"Putin Could Lose Power": Berezovets Interview on Possible Coup, Strikes on Oil Refineries, and Russia's Problems

Donald Trump continues to push his own scenarios for ending the war, Russia is suffering losses on the front, and strikes on its oil refineries are creating increasing problems for the economy. At the same time, a separate confrontation is unfolding in space that directly concerns Ukrainian military intelligence.

Lieutenant Colonel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, head of the international military cooperation department of the Territorial Defense Forces command Taras Berezovets, in an exclusive interview for the channel "Warrior of Freedom," analyzed Trump’s tactics, the situation on the front, and the weak spots of the Russian economy. He also spoke about the dangerous close approach of a Russian military satellite to an Iceye craft, the possibility of a military coup in Russia, and the consequences of Ukrainian strikes on oil refineries, writes 24 Channel.

Trump's tactics and U.S. support for Ukraine

Volodymyr Zelenskyy says the U.S. is delaying critically important deliveries. What do you think Trump is trying to achieve this way? Does he want to close the Russian-Ukrainian question with our capitulation, or is there something less obvious?

Trump always acts from the position of a strong player. He pressures an opponent or interlocutor at the negotiating table, testing their resilience. This is his usual tactic; there’s nothing new here. He has used it repeatedly, including toward Zelenskyy.

Many thought that after the scandal in the White House in February 2025, relations between Trump and Zelenskyy would never recover. But everything turned out quite differently.

Zelenskyy knows how to build relationships with Trump and other difficult world leaders. He succeeds at this, so I wouldn’t write off the current relationship.

Trump didn't say anything new. He constantly blames European partners, opponents, and allies, trying to get the result he wants from them.

As for the current situation, U.S. support is critically important for Ukraine, particularly in exchanging intelligence and supplying weapons. Delays in deliveries and intelligence sharing have happened before, but support has been restored. After all, the strategic interests of Ukraine and the United States coincide.

Trump certainly does not want a victory for Putin or Russia. At the same time, he may not want a crushing defeat of Russia either, because he believes that would inevitably strengthen China. And he has a right to that view.

Trump can change his strategy, increase pressure on Moscow or on us, but he acts based on what Marco Rubio said: America always pursues its own national interests.

It’s also worth remembering that both chambers of Congress maintain a strong majority in support of Ukraine. Polls show that the level of support for Ukraine among Americans consistently stands at no less than 70%.

Zelenskyy’s communication with representatives of both parties in the Senate on Tuesday, 20 October, via video link clearly demonstrated that we retain support. Democrats and Republicans have enough means to pressure the White House.

In particular, the White House is now seeking to increase the overall defense budget by 350 billion dollars – not only for aid to Ukraine, but for defense overall. U.S. congressmen have already warned: if aid to Ukraine is not restored, they may block the new Pentagon budget. Then the problems for the White House will be much more serious.

So, despite Trump’s current moves, we shouldn’t throw up our hands?

Absolutely. We have experienced such downturns many times. This is the hallmark style of the current U.S. president. He always acts this way.

Let me repeat: no matter how much some may want to criticize, we must start from the fact that this is the leader of the most powerful superpower in the world, a person on whom our fate depends. Civilians can afford to play at criticizing this administration. Diplomats and military personnel definitely cannot.

Full conversation with the serviceman: watch the video

Russia's space aggression and threats to satellites

Let’s talk about Russia’s actions. Recently a Russian satellite approached within 26 meters of a Finnish-American satellite that shares intelligence with Ukraine. What do you think this incident indicates?

Fans of "Star Wars" should understand that sooner or later war will unfold in space as well. A Russian military satellite approached a critically dangerous distance to a satellite of the Finnish company ICEYE, which collects intelligence important to the Defense Forces of Ukraine, including imagery of enemy military facilities.

In essence, this is an act of space aggression. The fact that a collision did not occur at such a short distance is a real miracle.

A distance of less than a kilometer between satellites is already considered dangerous. Here we might have witnessed an attempted ramming, intimidation, or something else. At the same time, there are international treaties that regulate activities in space. Such behavior can be seen as an act of aggression.

