How EW Affects “Banderol,” Ballistics, and KABs: Interview with Contra-Drone Co‑Founder

Can Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) counter the new CRPA antennas, fiber‑optic drones, and ballistic missiles? EW tactics are changing in response to new threats – fiber‑optic drones, jet‑powered Shaheds, and an increase in channels in UAV navigation antennas. But Ukraine can even influence ballistics and KABs. Contra‑Drone co‑founder Tymofiy Yurkow told RBC‑Ukraine how these changes affect the effectiveness of Ukrainian EW and how realistic it is to suppress ballistic and aeroballistic missiles. Key points: 20‑channel CRPA antennas. Russia bought large batches of 20‑channel navigation systems for Shaheds from China – compared with the four‑module antennas used at the start of the war. Fiber‑optic drones and AI guidance. Contra‑Drone names these two main threats to vehicle‑mounted EW systems, since a fiber‑optic link cannot be suppressed by radio‑electronic means. Jet‑powered Shaheds with speeds above 400‑450 km/h. Harder to shoot down with interceptors, but EW against their navigation remains as effective as against regular drones. Ballistic missiles are harder to suppress than UAVs due to higher flight altitudes, but even a deviation of 20‑40 meters can save a target from a direct hit. Russia is increasing the number of channels in navigation antennas. Electronic warfare remains one of the key elements of protecting Ukrainian forces and infrastructure from Russian drones and missiles. At the same time, the adversary is constantly changing its means of attack: increasing the number of channels in UAV navigation antennas, using fiber‑optic drones, developing automatic guidance with artificial intelligence, and deploying jet‑powered Shaheds. One major trend recently is the gradual increase in Russian use of fiber‑optic UAVs, the interlocutor says. At the same time, the adversary is changing the frequencies drones use, adding new ones to make interception by Ukrainian EW systems more difficult. This particularly concerns the navigation systems of large UAVs, including Shaheds. Russia is increasing the number of modules in CRPA antennas for GNSS navigation. According to Contra‑Drone, the Russians have recently purchased large batches of 20‑channel systems from China. Yurkow explains that at the start of the full‑scale war such CRPA antennas did not exist. Ordinary GPS antennas were used and were suppressed by electronic noise at the corresponding frequency. The first CRPA antennas had four modules. Then eight‑channel, 12‑channel and 16‑channel systems appeared. Currently, according to our information, the Russians bought large batches of 20‑channel systems from China, Yurkow explained. This, in his assessment, directly affects how defenses around energy facilities are built. To counter such systems you need to increase the number of navigation‑jamming means. Around energy facilities you need to create a large multi‑module system to suppress navigation channels of missiles, KABs, and UAVs like Shahed in time, the interlocutor said. Another new threat Yurkow names is the use of artificial intelligence to provide midcourse guidance for FPV drones against vehicles. In that case the operator initially locks on to the target, after which the drone continues guidance automatically. The problem is that after handing guidance over to AI, EW may lose effectiveness. Yurkow emphasizes, however, that such cases are not yet common. In his view, automatic guidance systems still have significant shortcomings: the drone often loses the target, especially when the vehicle is traveling over terrain with little visual contrast. The system is not yet well developed, but we see significant changes and understand that it will continue to evolve, Yurkow says. Read also: Artificial intelligence and autopilot: how Ukrainian drones bypass enemy EW Fiber‑optic drones and automatic guidance In addition to AI, Yurkow names fiber‑optic UAVs and FPV drones with automatic midcourse guidance as the two main threats to vehicles equipped with EW. The first are fundamentally different because a fiber‑optic channel cannot be suppressed by radio‑electronic means. At the same time such drones have drawbacks. Because of the fiber‑optic link they are heavier, slower and less maneuverable. There is also a risk of the cable breaking. That is why Contra‑Drone is working on an optical detection means for such targets. According to Yurkow, this system was already presented at DNV‑1 and is currently undergoing testing. This system cannot be used on its own. It will be used only together with a vehicle EW system. In other words, EW is not going away, the Contra‑Drone co‑founder said. The optical system should be a supplement to EW, Yurkow believes. Against skilled operators who pilot a fast drone and actively maneuver, interception at very short range remains difficult. In contrast, a fiber‑optic drone in most cases moves more linearly. The same applies to UAVs that switched to automatic AI guidance. If the drone moves linearly, as is the case in most fiber‑optic examples or nearly all AI‑guided cases, the system can detect and destroy it in time, Yurkow explained. He stresses that EW does not lose its importance. Its effectiveness is especially