to restore constitutional order. I consider that a mistaken and tragic step by the Georgian president in terms of its consequences. Moreover, he did it without informing either his NATO and EU partners or the president of Ukraine. A head of state has no right to make emotional decisions; he must keep his cool in all circumstances. Even when provoked into using force — and Saakashvili was provoked for a long time. Therefore, while expressing solidarity with the people of Georgia, who became the object of military aggression, I do not share the Georgian president’s decision. A month ago I supported his powerful initiatives aimed at normalizing relations with Abkhazia. Saakashvili offered that republic unimaginably broad powers and preferences: the post of vice president of Georgia, a quota for representatives of the republic in central government, special economic conditions for priority regional development, even a veto right over the passage of certain laws by the Georgian parliament. The proposals were rejected without discussion. In my view there are two reasons: deep mutual distrust and Abkhazia’s orientation toward Russia’s support. Now about the conflict and its consequences. The Georgian army’s use of force produced the opposite result from what Saakashvili expected. I believe that despite all efforts to preserve territorial integrity, Georgia has de facto lost both republics — South Ossetia and Abkhazia. — Forever?
— In historical perspective you cannot say “forever.” Recall that there were empires that thought they would exist “forever.” Empires fell apart, new states and new alliances emerged... But I don’t see realistic prerequisites for Tbilisi to be able to restore constitutional control over Tskhinvali and Sukhumi in the foreseeable future — over 10, 15, 20 years. That’s the first point. Second. I categorically reject and condemn the Georgian army’s use of multiple-launch rocket systems on its own territory and against its own citizens. Even militarily, systems like “Grad” are not the tool to fight militants and terrorists. That’s what special forces are for, or, at worst, precise artillery or air strikes. Multiple-launch rocket systems destroy all life and demolish all buildings within the impact zone. Such a method of restoring constitutional order is unacceptable. Therefore I believe the officials who ordered the use of those systems should be brought to trial. — And if that order came directly from Saakashvili? — I repeat: the official who gave the order must answer. Whoever that person is. Now regarding Russia’s actions. I’ll note two points. First, it is not for the Russian authorities to preach to the world about morality when speaking of unacceptable civilian casualties, genocide and ethnic cleansing. In our memory the Russian authorities ordered the shelling of a parliament, virtually erased Chechnya and its capital Grozny from the face of the earth, when, to quote a well-known Russian politician, they “beat everything that moved into the toilet.” So the Russian authorities should not moralize. That role belongs to leaders of states that resolved internal conflicts peacefully, including separatist manifestations. The Czechs and Slovaks can speak to that, and Ukraine can as well — we did not crush separatists in Crimea with tanks, we did not fire on the Maidan and we did not erase Sievierodonetsk from the map... Third. Russia’s response to the events in South Ossetia was clearly disproportionate in scale and force. Russia violated international law when it moved its regular troops onto the territory of a sovereign state and launched a large-scale military aggression against Georgia. Such actions are hard to call peacekeeping; let’s be blunt — they are war. Military operations were conducted in all three domains: air, sea and land. Strikes were delivered across Georgia — by artillery and by tactical, frontline and strategic aviation. There were elements of a naval blockade by Black Sea Fleet ships and active information and cyber warfare. The Russians’ plan was quickly understood in the other unrecognized republic, Abkhazia, and hostilities spread there. Abkhaz armed formations moved beyond its borders, striking with artillery, aviation and again multiple-launch rocket systems. Ultimately Russia additionally deployed about two divisions in Georgia — roughly one division to each of the two unrecognized republics — including tank, mechanized and artillery units, spetsnaz and paratroopers with equipment and weapons. And there were also “volunteers,” whom no one was counting.
