Who after Macron? The most worrisome election of 2027 year

The presidential election in France in the spring of 2027 will be of fundamental importance for Ukrainian interests. Emmanuel Macron’s second term is gradually coming to an end and he will not be able to run for a new term.

Certainly, from time to time his actions produced an effect of “strategic uncertainty” not only in the Kremlin but also in Kyiv, and political declarations sometimes exceeded practical actions. However, overall the French leader held a consistent position on political and military aid to Ukraine, proposed a number of constructive diplomatic initiatives — such as the “coalition of the determined” — and helped facilitate contacts with Donald Trump, until he himself was caught up in the turbulence of American administration diplomacy. In addition, personal communication at the presidential level took place on a positive note and France successfully performs the role of a strategic partner.

Second, despite a difficult domestic political and economic situation, France remains a driving force in the policy of supporting Ukraine alongside Germany and Britain. For Ukraine, a dangerous scenario would be losing allied relations with even one part of this strategic geopolitical triangle.

Third, for now opinion polls do not offer much optimism, and the frontrunner with the best chance of victory is the leader of the National Rally, Marine Le Pen, who did not show particularly pro‑Ukrainian intentions in her previous declarations. Considering that the president holds the key position in the French power hierarchy, the situation could become even more uncertain with unpredictable consequences.

However, one thing at a time.

So far the best chances of winning belong to the leader of the National Rally, Marine Le Pen

photo: Reuters

Polls against Ukraine. Is there a risk that a pro‑Ukraine candidate won’t make the second round?

A large international company, Toluna Harris Interactive, carried out a major sociological study for RTL and M6 and published several scenarios for the development of the presidential campaign as of August. The results reveal a troubling trend.

Marine Le Pen’s lead is discussed by experts immediately after she secured the ability to participate in the election: forecasts that her ratings will be at the level of 35% of the vote do not provoke particular surprise, although they do trigger certain anxiety.

The key risk in the first round of the presidential election is the real chance for Jean‑Luc Mélenchon to take second place. The leader of La France Insoumise consistently voices radical populist positions of a leftist orientation. Although he has publicly condemned the Russian military invasion of Ukraine, he has repeatedly resorted to statements like “the collective West led by the USA provoked Russian paranoia.”

Jean‑Luc Mélenchon has not demonstrated consistent support for military‑technical assistance to Ukraine. In his declarations one can see different stages in the evolution of his political awareness: from rejecting the supply of military equipment to acknowledging Ukraine’s right to defend itself, but with “red lines” — so as not to drag France into the war.

The politician condemned a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine and actively played to an electorate that does not support a particularly active French stance in deterring the Russian threat.

Jean‑Luc Mélenchon — Marine Le Pen’s main rival

photo: Reuters

Under various sociological models Jean‑Luc Mélenchon claims 17% of the vote, making him the main contender to advance to the second round alongside Marine Le Pen.

With all due respect to both, such a scenario, to put it mildly, does not inspire particular optimism in Ukraine. Two candidates with a rather ambiguous reputation and stance regarding the war and visions for the future of Europe as a whole. Working with either would require titanic efforts and the result would not be guaranteed. Therefore, a second‑round contest between candidates who are too restrained on supporting Ukraine is a dangerous option.

Relative positive: the possibility of avoiding that risk remains.

Who is running for the presidency from the pro‑Ukraine camp?

Currently there are three active contenders for the French presidency whose campaigns, de facto, promise to become a confrontation with the radical forces led by Marine Le Pen.

First, former prime minister of France, leader of the Horizons party, mayor of Le Havre Édouard Philippe.

He is called the main opponent who will be able to appeal to the political center, to supporters of the incumbent president of France, and to unite voters who voted for representatives of the left‑wing camp in the last parliamentary elections.

Édouard Philippe, former head of the French government and mayor of Le Havre — the key opponent of the right‑wing candidates

photo: Reuters

Philippe is being built a profile as a statesman and technocrat who has experience leading a government, a successful track record in local government, and a high level of support from the business community.

Second, Member of the European Parliament, leader of the left‑center political force Place Publique, Raphaël Glucksmann. He is a rather prominent political figure and stands out as the most pro‑Ukraine candidate among all contenders. The politician gives a clear understanding that Ukraine is a bulwark and the first line of defense of Europe, so setting “red lines” regarding support for Ukrainian needs and pressure on the Russian aggressor is not Glucksmann’s approach.

