Business, Power and Diia.City: What Is Known About the Network Around Artem Borodatyuk

When behind a pretty façade of digitalization and patriotic slogans old-fashioned schemes of reciprocal favors with law enforcement hide, the plot unfolds in the finest traditions of a new-generation Ukrainian "schematos."

Artem Borodatyuk is an example of an entrepreneur who built not just a large digital group but ended up at the intersection of business, the state, the security bloc, and information infrastructure. His story is not just success in digital business, but a complex web of connections that could have given his company additional advantages.

Fedorov and Borodatyuk

Officially they are business partners and like-minded people who for years have been building the country’s digital ecosystem. But if you dig deeper, you can trace a classic symbiosis typical of the Ukrainian techno-bureaucratic Olympus: “big business” and an “effective reformer.”

When in July 2026 the thunderous dismissal of Mykhailo Fedorov from the post of minister of defense happened (remember those clashes with the general staff and Syryskyi?), it was Borodatyuk who acted almost as the main mouthpiece of defense. His Facebook post spread in quotations: “I have no better example of a solution for the enemy than this.” You don’t abandon your own in trouble.

Borodatyuk is one of the founders and members of the Strategic Council of that union, which in fact is the main private beneficiary and partner of Fedorov’s brainchild — the tax regime "Diia.City." Business shapes the rules of the game, the Ministry of Digital Transformation (while Fedorov was there) legalized them.

Projects of FRACTAL (Netpeak) systematically helped and consulted the ministry’s digital initiatives. Marketing, promotion, analytics — what Borodatyuk is a pro at — was actively used to scale state products, including the famed “Diia” app and fundraising platforms.

Now Fedorov, despite his dismissal, is actively building an investment defense fund and attracting large private capital to it. And Borodatyuk is a person who coordinates a significant portion of large Ukrainian IT business. So their trajectories will repeatedly cross again in the field of innovative weaponry.

In short: these are not corruption “schemes” of the old-style budget-splitting kind.

This is a new, modern format of Ukrainian oligarchy or, if you prefer, a “technocratic brotherhood,” where a high-ranking state official and a top IT entrepreneur together create the rules of the game in which both are maximally comfortable.

Conscientious exemption in exchange for SMM servitude

There was a figure at the Ministry of Digital Transformation named Denys Pozdnyakov (in telecom circles he is known as an adviser on electronic communications and strategy). Officially he told the press about “Ukraine’s world leadership in internet stability.”

But behind the scenes, according to sources, his role was much broader — a kind of “mobile communicator” between Fedorov’s ministry, big IT business, and law enforcement agencies.

How does the classic scheme of protecting IT assets during a full-scale war work?

Having a lot of money and simply buying “immunity” is dangerous; you can be burned. Smart people do it elegantly: barter with intellectual capital.

The FRACTAL (Netpeak) group under Artem Borodatyuk’s leadership has hundreds of top specialists in promotion, targeting, development, and account management. And the security services — such as the Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) and the SBU’s CSO “A” — critically need professional media resources to wage information warfare, run official and anonymous Telegram channels, TikTok platforms, and bot networks.

And here, through intermediaries like the so-called “Pozdnyakovs,” a mutually beneficial puzzle is assembled:

From Borodatyuk’s side: some marketers, designers, and copywriters from Netpeak are “delegated” to the needs of the security agencies.

Specialists receive ironclad exemptions or official employment in structures like the SBU/HUR, protection from conscription commissions, and the status of “untouchable.”

They enter a sort of “digital servitude” — administrating channel networks, running targeting, and creating patriotic creatives for the security services either for free or for minimal pay.

The founder receives absolute “protection” and the loyalty of key law enforcement structures of the country. When your people run the official Telegram channel of a given directorate, the rest of your business is unlikely to face sudden raids.

While Mykhailo Fedorov sat in the chair of deputy prime minister of the Ministry of Digital Transformation, and then minister of defense, the need for such clever schemes was smaller. Diia.City provided legal instruments, and direct contact with the minister solved any delicate issues.

But after Fedorov’s loud resignation in July 2026 and the start of a large redistribution of spheres of influence, keeping all eggs in one basket became dangerous. It was necessary to diversify risks through direct work with security agencies.

This is the inside-out side of the Ukrainian IT miracle. Free SMM for security services in exchange for peaceful business.

The Netpeak business empire

When we are told about a “pure market IT business that built itself solely on contracts from the USA and Western Europe,” it’s always worth looking into the Prozorro system or state procurement databases. And what do we see there?

While digital ministers and their advisers provided a “political roof,” Netpeak LLC confidently mastered tens of millions of budget hryvnias through tenders of the largest state giants.

This “state pie” reached 65,4 million hryvnias, which Borodatyuk’s company successfully absorbed:

"Ukrposhta" — over 35 million UAH. An absolute favorite in Netpeak’s portfolio. Two hefty contracts — for 21,6 million and 13,4 million. What did they promote? Most likely a mobile app, updated postal services, or a marketplace. But that sum for the Ukrainian digital marketing market is simply astronomical.

"Ukrgasbank" — over 15,5 million UAH. The state bank also suddenly felt an acute need for Netpeak’s services. Two contracts — for 12 million and 3,5 million — for SEO optimization, contextual advertising, or SMM.

"Suspilne Broadcasting" — 8 million UAH. The state television and radio, funded from taxpayers’ pockets, also handed a solid sum to Borodatyuk’s team.

"Ukrnafta" — about 6,8 million UAH. The oil giant after nationalization also funneled money to Netpeak — contracts for 6,2 million and 545 thousand. Why does a state oil company need so much internet marketing? A rhetorical question.