“Russia Has Cornered Itself”
— Is there confidence today that the parties won’t return to fighting? On the one hand President Saakashvili declares withdrawal from the CIS and, crucially, denounces agreements on the CIS peacekeeping mission, calling Russian “peacekeepers” occupying forces. On the other, President Medvedev, speaking of the end of the military operation in Georgia, ordered his commanders that “in case of new aggression from the Georgian side to make decisions to destroy the aggressor.” How fragile or how solid is this peace? — I won’t answer briefly and will start with the causes of the conflict — they are twofold. On one hand their roots lie in the past; on the other they are directed toward the future. Why the future? I’ll explain figuratively: on Russian command orders and on press releases of the Russian Foreign Ministry, under heating, three words written in sympathetic ink may appear: “Kosovo” and “Greater Russia.” We warned that the Kosovo precedent projects directly onto South Ossetia, Abkhazia and other frozen conflicts worldwide, including Western Europe — there are more than 150 of them. Russia opposed recognition of Kosovo’s independence, and I believe Ukraine should also not recognize the self-proclaimed republic. Because demonstrations of separatism can spread across the planet and we won’t be able to put out the fires. So I think the first factor is that Russia decided to punish the West for recognizing Kosovo’s independence. The second factor is “Greater Russia.” In the recently published (already under Medvedev) Concept of the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy it is stated that “the West’s influence on global processes is weakening,” and it speaks of strengthening Russia’s potential, and that is true. Apparently Russian leaders decided their time has come and they must accelerate restoring superpower status. One that will actively influence global processes and important regions, starting with the “near abroad.” Obviously this applies less to the three Baltic states that have already boarded the NATO and EU trains. That’s why the causes are deep and long-term. Still, could Russia have acted differently — not only to win tactically (strengthening its position in the Caucasus) but not to lose strategically (undermining its image and trust worldwide)? It could have, but it didn’t. If Russia, in response to Saakashvili’s use of force, had sent troops into South Ossetia, strengthened its peacekeepers and then presented a firm demand to cease fire and, together with the world community, secured localization of the conflict without leaving the autonomy’s borders, Russia’s actions would have received a different, if not favorable, assessment. Even though it would still be a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty, I think the world would have seen it more calmly. Then very hard times would have come for the Georgian president. But Russia did not stop. One must admit that Russian military forces acted professionally. To stop Georgian army strikes on South Ossetia’s territory you need to strike rear areas, communications, other echelons, and military infrastructure. But beyond military logic there are norms of international law. There is a sovereign state and there are civilian objects whose strikes are impermissible under the laws of war. Here Russia crossed the line, and its subsequent actions are aggression and disproportionate use of force. Russia has cornered itself. With every strike, with every new destruction the world watched on screens in hundreds of millions of homes, Russia’s authority fell — everywhere. In my view, only Fidel Castro said a few words supporting Russia. Even Belarus, the allied state, was awkwardly silent. The world recoiled and remembered the USSR of 1956, 1968, 1979... By the way, if we limit ourselves to purely military aspects, the Georgian army proved weaker than expected. And this is not a question of soldiers, but of command. In many cases the command acted unprofessionally. It’s not time for final judgments, but some wartime actions (since martial law was declared) raised questions. During war the supreme commander-in-chief should not organize mass rallies when bombs are falling tens of kilometers from the capital. From a military viewpoint it’s also unclear why the Roki Tunnel was not blocked and why a column of Russian armored vehicles was allowed to pass freely into the country, knowing that that armor would then destroy Georgian army units. There are many such questions. One thing is clear — Georgia did not use its military potential effectively. Now about the ceasefire. Lacking a consensus among EU countries and a mandate for a tougher and fairer stance, President Sarkozy accepted six settlement principles written by the Russian side, including a ceasefire. President Saakashvili does not like all the principles, but he had to accept them. In his position it is difficult to dictate terms. The main thing is to stop the war and return the country to peacetime. I think regular forces of Russia and Georgia will cease firing. But Abkhazia’s leadership may behave unpredictably; as of Wednesday noon they were still fighting for full control of the Kodori Gorge. There may be provocations, deliberate or by uncontrolled combat groups. Again, whose orders do the “volunteers” follow? — Will the other principles among the six be observed? — Not without difficulties and problems, but I think they will. I’ll stress what was missing from the six principles — preservation of Georgia’s territorial integrity. Despite efforts by many countries, including Ukraine and some EU and NATO states, I repeat: I don’t believe this will be achieved. In my view the Kosovo precedent will be implemented in the South Caucasus. Both self-proclaimed republics — if not tomorrow, then soon after — will call themselves states. And some countries will recognize them. I don’t rule out that South Ossetia, Abkhazia, or both may later seek to join Russia. Politically, much of Russia’s action is irrational. In reality Russia already had almost complete control over both republics before the war. Key positions there are held by Russian citizens. They always looked to Russia, did not communicate with Tbilisi, and traveled to Moscow for meetings instead of Tbilisi. Russia does not need simply additional territories. It lacks people to settle those it already has. Taking responsibility for two more republics would mean additional budgetary costs for reconstruction and more problems Moscow would have to solve. The economic and political consequences of this war will be negative not only for Russia and Georgia. Georgia in particular will need billions in international aid and loans to stabilize its economy and financial system. Armenia — Russia’s strategic partner — is in a difficult position because 70% of that country’s foreign trade goes through Poti, and that Georgian port was blocked. Also gas from Russia reaches Armenia via Georgia. Problems have arisen in Azerbaijan and among consumers of its energy resources. Recall, the only alternative pipeline not running through Russia for Caspian energy transport (Baku—Tbilisi—Ceyhan) also runs through Georgia. Today its security is a serious question. There will be many direct and indirect consequences of the war, including for Ukraine.
