Another Russian Citizen Exposed Who Was Appointed to Run a Strategic Facility on the Eve of the Invaders' Invasion

Another Russian citizen exposed who was appointed to run a strategic facility on the eve of the invaders' invasion

16 February 2022, a week before the start of the full-scale invasion, a Russian citizen became the director of a strategic facility that was almost immediately taken by the occupiers. And now that same Russian citizen has somehow ended up in Kyiv and works at Energoatom.

Russian invaders kidnapped the general director of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, Ihor Murashov — this was stated on 1 October 2022 by the president of SE Energoatom, Petro Kotin. At that time Murashov had already been working for 7 months in occupied Enerhodar. According to Murashov, after he refused to cooperate with the Russians they held him captive for several days and “deported” him to Zaporizhzhia. He now lives and works in Kyiv — he holds the position of chief engineer of the ZNPP. Hromadske journalists were able to establish that in 2014, after the Russian occupation of Crimea, Ihor Murashov received a Russian passport. Details are in the investigation.

Two eagles for father and son

Ihor Murashov was born in the Russian city of Borovsk, about 100 km from Moscow. He received his higher education at the Obninsk Institute for Nuclear Power Engineering in Russia. He studied there together with the current director of the ZNPP, Dmytro Verbytskyi. After Obninsk, Murashov studied at the Sevastopol Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry.

Since 1998 he worked in various positions at the Zaporizhzhia NPP and often traveled to Crimea. After the Russians occupied the peninsula, he continued to go there.

According to hromadske journalists’ sources who have access to data on crossings of the administrative boundary between mainland Ukraine and occupied Crimea, in 2014 Ihor Murashov visited the occupied peninsula at least three times.

On one of those trips he became a Russian citizen. Hromadske obtained an extract from the automated system “Rospassport” from two sources. According to it, on 23 September 2014 Ihor Murashov received a passport with the double-headed eagle in occupied Sevastopol.

Ihor Murashov’s application for obtaining a Russian Federation passport

Murashov’s application for a Russian passport remains in the “Rospassport” system. It also states the reason for acquiring citizenship. As the extract says, the passport was issued on the basis of article 5 of the treaty incompatible with international law “between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea.” Under that article Russia recognized citizens of Ukraine and stateless persons who permanently resided on the peninsula at the time of annexation as its citizens.

Extract from the automated system “Rospassport”

The “Rospassport” system shows that Murashov’s passport is still “valid,” although the man should have replaced the document in 2021 when he turned 45. Because Murashov did not do this, in the Russian Interior Ministry database this passport is already displayed as “invalid.”

“I have seen such errors before, when in ‘Rospassport’ the invalidity of a passport does not show. That does not indicate that the document is forged,” says Bellingcat investigative journalist Christo Grozev.

Grozev explains that in the “Rospassport” system the status of a document can be changed to “invalid” manually. For example, when a person physically comes to replace their passport with a new one.

However, the invalidity of a Russian passport does not mean loss of Russian citizenship. Untimely replacement of a passport in Russia is punishable only by a fine.

“You can let a passport expire, lose it, burn it. That does not affect citizenship in any way,” says Russian lawyer Ilya Novikov.

24 September 2014 — the day after Ihor Murashov was issued the passport — in the same branch of the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation in Sevastopol his father Valerii, a native of Ivano-Frankivsk (now deceased — ed.), also received a Russian passport.

According to the document, the father, like his son, received a Russian passport for the first time. For the same reason — under the treaty that is an attempt to legalize the occupation of Crimea.

Valerii Murashov’s application for obtaining a Russian Federation passport

However, unlike his son, a month later Valerii Murashov also obtained an international passport. This time in Moscow.

Valerii Murashov received a Russian international passport

According to hromadske’s sources, on 24 September — the day his father received the Russian passport — Ihor Murashov left Crimea. As he later told us, his family left with him.

Energoatom office in Kyiv. Energoatom / Facebook

Murashov’s version — a passport for one and a half thousand dollars

Hromadske journalists met Ihor Murashov in Kyiv near the Energoatom office, where he currently works, to hear the ZNPP chief engineer’s explanation about his Russian passport.