Raphaël Glucksmann, MEP and leader of Place Publique — the most pro‑Ukraine of the potential candidates

photo: facebook.com/raphaelglucksmann

One of the key practical problems for the politician is that he enjoys support among the intellectual elites, but it will be difficult for him to win over broad masses of people of various occupations and views.

Third, general secretary of the Renaissance party, former prime minister Gabriel Attal, who, de jure, should act as Emmanuel Macron’s potential successor, but de facto there was a rather complex history of relations between the two politicians accompanied by certain conflicts.

Gabriel Attal demonstrates a clear and consistent position on Ukraine. At the same time, lately he has been trying to court a hypothetical center‑right electorate, seeing in himself the ability to compete for that sociological segment with Marine Le Pen.

Former prime minister Gabriel Attal (left) should act as Macron’s successor, but...

photo: Reuters

Gabriel Attal’s interview with the French publication Le Journal du Dimanche (JDD) provoked a rather ambiguous reaction.

This media resource openly expresses anti‑Ukrainian views and freely provides a platform to experts and journalists commonly labeled as “agents of Russian influence.” It is worth noting that the notorious Yuliia Mendel recently gave an interview to this media outlet, spreading typical propaganda tropes and pro‑Russian conspiracy narratives.

It is possible that Gabriel Attal will try to “sit on two political chairs”: simultaneously maintaining a pro‑Ukraine course while trying to win back the right‑wing conservative electorate in order to somehow increase his chances.

JDD, together with other well‑known online and television resources, is part of Vincent Bolloré’s media empire — a large businessman with conservative views who has often been noted for ideological sympathies with Marine Le Pen. Given the huge audience controlled by the resources of the local French oligarch, securing his platform is an important component of political success. Gabriel Attal is likely thinking in these terms.

Among these three politicians Édouard Philippe has the greatest chance to advance to the second round; he is either level with Jean‑Luc Mélenchon or slightly behind him by 1–2% (depending on campaign variations).

Raphaël Glucksmann and Gabriel Attal lag behind and by various estimates can hope for a result in the range of 10%. However, their participation may prove decisive for the first round.

Why? To simplify understanding: supporters of Raphaël Glucksmann or Gabriel Attal are more likely to vote for Édouard Philippe than for Marine Le Pen or Jean‑Luc Mélenchon.

This feature will be important not only at the end of the campaign but has the potential to influence the early stages as well. If current polling configurations hold, the participation of both risks preventing Édouard Philippe from advancing to the second round and overtaking Jean‑Luc Mélenchon.

Therefore, Raphaël Glucksmann’s and Gabriel Attal’s camps will face a difficult choice: either focus solely on their own ambitions or “think about France’s future” and prevent a second round featuring a radical right and a radical left contender.

However, in that case one of them will have to withdraw from the campaign.

Remembering how unexpectedly and abruptly Emmanuel Macron earlier burst onto the political Olympus, one cannot rule out the scenario of a new contender emerging who will seize the lead in the fight against Marine Le Pen. For now, we can only wait for such sensational moves.

Second round — consolidation against the right

If one of the contenders does manage to bypass Jean‑Luc Mélenchon and compete with Marine Le Pen in the final, the situation will look quite difficult. Although there would still be chances if the scenario “anyone but the right‑wing politician” is successfully realized.

A similar model worked in the snap parliamentary elections in 2024 year, when the National Rally did not achieve as convincing a victory as it had hoped for.

There are options for a similar political maneuver now.

First, if the model is based on Édouard Philippe reaching the second round, he has significant potential to mobilize votes — primarily those who will support him only to prevent Marine Le Pen from winning.

Second, it would be strange if radical left voters of Jean‑Luc Mélenchon suddenly went to vote for Marine Le Pen. More likely, most of them would simply ignore the next round.

Third, Marine Le Pen would have to fight for conditional voters of Emmanuel Macron, representatives of the moderate center and center‑right, and capture the electorate disappointed with the government and looking for an acceptable alternative. Otherwise, her potential to mobilize additional votes in the second round would look limited.

What will the next French president’s policy toward Ukraine look like?

If Édouard Philippe’s position seems more predictable and close to Emmanuel Macron’s course, Marine Le Pen gives more cause for reflection or concern — especially given that she is the favorite.