Recall that the Russian military satellite approached within 26 meters of the ICEYE satellite, which helps Ukraine obtain intelligence on Russian military facilities. Because of the dangerous close approach, the craft had to fire additional engines to avoid a collision, which could lead to fuel depletion.

Clearly, the Russians understand the risks they narrowly avoided. It’s not just about possible material liability, but also about the consequences of attacking a satellite associated with a NATO country. I have no doubt they acted intentionally.

Russia continually raises the stakes. If it is not stopped and does not receive a meaningful response, it will move to the next level of escalation. Therefore, it must be reacted to.

Russia is trying to interfere with everything that works in Ukraine’s favor. Europe helps – they aim to destabilize Europe. Ukraine receives satellite images and intelligence – they seek to influence satellites. Experts also suggest that the purpose of such maneuvers may be to demonstrate power and a new form of orbital confrontation. For example, forcing a satellite to expend fuel to evade gradually exhausts its resources. So to harm them, a direct collision isn’t necessary?

The satellite was forced to fire additional engines to avoid a collision. That was the goal. This further underscores the hostile character of Russia’s actions – deliberate and intentional. This is a new level of hybrid threat, and now we must prepare for similar incidents in space.

Again: "Star Wars" is not just the title of a Hollywood movie, but a real danger posed by Russia. We must clearly understand that Russia today is a dangerous state, a state-terrorist that observes no laws or rules of war. It is ready to wage war everywhere: on land, in the air, at sea, underwater, and in space. Therefore, we must respond harshly.

If we talk about incursions into airspace, then it is necessary to destroy Russian aerial targets, not coddle them or wait for them to fall or self-destruct.

After all, they can strike civilian, military, or any other target. Regarding space, a satellite has no means of attack – it has no missiles or machine guns, it can only evade. But there are combat satellites and possibilities to use lasers.

Ultimately, one can blind an enemy satellite or damage its optics. If it approaches at a dangerous distance, first it should be warned through official channels. If the warning is ignored, then, in my opinion, one can aim a laser and literally burn its eyes out. And that’s it, goodbye. Let it fly on.

Satellite intelligence, Starshield, and Europe’s role

How do you assess the level of threat if Russia accelerates development of the "Rassvet" system, which would allow it to control Shaheds over Ukrainian territory in real time?

Everything Russia does is aimed at improving its warfare tactics. One should not mock the fact that two of their satellites recently fell from orbit and treat it as an isolated case. In general, Russia is working to make this system effective.

Of course, technologically it won’t catch up to SpaceX, including Starlink or its military version Starshield. But for Russia it would be an alternative it currently lacks. Such a system will strengthen the Russian army’s capabilities, and it will try to use it actively.

By the way, Russia is developing the satellite system "Rassvet" – its own analogue of Starlink, which could provide Russian troops with protected communications and the ability to control strike and reconnaissance drones in real time. According to the advisor to the president of Ukraine on defense technologies, Serhiy "Flesh" Beskrestnov, full coverage of Ukraine could appear in about half a year. Currently the system is in deployment and testing, and stable around-the-clock communications would require hundreds of satellites.

Ukraine does not have its own satellite launch capabilities, so it uses partner countries’ craft already in orbit and also receives intelligence from allies. At the same time, as French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot said, two-thirds of intelligence data for the Armed Forces of Ukraine come from Europeans, primarily France.

So our dependence on American intelligence is no longer as critical. The only area where the U.S. can provide unique information that other partners currently cannot is early warning of ballistic threats.

When the last three ballistic attacks occurred, the Americans did not send corresponding warnings, and we did not see the moment of missile launches. The president of Ukraine stated this. So far this problem has no solution.

Allies, particularly European countries, must develop their own missile defense and early warning systems for ballistic launches so that Ukraine does not depend solely on the U.S.

How quickly can Ukraine fully switch to a European satellite system? According to Reuters, Starshield’s operation in Ukraine was allegedly restricted by an order from the White House.

I cannot comment on that. These are journalistic investigations with their own sources. Officially the White House said it was not involved in this story. We must rely on official sources. As for the European system, we will be able to use it only after its launches, testing, and setup.