“There Is a Way to Deal with the Strong”
— Then let’s return to international reaction. In my view it does not withstand criticism; it was shamefully cautious and sluggish. Everyone only called for a ceasefire, but no one gave a clear legal assessment of Russia’s actions under international law. The day after the bombing of Gori, after the deaths of European journalists, after the utterly outrageous statements by high-ranking Russian officials — who likely read Orwell and Zamyatin — Sarkozy (who addresses Medvedev familiarly) says he came to talk with his “Russian friends” about peace. I think each of us can easily imagine that the Russians, if they wanted, could have entered Tbilisi and captured President Saakashvili. I’m convinced that no tank or plane from EU or NATO countries would have moved to protect that sovereign partner state and its legitimately elected president. It follows that Russia today can act with impunity in the territory it considers its zone of interests. Do you see who or what can stop Russia? — I understand we are talking about Russia. But evaluating international organizations’ effectiveness, let’s pose the question more broadly: who today can decisively and quickly stop China? Or the U.S., the U.K., France? Modestly I’ll remind readers: in 1999 in the article “Does Ukraine Need a New Military Doctrine?” in “DT” I discussed these questions, and that material remains relevant. Start with the UN. It’s the only global international organization, but it is disabled when a permanent Security Council member is involved in a conflict. The veto right. So an effective UN decision to stop or condemn — will not happen. By the way, should a conflict around Ukraine involve or interest a permanent Security Council member, the UN will be similarly hamstrung. The OSCE is the only international organization that includes all European states plus the U.S. and Canada. Despite respect for the OSCE, it has always been slow in making decisions, and in case of war it is at best capable of mediation and humanitarian assistance. Better not to speak of the CIS and GUAM. Now NATO and the EU. If a threat is directed at member states, they will defend themselves. They will act faster and more decisively, cut vacations, convene ministers and heads of government not in 7— 10 days but immediately. Another case: if the object of aggression is a non-member country, it can expect consolidated political and diplomatic support. Even that support may not be very unified, as we see today. If assistance requires significant military, material and human resources with predictable casualties, I put a huge question mark. Few NATO and EU states will be ready to act adequately to defend a country, even if it is orienting itself toward membership. It’s clear that no one, including the U.S., was ready or planned to give Georgia military assistance. Meanwhile a Georgian peacekeeping brigade was in Iraq performing military tasks side by side with NATO and EU members. — So might Russia continue to do whatever it pleases? — No, it cannot. Yes, the world order is imperfect and often unfair. Yes, economically and militarily powerful countries can act aggressively. But we must not accept this fatalistically. The rule of the strong has always existed, yet there was always a way to deal with an aggressor. Remember the world wars — how did they end? Moreover, today the world is interdependent like never before. Even the strongest states cannot exist in isolation without active exchange. The world is vulnerable, and they are vulnerable. Understanding this factor plus democratic values that distinguish the third millennium from previous ones are, albeit slowly, a restraining factor. In this concrete situation? Yes, Russia could have taken Tbilisi in a day, could have overthrown Saakashvili, and nobody would have been able or willing to stop it. But that would not have been the last word in the war.
“A Military Conflict Between Ukraine and Russia Is Unacceptable”
— When the TV showed frames of bombed Gori, located some tens of kilometers from Tbilisi, my eyes involuntarily looked on the map for Boryspil, Obukhiv, Fastiv, Vasylkiv... Most Ukrainians today would say that’s nonsense, an absolute fantasy, that Russia will never wage war against Ukraine. Yet for Georgians Russian bombers over Gori were until recently also fantasy. Do you think Russian military aggression against Ukraine is possible? — Let’s not frighten ourselves and get worked up. We need to think, draw conclusions and act. — Fine, suppose the Ukrainian experts and journalists who suggested Ukraine would be next after Georgia were emotional. But some Western colleagues and analysts, including the well-known Briton James Sherr and the veteran U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke, expressed confidence that while fighting in Georgia Russia was thinking about Ukraine. — Despite mistakes at various stages of building Ukrainian–Russian relations, we have avoided such conflicts. I think that will continue despite many contradictions in various spheres. Obviously because there is an understanding that a military conflict between Russia and Ukraine — the two largest countries in Europe — would be a true catastrophe for the whole continent in political, economic, environmental, energy and other aspects. We must operate from the paradigm: a military conflict between Ukraine and Russia is unacceptable. But let’s step away from particular states. A militarily strong country X may try to subjugate a weaker country Y and may succeed at the initial stage due to military power and surprise. Yes, a powerful army is necessary. But not only that. In a large state the