Where is the guarantee that strategic connectivity will not become the next lever of pressure on Ukraine?

Nothing special. Just a bank of a Kyivstar co-owner helps raise money for Russia’s Rostelecom. Three-month digital financial assets are the equivalent of bonds. You buy through the bank’s platform, lend money to Rostelecom, and receive 15,25% annually. Cooperation is regular: another 2024 years, companies reported a issue worth a billion rubles. Ordinary business. If you forget who is at war with whom.

Alfa-Bank is a child of Fridman and Aven. Until 2024 year they together owned about 45%, then Andrey Kosogov bought out the stakes. Their longtime partner in Alfa. A fictitious buyout to make life easier and to push for sanctions relief.

But even if you look formally, the beauty doesn’t disappear. Kosogov is also a co-owner of Kyivstar. Together with Fridman and Aven. In Kyivstar Group’s report to an American regulator it is written: Kosogov owns 47,24% LetterOne, Fridman 37,86%, Aven 12,13%. LetterOne is a large shareholder of VEON, which controls Kyivstar. So the main owner of the bank became Kosogov, and in Kyivstar he remains a partner of Fridman and Aven.

And so a strange miracle emerges. On one hand we have a Russian connection, on the other — Ukrainian. Here Rostelecom, here Kyivstar. The main thing is not to mix them up. But somehow I think they mix them up, and how.

If someone doesn’t understand — Rostelecom services the Kremlin’s security machine. Its president lists clients: Ministry of Defense, FSB, Rosgvardiya, FSO, Ministry of Internal Affairs. In April 2025 year a participant in the war with the Putin program “Time of Heroes” was appointed to be responsible for special communications. Here is whom the co-owner of the Ukrainian operator helps to attract money.

And Rostelecom is just one episode here. According to the GUR, Alfa-Bank financed Iskra, which makes engines for missile complexes, Pribor, a propellant manufacturer, Uraltransmash, which upgrades self-propelled howitzers. Also the Ural Optical and Mechanical Plant – a manufacturer of equipment for Russian combat aircraft and helicopters. After the invasion began, the bank also financed a raw material supplier for enterprises that produce nuclear weapons, cruise missiles, and anti-personnel mines.

Separately operating AlfaStrakhovanie. EU documents record insurance of military vehicles of Rosgvardiya, Kalashnikov enterprises and CNDItochmash, even vehicles guarding Putin. Cartridges, missiles, howitzers, aircraft optics, insurances for law enforcement. This is a whole servicing system for the Russian state and its war.

FSB already in September 2023 year notified Fridman of suspicion: since the invasion began he invested about 2 billion rubles in military plants, including the Tula Cartridge Plant and the Ural Optical and Mechanical Plant. The SBU also stated cooperation of his telecom enterprise with the FSB to organize mobile communications in the occupied territories of Ukraine.

Today, 14 October, the military reported restrictions on Starlink’s operation in motion, confirmed interruptions in connectivity and cancellation of some combat missions. One decision by an external supplier — and our units are forced to change combat plans. This is already happening.

And what will happen tomorrow? Where is the guarantee that strategic connectivity of Ukraine will not become the next lever of pressure? We already saw in December 2023 year after the Russian cyberattack Kyivstar stopped operating.

At the same time the operator calls itself a “partner of the state in digital transformation.” It offers ministries and law enforcement agencies connectivity, cloud services, data work, cybersecurity.

State Special Communications Service included it in the list of operators that can provide secure internet access. Minprom appears to promote Starlink purchases through Kyivstar for state institutions. Russian economic interests remain inside this infrastructure, and the state expands cooperation.

What else has to happen for the authorities to begin the process of removing the Russian part from the strategic operator? Nationalization or seizing under sanctions procedures — the government and the National Security and Defense Council must propose a solution and set deadlines. Because now we are asked to wait for the risk to turn into a catastrophe. Or perhaps it already has turned, but we just are not aware.