noticeable at long distances between the UAV operator and the target. If the operator is at a distance of more than 7‑10 km, the effective radius of a vehicle EW system, according to Yurkow, can be more than 300‑400 meters, and sometimes 500‑600 meters. In such cases the drone may fall before reaching the vehicle. Photo: EW work (Contra‑Drone) For the front line this is especially important, since operators, in Yurkow’s estimate, are usually at least 4‑5 km from forward positions. At the same time Contra‑Drone and partners continue to modernize long‑range EW systems that can intercept drone control channels practically immediately after launch. Long‑range EW systems can intercept a drone’s control channels right after launch and, for 30‑40 seconds, leave it still on the enemy side, the interlocutor noted. Intercepting the video signal at long distances remains a separate direction. Yurkow reported that the company currently has figures of about 30 km for video and control interception and is working on further development of video signals that will allow video data transfer between drones. Jet‑powered Shaheds are harder to shoot down, but EW remains effective Another problem Yurkow names is jet‑powered Shaheds, whose attacks have become more frequent recently. According to him, the navigation principle of such a drone has not fundamentally changed: the inertial system and CRPA antenna remain. Therefore the difference in applying EW against a jet Shahed versus a regular Shahed is small. What becomes much more difficult is physically intercepting such a UAV with interceptor drones. The reason is the much higher speed of the jet vehicle. Yurkow estimates it at more than 400‑450 km/h and notes that most interceptors cannot operate at those speeds. He says there are currently very few successful shoot‑downs of such Shaheds. They are almost absent, and if such cases occur they are more like chance than a consistent trend. According to him, for such an interception the operator needs not to chase the target but to calculate its trajectory and make the interception. This requires high skill. A separate problem is the technical capability of the interceptors themselves. According to Yurkow, after reaching speeds of about 350 km/h and above there are difficulties with components, and batteries cannot always sustain the required operating mode. Therefore, the co‑founder of Contra‑Drone says combining interceptors with personal radars is becoming increasingly relevant. This approach should allow detecting fast targets and guiding the interceptor not to follow them but to the intersection of trajectories. The issue of intercepting a target is not to chase it but to intercept it by trajectory – this will become increasingly relevant as Shahed speeds increase, Tymofiy Yurkow explained. Contra‑Drone also manufactures personal radars for fire teams. Yurkow expects that combining them with interceptors will help change the situation with intercepting high‑speed drones. At the same time he emphasizes that suppressing Shahed navigation remains one of the most optimal solutions, especially when a large number of drones approach a city or target simultaneously: The majority of Shaheds lose the ability to reach the target precisely because of suppression, not because of successful physical shoot‑downs. Read also: Armor retreats: interview with the brigade commander of the 107 Territorial Defense brigade about how drones have changed the front Banderol, ballistics, and KABs An important question is whether EW affects the means the Russians are increasingly using to attack Ukraine: the Banderol rocket‑drone, guided aerial bombs, and ballistic missiles. According to Tymofiy Yurkow, Banderol in terms of EW countermeasures is fundamentally no different from a regular Shahed. He notes that it is a rocket‑drone, but it does not have the same speed as a jet Shahed. Banderol is also susceptible to suppression. Contra‑Drone considers ballistic, aeroballistic missiles and jet UAVs more significant problems. According to Yurkow, ballistic missiles can also be affected by EW because they initially use GNSS for target positioning. At the same time working on them is much more difficult than on UAVs because of much higher flight altitudes. A ballistic missile can acquire a target at high altitude where most EW systems no longer reach and satellite signals arrive in more favorable conditions. Still, even a deviation of 20‑40 meters from the intended course can allow avoiding a direct hit on the target. Yurkow emphasizes that Russia often launches multiple missiles at a single target, so even with dispersion one or two can still hit. With missiles that have a non‑ballistic trajectory, the situation is somewhat easier due to their lower flight altitude. If the missile is at an altitude of 2, 3, 5 or 6 km, suppression can be applied to deviate it from course. At the same time Yurkow notes that missiles are much better protected from such influences than UAVs and their CEP is usually smaller. Even a deviation of 20‑40 meters can be critical for the attack outcome. Even a deviation of 20‑40 meters, in principle, can save an object from a direct hit. Sometimes those 20‑30 meters save the object, the interlocutor explained. Another factor he