What is the cynicism of the scheme?

State contracts in themselves are not a crime. But let’s look at the picture more broadly.

On one hand, Mr. Borodatyuk gives his people into a sort of “SMM servitude” to the SBU and HUR, ensuring them exemption from mobilization and gaining the loyalty of the security forces. On the other hand, his company taps into budget flows through procurements by Ukrposhta and Ukrnafta.

The result is a perfect win-win loop:

The Ministry of Digital Transformation creates conditions and coordinates.

The security services grant peace and untouchability in exchange for free work on the information front.

State companies reliably put tens of millions of hryvnias into Netpeak’s accounts for “promotion and marketing.”

And all this is dressed up in patriotism, technological breakthrough, and building a “state in a smartphone.”

Pretty? That’s an understatement. Large-scale? Absolutely.

We would like to see the certificates of completed work. We want to know the cost of every click that Ukrainians paid for with their taxes.

Donor millions: war as a marketing budget

When the full-scale invasion began, Western partners — USAID and various European funds — began allocating hundreds of millions of dollars for informational counteraction to the Russian Federation, strategic communications, and patriotic campaigns.

The money was not given directly to the state, but to “vetted NGOs and their contractors.”

And here structures in FRACTAL’s (Netpeak’s) orbit proved maximally appropriate.

With a reputation as a patriotic IT business and direct recommendations from the Ministry of Digital Transformation, they gained access to these grant donor budgets. The sums that circulated there, sources say, far exceed the 65 million hryvnias from Prozorro.

These are closed reports where millions of dollars were written off for “information-space analytics” and “targeting occupied territories.”

Telegram Ads case: Fedorov in contact with Durov?

And this is an international exclusive.

Recall: Netpeak officially became the first reseller of advertising in Telegram (Telegram Ads) in Ukraine. Commercially, this is a gold mine — since all Ukrainian businesses are now forced to go to Borodatyuk to legally buy advertising in the country’s messenger No.1.

But how did an Odesa agency bypass international giants?

Our sources confirm: heavy artillery was turned on here. Mykhailo Fedorov personally communicated with Pavel Durov regarding specifics of the Ukrainian market.

Officially the ministry always advocated for “regulation and safety” of Telegram. Unofficially, it seems, it pushed for exclusive commercial terms for “its” companies.

Borodatyuk received a monopoly, and the ministry gained a loyal tool for controlling advertising flows in the messenger.

Diia.City: an informal “gatekeeper” at the entrance

Publicly Artem Borodatyuk is a co-founder of Diia.City United, which cares about residents’ rights.

Unofficially — he became the main moderator and “filter.”

Does a large company need to quickly enter the Diia.City preferential tax space so that the tax service or SBU have no questions?

Go to a tete-a-tete with Borodatyuk or his people. He acted as an informal “arbiter” who decided who was “the right business” and who needed to wait at the door of the Ministry of Digital Transformation.

The “exemption curve” at 70%

And the most painful — exemptions from mobilization.

The status of a Diia.City resident and of a “critically important enterprise” gives the right to hide people from the army. An insider voices a shocking figure: up to 70% of exemptions in some quasi-state IT structures could be dubious.

Under the guise of “unique developers” and “system architects,” ordinary SMM specialists, lead generators, banner designers, and simply “useful people” were being exempted upon the right call.

While ordinary guys in the regions storm positions, in Odesa and Kyiv offices, certificates of untouchability were being produced through the right connections.

Connections with Russia and official statements

Officially on 9 March 2022 Netpeak Group loudly and beautifully made a public statement: “We completely stop working with clients from Russia and Belarus, and services Serpstat, Ringostat and others block accounts of users from the aggressor countries.”

The picture for the press was perfect; Artem Borodatyuk even recorded an appeal to Russian IT people.

But analysts and journalists, including from the project “StopKor,” dug into open Russian legal entity registers and found a very different, far less patriotic reality.

Behind the loud exit remained millions of rubles that flowed into the aggressor’s budget and a rebranding “with nuances.”

The Russian legal entity OOO "Netpik" after 24 February didn’t suddenly disappear. Instead of immediate closure, the company on 21 April 2022 — two months after the start of the full-scale war — was quickly renamed OOO "Consult Professional."

For what?

To remove the toxic name from Russian databases and not spoil the reputation in Ukraine.

This company continued to operate and finance the war, and it was finally liquidated only on 30 January 2023. Almost a year after the statement about a “complete exit,” the Russian clone continued to exist and transferred over 23 million rubles to the Russian budget.

Now it’s clear why Netpeak Group suddenly and very hastily carried out a large-scale rebranding and renamed itself FRACTAL?

When in the summer of 2026 journalists began massively publishing extracts from Russian tax registers with the name “Netpeak,” the brand became too toxic inside Ukraine.

It was necessary to urgently “clean the internet of the Russian trace” and change the signboard.

Where does help to the state end and conversion of access to the state system into a competitive advantage for private business begin?

Mr. Borodatyuk is a brilliant manager. He managed to convert his closeness to Mykhailo Fedorov and the country’s digitalization into an absolute commercial triumph.

Did he help the state? Yes, unquestionably. At the start of the war his teams did a lot of useful work.

But the line between “helping the homeland” and “using state institutions as a private resource” was completely erased.

This is pure capitalism on ties to power.

Borodatyuk himself, after Fedorov’s removal, hurriedly left Kyiv and is trying to erase all traces. But all the schemes have already surfaced, so without Mykhailo in power it’s unlikely anyone will help him.