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Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
Ukrainian servicemembers carry out complex operations at the front, yet problems with mobilization and financial support remain acute. At the same time, certain decisions regarding protected employment status could change the approach to staffing the armed forces.
Deputy commander of the unmanned systems regiment Lava of the 2 Corps of the National Guard "Chartiya," Andriy Romanchuk, in an exclusive interview for the Voien voli channel, spoke about a unique underground operation in the Kharkiv region, mobilization problems, attitudes toward economic exemptions, and actual payments to assault fighters, reports the 24 Channel.
Underground operation in Kharkiv region: how the offensive was prepared
"Chartiya" carried out a successful counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region: Defense Forces advanced 15 kilometers via underground communications into the enemy’s rear on the Kupiansk direction. Your regiment directly participated in the operation. How long did the preparation take and what role did technologies, including drones, play?
We are truly proud that the operation succeeded. The corps will gradually inform the public and media about what was accomplished and how it happened. Step by step we will release new details, because we do not want to reveal operational details to the enemy.
I can say that it all began with the concept of the corps commander. In fact it was his idea, which was later worked out in detail.
Fighting in Kharkiv region: look at the map
Objectively assessing the situation from the standpoint of military tactics, this is a very unconventional decision that at first seemed difficult for us to implement. The team’s coordinated work played an important role. The operation was extremely complex, and later, when new materials appear, you will be able to better understand its scale.
We are glad that team cohesion, faith in the common cause, technology, the desire to destroy the enemy, and new ideas about using technical means made it possible to realize this plan.
At the same time, the operation took place in parallel with the actions of our brothers from the Third Army Corps. We worked on a different section of the front, which differs in terrain, proximity to the state border, and other circumstances.
It should be noted that the operation "Vivaldi" is mentioned – a large-scale counteroffensive by the Third Army Corps in Donetsk that began in May. Ukrainian forces combined mechanized advances, strikes on Russian logistics, and mass use of drones and ground robotic systems. This helped to disorganize the enemy, disrupt its supply lines, and liberate a number of settlements. One of the key results was thwarting the Russian army’s plans to advance toward Donetsk.
Given these features, this option seemed the most optimal for conducting the operation. The key element, of course, was the underground work carried out by our brothers from the 13 Brigade and the Rukh regiment, which are part of the corps. Our task was to provide support from the air. I believe that all units fulfilled their assigned tasks properly.
Full conversation with Romanchuk: watch the video
De-exemption, the defense industry, and outsourcing for the military
The government is considering reducing the percentage of exempted workers at defense industry, energy, and utilities enterprises. Defense industry representatives already say they lack personnel, and additional de-exemptions could further complicate operations. How do you feel about this idea? Has the time for this question come?
My attitude toward this issue is twofold. First of all, we are not interested in the economy and businesses having problems they cannot handle. We depend not only on assistance from Western allies and partner countries, but also on Ukrainian businesses that play a key role in supplying the Defense Forces, including the means currently produced and used by the military. So I would not want the state to create additional problems for such enterprises.
At the same time, we often visit manufacturers, primarily those who make drones, because this is one of the largest sectors of Ukrainian production. When you go into one shop, then another, and analyze product quality, certain questions arise. Very often 80 – 90%, and sometimes even all 100% of workers there are young men who could serve as pilots, but instead perform not very complex assembly work.
Maybe this remark is not entirely correct, but in my opinion women could be involved much more actively in such processes. It shouldn’t be the case that 90 – 100% of the workers assembling components are young men. This is not such a complex job, and there are opportunities for change.
Nevertheless, it is fundamentally important for the military that the economy functions, because the front’s support depends on it. This concerns both the energy sector and the defense-industrial complex.
I think the government should find a balanced solution. However, this problem needs a comprehensive approach. For example, some functions currently performed by military units could be outsourced to private companies.
Please specify which companies and functions you mean?