names is the number of missiles. According to Yurkow, the adversary may launch five or six, and sometimes about ten missiles at a single target. Even if suppression causes some dispersion, one or two may still hit the target. There are cases when there is significant destruction around the object from strikes, but the object itself remains intact. That is the work of EW. Regarding KABs the situation, he says, is somewhat better. They have a lower altitude and a more linear trajectory that can be calculated, and EW means can be directed to the appropriate sector in time: In most cases timely reaction and timely suppression of KABs by EW prevents a direct hit on the target. However a KAB contains a large explosive mass. So even a deviation of 20‑30 meters does not always guarantee the object will not be damaged or destroyed. At the same time the range for using KABs is much less than for ballistic and aeroballistic missiles. According to Yurkow, to use KABs a Russian aircraft needs to be roughly 40‑50 km from the target. This creates a risk for it because of Ukrainian air defense, so the main targets for KABs remain frontline cities where Ukrainian forces find it harder to bring air defense assets closer. Private EW and city protection Yurkow believes EW complexes should be part of a private air defense system for large logistics and energy facilities. He compares EW to an invisible missile in an air defense complex that can affect targets without physically destroying them. This becomes especially important because of the large number of decoy targets during Russian attacks. According to Yurkow, for every hundred real Shaheds there may be 200 decoy targets used to distract Ukrainian air defense. Such decoys, he believes, do not necessarily need to be destroyed. If they have cheaper and less protected navigation systems, they can be diverted from their programmed route using EW: You need to be able to identify them, but not necessarily shoot them down. They can simply be diverted by effective EW. Even if regular air defense cannot shoot down all drones, EW can prevent them from hitting the programmed target precisely. Yurkow notes the error can range from tens to hundreds of meters depending on weather conditions. In his view, under worse weather conditions it can be 200‑300 meters, and in some cases 500‑600 meters. Under favorable conditions the error can be smaller — about 20‑40 meters. That is why, Yurkow believes, EW must be an integral part of a comprehensive air defense system. At the same time the approach to protecting large cities and frontline settlements should differ. For frontline cities he proposes using a large number of small complexes, personal detectors and EW means for every vehicle or other military unit. Separate long‑range detection and suppression means should work to cause as many drones as possible to lose the ability to complete their mission while still on the enemy side. These should be small complexes, but there should be many of them, Yurkow said. Photo: SENSE detector (Contra‑Drone) This approach also has an economic rationale. If the adversary destroys one or two inexpensive complexes with an expensive missile or KAB, the economics of such a strike remains unprofitable for them. Yurkow also proposes using a larger number of shorter‑range radars. This should complicate the enemy’s choice of weapons to destroy them, since using an expensive ballistic missile or KAB against a relatively cheap radar will not be economically justified. The economics of war must remain in our favor. Even if the enemy uses million‑dollar missiles against EW that costs tens of thousands, or against a radar that costs a hundred, two or three thousand, the economics remain in our favor, Yurkow says. For large cities, he says, a different approach is possible. Complexes there can be better concealed from reconnaissance, camouflaged and use somewhat more powerful systems. At the same time Yurkow believes there is no need to provide every Kyiv resident with a personal video‑signal detector or to install a vehicle EW on every car. Not all types of drones can reach central or western Ukrainian cities. Overall, approaches to applying EW in frontline cities and in central, southern and western Ukrainian cities differ fundamentally. Questions and answers (FAQ): – How many channels do the new navigation antennas of Russian Shaheds have? – According to Contra‑Drone, Russia bought large batches of 20‑channel CRPA systems from China – such antennas did not exist at the start of the full‑scale war. – Can a fiber‑optic drone be intercepted by EW? – No, a fiber‑optic control channel is not susceptible to radio‑electronic suppression, so Contra‑Drone is developing a separate optical detection means for such targets to complement EW. – Is EW effective against ballistic and aeroballistic missiles? – Yes, partially: missiles use GNSS for guidance, so suppression is possible, but it is harder to work on them due to flight altitude — even a deviation of 20‑40 meters can save the target. – Why are jet Shaheds hard to shoot down with interceptor drones? – Because of speeds above 400‑450 km/h, which most interceptors cannot handle; Contra‑Drone suggests combining interceptors with personal radars to intercept by trajectory.