army will usually be larger and stronger. Does that mean the weaker country is doomed? No. Whoever doubts it should read classics of military strategy — Chinese, German, Russian... In war victory goes not to the one with more planes, ships and corps, but to the one whose “government–people–army” triangle is stronger and who can break the enemy’s triangle. Sun Tzu taught this centuries ago. You need not only a strong army but above all strong authority that relies on the people’s support. As for military aspects, there are many options for asymmetric actions. Shamil Basayev showed how a force the size of a battalion can for a long time take away a major country’s will to keep fighting. I absolutely condemn Basayev’s actions that caused many civilian victims and cite this asymmetric option only because readers know it. Those who cannot withstand head-on confrontation may break the enemy’s will or inflict irreparable damage through asymmetric measures. Let professional military work out scenarios stored in “dark” rooms, and demand responsible and effective governance from politicians. Because today there is no greater threat to Ukraine than ourselves. — I also don’t want to be fatalistic. But during the Russia–Georgia conflict Moscow spoke to Kyiv in a tone scarcely different from that used with Tbilisi. Ukraine was accused of arming Georgia, of bias, of supporting one side, of interfering in the Black Sea Fleet’s activities. On the one hand, it’s humiliating to silently endure such shouts. On the other, it’s obvious we are being provoked. How should Ukraine now conduct dialogue with Russia to preserve national dignity, avoid escalation with the northern neighbor, and especially to avoid the trap that caught Saakashvili and Georgia? — How to build a dialogue? Calmly, professionally and responsibly. But first both sides must admit that there were never, are not now, and will not be fraternal relations between Ukraine and Russia. — Relations may be fraternal between me and my brother Vitaliy, a Russian citizen. But interstate relations cannot be fraternal, and politicians should stop exploiting that notion. Relations between states must be mutually beneficial and equal. Now about the tone of Russian statements. The latest statements from the Russian Foreign Ministry are written in the language of the 50–60 decades of the last century, and with clumsy diplomatic sarcasm. “Ukraine avidly armed the Georgian army to the teeth, directly pushing it toward intervention and ethnic cleansing” — a provocative, irresponsible and false claim. I asked Ms. Loskutova, counselor-envoy of the Russian embassy (the ambassador is on vacation): who exactly among Ukrainian leadership pushed for intervention and ethnic cleansing? Yushchenko? Tymoshenko? Yanukovych? Bohatyr’ov? Kinakh? Yekhanurov? Hrytsenko? Who? — No one! That’s an absolute falsehood. These and subsequent statements reflect hostility and accumulated resentment. Ideologues of “Greater Russia” psychologically don’t want to recognize a sovereign country’s right to pursue its own policy and set priorities without consulting the Kremlin. Those priorities may differ from Russia’s. Not everyone has to march in step. — But are we able at least to defend our priorities regarding the basing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet? — We already said relations with Russia will never be fraternal but should be mutually beneficial and equal. Emphasize the right root and clarify positions on basing the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine. I believe we must, without delay, take the step provided by the basic agreements on the Black Sea Fleet of 1997 and analyzed in detail a month ago on DT’s pages. A step that for some reason the Cabinet mentions little and the president doesn’t speak of at all. The document states: starting from 2008, Russia must pay Ukraine for leased fleet facilities in accordance with Ukrainian law. Our legislation requires market valuation of leased property and, accordingly, market rent. On DT pages and elsewhere experts estimated that around 1 billion dollars per year. What do we have today? Starting from 1997, Russia annually wrote off 97 million dollars to Ukraine from the total recorded debt at that time. Based on that, from next year we could switch to a new rent system, but only if we fully repay our debt to Russia. Today we owe Russia 1,3 billion dollars. Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko says the government, thanks to prudent policy, has additionally replenished the treasury by over 20 billion hryvnias. So I propose — to the government, Rada and president — to include in the September submission of the budget amendment-2008 a mandatory repayment of our debt to the Russian Federation in the amount of 1,3 billion. And after that move to collecting market rent for the basing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Yes, we will lose this year, but we will gain over the next nine. And it will be done lawfully, under existing bilateral agreements. Then the logic of the Russian fleet’s presence and perception in Ukraine would change. The administrations of Sevastopol and Simferopol would receive huge additional resources for city and Crimean development. No one will claim the Russian Black Sea Fleet “supports Sevastopol.” With a billion dollars we will create many times more jobs in Sevastopol and Crimea. If the government does not add such an expense item, I will not vote for the budget amendment-2008. Even if my vote would be 226-th. This must be done; it would be equal and mutually beneficial: Russia gets a base, Ukraine gets real compensation for renting its facilities and land.