In any case, this is a matter of years, not months. To create a system comparable to Starshield requires huge investments, the necessary technologies and, most importantly, production of hundreds of satellites. We are not talking about tens of craft.

Can Europe fully replace the U.S. in intelligence and satellite capabilities?

As I already noted, two-thirds of our intelligence data come from Europeans. The only area where Americans provide unique information is ballistic-threat warnings.

Europe has already replaced the United States in part of intelligence provision, or rather has largely compensated for that shortfall. However, Ukraine still critically needs important intelligence from American partners.

What Putin is counting on and how Russia is sowing discord in Europe

Putin continues the war. Do you think he still believes in his victory or continues hostilities for other reasons?

The war can end with a peace or other agreement that fixes its end in several cases. The first is when one country suffers a catastrophic defeat and the other achieves decisive victory. That did not happen.

The second reason is exhaustion of resources on both sides to a level where they can no longer continue hostilities. An example is the Iran–Iraq war, which cost over two million military and civilian lives. It ended, in part, because the parties no longer had the capacity to continue fighting.

The third option is intervention by powerful states that can influence the conflict participants if its continuation poses a serious threat to their trade, economy, or other interests.

In Russia’s case, such a country could only be China. For now, Beijing is not interested in ending the war because it weakens not only Ukraine, but also Russia and Europe. Strategically, China benefits from this. It sells its technologies and components to the parties of the war, primarily Russia.

At the same time, Beijing is strengthening its position and increasing influence as a state able to pressure Putin. So China does not seek to end the war. The question is when Beijing will assess the risks and understand that continuing hostilities is simply unprofitable for it, especially regarding trade and national interests.

I think several factors must coincide: the parties’ resources will be depleted, and external players will be able to exert pressure on the Kremlin. That could lead to the war’s end.

What does Putin count on most today – Ukraine’s exhaustion, a split in the West, or his own military breakthrough?

I'll start with recent events in France and several other European countries. Mass protests and serious social conflicts encompassing political and religious spheres have caused a security crisis in some European states. All this leads to the rise of right-wing and far-right parties seeking power in elections, primarily in Germany and France, and in other European countries.

This certainly plays into Moscow’s and Beijing’s hands, since the rise of the far right to power could mean severing relations with Ukraine and aggravating internal contradictions within the European Union and NATO. Many far-right parties demand withdrawal not only from the EU but also from NATO or at least limiting their countries’ participation in the Alliance.

Of course, this would seriously weaken pan-European security. Putin is certainly interested in stirring such sentiments and invests effort into this. In particular, data center resources on Russian territory contributed to boosting support for far-right parties on social networks and the internet in general. I mean the data centers of Yandex.

Through them, support for far-right parties was amplified in social media. Putin invested huge sums in stoking contradictions, anti-immigrant, anti-Ukrainian, and anti-European sentiments.

He will continue trying to undermine support for Ukraine. Putin hopes that sooner or later it will stop or become insignificant, and Ukraine simply won’t have the resources to continue the war. That is how he expects to achieve his desired outcome. This is his main plan.

Russian sabotage efforts were also involved in stoking support for far-right forces in Europe, including ahead of elections in Germany.

Russia carried out sabotage operations in many EU countries and beyond, including the United Kingdom. These included explosions and assassination attempts on heads of defense companies, including in Bulgaria. Many sabotage acts were committed in Germany, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia.

The Russians will try to expand this activity. This is part of the hybrid war that Putin spares no resources for, even without having finished the war against Ukraine. Seeing mass protests and rallies of left-wing movements and students in Europe, he will invest additional funds in supporting them and stoking conflicts.

Putin sees this as an opportunity to destabilize from within so that European countries eventually have neither the time, desire, nor funds to help Ukraine.

So Putin simultaneously plays to the far right and the far left—in other words, to extreme political camps. Can such marginal forces become part of national politics?

You mean the speech by Alice Weidel, leader of Alternative for Germany (AfD). Unfortunately, such statements are possible, since the rapid rise in AfD’s popularity in Germany already led to the party winning the state parliament elections in Saxony – so far in the first, but sadly not the last, federal state.