For objectivity — Marine Le Pen is long since not the pro‑Russian politician who did not condemn the occupation of the Crimean peninsula and showed open loyalty to developing Franco‑Russian relations.

Ambitions to become a politician of national scale have pushed her to act moderately and not limit herself to a pro‑Russian or marginal electoral field. This is a relative positive and opens a certain “window of opportunity” for Ukraine in the future.

As of now Le Pen’s position as a candidate is quite restrained, and at times destructive if evaluated exclusively through the prism of Ukrainian interests.

Yes, she condemns the Russian invasion, but she opposes unconditional increases in military aid to Ukraine under the pretext of countering escalation. She rules out sending French peacekeepers to Ukrainian territory, which calls into question her real intentions to continue the “coalition of the determined” initiative.

Although the topic of peacekeepers is fairly abstract anyway, in this case her political positioning is revealing: support for Ukraine is admitted, but within clear limits and “red lines.” The politician advocates negotiations, seeing no preconditions for Russia’s strategic defeat. Such a restrained approach is not what Ukraine would like to hear amid a continued war for survival and terrorist shelling of the population.

But would Marine Le Pen fully stick to such positions once confronted with objective reality and becoming president? Once she gains full access to information and realizes the real actions and approaches of the Russian side, as well as the full scope of threats and the Kremlin’s imperial ambitions, which are not geographically limited to Ukraine and threaten NATO partners?

There are too many conditional factors to form a coherent forecast.

Le Pen’s further vision regarding policy at the EU and NATO levels is also interesting. Currently the National Rally is part of a right‑wing group in the European Parliament called Patriots for Europe, which includes parties such as Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz, Andrej Babiš’s ANO, Matteo Salvini’s League and Krzysztof Bosak’s Confederation.

The latter even carried out an important initiative in June by organizing a visit to Poland of Marine Le Pen’s ally Jordan Bardella (who at the time was still considered a potential presidential candidate but now is running for the prime minister’s post). Then Jordan Bardella demonstrated ideological unity with the Confederation on migration issues and held a personal meeting with the president of Poland, Karol Nawrocki. Poland’s right‑wing camp does not hide hopes for Marine Le Pen’s victory, which would provide a positive backdrop for their parliamentary campaign in the autumn of 2027.

At the same time, Ukraine currently lacks overt ties with Marine Le Pen or her team, so the future new Ukrainian ambassador to Paris will face the difficult task of establishing pragmatic communication.

Such contacts should be developed at the political level already now and, with the right approach, this would not look like “disrespect” toward Emmanuel Macron or an attempt to “interfere in someone’s election campaign.” It should be noted that the three potential candidates from the conditional pro‑Ukraine camp have already visited Ukraine.

A great option would also be to organize a visit by Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella as the presidential and prime ministerial candidates respectively.

Without forming an effective strategy regarding Ukraine it is impossible to carry out a foreign policy course for any country that aspires to leadership in Europe. A hypothetical victory of Marine Le Pen would not be an exception to this axiom.

For example, for creative thought: given that the National Rally is a conservative political force with nationalist values, an invitation to Jordan Bardella from someone like Andriy Biletsky or another military‑political figure of conservative views would be a logical political step.

As for Marine Le Pen herself, inviting her as a candidate for the French presidency (on the same level as other campaign participants) is also a realistic option. It would be advisable, however, to choose an appropriate “initiator.” For example, if Iryna Vereshchuk remains interested in positioning herself as a conservative politician, she could make such a request herself or organize a collective appeal from Ukrainian women who heroically resist Russian aggression.

Ignoring such proposals would be the wrong decision for the French side, and a visit would be an important step toward an objective understanding of what is happening in Ukraine.

In summary, there is not much time left until the presidential election in France and Ukraine should prepare for all possible scenarios.

A potential victory for Marine Le Pen would allow her to immediately call for the dissolution of parliament with the aim of concentrating all power in her own hands.

A victory by a candidate like Édouard Philippe would help keep France’s foreign policy course as close as possible to the current official Paris line, but would not eliminate the need to resolve the domestic political crisis that continues to this day.

Given all the unpredictability of French politics, one should not rule out that President Emmanuel Macron might still have time to call another snap parliamentary election before the presidential campaign. The law no longer restricts him in this.

In any case, Ukrainian diplomacy and politicians must not only observe but act so as not to lose the strategic alliance with France.

PhD in Political Science, Director of the Council of Eastern Europe Anton Naichuk