An Acute Triangle
— I must again express doubt: are we strong enough to conduct our own independent policy? — Strong foreign and defense policy is possible only when the country and society are united, when authority is strong and consistent in its actions, and when there is a combat-capable army — remember the triangle drawn by the Chinese strategist? What do we observe while a war rages between two of Ukraine’s strategic partners that drags our state into it? Start with parliament, the first branch of power. I understand it’s holiday season. That may explain a delay of one or two days. But three, four, five days pass and leaders of the major political forces represented in parliament (except the Communist Party) have not stated their positions on the war. It’s not so important what those positions would be — whether by Yuliya Tymoshenko, Viktor Yanukovych, Volodymyr Lytvyn, Viacheslav Kyrylenko — but it’s important to have them. These are political, not business leaders, right? No party leaders’ positions — no point even discussing forming a unified Rada position. Wait until September? Now the presidential vertical and executive branch. We know in general the president’s position articulated through Foreign Ministry statements. Regrettably, the president did not immediately convene the National Security and Defense Council, which he chairs. He did not recall the NSDC secretary from vacation, nor ministers, heads of security and law enforcement bodies who are NSDC members, nor heads of military intelligence and the border service, nor the head of his secretariat. The result: no one organized clear coordinated around-the-clock interagency work in situation rooms. Operational information flows are disorderly, there’s no systematic analysis of all information leading to considered, coordinated, realistic action options. Therefore statements and demands are voiced on the state’s behalf that the state is unable to uphold or ensure. A decision to deny Russian Black Sea Fleet ships access to a Sevastopol base could be implemented in various ways, but is the president ready to give the order and then be responsible for the entirely predictable negative consequences? Hence one intelligence report on 8 August (!) wrote up the chain that everything is calm, while the world already knew there was war in the Caucasus. So instead of signed Cabinet decrees, hurried presidential decrees are issued. Then an official in the presidential administration drives a wedge into one side of the triangle — into unity of power — by telling the whole world which government members didn’t sign the NSDC-coordinated decision. War or no war, rivals for the next elections must be “taken down” in advance. Then a vice prime minister sends (to whom?) a message that the Cabinet will follow only “technological” decrees. The next day another official adds to the issue of unity by accusing ministers of aiding another state. And what about the army vertex of the triangle? The army awaits promised but undelivered funds (budget amendments not adopted) and the loudly promised but improbable 8000 apartments (a failed report signed by Yekhanurov exists). The army is already eating into November food funds and burning remaining fuel bought at prices much higher than station prices (there is an act by the Accounting Chamber). Yet the army helps people: it builds bridges and rescues from floods. But the main focus is the parade! The supreme commander ordered it. It doesn’t matter that funds were taken from combat training, that our tracks will tear up the asphalt (there was no time to make rubber shoe covers because the decision was made as always at the last minute), or that the Kyiv administration didn’t give permission for military aircraft to fly over the capital. None of that matters — we will have the parade! Regardless of weather, even if half the country is, as the president says, a “second Chornobyl,” and war is near the borders. — But we really do need a strong army. Although not long ago the media debated whether Ukraine even needed an army. — Those who doubt will be fewer now. Creating a strong army requires nothing new. First, implement the State Program for the Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine through 2011, developed by the Ministry of Defense, agreed by two governments (Tymoshenko and Yekhanurov), supported by NSDC members and enacted by presidential decree. The program is not being fully implemented, primarily due to insufficient funding. The prime minister promised to allocate 2% of GDP to the army, but allocated a little over 1% of GDP. Therefore the program will be derailed. There will be no technical re-equipment with modern arms, especially domestically produced ones our defense industry can already make. Second, implement the program to transition the Armed Forces to a contract principle of manning. That too is failing. It’s clear that without emergency measures in the remaining year and a half, Yushchenko will not fulfill his pre-election promise to create a professional contract army by the end of 2010. Third, we must implement the Special Operations Forces development program. By the way, this was the last document I signed as defense minister last December. The program was the result of a year of work by the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, military intelligence, unit commanders and experienced special forces officers. Special Operations Forces are the most combat-ready component of our Armed Forces. In special forces units and combat groups the logic, spirit and ethics of relations are built on principles I planned to extend to the future professional army. There is no ostentatious rank-worship. A small combat group must operate autonomously, detached from base, in extreme conditions, including on foreign territory. Each fighter depends on the others regardless of rank, and the result hinges on each soldier — success or mission failure. Special forces cultivate independence in decision-making, responsibility, audacity and willingness to take risks. Special forces soldiers, let alone sergeants and officers, walk with straight backs, unlike regular units trained from Soviet times to march half-bent, to march in formation, salute, clean territory, paint curbs, flatter superiors and only superficially practice military professions. Regrettably, the Special Operations Forces development program was sabotaged by Minister Yekhanurov. This was not a budget or Cabinet issue but a Ministry of Defense failure within its allocated budget. This year an additional 300 million hryvnias was intended for special forces. When I signed the program everyone in the General Staff and Ministry of Defense understood: however the overall defense budget looks, the money would be found — by hook or by crook. Even by reducing spending elsewhere. Special forces units can carry out missions of strategic importance by tactical detachments. They are the army’s elite, capable of operating by land, air and underwater. A group of four to five can block any headquarters, command post, airfield or port, seize missile launchers. These professionals can conduct asymmetric operations, including abroad, to convince any aggressor continuing aggression against Ukraine will cause serious problems on his own territory. And such an important program was sabotaged! At initial planning in the General Staff and Ministry of Defense, when the budget was approved, instead of 300 about 160 million was allocated on paper, but in reality half that. There will be no purchase of modern communications, weapons and ammunition, parachutes... Why? Because of lack of professionalism and responsibility. Ukraine has no defense minister, it has a minister of excess military property. Of his five deputies only one is a professional who understands the army, and even he was assigned a secondary role (perhaps because he worked in my team for a few months?). The other four know finance and surplus property. No one in the Ministry leadership, with a silent General Staff, told the president that funding special operations development is much more important for the country’s defense than holding a parade (over 80 million hryvnias) or building another, 18-th, lyceum in Baturyn (50 million this year just for documentation and hundreds of millions next year for construction). I managed to resist outside influence and develop army components that guarantee national security, not symbolic attributes of third-rate importance. I won’t list more examples of ineffective actions or criminal inaction by authorities in critical conditions. The main point is clear — state authority is not only weak; it doesn’t function, and when it does it often works to the negative. Today we need a state apparatus that sets goals, not reflexes; that defends national interests, not ratings; that constantly monitors internal and external trends and challenges so we are not forced to react in a piecemeal way to late and unfamiliar information... For now we have collapse across all branches and verticals of power; one cannot expect strong foreign and defense policy. We are being played, and will continue to be played — by both strong and weak actors.
