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Russia is shaping perceptions of the Baltic region in which NATO is preparing to attack Russia, the Baltic States are actively building up their military potential, and Russian-speaking populations face persecution. Together these narratives create an atmosphere of constant crisis in which military escalation appears increasingly probable.
This allows Moscow to exert pressure even without open military action—the very possibility of conflict becomes a tool of coercion.
At the end of 2025 the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) drew attention to the constant spread of Russian FIMI (foreign information manipulation and interference) aimed at the Baltic countries, noting that they reflect narratives the Kremlin used to justify invasions in Ukraine. Recent assessments by intelligence services in the Baltic states describe protracted and increasingly organized efforts by Russia to influence the information space of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, spreading anti-Baltic narratives on social networks and conducting coordinated cross-platform campaigns.
“Baltic aggressors”
One of the recurring narratives portrays the Baltic states as aggressors who lead the West’s fight against Russia. This baseless assertion gained traction after Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure, when Russian officials unjustifiably accused the Baltic states of opening “air corridors” for Ukrainian drones—a claim that the Baltic authorities denied.
Another widespread narrative is that the West is losing the fight against Russia and is therefore trying to open a “second front” in the Baltic region. In this narrative, the Baltic states are portrayed as “kamikazes” ready to sacrifice themselves to weaken Russia, just as Ukraine allegedly sacrificed itself earlier.
The narrative about “Baltic aggressors” also includes assertions that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are rapidly building up their military potential in opposition to Russia. Such reports have intensified particularly during recent NATO exercises in the Baltic region.
The Gallant Boar 2026 exercise (“Gallant Boar 2026”) aims to strengthen coordination among allied forces in the strategically important region of the eastern flank of NATO—between Russia’s exclave Kaliningrad and Belarus. Media in the Kremlin’s information ecosystem depicted these exercises as preparations for a broad-scale war with Russia, claiming that NATO is testing Kaliningrad’s defenses in anticipation of an attempt to seize the Russian exclave or block it by the Crimea model.
Belarusian state media spread similar narratives: for example, one report on state television claimed that “Lithuania is being transformed into a huge military training ground.”
Statements about persecution and legal grounds
Belarus also echoed Russian claims that the Baltic States violate the rights of their Russian-speaking minorities. At the beginning of June, Russian and Belarusian officials published a joint report on this.
Russian rhetoric often erases the line between Russian-speaking people, ethnic Russians, and citizens of Russia, allowing the Kremlin to present a broad and heterogeneous population as a single community allegedly under Moscow’s protection. Grigory Lukianets, director of the Human Rights Department at the Russian MFA, without any evidence stated that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are preparing mass deportations of Russian-speaking people.
Affiliated with the Russian state, media widely amplified his statement, and Russian embassies in all three countries published this information on their websites and in social networks. Recently, the spokesperson for the Russian MFA, Maria Zakharova, also stated that the Baltic states were actively attempting to hinder the vote of Russian citizens in elections to the State Duma.
The Russian MFA announced plans to apply to the International Court of Justice on the basis of what it calls “systematic violation” of the rights of ethnic Russians in Latvia, Latvia and Estonia. The ministry asserts that the Baltic authorities “ban” the Russian language, “rewrite history,” and conduct a “repression and intimidation campaign.”
A joint investigation by journalists from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia found that Russian MFA lawyers had been gathering legal arguments for such a case since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Around the same time, Russian embassies in Estonia and Lithuania published statements that Russian citizens in both countries had become targets of “threats and provocations,” and urged them to report such cases to their consular sections.
Statements by the Kremlin about persecuting Russian citizens raise particular concern, because Russia has used similar narratives of “protection” to justify aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and a full-scale invasion in 2022. Such rhetoric has deeper historical precedents.
When the Soviet Union invaded eastern Poland in September 1939 after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact with Nazi Germany, it also claimed it was intervening to protect local Ukrainians and Belarusians.
In May this year, Putin signed a law allowing the president to use the armed forces of the Russian Federation to protect Russian citizens who were arrested, detained, or subjected to criminal or other proceedings based on decisions of certain foreign or international courts. This provision seemingly does not apply to ordinary administrative procedures—such as compliance with residence rules in a country. Yet Moscow cited Latvia’s decision to deport Russian citizens who did not comply with such requirements as further evidence of persecution, showing how individual legal and administrative disputes can be folded into a broader Kremlin narrative of “protection.”
Accusations of “glorification of Nazism”
A survey of Russian narratives against the Baltic states that closely resemble those previously used against Ukraine would be incomplete without charges of “glorification of Nazism.” In recent years, representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry have repeatedly accused the Baltic states of glorifying Nazism, notably through dismantling monuments of the Soviet era and the peculiarities of treating and honoring historical events.
In the 2026 year’s report on the glorification of Nazism, the Russian MFA names the Baltic states—together with Ukraine, Moldova, Poland, and Finland—as countries that actively destroy Soviet monuments dedicated to those who fought against Nazism. Accordingly, the report accuses these countries of “increasingly active attempts to glorify Nazis, collaborators, and their modern successors.”
As part of this campaign, the Kremlin sought to link Lithuanian resistance fighters against the Soviet occupation with Nazism. In the Russian MFA’s human rights report on the Baltic states, Vilnius is accused of “openly pursuing a policy of falsifying World War II history and heroizing collaborators and Nazis by granting them the status of national heroes.”
Growing military power and warnings of an attack
Alongside Kremlin information campaigns, Russia’s military buildup and recent Western media reports have intensified real security concerns for the Baltic states. However, military potential, rhetoric, and proofs of intent should not be conflated.
According to The Telegraph, Russia already uses at least 10 military bases near borders of Belarus and Ukraine to launch long-range drones against Ukraine. Depending on the launch site, parts of several NATO countries could lie within the stated 1000-kilometer reach of “Geran-5.” This indicates expanding military capabilities, though it does not itself prove an intent to attack NATO territory.
Not surprisingly, many experts assess the risk of a Russian attack on the Baltic states as high. Concerns about a more direct threat intensified after reports by two American publications about a visit of CIA director John Brennan to Moscow.
They cited unnamed sources familiar with the visit and stated that John Brennan warned Russia against attacking NATO territory. Politico quoted an anonymous source saying the meeting was “primarily aimed at warning Russia against any action against Baltic states that could lead to escalation.” The Wall Street Journal, citing “people familiar with the visit,” reported that Brennan went to Moscow “to warn Russia not to attack NATO countries.”
In response to these reports, Estonia’s Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna said that Estonia’s threat assessment had not changed. A similar reaction came from Latvia’s Chief of Defense, Kaspars Puodāns, who noted that “he wouldn’t sit there” if there was an imminent threat. Former Estonian president Toomas Hendrik Ilves also questioned the anonymous-source reports and suggested that mentions of the Baltic states might be a smoke screen.
Fear as a tool of pressure
These narratives benefit Moscow, regardless of its current intentions or possible evolution of military events. They not only help legitimize potential future aggression but also erode trust in NATO, push the West to make risk-averse decisions, and frame defensive preparations as dangerous escalation.
It would be unwise to ignore the threat or fail to prepare. But preparation should be based on a rational assessment of Russia’s capabilities, not on the fear that the Kremlin deliberately sows.
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Source: EUvsDisinfo
Document: PDF proof of the original version of the news item "Страх як частина стратегії рашистів по ескалації в Балтії". It records the publication content at the moment of the first scan, the preservation date and the source: argumentua.com.
