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Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
Even if the Rada finds votes for the first reading, key provisions that limit political control over law enforcement could be removed in the second reading.
The Verkhovna Rada Committee on Law Enforcement, chaired by Serhiy Ionushas, according to sources, has still not reviewed the compromise bill No.15230-d on the Anti‑Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030 years. This committee could become the main venue where the Presidential Office will try to remove key provisions of the document that limit political control over the law enforcement system. Kateryna Butko and Maryna Bohuslavets write about this in the article “25 billion for the right to control law enforcement. Why the Rada is blocking the Anti‑Corruption Strategy.”
According to the authors, the law enforcement committee is where the interests of the presidential office and its deputy head Oleh Tatarov intersect, with whom the Presidential Office’s informal influence over law enforcement is associated.
“However, Tatarov should not be confused with the center of decision‑making. He is not an independent actor but a conduit of the president’s political will. And one can already predict that the law enforcement committee will be the axe with which the Presidential Office chops away at the key anti‑corruption provisions embedded in the strategy,” Butko and Bohuslavets note.
Bill No.15230-d was planned to be brought before the Verkhovna Rada on 3 September and 13 October. But both times the vote did not take place. According to parliamentary sources, the reason was a lack of confidence that the document would secure the necessary 226 votes even in the first reading. Despite concessions made during the bill’s preparation, support from the presidential faction Servant of the People remains uncertain.
According to an interlocutor familiar with the negotiations, it is possible to assemble roughly 90 votes outside Servant of the People. Of those, about 40–45 could be provided by European Solidarity and Holos, up to 50 more by the deputy groups Platform for Life and Peace, Restoration of Ukraine, For the Future, Trust, and unaffiliated deputies. Negotiators do not expect support from Batkivshchyna.
“So roughly another 130 votes will have to be sought within Servant of the People. Without a political decision inside the presidential faction, the strategy will remain just a bill,” the authors say.
Some disagreements were resolved during negotiations with parliamentary committees. In particular, the drafters agreed on a significant portion of the comments from the committees on education and digital transformation without removing the document’s fundamental provisions.
One of the most difficult reviews was in the Committee on Legal Policy. Negotiations have been ongoing since May, and one meeting, according to an interlocutor, lasted about six hours and ended with a long list of comments.
“After consultations, the drafters managed to preserve about 95% of the provisions of the relevant section of the strategy. However, some committee members still oppose the participation of independent experts delegated by international partners in competitive and other collegial bodies,” the authors write.
Negotiations over the tax and customs sections were also difficult. The chair of the Committee on Finance, Tax and Customs Policy, Danylo Hetmantsev, joined the review of the relevant provisions. Initially there was talk of deleting or significantly weakening some anti‑corruption measures. But after consultations, according to a source, more than 90% of the disagreements were resolved and the main provisions regarding tax and customs were preserved. That, however, does not guarantee the votes of all committee members.
Butko and Bohuslavets believe the main threat to the Anti‑Corruption Strategy is not only a possible failure at the first reading but also the revision of its key provisions during the second. Through amendments, deputies could remove norms intended to limit political control over the law enforcement system. And Ionushas’s committee could become the main arena for that struggle.
For the Presidential Office, the first reading could serve as a convenient signal to international partners. However, the Ukraine Facility plan requires the final adoption of the strategy. A vote in principle alone is not enough to receive funding.
“Thus, the parliament faces two interconnected tasks: to find 226 votes and to avoid losing, in the search for compromise, those provisions for which the strategy was developed in the first place. Because if in the first reading deputies agree on the need for more independent law enforcement bodies, but by the second remove competitions, international experts and new powers for the Specialized Anti‑Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, the document may be formally adopted. Yet the political control over the system that it was meant to limit will remain virtually unchanged,” the authors conclude.
In October the Verkhovna Rada for the second time this fall removed the Anti‑Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030 years from its agenda. After reconciling three bills and comments from agencies and parliamentary committees, a revised document No.15230-d appeared, which was supported by the Rada’s anti‑corruption committee.
According to an interlocutor familiar with the strategy’s preparation, the provisions that face the most resistance make up less than 1% of its text. It is precisely because of these norms that the parliament cannot move to a vote.
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