“The Civilized World Is Weaker Than Ever”
— So are we the weakest in this world? — Today we talk more about the Russia–Georgia war. But beyond the burning Caucasus there are global world processes. Their analysis shows that other wars and threats will become the true challenge for the civilized world. I dare say the civilized world is weaker now than ever, while threats are stronger than ever. I very much hope that in fighting these threats current conflict participants, Russia and Georgia, will stand side by side, however unlikely that may seem today. We can draw a strip on the map from North Korea through Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, the Middle East, Sudan and end at the Balkans. That would be not the only but the most dangerous conflict zone. By the way, captivated by the Caucasus and the Olympic Games, world and domestic media forgot that impeachment proceedings have been launched in Pakistan. How will that end? Stability in that country relies on General Musharraf. Stability in neighboring Afghanistan depends largely on Pakistan, which for years has kept a force of over 60 thousand troops at the border, covering it. Not only against drugs. Over a thousand Pakistani soldiers have died. A serious problem could erupt in this explosive region. Ukraine doesn’t even speak of this. In that explosive belt there is everything: frozen, smoldering and burning conflicts; transnational terrorist and criminal groups outside state control; huge financial resources; nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, their technologies and components; numerous extremely dangerous conventional weapons; thriving global drug trade. Many countries’ troops are there, governments are ineffective, daily terrorist attacks produce human casualties. Most importantly, combat groups are not burdened by democratic values and are ready to sacrifice thousands of lives, including their own. They are ready for the most decisive actions worldwide. Threats are serious for any country — even the mightiest. The U.S. has modeled containment of the use of biological weapon components many times. The result is always the same — millions of victims; it is impossible to contain the threat by one’s own means. That’s the U.S.! What about Ukraine, Georgia, Russia? Now look at the other side — the civilized world. How is it today? I assert it’s weaker than ever. Why? I’ll name four major factors. First: all developed, stable democratic countries vote roughly fifty-fifty in elections. It cannot be otherwise in a stable country. Take Western Europe, the U.S. or even Ukraine. You can’t get 80—90% of the vote except in authoritarian regimes or in countries at critical junctures. In most places it’s fifty-fifty. What does that mean? Political leadership at the highest level is weak and politically vulnerable — and becomes more so the closer to elections. In such situations it’s very hard to make important, responsible and unpopular decisions, such as sending troops to a dangerous region. It’s even harder to endure when bodies return home and when huge military expenditures and casualties mount, all under daily media and opposition pressure. Obviously: sending troops to Iraq, whether ours or Poland’s, lacked public support — over 70% opposed. It’s very difficult for the top political leadership to make such decisions. We saw in some EU and NATO countries that after elections peacekeepers were pulled out within two weeks (Spain, for example). (Ukraine withdrew its contingent gradually over a year.) That is, the top political level is very vulnerable, especially approaching elections. This is visible in the U.S. now. Second: at the next level — defense ministers — turnover is high. I served as defense minister two years and ten months. When I left, only five of about 40 defense ministers with whom I started remained. In Belarus, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Denmark. In many countries defense ministers are appointed from medicine, finance, culture or journalism. An exotic case in Spain: a minister was appointed while seven months pregnant. Can you imagine her being effective if a conflict requires working 24 hours a day for many consecutive days? The point: when the top political level is weak, the next level — defense ministers — should offer well-considered military-political decision options and defend the optimal variant, but that level is not ready for that role. Objectively. So reliance shifts to the military. Third: the highest military leadership — the chief of the general staff — in how many countries do these generals have personal experience planning, deploying and commanding significant combined-arms formations? Not just a regiment or brigade, but a large operational grouping? You can count them on your fingers: the U.S., Russia, Turkey, Israel, Britain. And almost that’s it. Others read textbooks often based on analysis of previous and foreign wars. So the top political leadership cannot rely on firm professional military advice in a crisis. Fourth factor: low effectiveness of international organizations and slow decision-making — we already discussed. Add that democratic strength has serious weaknesses. Most democratic alliances operate on consensus and a single country can block NATO decisions. Now recall who can challenge the stable, peaceful, slow-to-decide civilized world? Those willing to kill thousands and die by the thousands. They don’t need huge logistics chains and amenities; with a handful of rice and a weapon they move across terrain for weeks. Crucially, they are trained and ready to act asymmetrically, striking the most painful points of developed democratic societies. I’m convinced leaders of democratic states must promptly recognize the vulnerability and weakness of individual countries and international organizations. Perhaps it will be easier now, after the Russia–Georgia conflict revealed some weaknesses. And what about Ukraine? Our leaders at home and abroad talk about coalition and elections... Serious regional and global problems are either unrecognized or never interested them.