I say "sadly" because AfD coming to power would be a problem not only for Ukraine but for the whole European project. It could threaten Germany’s exit from the European Union, since AfD voters largely support limiting the country’s participation in the union or even full withdrawal.

I would not rule out a British-style scenario. However, British voters have already regretted the decision to leave the EU. Brexit cost the country far more than it gained. This was also the result of the popularity of far-right forces in the United Kingdom that pushed the country toward that scenario. We see how it ended.

Will this stop Germans from leaving the EU and the associated losses? I don’t think so. The engine of hatred is already spinning very strongly. One must admit AfD works well with electoral technologies.

The Saxony elections showed how skillfully the party’s political technologists used social media—primarily Threads, TikTok and Instagram—to attract young people and broaden their electorate. That paid off. AfD has a fresh image and is on-trend, unlike the traditional parties many Germans are already tired of.

Right now AfD skillfully works with public opinion. This is the result of pollsters—sociologists—who pick messages correctly to match the moods and wishes of German voters. In my view, AfD’s rise to power now looks almost inevitable. I also would not rule out Marine Le Pen’s victory in France.

I say this with regret, because then problems will arise for everyone, and very serious ones.

Will this trend scale up and not subside but instead spread?

It’s like a forest fire. At first the fire flared in one place, it couldn’t be contained, and now it’s reaching uncontrolled proportions. All these left-radical movements combined with extremist groups of migrants and shared religious views can sooner or later lead to serious consequences. This is an extremely explosive mix.

Many ordinary, respectable European residents—what you might call the bourgeoisie—seeing all this, will not delay in seeking an exit. They will seek salvation because for them this is a matter of security, business, and physical survival.

All the footage shown by the media and spread on social networks creates a sense of danger. People may get the impression that Europe is returning to the 1930-ies. Recall the fires and pogroms of that time, including Kristallnacht in Germany and the horrific crimes against the Jewish population.

These historical memories and fears are still alive. Paradoxically, they can again contribute to the rise of the far right to power.

I do not draw a direct parallel between AfD and the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP). Some may do that, but I do not. At the same time, AfD includes various representatives, including very toxic ones with Nazi-leaning views. The party itself is heterogeneous.

If we recall the NSDAP, at the beginning it wasn’t homogeneous in views either; it contained different currents. The name "National Socialist German Workers’ Party" reflected that among its early voters there were many poor citizens, ordinary workers.

Some of them supported communists and socialists, others supported the Nazis. That is, the electoral base could be similar, but the political choice was different. When voters incline toward extreme political forces—far left or far right—the reasons are often the same. Usually it is crisis, which then leads to social rupture and stratification.

Therefore, today’s situation in Germany in some respects resembles events of the 1920–1930-ies, and this is extremely dangerous. Again, there are no grounds to equate AfD with the NSDAP. These are different historical epochs, and Weidel is obviously not a figure on the level of Adolf Hitler. But we do not know which other leaders or even Führers could emerge within Alternative for Germany.

The new drone war and the situation on the front

We talked about foreign policy factors affecting the Russian-Ukrainian war. Now I’d like to talk about the front. We see that the Ukrainian army has tactical successes, although we understand Russia has a resource advantage. What prevents us today from turning local successes into a strategic breakthrough?

First, strategic-level operations require sufficient reserves. Right now such reserves are lacking both in the Defense Forces of Ukraine and in our enemy. A strategic breakthrough into depth is possible only with strategic reserves numbering roughly two armies.

That means accumulating 250 – 300 thousand servicemembers and having a sufficient concentration of fire assets to strike the enemy on a narrow section of the front. Fortunately, the enemy does not have such resources and is not expected to.

That is why the front has long been quite static. The extremely successful "Vivaldi" operation, and I say that without exaggeration, became possible thanks to a combination of factors.

First, it was a tactical idea implemented so that the enemy knew nothing about the operation’s preparation.

Second, the Defense Forces had a high level of situational awareness thanks to quality intelligence—human, aerial, and also reconnaissance conducted by our scouts and units along the front line.

An additional role was played by the element of surprise: the enemy was misled about the main strike direction. He expected an attack in one place, but the strike came in another.

This operation is most likely an exception. It covered a fairly wide front and produced significant results: territory was liberated and many Russian servicemen were captured.

