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Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
Ukrainian businesses are beginning to pay out of pocket to protect factories, warehouses, and critical infrastructure from Russian drones and missiles. By mid‑July 2026, 51 companies had been approved to participate in the private air-defense program. However, only groups from four enterprises reached combat duty.
Protecting a significant facility can cost from 20 million UAH. Depending on the configuration, a full system for a large industrial site is estimated at between $250 thousand and $500 thousand and up. Potentially this is a billion‑UAH market, although its actual turnover, number of clients, and contract amounts remain closed.
Delo.ua investigated who is already working in private air defense, what exactly businesses are buying, how the state controls weapons use, and whether this model will persist after the war.
More than 50 companies received clearance, but only a few carried out combat duty
Why private air defense is not a private army
How much it costs to protect an enterprise
What awaits the market
More than 50 companies received clearance, but only a few carried out combat duty
As of 16 July, according to the Ministry of Defense, 62 enterprises submitted applications to participate in the experiment, 51 received special status, but only groups from four companies carried out combat duty. The ministry reported over 50 destroyed Shahed strike drones and Zala reconnaissance drones.
An "authorized enterprise" is a company that the Ministry of Defense has allowed to form its own air‑defense group and operate as part of the state air‑defense system. That status can be given to a specialized operator selling services to others, or to a factory, energy company, or infrastructure operator that protects its own facility.
So 51 authorized enterprise does not mean either 51 a service provider, or the same number of paying clients. There is no single open registry of active groups, their customers, contracts, and results.
"About 20 companies" involved in this direction, Igor Fedirko — executive director of the Ukrainian Arms Council — estimated in an exclusive comment to Delo.ua. But that number includes not only operators but also manufacturers of drones, radars, and electronic warfare equipment, suppliers of hardware, and system integrators. Far fewer companies can build turnkey protection and provide round‑the‑clock duty.
Among operators, Carmine Sky and Gvardiia have the most independent confirmation. Reuters described how Carmine Sky combines interceptor drones with remote turrets fitted with M2 Browning machine guns. Gvardiia forms mobile teams and trains pilots — training an operator from scratch takes about three weeks.
Carmine Sky operates through LLC "Karmin Sky." According to the Unified State Register, 55% of the company belongs to director Yehor Korniienko, and another 45% to Ihor Srebrodolskyi. The charter capital is 6,98 million UAH. In 2025 the company declared 3,34 million UAH in revenue and 1,52 million UAH in net profit. However, the company was registered only in September 2025, so these figures do not yet reflect earnings from private air defense.
The Gvardiia brand is operated by LLC "Security Service 'Gvardiia'." Register data indicate Vladyslav Halchevskyi owns 90% and is the ultimate beneficiary, and another 10% belongs to director Valerii Kocherha. The charter capital is 5 thousand UAH, and income for 2025 year is not listed in the reports. The company moved into combat operations in 2026.
SHERIFF, Triarius, and "General Chereshnia" have also announced entry to the market. SHERIFF offers comprehensive protection — from acoustic detection and EW to interceptors and turrets — but does not disclose which legal entity of the holding received approval. Triarius said it had received requests from private companies and state critical‑infrastructure operators but did not name clients or contract amounts.
The brand "General Chereshnia" is associated with LLC "Center for Unmanned Systems Research," owned by Yaroslav Hryshyn. The company's charter capital is 53,42 million UAH. In 2024 it recorded 657,96 million UAH in revenue and 224,36 million UAH in net profit. But those figures cover all drone production, mostly for the Defense Forces, not only private air defense.
Operators conceal the number of clients for security reasons. Forbes Ukraine, in its own investigation, mentioned two private contracts of Carmine Sky but without names or values. BBC News Ukraine included "Kyivvodokanal" among the facilities Gvardiia protected. Other publicly named enterprises mostly appear as potential clients.
Why private air defense is not a private army
The term "private air defense" is conditional. The money, equipment, and personnel may be private, but not the decision to open fire. Cabinet Resolution No. 1506 allows an enterprise to form its own group, but it operates only within the general Armed Forces system. Air Command determines the patrol area, permitted means, and targets. A group may use EW, a turret, or an interceptor drone only after military orders.