“I Would Withdraw Ukraine’s MAP Application”
— I must ask: should Ukraine, after the Georgian events, accelerate toward NATO? Is this goal no longer relevant? Have our chances of getting a Membership Action Plan (MAP) in December increased or decreased? — I don’t consider this question the most relevant now. We’re not talking about membership, which requires preparation and a unified political position to be supported by the country’s citizens. There are no prerequisites for that now. So membership is not on the table. It’s clear nobody can face a serious threat alone. It’s also clear that joining efforts is beneficial, including economically. And it’s equally clear that if there’s any effective military alliance in the world it’s NATO. There’s a queue for NATO, unlike the Tashkent Treaty that people leave. Why do I find formal MAP accession irrelevant now? Because nothing prevents us from fulfilling MAP ourselves today. Nothing. Regardless of whether NATO decides in December or April or doesn’t decide at all. If Ukrainian authorities realize we must lift our economy, environment, judiciary and military machine, let them do it. That is what the MAP acronym means. I understood this when I was defense minister: in November 2005 I proposed at a meeting of NATO defense ministers that Ukraine develop its own MAP to raise the Armed Forces to NATO standards. There are no higher standards. They said: “Great, develop it.” Why did I do it? To move MAP talk into practice. To avoid MAP as a “black box” and have a document on the minister’s desk so we’d know what to do, what resources and timelines. We drafted a MAP in three months, discussed it, gave it to NATO, brought in their consultants, especially from countries that recently joined the alliance, heard recommendations and adopted what was useful. The MAP contained only what Ukraine needed. I say this firmly. If the government’s “Ukrainian Breakthrough” program is the MAP in substance. I told Yuliya Tymoshenko before her Brussels trip: don’t fear public reaction; this is MAP in the current government’s vision. There’s nothing else in that document but sections on a normal electoral system, a normal market economy and anti-corruption — things we need. A strong combat-ready army we need, not the Americans — they have theirs. So nothing stops us from implementing our MAP today. I rebuke the government: why haven’t they drafted a MAP for their ministries and are they not implementing it? I’m sure that if in June 2006, during the Ukraine–NATO Commission meeting at defense minister level — which I attended — the country had a coalition and a new government, we would have guaranteedly received MAP. Then Germany, France, Belgium and others would have voted for it. Why? Because in every meeting with NATO defense ministers we exchanged new results and experiences. I reported results and NATO members saw Ukraine knew where to go and was moving there methodically. Now who prevents our ministers — Shandra, Knyazevych, Onyschuk, Vakarchuk, Danylyshyn and others — from drafting their MAP parts and traveling every three days Brussels—Berlin—Paris to present their MAPs to partners? Then in two months returning with first implementation results, then again two months later. You know how that would end? NATO would say: “Enough, guys; we don’t have time for our work. One of your ministers arrives, then another with their report. We are satisfied; we see results; we will support Ukraine.” But that isn’t happening. The government talks about MAP but doesn’t work on it. The president could long ago have issued a decree requiring every minister to develop their MAP within two months and implement it actively. Yushchenko didn’t do that either. So whether NATO formally grants MAP in December is unimportant for us. I’ll say more: in Yushchenko’s place I would withdraw Ukraine’s MAP application from NATO headquarters. But ensure its real implementation by Ukraine without any NATO decisions, because they aren’t necessary. — Perhaps the events in Georgia will push previously hesitant alliance countries to make a positive decision for Ukraine? Or do you think they will be more frightened? — Some will be pushed, some frightened. It’s hard to judge now. But I think no radical change will occur, for various reasons including energy considerations. Back to withdrawing the MAP application: let’s not put the alliance in an awkward position. When there is no unity inside the country, when parliament blocks the floor and won’t pass critical laws, when there is no unity across the vertical of power, when there is no effective state machine — remember, we’re not speaking of joining the alliance. Joining NATO is like entering a university. MAP is like being allowed to use the library to study. If you want to read, read! We have books, domestic and foreign. I’m not sure people would support withdrawing the application. But I would focus on creating an effective system of government and achieving concrete results. When citizens feel weekly or monthly that life is improving they will respect their government and then entrust it with strategic decisions — any strategic decisions, even without a referendum. They will understand the government works for them. Given it works wisely at home, it can be trusted with difficult foreign-policy decisions. But when internal political wars are ongoing, people feel increasingly insecure and can’t plan household budgets or business; they have no respect for authorities and won’t entrust them with important decisions, opting for referendums instead. So don’t shift your problems to Europe. Implement your MAP. To finish: many countries became NATO members without any MAP. And some European states are not NATO members and won’t do MAP. But through effective internal and external policy they could be admitted to the alliance any moment they apply.