I haven’t recalled an operation in which hundreds of enemy servicemen were taken prisoner. The last time was probably during the Kharkiv offensive. In the past four years prisoners were taken in groups, tens at a time, but not hundreds.

Most importantly, the enemy could not react in time to our actions. I repeat, this is rather an exception. The nature of war has changed so much that support features—fortifications, minefields—have become a serious obstacle to offensive operations.

Moreover, FPV drones work extremely effectively. Therefore, traditional tactical methods of 20th-century warfare, including mechanized assaults and the use of artillery and mortars, no longer produce the same results. Even snipers are no longer used in the same way on the front.

Why? Because the sniper himself becomes a target. Once he takes position to shoot at up to two kilometers, he sooner or later gets detected. Even if he completes the task, they can find him, determine his location, and destroy him. Everything has changed.

So there is no strategic breakthrough primarily because of a lack of reserves—neither in us nor in the enemy. At the same time we control the situation locally. Putin claimed Russia occupied 6,5 thousand square kilometers of Ukrainian territory, although by my data it’s actually 144 square kilometers. That is 45 times less.

That’s the real result of Russian claims. Does Putin believe in his victory? Yes, he continues to believe because his generals reassure him. They tell him they can achieve a strategic breakthrough, destroy the Armed Forces of Ukraine and reach the Dnipro along its entire length, not only in Kherson region.

After that, according to their plans, there would be a breakthrough or an amphibious operation on the right bank. In other words, they tell Putin that Russia is capable of victory. It’s not just about taking the Donbas—he seeks control over all of Ukraine without exception.

Given the new concept of war you described, where does the enemy have the advantage today, and where do we outpace them?

Right now a tactical equilibrium has essentially been established on the front. As one senior officer of the Armed Forces whom I respect says, innovations on the front live four days. We come up with something new, and the enemy quickly finds countermeasures.

They develop a new approach—we find a way to neutralize it. Tactical balance persists also because the sky is effectively filled with drones—both Ukrainian and Russian.

Electronic warfare works effectively in some places and fails to produce the desired result elsewhere. The reason again is that drones develop rapidly and switch frequencies. The only area where the enemy for now has an advantage is means of air attack, including cruise and ballistic missiles.

Russia has more such missiles and broader capabilities to use them for both precision and large-scale strikes. We cannot inflict large-scale missile strikes because we lack sufficient missile stockpiles. We can carry out a few such attacks using Western and domestically produced missiles, but after that supplies will be exhausted.

Russia, however, has continuous production that allows regular missile use. This is one of the main enemy advantages. Another advantage is aviation.

Russia has significantly more bomber, fighter, and ground-attack aircraft than Ukraine. That is where we are at a disadvantage. In other components, including land and naval forces, we have achieved a certain parity and in some areas even an advantage. At sea we have effectively pushed out the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Approximately 30% of its ships are already at the bottom, and the rest are disabled or do not dare to go out to sea.

Strikes on Russian oil refineries and Russia’s economic vulnerability

Strikes on Russian refineries are a fairly effective lever of pressure in this war. The situation is not fully clear right now: how will Ukraine act further in this direction? Has Russia adapted to these strikes?

No, of course not. Otherwise why would Putin be spinning up Trump to demand that Ukraine stop strikes on Russian refineries? There’s the answer. Russia has not adapted. Even when Russians wrap their plants and tankers in nets, that ultimately does not help.

Our military engineers have already found ways to bypass such primitive protective measures. The enemy cannot fully protect their facilities, and they will not be able to going forward.

First, we have enough air strike assets in the middle strike and deep strike classes. Their production can not only be scaled up—it can continue to grow.

Second, Russia does not have enough air defense systems to cover all of its facilities. It produces a limited number of Pantsir-S1 systems, practically does not produce S-400 systems, and other air defense assets are dispersed across a huge territory. As they say, where it's thin, it rips.

Russia’s vast territory is not only its advantage but also an Achilles’ heel. It cannot protect everything. It can concentrate defense around specific objects, such as the Crimean Bridge and Moscow. But even those, as we see, are reachable by Ukrainian strike means.