Currently military units organize the work of many services themselves. This includes procurement, legal support, audit, logistics, and other areas. Part of these functions can be handed over to private companies that would provide the relevant services to military units and have exemption status.
Some specialists who could perform such work as civilian professionals instead go through Territorial Center of Recruitment (TCRC), basic general military training (BGMT), and only after several months reach units. As servicemembers they are not what we need.
I am not sure such a reform can realistically be implemented during martial law, but a significant portion of functions — software development, IT, legal support, audit, and logistics — can be transferred to private companies. They would perform these tasks for military units. The second direction is direct de-exemption.
It is necessary to categorize enterprises and determine where there is truly an excess of exempted workers.
The defense-industrial complex, in my view, should be among the last sectors where exemptions are reduced. The third direction is a different approach to servicemembers who have deserted their unit (SZZH). In my view there are several categories among them.
The first is those who were already at the front but, for certain reasons, conflicts, or fear, left their unit. This is a difficult category, and each such situation must be considered individually.
The second is those who flee during basic general military training, before getting into a combat unit.
The third is those who leave service at the stage between TCRC and BGMT. With these people you need to talk, explain opportunities, and seek ways to return them to service.
In our unmanned systems regiment there are servicemembers who returned after desertion. Therefore I believe the state can solve the personnel shortage problem if it acts comprehensively and uses all available options.
Attitudes of servicemembers toward exemptions and myths about mobilization
How do fighters view exemptions in civilian life? Does a feeling of injustice arise when some people have exemptions while others have been fighting for several years? For example, when you see that even the Kyiv Circus is exempted, you wonder whether that sector is truly critical.
Of course such thoughts arise, because several years at the front is not easy. There are directions where the situation is even hotter than ours, but ours is also difficult. When you talk to the guys, especially those who have been fighting for five years, you hear comments about injustice and a certain imbalance in society.
At the same time I would not say that the military now predominantly holds a categorical attitude toward exemptions or a new wave of mobilization. Approaches and thinking are gradually changing. You are intent on performing combat tasks, destroying the enemy, and you hope that sooner or later other people will join you. Of course, you would like that to happen more actively.
Now voluntary recruitment and mobilization have practically stalled, although in 2022, 2023 and even in 2024 years activity was high. "Chartiya" as a corps, as well as our units, brigades and regiments, have a good reputation. We keep promises and obligations to volunteers who come to us.
Despite this, the level of voluntary recruitment now is, regrettably, extremely low.
Have you encountered servicemembers who before mobilization feared that immediately after entering the army and completing BGMT they would end up on the front line in the infantry? Could such myths deter Ukrainians from volunteering and choosing a specific specialty?
Such myths exist, and we constantly try to dispel them. Honestly, I don’t know where they come from. For example, when you join an unmanned systems regiment, and during voluntary mobilization the chances of ending up in such a unit are particularly high, you can receive specialized pilot training — before or after mobilization.
Then you undergo all necessary procedures and join the unit. How, in that case, can you end up in the infantry? I don’t understand where this myth came from.
In "Chartiya" there is generally an approach that a place in the infantry must be earned. As you could see during operation "Veles" and other operations, the infantry consists of the most motivated, professional, and well-prepared fighters with high stress resilience. So stories that someone was taken from Lviv to the TCRC and the next day found themselves on the front line in the infantry seem like Russian narratives to me. That does not happen.
Every mobilized person undergoes 58 days of basic general military training. This is a mandatory procedure, because training centers are not subordinate to us, and we cannot take someone out of them earlier.
Moreover, introducing a servicemember into the combat sector without proper training and BGMT is punishable by criminal liability. We have brothers who go through BGMT and already have certain preparation from civilian life. They would be ready to shorten this process, but it is simply impossible.
After returning from BGMT a person goes through another 14 days of adaptation directly in the unit, and only after that does full-scale work begin.
We are always interested in preparing a servicemember as much as possible in all respects.
