Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
What Is Prosecutor General Kostin Keeping Quiet About?
At the end of July, the Verkhovna Rada approved President Zelenskyy’s proposal and dismissed Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova, later appointing the MP from Servant of the People, Andriy Kostin, in her place.
As always, the authorities did not explain the reasons for either the dismissal or the appointment. Which is not surprising, since almost all removals from the prosecutor’s throne have been driven by political considerations rather than objective needs in the public interest, writes ZN.
What is happening in the Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG) while Kostin shows no public activity? What personnel changes has the new prosecutor general made and why? How is cooperation with the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and its very active new head proceeding? What is the case regarding proper collection of the evidentiary base for crimes by Russian servicemen, for which the OPG is responsible?
Kostin’s first step, as is clear, was supposed to be a kind of loyalty contest among the deputies. Some people had to be dismissed, others appointed. “Our people” is the global trend of the current authorities, who have effectively dismantled the civil service reform along with the once-uninspiring competitions. That European know-how, as is known, never really reached the Office of the Prosecutor General.
So predictably they immediately dismissed “Medvedchuk’s lawyer” Maksym Yakubovskyi. By mid-September, of the old staff the Office of the Prosecutor General still had First Deputy Roman Hovda, Ihor Mustetsa and Oleksii Symonenko.
As noted, Symonenko was definitely to remain on the prosecutor general’s team. And that, of course, was not Kostin’s decision alone but the will of the Bankova. The explanation is simple: Symonenko backed up the previous leader at delicate moments by signing suspicions against one political opponent or another of Zelenskyy. And such convenient personnel are not wasted in decent teams.
Deputy Ihor Mustetsa fought for his place in the sun until the last, securing the support of Deputy Head of the Presidential Office Oleh Tatarov. I will remind you that it was Mustetsa who entered the OPG thanks to the well-known “businessman in smuggling” Illia Pavliuk. And Tatarov succeeded: Mustetsa became a deputy. But Roman Hovda, despite his efforts, did not hold on – he is being transferred to Zhytomyr region.
Regarding “their people.” Prosecutor General Kostin appointed two new deputies – Dmytro Verbytskyi and Oleksii Khomenko. Both previously held leadership positions in the Odesa and Kyiv regional prosecutor’s offices. There were also rumors about appointing another deputy, Serhii Kostenko, from that same Odesa prosecutor’s office. Sources say he passed the interview but has not yet been appointed.
It recalled how Prosecutor General Yurii Lutsenko personally took each prospective deputy to then-President Petro Poroshenko. It’s interesting whether Kostin escorts his deputies, and to whom?
Sources in the OPG reported that in September 16 the prosecutor general redistributed powers within the Office of the Prosecutor General. He kept for himself the joint organization of work, cooperation with the Verkhovna Rada, the Cabinet, the Presidential Office, the NSDC, the High Council of Justice. In addition, Kostin coordinates law enforcement activity in crime prevention, oversees patronage, personnel, international legal cooperation, the Department for Countering War Crimes, the General Inspectorate, and more.
Meanwhile Dmytro Verbytskyi was given lucrative areas of responsibility. Among his subordinate units are the Department of Criminal Policy and Investment Protection, the Department for Combating Violations of Human Rights in Law Enforcement and the Penitentiary Spheres, the Specialized Environmental Prosecutor’s Office, the Division for Oversight of Law Compliance by the SBU, the Division for Combating Criminal Offenses in Cybersecurity.
Why? Sources from Odesa say that it is Verbytskyi who can effectively direct inflows from economic topics. The art of collecting corrupt nectar by prosecutor bees is a very complex job that requires appropriate skills and experience. And if a bee needs to bring 120–150 thousand loads of nectar to collect one kilogram of honey, then a “successful” prosecutor can bring a million conventional units from a single “investment protection” case. But let us not rush to conclusions in case we are wrong this time.
Ihor Mustetsa received the Department for Oversight of Law Compliance by the National Police, the Department of Representation of State Interests in Court, the Department for the Protection of Children’s Interests and Countering Violence, the Division for Support of Public Prosecution in Court, cooperation with the State Service for Special Communications and with the Agent for ECHR matters.
Oleksii Symonenko has not yet risen to the level of first deputy, as expected, but he was assigned the Department for Oversight of Law Compliance by the DBR, the Department for Oversight of Law Compliance by Security Agencies, the Department of Document Support, and so on.
By the way, it is worth pausing over the reshuffles in the mentioned OPG unit that deals with the DBR. About two weeks ago, immediately after the removal of the former first deputy prosecutor general Roman Hovda, its reform began. Former head Oleksandr Panov was replaced by Yan Streliuk as head of this department. Panov, for his part, preliminarily “played his part” as head of the oversight unit for the BEB, but is now off-staff.
Another deputy, Oleksii Khomenko, will oversee the Specialized Prosecutor’s Office in Military and Defense Spheres, the Euromaidan Department, the Department of State Property, Resources and Logistics, the Department of Planning and Financial Activity, Accounting and Reporting, the Department of Information Technologies, the Organizational Support Division.
