Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
Reactive Shakheds during massive attacks on Kyiv stay as close as possible to the border with Belarus in order to catch signals from local mobile and navigation stations. This is what cybersecurity expert Konstantin Korsun explained while commenting on the unusual drone movement path previously shown on a map by presidential adviser Serhiy Flesh. The expert noted that such a trajectory hook is logically justified from the perspective of drone control features.
According to him, suppressing this communication is theoretically possible, but for Ukraine it would require placing EW (electromagnetic warfare) assets as close as possible to the enemy’s border. Korsun emphasized on air on Kyiv24 that proximity to territory controlled by the enemy provides drones with a more stable navigation and control signal.
"Of course, they stay as close as possible to the 'friendly' territory. The bend is not that large in reality. But from the point of view of control stability and signal transmission, it is absolutely justified and entirely logical," the expert explained.
According to Korsun, this is not only about cellular towers. It can also involve special military repeaters, as well as ground GLONASS stations, whose signal, Korsun says, smartphones of Ukrainians near GPS receive.
Can the enemy’s new tactic be countered?
Reflecting on whether Ukraine can counter this tactic without strikes on Belarusian territory, Korsun stressed that the option of jamming the connection exists. However, in the expert’s view, it has significant technical limitations.
"To set up our jammers, we need to place a sufficient number of such tools as close to the border as possible. The signal of EW devices is physically limited by distance, so it must be placed as close to the target as it will jam," Konstantin Korsun noted.
The expert added that Russians deliberately place their own jammers not directly on the border, but considering possible responses from Ukraine. Korsun also commented on the claim about SIM cards in drones for intercepting communication and explained that nothing fundamentally new has been invented in this area by the Russians. According to him, the real technological breakthrough for the enemy concerns not communication but the production of jet engines for the Shakhids — an industry that requires special materials and highly scientific research, whereas in Ukraine there are problems with similar jet-powered UAVs mainly due to a shortage of their own engines.
Explaining how jet drones cover hundreds of kilometers without hitting targets, as recently happened when an enemy Shakhid traveled 900 km to western regions of Ukraine, Korsun noted that at high altitude the air is thin, resistance is lower, and fuel consumption is lower, so the aircraft can fly much further.
"The higher the aircraft flies, the less fuel it uses, the farther it can fly. This is also a lesson for us. If Starlink helps us more than it does now, our drones could fly at 3–5 thousand meters, out of reach of Russian ground-based air defense," Korsun noted.
According to him, lifting to a greater altitude requires a special airframe and engine design, as well as fuel of a different composition.
Earlier, Informator reported that reactive ShakhEDS could be shot down within a few weeks — MP Maryan Zablozky (Zablotsky) reported on a working and relatively inexpensive technology to counter such drones, which was funded thanks to American donors. We also wrote that a reactive ShakhED can be heard only seconds before impact — founder of the company "First Contact" Valeriy Borovyk explained that the turbine whine of these drones leaves people far less time to reach shelter than the usual motorcycle-like hum.
Document: PDF proof of the original version of the news item "Експерт пояснив, чому реактивні Шахеди летять уздовж кордону з Білоруссю і долітають до західних областей України". It records the publication content at the moment of the first scan, the preservation date and the source: Informator.