Under the Ministry of Defense's algorithm, an enterprise undergoes checks, agrees the group's composition and patrol area with the Air Forces, purchases equipment, trains personnel, and integrates into a unified air‑defense control system. Operators remain civilian employees, and participation in a group does not automatically exempt them from mobilization.
The company pays salaries, training, procurement, and equipment maintenance. Purchased equipment remains its property. After changes adopted in March 2026, military units can also temporarily transfer unused state weapons and ammunition to private groups.
Economic preconditions for such a market appeared in the fall of 2022, when Russia began mass use of Shaheds. Business financed searchlights, thermal imagers, vehicles, and communications for military mobile groups, but did not have the right to create its own combat units.
The corporate segment legally appeared in November 2025. In March 2026 the Ministry of Defense confirmed, for the first time, combat interceptions of Shahed and Zala by private groups in Kharkiv region.
Demand is driven by the scale of the threat. In July Russia used over 9000 strike drones and missiles against Ukraine. Ukrainian air defense intercepted more than 5300 targets. For factories, power companies, warehouses, and logistics hubs, air protection becomes a condition for uninterrupted operation.
A private air‑defense operator sells not an individual drone or machine gun, but the whole chain: "detect — identify — pass a targeting cue — neutralize." Such counter‑UAS systems combine sensors, secure communications, software, EW means, and kinetic interceptors.
"The value of this model is that an enterprise defines a specific mission, and manufacturers then compete not on individual products but on comprehensive solutions," Fedirko explains.
Thus private air defense is an additional local layer against strike and reconnaissance drones, not a corporate analogue of Patriot.
How much it costs to protect an enterprise
Private air‑defense finances consist of initial equipment purchase, integration, continuous team maintenance, and expendable interception means. Estimates start at roughly 20 million UAH.
"Depending on the configuration, a protection system for a large industrial site can cost from $250 thousand to $500 thousand and up. To that you must add costs for operators, training, technical maintenance, and new interceptors," Fedirko notes.
This is not a single tariff. Hryvnia and dollar benchmarks apply to different configurations and partially overlap. Price depends on the object's area, terrain, attack routes, detection range, number of posts, and type of effectors.
If each of the 51 authorized enterprises bought at least one kit at 20 million UAH at its own expense, the total would be 1,02 billion UAH. But this is only an illustrative calculation, not actual turnover: combat groups are present at only some enterprises, and part of the equipment may be provided by the state.
The cheapest means of physically destroying a target remain interceptor drones. Ukrainian systems of this class cost from $1000 to $2000, while a Shahed costs about $30 thousand. Thus, an interceptor is 15–30 times cheaper than the target.
However, that does not mean a guaranteed interception costs proportionally less. Full cost includes sensors, communications, duty shifts, repairs, and failed launches. The National Security and Defense Council estimates the average success rate of Ukrainian interceptor missions at over 60%, but does not disclose the detailed calculation method.
For comparison, in 2025 state contracts for Ukrainian interceptor drones exceeded 3 billion UAH. There is no comparable metric for the private segment.
Main clients could be industrial, energy, agricultural, and logistics companies for whom production stoppage costs more than a protection system. For small businesses, the tens‑of‑millions‑UAH threshold is largely unaffordable. A cluster model could be a solution, where one group protects an industrial zone, port, or logistics hub serving several enterprises.
The question of liability remains unresolved. Rules must define who will compensate damage if an intercepted drone or debris falls on a residential building or neighboring enterprise: the group owner, the state, or the military command that authorized the use. Without such a mechanism, it is harder for businesses to invest in a system they finance but use under state command.
What awaits the market
In the coming year the key indicator will be not the number of permits issued but the number of groups that actually went on around‑the‑clock combat duty. The gap between more than fifty authorized enterprises and a few active operators reveals the main problems: the high cost of radars, personnel training, integration with the Air Forces, and access to military targeting.
The market will likely consolidate around several integrators with proven interception statistics. They will sell not an equipment kit but a long‑term service — threat assessment, design, installation, duty shifts, repair, training, and replenishment of interceptor stocks.
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