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Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
Why did Lindsey Graham's law pass this time?
The core economic model of Trump, which he used during the campaign, is a system of import tariffs through which they planned to raise $500 billion to partially offset the federal budget deficit, which reached $2 trillion. The Trump tariff model was developed by his economic adviser Steven Mnuchin, who wrote the famous article "Methodological Recommendations for Balancing the Trade Deficit." Additionally, the tariff system is a tool of pressure on China and Global South countries. But the Trump tariff mechanism “broke,” and so did the United States Supreme Court, which canceled a number of imported tariffs and obliged the Treasury to return $200 billion to importers.
Trump still has a temporary tariff mechanism: within the framework of protecting national interests, crisis response, etc. But these are all time-limited mechanisms, up to three months, some of which require the approval of Congress. The tariff issue as part of the country’s tax system is a prerogative of Parliament; the American president has only tools of a permanent and temporary “tariff initiative.”
But to confront China, a systemic mechanism is needed that does not depend on Parliament or the courts. In negotiations with Xi Jinping, Trump must present himself as a strong figure with a broad toolkit of pressure on China, not a president whose tariffs against the Celestial Empire are canceled by his own Supreme Court. That is why Trump decided to “pack” the tariff issue into a sanctions story to gain bipartisan support in the House of Representatives.
Democrats, by the way, clearly understood the gist of Trump’s financial trick, but could not help voting for the “hellish sanctions” – their own voters would not understand it ahead of the elections. That is, Trump got the perfect option: Democrats vote for the law – and he gets the broadest instrument for applying anti-Chinese sanctions without Congressional approval and without the risk of tariffs being canceled by the Supreme Court; Democrats do not vote – and Trump accuses them of hypocrisy and secretly “playing to Putin.”
At the same time, Trump was evidently in a hurry – a new House majority after the elections could be unfavorable to Republicans, and Democrats could propose their version of the law with greater congressional powers, not the president’s.
Why was the law passed exactly now? Obviously, it was done on the eve of Xi’s visit to the United States, which will take place 23–25 in September. Now Trump finally has trump cards (unlike in the two previous meetings), or so he thinks. Russian oil is purchased mainly by three countries: China, Turkey, and India. But the main volume of oil goes to China. In addition, India and Turkey are unlikely to resist much, while China, in the context of events in the Middle East, already depends on supplies of Russian oil.
But the whole point is that the issue of oil in this story is only an excuse. Trump is most likely not going to force China to completely abandon Russian oil supplies; he needs something else from Beijing, something much more important for the United States. If you look at the structure of industrial development in the United States in 2026 year, you can see a serious structural imbalance: good growth in advanced industries (AI, electronics, aviation, space) and stagnation in traditional industries (automobile manufacturing, chemicals, processing, etc.).
The global division of labor is built in such a way that innovative sectors of the US economy keep for themselves, while the “dirty” ones are moved to Global South countries, in particular to China. America does not want to plunge into the complex technological cycle of extracting rare earths on its own, although such projects have already been activated. For the United States, it is advantageous to stay in the old paradigm of the global division of labor: maximize its gross value added and minimize others’. But such a paradigm can function only in a unipolar world.
If China is your opponent, handing over production of the main line of components, consumer and industrial goods is very risky. Therefore, the task for the United States is to force China to give up global ambitions: leadership in artificial intelligence, investments in fundamental science, innovative energy projects, plans to build a new Eurasian reality. And bring China back into the format of a “global manufacturing.” But for this, a powerful and long-term tool of pressure and several decent pretexts are needed.
Source: Aleksey Kush / Facebook
Document: PDF proof of the original version of the news item "Трамп не вимагатиме від Китаю відмовитися від нафти з РФ. Йому потрібно від Пекіна дещо інше". It records the publication content at the moment of the first scan, the preservation date and the source: Gordon.
