Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
Reporters found hundreds of companies that may be linked to a single scheme: they were registered to young people, used to process multimillion imports, and then transferred to new owners. Some of the firms have websites with no products, prices, or even working phone numbers.
This is reported by Telegraf
We have already written about how companies showing signs of dubious imports may have been used to move money abroad. This concerns “Black Audit,” a network of companies that provide conversion-center services and help move funds to other countries.
Media outlets have claimed that former tax and customs employees Vasyl Sandul and Yevhen Kulibaba may be behind “Black Audit.”
How a factory of suspicious companies was created
In 2024 in Ukraine, several dozen companies were registered to three 18-20-year-old young men. The firms received charter capital of roughly 200 thousand UAH, declared wholesale trade, began importing goods worth hundreds of millions, and then had their names and owners changed.
Sometimes the chain did not end there. The first protagonist of this story is Illia Hrytsenko.
In 2024, when he was only 18 years old, ten companies were officially registered to him. Five in March. Another five in June. The names vary: Entoblaun, Panska Moda, Kvadrosfera, Fauzeropt, Treidlott, Lauder Torg, Modna Khvylia, Gateswit, Priamtray Optimal, Distribkontakt.
But the structure is almost the same. The companies engaged in wholesale trade, had small staffs, charter capital mostly in the 200–220 thousand UAH range, and conducted import operations.
This scheme resembles how “Black Audit” operates. Moreover, some companies registered to these young men also appeared in complaints to law enforcement about “Black Audit” activities. In particular, Planet Rechey LLC previously belonged to Yurii Yarosh. Read more about that here.
According to YouControl, the total declared import volume for these companies amounts to more than a billion hryvnias. A simple question arises: what exactly did these firms sell?
Some of them have websites where one could check the assortment… And this is where it gets most interesting. These resources do not look like full-fledged online stores. There is no catalog, no specific products, no prices, no product photos, no supplier information. In some cases there isn’t even a working phone number.
For example, one of Hrytsenko’s companies is Modna Khvylia LLC. According to YouControl, over two years it imported goods worth about 400 million UAH.
Documents state that knitted fabrics and textile materials were imported from China. The supplier was Soltera Trade Limited (remember that name).
Customs clearance took place through Odesa Customs. The Chinese supplier also has a website. It was created in March 2025. The web page is essentially a business-card imitation, without a proper product list, prices, or other information you would expect from a company presenting itself as an international supplier.
Domain ownership data are hidden via Withheld for Privacy.
And the Modna Khvylia website follows a similar concept.
It was created in November 2025. Again, Withheld for Privacy was used.
So we have a Ukrainian importer, a foreign supplier, hundreds of millions of hryvnias in trade operations — and two maximally nondescript sites that give a potential customer almost no way to understand what these companies actually sell.
But it’s even more interesting what happened to the firms themselves.
Today the companies that once “hung” on the 18-year-old Hrytsenko no longer exist under his name.
They were re-registered to other people. Among the new owners is Uzbek citizen Usarov Muhammadzhon Egamberdi Ogli, who, according to open registries, is registered as the owner of more than 40 companies. This scenario repeats in another group of enterprises.
A 21-year-old boy from a village and another 16 companies
Yurii Yarosh is a resident of the village Stara Chortoryia in Zhytomyr region. In 2024, when he was 21 years old, companies began to be registered to him. In total — 16.
“Khvyliaopt,” “Sintexred,” “Linderio,” “Ekobudia,” “Kingstaropt,” “Visionprom,” “Denisopt,” “Torgstok,” “Origent Svit,” “Torgrukh,” “Torgimpact,” “Globavers,” “Khatnii Smak,” “Tovarnyi Shlyakh,” “Asortitrade,” and others.
Again we see a familiar set:
Some of the companies were later re-registered to Uzbek citizen Tursunhodzhiyev Abduraufkhan Bohodirkhon ogli. Registry data show more than 70 companies registered to him.
The most illustrative case in this story is the company now called Khvyliaopt.
Initially it was named Hozportal. Yarosh created it on 7 March 2024. The firm later became Center Pokupok. And later — Khvyliaopt.
Owners changed too: first Yarosh, then Vasyl Tsalko, and later the same Uzbek citizen Usarov Muhammadzhon Egamberdi Ogli.
According to YouControl, the company imported goods worth about 400 million UAH. Then an episode occurred that goes beyond registry statistics.
In August last year the company’s cargo was stopped at the Mostyska customs post in Lviv region. The customs declaration listed more than 1,7 thousand steam cleaners.
But during inspection customs officers found something else. The cargo contained items bearing labels Gucci, Hermès, Louis Vuitton, Dior, Montblanc, Boss, Tommy Hilfiger, Prada, Loro Piana, Yves Saint Laurent, Celine. And another 398 Apple AirPods Pro.
Customs officials drew up a protocol for an administrative offense for moving goods across the border while hiding them from customs control. But, according to information Telegraf was able to establish, the case did not develop into a criminal prosecution of the company.
Why does a million-hryvnia importer need a website where nothing can be bought?
Back to Khvyliaopt. The company has a website created on 18 November 2025.
Domain ownership data were hidden via Withheld for Privacy. Like the sites of other companies, it strongly resembles a cover website. For example:
The third protagonist of the story is 20-year-old Dmytro Hnatiuk from Bila Tserkva. In 2024 about a dozen companies were registered to him. And again — the familiar scenario.
The companies were created over several months, declared wholesale trade, conducted significant import operations, and then transferred to other owners. One of them is Maiden Sale.
Its website looks different, but the principle is the same. Instead of a full catalog — icons. Instead of specific products — general categories.
There are no prices, proper descriptions, information about suppliers, or management.
Telegraf tried to call the numbers listed on the websites of such companies. Almost none of the mobile numbers turned out to be working.
Again — Withheld for Privacy to hide the domain registrant’s data.
If you look at each company separately, all these details could be dismissed as careless marketing, a young business, or an unsuccessful website.
The foreign supplier of Modna Khvylia has a similar website. This is important, because if a company really buys goods in China worth hundreds of millions of hryvnias, its supplier should be a real commercial entity with a corresponding scale of operations.
But here we see a site that practically contains no information about its products.
The question is who creates these companies, why dozens of them are registered to young people, and who actually controls them after they are re-registered?
Telegraf does not assert that every one of these companies is part of “Black Audit.” Only investigators can prove that. But the large number of identical details raises the question: are we dealing with a single network that stamps out firms using the same template?
Here is what is most alarming:
Some cargoes themselves raise questions: customs declarations list one thing, but the containers turn out to hold branded clothing or expensive AirPods. When that happens with a single firm — that’s odd. But when it’s a whole system, law enforcement should investigate. And here we again return to “Black Audit.”
Document: PDF proof of the original version of the news item "Мільярдний імпорт на підставних хлопців: як мережа «Блек Аудит» проганяє мільйони через фірми-привиди та псевдосайти". It records the publication content at the moment of the first scan, the preservation date and the source: HAB Media.