Even in winter, interceptor drones for reactive Shahed were “ready”: Flash reveals what went wrong

UNIAN, photo ua.depositphotos.com, screenshot Ukrainian manufacturers were claiming readiness of interceptors capable of shooting down Russian jet drones back in winter. However, during trials in combat conditions it turned out that creating a device that simply flies fast is not enough. This is what Sergei Beskrestnov (Flash), the president’s adviser on the development of defense technologies, told NV in an interview.

According to him, as early as winter he attended a meeting convened by then defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov. All interceptor manufacturers gathered there.

“We began asking at what stage their solutions were, and all eight companies said: we are ready, the solution exists, it flies, we tested it, speed is sufficient, everything will be fine,” recalls Flash.

In his view, the mistake was that no one monitored these companies weekly, did not ask to show their developments.

“They answered that everything was fine, everything worked, they could even demonstrate. And there were still too few reactive Shaheds to show in practice how everything happens. At the range they showed: it flies. That’s where the problem lay,” he noted.

Why is it hard to intercept a jet Shahed

According to Beskrestnov, to attack a jet drone from behind the interceptor’s speed must necessarily be higher.

“‘Geran-3’ flew 320 km/h, ‘Geran-4’ is already flying somewhere 450−500 km/h. So the interceptor needs higher speed and sufficient endurance to search for the target and stay aloft. It must ascend to the same altitudes as the jet Shaheds and have fuel reserves to fly there and search for them,” he says.

At the same time, regarding the actual speed at which jet drones fly, Flash says there is no concept of cruise speed for them. He explained that they cover some segments at 300 km/h, others at 500.

“Why so? The Russians analyze where our electronic warfare is working, where our air defense is, where other means are, and adjust the speed. Some segments must be passed quickly, others slower. Somewhere you must attack quickly, and somewhere, conversely, slowly, so the camera and the operator can see where the drone is flying. Everything is individual. To say that a jet Shahed travels the entire route at maximum or minimum speed cannot be done,” the expert said.

Therefore, he says, Ukraine needs interceptors that can shoot down Shahedis at any part of their route, as if to say “it’s wrong that here, at this speed, we can, but there elsewhere we can’t.” Beskrestnov stressed that the interceptor must be universal.

Why it is hard to manufacture an interceptor

The main difficulty for Ukrainian manufacturers is not in engines for interceptors, says Flash, since they can be purchased abroad.

“And making a plane that simply flies fast in a straight line is not hard. The hard part is making a plane maneuverable enough to follow a Shahed. We understand: once we have interceptors, Shaheds will start evading—changing altitude, performing other maneuvers in flight. And jet Shaheds are much more maneuverable than regular ones. Therefore the interceptor needs speed, maneuverability, and a control channel, because at long distances radio control presents other challenges,” he noted.

Most importantly here, the expert argues, is the target acquisition and guiding system, because at high speed the operator’s error can be large, and working at such speeds is difficult for him. Therefore “automatic target acquisition by machine vision and automatic guidance is needed.”

“I understand the manufacturers. They built little planes, tested them on ranges: planes fly, speed is sufficient, control on the range exists, it remains to install a warhead. And when they began testing in combat conditions, questions poured in: what about maneuverability, what about control, how to launch, how to capture the target, how much fuel is needed, what else is required. Building a design that simply flies fast is the easiest part,” he emphasized.

Why interceptors cannot yet simply be ordered in thousands

Beskrestnov also explained why Ukraine cannot immediately order production of thousands of interceptors to cover the entire country.

“First, a final combat test is needed. We must be at 100% certain that the solution we propose will work for any crew: for SBU specialists and for a regional defense fighter... And we need a product that is simple to use and reliable: so it can be serviced, launched, and controlled. That is the task. Before spending millions, we need a truly working sample. Because showing in tests that some special forces crew managed to do something is only part of the job,” Flash says.

Moreover, according to him, after a reliably working sample appears there will be no problems with scaling production.

“Any manufacturer can scale production, it’s a matter of finances. If there is an active sample, in which we are 100% sure, finding components and ordering them is a matter of a short time. The whole country understands how important this is,” he added.

Jet Shaheds of the Russian Federation and their countermeasures

As UNIAN reported, the director of the New Geopolitics Research Network Mikhail Samus says Ukraine failed to prepare to counter jet drones. He says there are many reasons, including the situation with the change of defense minister, i.e., the ministry is responsible for resource planning.

Head of the Air Forces’ Communications Department Yuriy Ignat admitted that the most unexpected aspect of jet Shahed attacks was that the Russian side launched them into mass production. That everyone understood there was a threat from these drones, but there was no realization and vision that the enemy could use them on such a scale. “After all, this is very expensive, because one engine costs from 20−25 thousand dollars and up to 50 thousand,” Ignat said.