They showed him the documents mentioned above.

— Here is your signature on the document regarding obtaining Russian citizenship.

— Similar. Similar to mine, I agree.

— Are you familiar with this document?

— No.

— Why did you travel to Crimea at that time?

— My father and mother had an apartment at the address indicated here. (Murashov claims that neither he nor his parents permanently lived there — ed.). It was purchased in 2009. In 2014 I took them there to arrange utilities.

Murashov says he knew that during the trip to Crimea in September 2014 his father decided to apply for Russian citizenship. According to Murashov, his father held pro-Russian views and even wanted to give a bribe to get Russian passports for the whole family. But he only arranged them for himself and his son. Although Ihor Murashov himself, he says, asked him not to do it.

— Do you think your father arranged these documents?

— I suppose so. The idea occurred, but now I see there is some evidence (...) I don't know anything about it. There was a murky story with a lawyer named Melikyan. Maybe my father did it without me.

— How could your father have arranged such a document without you?

— One and a half thousand dollars.

— He paid that much for the documents?

— I don't know how much he paid. I say there was a conversation. I was categorically against it.

— Then how did he obtain the signature?

— I wouldn't say that's my signature.

Comparison of the signature from the ZNPP inspection report dated 13 November 2020 with the signature from Ihor Murashov’s Russian passport application

— Why did your father get a Russian passport?

— He held “that” position. We argued a lot. On some trips he would shout and get out of the car. I don't want to remember it. My wife and I had a clear pro-Ukrainian position.

Murashov says his father worked at the Russian company Atomtekhenergo, where he held the position of head of the representative office at the Belarusian NPP. On 5 February 2023 Ukraine imposed sanctions on that company.

Bellingcat journalist Christo Grozev, who has worked with such documents for many years, investigated the extract from the “Rospassport” system about Murashov’s acquisition of Russian citizenship and concluded: “The document definitely exists. And that is a fact. It is entered in the ‘Rospassport’ system.”

Hromadske journalists also asked Grozev whether Murashov’s father could have independently obtained a Russian passport for him without the son’s presence.

The journalist considers the ZNPP chief engineer’s version unlikely: “I checked whether it is possible to issue a passport without the person’s presence, but no one takes that on. Theoretically he could find such a corrupt official, but there is biometrics, so I don't understand how it could be done that way.”

Murashov’s return to Ukraine

Murashov became acting general director of the Zaporizhzhia NPP a week before the full-scale invasion — 16 February 2022. After the Russians kidnapped him in the fall of 2022 and then released him, he resigned from that position.

He now works as chief engineer at the Zaporizhzhia NPP. This position is not as public as the leadership role Murashov previously held. But it still provides access to many documents and participation in meetings where Ukraine’s energy security is discussed.

Meeting of the Council of Chief Engineers of SE NAEC Energoatom in February 2023, where Ihor Murashov is present. Energoatom

Hromadske journalists sent the SBU a request asking whether the service assessed the actions of ZNPP leadership on the eve of and during the first months of the full-scale invasion, and whether any actions by Ihor Murashov could have put the security situation at the ZNPP at risk.

They were told that following the capture of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant by the Russian army and its improper maintenance and operation during the temporary occupation, the Security Service of Ukraine opened a number of criminal proceedings. Pretrial investigation is being carried out under Art. 111 (state treason) and Art. 438 (violations of the laws and customs of war) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

“Within these proceedings the SBU is investigating all the circumstances of the capture of this critical infrastructure facility, documenting criminal actions of the leadership and employees of the ZNPP who voluntarily take positions in the fake Russian operating organization and help the aggressor state. Detailed information from the pretrial investigation is part of the secrecy of the investigation and can be disclosed only with written permission of the investigator or prosecutor and to the extent they deem possible. At present there is no such permission,” the SBU press service replied.

It should be noted that the hromadske editorial team does not have evidence of Ihor Murashov’s cooperation with the Russians. However, the presence of Russian citizenship in one of the key employees of a state strategic enterprise raises concern. Therefore hromadske journalists handed over to the SBU all the evidence that Murashov and his father received Russian passports.

The press service told hromadske journalists: “The information you provided has been taken into account in operational-service activities.”