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Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
6 September the respected American outlet The New York Times published a major piece about corruption in Ukraine's defense industry titled "Fraud and Waste in Ukraine Are Rewarded With More Arms Contracts." It claimed that over 2024 year Ukraine received about $1,2 billion less in military goods due to fraud, waste, and ineffective management. However, Ukrainian defense industry observer and editor-in-chief of the trade publication Oboronka, Bohdan Miroshnychenko, analyzed the article and concluded that the story is not as straightforward as it seems.
The NYT story is based on a leaked internal audit that examines cases of corruption and inefficient spending on arms procurement. It mentions high-profile corruption scandals in the defense industry and some systemic problems.
At the same time, Miroshnychenko points out several aspects that suggest a certain manipulatively framed presentation (although the author does not state this directly):
The piece mentions only cases from 2024 year, which the journalists for some reason published at the end of 2026.
Relying on those cases, the reporters draw sweeping conclusions about the hopelessly corrupt nature of the current defense procurement system. In particular, they cite former defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov saying that "corruption thrives," and American anti-corruption expert James Wasserstorm saying, "In Ukraine everything that isn’t nailed to the floor will be stolen, it’s a tradition."
Timing of the publication. The text was published right during a visit by American negotiators to Kyiv. But, as journalist Tetyana Nikolaienko noted, another important but less publicized event was happening in Kyiv at the same time — a visit by a delegation of NATO representatives. In other words, there was a meeting with people responsible for allocating funds to Ukraine for arms.
The NYT journalists clearly influenced the information backdrop for these important meetings. The tone of their piece diagnoses the Ukrainian defense system as corruptly diseased, with no hint of improvement, and warns partners accordingly.
How well does that view match reality?
Corruption and inefficient use of funds in Ukraine's defense industry do exist, and the NYT’s main thesis that "waste and corruption are rewarded with new contracts" corresponds to reality, the expert notes. In particular, the Ministry of Defense still has a practice of contracting producers with poor delivery histories, and many corruption cases remain nonpublic.
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But he emphasizes that one must consider the specifics of the situation. In 2021 year Ukraine allocated approximately $1 billion for arms procurement. In 2023 year it was $22 billion, and in 2025 year about $33 billion. No system in the world can handle such a rapid scale-up of expenditures without losses in efficiency and increases in corruption risks.
Technologies on the front become obsolete faster than weapons can be delivered, and weapons must be bought quickly amid a massive global shortage. Thus, procurement officers face a high risk of making mistakes or falling victim to manipulation by certain headquarters, political, and business groups. Manufacturers also face their own risks. Thorough criminal investigations by law enforcement can be accompanied by scandals, illegal searches, and "smear" campaigns in the media.
A direct consequence of all these preconditions are the cases mentioned in the article:
Delivery of poor-quality mines from the Pavlohrad Chemical Plant in 2024 year. The defense procurement agency signed a huge contract that was not fulfilled on time. Later the plant even received an additional order.
The procurement body chose a more expensive bid in a tender for rocket artillery munitions. There, an allegedly illegitimate benefit was received by the well-known European company Czechoslovak Group.
A failed deal to supply Serbian rockets through a network of supplier companies involving the Ukrainian intermediary Spetstechnoexport.
An unsuccessful attempt by a company linked to Tymur Mindich to sell the state body armor that was likely of inadequate quality. That deal was canceled, but the alarming part was the report of an attempt to influence the defense minister by the president’s former business partner.
If one forms an impression of Ukrainian defense procurement solely from these four stories, the picture looks dreadful.
What the NYT authors did not mention?
That the procurement procedure has changed significantly since then. The defense procurement agency (DPA) is gradually adding various tools to work with risks and prevent corruption. For example, the DOT-Chain Defence procurement system was created and scaled up; it directly links the operator and the manufacturer and effectively makes corruption in drone purchases impossible. About 35% of FPV drones are now purchased through it, with a plan to reach 70%.
Three of the four NYT stories concern imported weapons, not domestic production, and the need for imports is now much smaller than two years ago. In 2024 year the share of domestic production in DPA procurements was 44%, and now it is 87%.
A process of mass tender procurement for domestic producers has been launched.
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At the same time, the Ministry of Strategic Industries, which mismanaged the Pavlohrad plant and was responsible for its failures, was dissolved; the figures involved in that story are now on trial; and the person implicated in the body armor procurement scandal and the tapes about Fire Point’s Tymur Mindich has been "effectively pushed out of the country."
"I don't want to sound like an official who says, 'You journalists only write about the bad, write about achievements too.' But when talking about corruption in Ukraine's defense sector, it's necessary to also speak about positive dynamics," Miroshnychenko emphasizes.
He reminds that if one is not balanced in assessments of corruption in Ukraine's defense industry, voters in partner countries will reasonably ask: "Why are we even giving money to these thieves?" That is a direct ticket to the rise of right-wing anti‑Ukrainian forces to power in Europe.
"Of course, you cannot 'paper over' real problems with news about tenders and reforms. You must actively work on changes. But you cannot close your eyes to obvious achievements and positive processes in the fight against corruption. Right now many people at all levels are working to build a decent procurement system, meet European partners’ expectations, and supply the army with more drones and munitions," Miroshnychenko concluded.
Document: PDF proof of the original version of the news item ""В Україні буде вкрадено все". Що не так (і що – так) зі скандальним матеріалом NYT про корупцію в оборонці". It records the publication content at the moment of the first scan, the preservation date and the source: Gordon.