“We Must Not Trade Values for Prices”
— You planned to return to the energy aspect. — The point is EU and NATO countries ensure their security collectively, yet negotiations with Gazprom are bilateral. Here some see a challenge, others (including our government) see temptation: to trade values for prices. Strategic goals and democratic values for cheap gas for a specific year, a specific election, a specific prime minister or president. I don’t want Ukraine to trade values for prices. We have done it before and saw the result. There is no cheap gas. The remainder of the price will be procured via closed schemes and by establishing control over our economy. Independence must be fought for and paid for. If we don’t want to kneel and want to stand with a straight back, we must pay market prices for gas. It will be market-priced anyway, regardless of presidential statements or why the prime minister remained silent watching the war in the Caucasus. Prepare for this and not in a state of shock. The fatalistic tone of the gas issue (that the economy and social sphere will collapse) is largely because gas has been the source of billion-dollar profits. The gas lobby is very strong; it breeds the largest metastases of corruption regardless of who is president or prime minister. I’ll voice an opinion few share today but soon most thinking people will: with smart policy our government can make gas price non-decisive. It will be market-priced and higher than now. But let’s view the problem without fear and calmly evaluate what we have that most European countries don’t. First: we have our own gas — over 20 billion cubic meters annually. Most European countries do not. Second: we have a strategic pipeline that after the Georgian conflict will attract even more attention. Most European countries don’t have such a pipeline. I remind you that pipeline added in our gas balance in 2004—2005 years an additional 28 billion cubic meters (for comparison, this year only 9 billion). Third: we have underground gas storage. Most European countries lack that too. That’s a plus. Fourth: we have coal for about 400 years, with all sector problems but also potential. Most European countries lack those coal reserves. Fifth: we have nuclear energy. Many European countries don’t. Sixth: we have hydropower thanks to powerful rivers many European countries lack. We used to have small hydropower too — frozen or ruined now — but it once powered whole districts and could be restored. Seventh and perhaps most important: our energy consumption per unit of output is four to six times higher than in developed European countries. That’s a huge reserve to reduce gas use starting at the housing-and-communal services level and in every apartment. Stop heating the ground with pipes, put regulators on radiators, don’t open windows in winter. Now the question: having what most European countries do not have, will we not survive and perish? How have they survived and prospered? A market gas price (and soon there won’t be another) will be a huge incentive to reduce energy consumption. No Cabinet decision will be a bigger incentive than high prices because everyone from businessmen to ordinary citizens will think how to heat homes and start saving. So we are not in a weak position. Additionally, we must more clearly define the role of the state. Our high officials, ministers and presidents should not kneel in negotiations to get cheap gas for people who increase their fortunes by five to ten billion each year. Let those people pay market prices; they can afford it. The state will of course support structures that create jobs and contribute taxes. But the state should not negotiate gas prices for business. Let them buy on the market. Many already do; some have their own pipelines. Messrs. Mittal Steel, Mr. Firtash, Mr. Akhmetov, Mr. Pinchuk and others sell products at world prices while not paying workers world wages. Profit margins exist; let them buy gas at market prices. The state will support vulnerable sectors with loans for some time. Remember all the talk that if gas prices exceed 130 dollars the economy would collapse? Today they get gas at 296 dollars. Much didn’t collapse; profitability declined in places that did collapse and the state must help them. In three or four years the gas issue will fade. I’m not even mentioning reserves to be found by auditing fields, checking who manages them, which are conserved and can be reopened, verifying whose gas is stored in underground storages and who exports it. Seriously, not through shadow and clearly ineffective schemes, but by developing the gas shelf with real investors rather than “Venko.” We must become stronger and then MAP will be secondary and others’ diktat secondary if we want to be a sovereign state.
gazeta.dt.ua
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