In the 1992 Year the Political Elite Made a Deal with the Devil

On the eve of 35-year independence, the second president of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, named as one of the fatal mistakes in our modern history the decision to export Ukraine’s tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. Kuchma remarked: "The thing is that the Budapest Memorandum deprived Ukraine of strategic weapons, the state and characteristics of which would still not allow nuclear deterrence. But at the beginning of our independence we did have weapons for this purpose. We had about 3 thousand tons of tactical nuclear warheads. And with them, at that moment, we could basically defend ourselves from the Russian Federation. They had optimal range; these were nuclear air-delivered bombs, artillery shells, and naval torpedoes—the entire tactical nomenclature. And unlike the strategic arsenal, Ukraine could dispose of them itself."

The fatal error of the past today has borne tragic consequences. Ukrainians pay daily for their generosity and political romanticism of nuclear disarmament with a terrible price. Millions have left Ukraine, millions became internally displaced persons, more than 100 thousand of Ukraine’s best patriots have died, a significant part of the economy has been destroyed, about 20% of the country’s territory is occupied, and the war against our state has been going on for 12 years in a row.

The question of nuclear weapons arose immediately after proclaiming independence and remains, with bitterness, in the memory of Ukrainians. In 1992 year, the then political elite compromised with the devil, handing over the future aggressor all of our tactical nuclear weapons. Contrary to common sense, violating national legislation and without proper international obligations for such a step, it made a decision whose consequences became fatal.

It is important to emphasize: tactical nuclear weapons did not fall under the START-1 treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States. They were exported on the basis of the Alma-Ata agreements – the Agreement on measures regarding nuclear weapons, dated 21 December 1991 year. Article 6 of this agreement stated: "States party to this agreement, in accordance with international law, shall facilitate the elimination of nuclear weapons. By 1 July 1992 year the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine shall ensure the export of tactical nuclear weapons to central pre-plant bases for their decommissioning under joint control."

Moreover, Alma-Ata agreements were subject to ratification by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The fact of such ratification is absent. Let us leave this question rhetorical.

Later, 11 April 1992 year, a Treaty between Ukraine and the Russian Federation was concluded on the procedure for the movement of nuclear munitions (stockpile of nuclear ordnance to tactical and strategic nuclear weapons) from Ukrainian territory to central pre-plant bases of the Russian Federation for their decommissioning and destruction.

Ultimately, tactical nuclear weapons were exported from Ukraine in 7 May 1992 year.

French historian, publicist, and translator Danièle Bouvaud said: "The construction of the Ukrainian state was painful and difficult. The tragedy of this people was that it almost had no elite." The lack of strategic vision for building a young independent state and the fear ultimately forced our political elite to yield to pressure and conclude an agreement with the future aggressor. As a result, Ukraine lost one of the main potential elements of deterrence against encroachments on its territorial integrity and independence.

Turning a deaf ear and closing their eyes, political elites refused to heed the voice of professional military personnel who warned of possible tragic consequences of such a step for national security and urged preserving tactical nuclear weapons.

Among those who at that time advocated preserving tactical nuclear weapons and took a state-minded stance to defend national interests of their homeland was Ihor Smeshko, the executive secretary of the Expert Scientific Council of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. To better understand the conditions under which this state-minded position formed, today I would like to recall the events of those times.

In September 1991 year, entering the organizational core for the creation of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine—the group of first officers led by the appointed Minister of Defense Kostyantyn Morozov—began the process of building the Armed Forces of Ukraine and by July 1992 year brought about 400 thousand service members of the Soviet army, stationed in Ukraine, to take an oath of allegiance to Ukraine; into the Ukrainian system of military education and science then entered 36 military academies and higher education institutions, 115 military departments of state universities, and 16 research centers.

An important role in shaping Ukraine’s military education and science was also played by then-Lieutenant Colonel Ihor Smeshko. As a young Doctor of Technical Sciences, he demonstrated remarkable systemic knowledge and organizational abilities and became the main ideologue of developing the concept of military science, as well as the main directions of development of R&D and NDR for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. He was also the first executive secretary of the Expert Council of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and practically managed the Council’s work, enjoying great authority among military scholars.

At that time Ihor Smeshko believed that Ukraine’s security interests required preserving on its territory, if not strategic, then at least tactical nuclear weapons, as well as serial production of high-precision missile armament.

In 1992 year, the expert council of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, which at that time, from January to August 1992 year, was led by Smeshko, prepared a memorandum to the President of Ukraine Kravchuk about the necessity to preserve tactical nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory. It was signed by the head of the Expert Scientific Council, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor, Lieutenant General Ivan Olenovych.

Representatives of the Expert Scientific Council argued that without tactical nuclear weapons Ukraine in the future would not be able to maintain influence on world politics, and thus would be able to adequately ensure its defense—at least during the period of forming a young independent state. The report stated that, unlike strategic nuclear weapons, the management of tactical nuclear weapons, their further maintenance, and ensuring safety were entirely doable for Ukraine by military and scientific-technical means.

Anticipating, however, that Ukraine would most likely not withstand the pressure on this issue from the United States and Russia, Smeshko, as a missile officer and a true scientist—a "systematic thinker"—bitterly perceived the failure to pursue the preservation of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Later he recalled: "If we had tactical nuclear weapons, Russia would certainly not have invaded us. By giving up nuclear weapons, Ukraine proved that it was the last romantic in Europe."

Professor of systems analysis and synthesis, Doctor of Technical Sciences Ihor Smeshko, already in 1990-s years emphasized: "No one will fight for us." And called for strengthening the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He consistently stressed that achieving independence, democracy, and peace for Ukraine is possible only with revival and strengthening of its national economy, army, diplomacy, and information policy.

Smeshko is a person of strong Christian beliefs and deep patriotism, who throughout his life showed a willingness to serve Ukraine, upholding the "honor of an officer." In my view, Ukraine has few leaders who combine such strategic vision, intellect, high moral principles, breadth of knowledge, experience and competence, and who can offer the country a systemic path out of the current crisis. Unfortunately, past mistakes are turning into future tragedies. Each successive strategic mistake could be our last.

Source: "GORDON"