Prosecutor General Kostin and his relations with the head of SAPO
Regarding cooperation and coordination between Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin and SAPO head Oleksandr Klymenko, it gives the impression that the prosecutor general is not throwing a wrench into high-profile investigations as Venediktova typically did. However, it is still too early to draw full conclusions. For now, one can only say that SAPO has been functioning much better than during the power vacuum after Nazar Kholodnytskyi’s resignation at the end of August 2020.
After the appointment of the new SAPO head, various cases were sharply activated and carried to logical conclusions within the powers vested in prosecutors. In particular, eight people involved in a scheme to embezzle more than 13 billion hryvnias from Ukrnafta were notified of suspicions. I will remind you: this company was long controlled by the Privat group.
Another case that deserves attention concerns the “Rotterdam+” case. The SAPO head revoked the decision to close that proceeding. Later they published news that the investigation in that case was finally completed.
In addition, SAPO completed the investigation in the case against Servant of the People MP Oleksandr Trukhin, who is suspected of attempting to bribe patrol police officers. And Bilotserkiv mayor Hennadii Dykyi was notified of suspicion of embezzlement of funds during the purchase of real estate, and was later remanded. But this is only part of what SAPO has achieved since late July this year.
But what does Kostin’s demonstrative noninterference in SAPO activity mean? Is he building his reputation or methodically erecting another Potemkin village under the close supervision of the Presidential Office and Andrii Yermak personally? We will learn the answers a little later.
Collecting proper evidence in the war with Russia
Human rights defenders claim that nearly half a year of military leadership of the Office of the Prosecutor General by Iryna Venediktova, amid her active PR about collecting an evidentiary base of Russian crimes, resulted in an “unprecedented” outcome — total failure. So on the crucial direction today — the field for the new prosecutor general is untilled.
Therefore it is not surprising that after the redistribution of responsibilities Kostin set off on an international tour. His aim was “discussing joint actions of the international community to hold accountable for aggression and war crimes of the Russian Federation committed in Ukraine.” Thus, during the Warsaw Security Forum the prosecutor general noted that different accountability mechanisms are needed, including a Special Tribunal, the International Criminal Court, and national criminal proceedings that will complement each other. Then Kostin again focused on creating a Special International Tribunal, apparently specifically for our case of Russian aggression. During the Paris “Night of Law” forum Kostin called on the international community to join Ukraine’s legal fight against the aggressor.
Undoubtedly, all this is very important, but will someone finally start properly collecting the evidentiary base? I remind you: 418 children have already died during the Russian aggression, and more than 1200 little Ukrainians have been affected in total. Bucha, Irpin, Makariv, Izium… And there is still no full documentation of war crimes with corresponding public messaging. So it is difficult to understand whether Kostin is trying to correct the situation that developed under Venediktova’s leadership of the OPG. There are two possibilities — either the prosecutor general is lying low and work on correcting mistakes is indeed underway, or he continues Iryna Valentynivna’s policy of noninterference. It is interesting how often these questions are pondered at the Bankova.
Moreover, regarding the role of international courts in history, it is worth recalling that the chief prosecutor at the International Tribunal in the trial of war criminal and former president of Serbia Slobodan Milošević, Geoffrey Nice, noted that a tribunal to convict war criminals in the Russo-Ukrainian war should be created in Ukraine. He does not understand why Ukrainians want the tribunal to be run by foreigners.
Prosecutor General Kostin. Conclusions
Undoubtedly, too little time has passed to reach conclusions about the work of Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin. But all the nuances listed above, especially regarding the OPG’s activities in collecting evidence of war crimes, are personal risks for Zelenskyy. Because it is the president who personifies the struggle against Putin and his Russian forces, as well as the crimes those scoundrels commit. One can rant for a long time about Russian atrocities and appeal to our “political” teachers from Washington, London or Brussels in video addresses, but at the same time one must do the homework. And also “not forget the diary at home” when international actors point out quite obvious things and failures.
Kostin himself must pay attention not only to war crimes and the fight against corruption — thank God, for now not getting entangled with SAPO. There are other problems inside the institution – the dependence of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors, the All-Ukrainian Conference of Prosecutors, and the Council of Prosecutors. The prosecutor general should focus on fulfilling his constitutional role — coordinating, without replacing investigative bodies.
The final (but certainly not least important) task should be breaking the chains with which the political leadership of the state constantly binds the leadership of the OPG. After all, the prosecution has long become part of the judicial branch, and this division and the principle of independence are enshrined both in the Constitution of Ukraine and in the relevant law.
Andriy Kostin should not be a clone of Iryna Venediktova, if only because he, unlike his predecessor, has no political ambitions. But the question is different: what ambitions do those who put him in that chair have? Will the prosecutor general be able and willing to truly distance himself from the Bankova? We are watching.
Source: skelet.info
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