If it is a pilot, they do not go to positions immediately. First they gradually enter the work, train, and gain experience, because they must master drones and learn to operate those systems.
First and foremost we care about a person’s life. They also value their life, may be afraid, worry, and be anxious — that is natural. The better a servicemember is trained, the lower the risks for them.
Demobilization and critical questions about fighters’ pay
A servicemember with the callsign "Officer" said that the backbone of the army now consists of volunteers who joined in 2024. Those who came earlier may be wounded or discharged for health reasons. At the same time these fighters are due for promotion and to move into higher positions, but there is almost no one to replace them because there are practically no motivated volunteers. Is there really no even partial demobilization now and how great is the need for servicemembers?
It is difficult to speak about specific numbers. Today the profile of the volunteer has significantly changed. Now a volunteer is a person who in one way or another reached the TCRC, after which units, including ours, begin to communicate with them.
We explain how everything works, what to expect, and the person accepts this life challenge with understanding and joins the military. Our Lava regiment began work as a drone battalion about a year ago, and subsequently very quickly grew into a regiment.
All this time we constantly work with people who join the military: we communicate, explain our approaches, and by our own example show how everything functions.
Frankly, I am satisfied with the results of our Lava regiment and the Chartiya corps in general, including how we manage to communicate with people.
Of course different situations happen, but overall we are satisfied with those who come to us. I hope that the servicemembers themselves are satisfied with our attitude, approaches, and combat results.
Without unnecessary pathos: we must stand and defend the state from Russian occupiers. There is no point in seeking illusions about possible reconciliation, because this war is aimed at the destruction of Ukrainians. If in 2022 the young men and women, like the whole nation, had not risen to defend the state, the consequences could have been catastrophic. Russian women would be going to the theater in Lviv in nightgowns, thinking they were expensive dresses. We cannot allow such a scenario to repeat.
We have an interesting slogan: 100 years ago we fought near Lviv, and now we fight near Kharkiv, so we are advancing.
But today the war is going through a very difficult stage. We need to unite and repel the enemy. That alone would be a great victory for the state.
How could the state make mobilization more attractive? Military personnel often say that with basic pay of 20 – 30 thousand hryvnias it is hard to support a family. Also people worry about what happens in case of injury. Maybe the state does not sufficiently explain what payments, benefits, and free services are available to servicemembers?
It is difficult for me to answer this question unequivocally, because I view the situation somewhat differently. First, during wartime we, the military, are not doing the state a favor. We are defending our families, property, lives, business, territory, and history. Therefore I do not think in terms of the state being obliged to provide servicemembers with certain material benefits in exchange for their service.
When the war ends and former Ukrainian servicemembers carry out peacekeeping missions on other continents or in other countries, then one can discuss the fairness of their material provision. But that is already a question of moral ethics.
At the same time your question contains an important point. Servicemembers who perform combat missions do not receive only 30 thousand hryvnias. The state has regulated this issue, and actual financial provision can be significantly higher.
The base payment is approximately 25 thousand hryvnias, to which 30, 50 or 100 thousand hryvnias are added depending on the combat tasks performed.
Assault fighters receive significantly more. The financial provision for this category of servicemembers can range from 250 to 460 thousand hryvnias. That is why I say the position of an assault fighter must be earned.
So materially the state provides the opportunity to carry out combat tasks. It is also important to understand that our Western allies and partners help financially in this regard.
In addition, servicemembers have other material support — equipment, gear, and necessary means. Of course not everything is provided at the highest level, but it allows us to work. So frankly, we carry out this mission not for someone, but above all because we understand what our future depends on.
This interview was shortened, corrected, and edited for better audience understanding.
Document: PDF proof of the original version of the news item ""Посаду штурмовика потрібно заслужити": інтерв'ю бійця "Хартії" про підземну операцію на Харківщині та міфи щодо війська". It records the publication content at the moment of the first scan, the preservation date and the source: Channel 24.