The only question is the advisability of using scarce cruise missiles. Such decisions are made by the commander-in-chief and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s Staff. If they see a need, they will act accordingly.

We have enough means to strike critically important infrastructure, including the Crimean Bridge. I am convinced that at the right moment the corresponding decision will be made.

Can these strikes and their continuation break Putin’s strategic calculations?

Of course. First, strikes on refineries reduce revenue to the Russian treasury. Second, the Russian economy is resource-dependent: the country’s main income comes from selling raw materials. Russia has not created something exceptional that could replace these revenues. It sells oil, gas, and also stolen Ukrainian grain. So strikes on oil infrastructure weaken its economic capabilities.

Moreover, that means less diesel, gasoline, and aviation fuel for the Russian army. All of this works to weaken Russia. At the same time strikes create a sense of instability among the population. Russians see that the so‑called "special military operation" has come home to them. All this significantly weakens the Kremlin.

When you say Russians feel the consequences of the so‑called "SMO" at home, recall recent events in Saint Petersburg and Moscow when air traffic was halted for hours or sometimes several days at airports. Is that part of operation M&M's or something else?

Officially no one named the operation that—journalists used that name. I don’t know if it’s M&M's, Twix, or something else. The most important thing is the result. As they say, the result is on the scoreboard, including on the boards at Moscow airports.

When you see signs saying "canceled," "canceled," "canceled," "delayed," that is the result. We can do this, we do it, and we will continue to do it as long as necessary. The president warned Russia about this. And we have no reason to refuse such actions.

Russia is destroying our energy infrastructure that should prepare cities for winter. So why should we worry about its problems, including that Russians need to fly somewhere?

Russia is a huge country that cannot fully function without aviation. This transport system was formed in Soviet times. Therefore, problems with air transportation are very serious for it and not easy to solve. Let me explain why.

Some say Russia has vast territory, but where is the single federal highway that connects Moscow or Pskov with Vladivostok? It doesn’t exist. There are separate road sections, and between them there are gaps, dirt roads and forest routes. You can travel the country by rail, but such a journey can take a week, and the route is not always direct.

Therefore aviation is an extremely important component of Russia’s transport system. If its operation is disrupted, not only passenger but also cargo transportation is destroyed. When aerodromes and airports stop working, Russia’s transport system takes a severe hit.

Moreover, air routes in Russia are built so that a significant portion passes through Moscow or Saint Petersburg.

Yes, and this system is often unprofitable. To get from one city to another, you sometimes have to fly first to Moscow and then from there to your destination. If the four Moscow airports or Saint Petersburg airports stop operating, the usual scheme ceases to function. This disrupts air connections between regions and creates problems for the entire transport system.

Scenarios to 2027 and the likelihood of a coup in Russia

At the end of our conversation I listed three potential scenarios for 2027: a turning point in favor of Ukraine, a protracted war of attrition, or a dangerous Russian success. Which of these do you think is most likely?

First, let me repeat: ending the war requires fulfillment of certain conditions. This could be either one side’s defeat or complete exhaustion of its resources. Putin’s main bet in the war against Ukraine is on exhaustion.

Is Russia’s exhaustion possible? Yes, if it loses the ability to sell its resources abroad, primarily hydrocarbons. That could happen for various reasons.

In addition, an end to the war in the Middle East could eventually cause a drop in oil and gas prices and therefore a significant reduction in Russian revenues. I do not believe in a rapid fall of the Kremlin regime. As an analyst, I currently do not see prerequisites for that.

This regime has proven far more resilient than the Soviet one, in part because it has no ideological constraints. The Soviet Union collapsed partly because people realized you cannot lie forever. You cannot promise the victory of communism endlessly when 99% of the population lives in poverty and one percent has special rations and rides in black Volgas.

Today's Russian authorities have combined the worst of the Soviet Union with new mechanisms of control. It is basically a gangster Soviet state built on lies, killings and violence, but without the need to adhere to communist ideology.

At the same time, a system of total control—whose scale exceeds even the former KGB’s capabilities—helps the regime hold onto power. However, the system remains vulnerable, which was demonstrated by Prigozhin’s mutiny and march on Moscow. So the basic scenario I would call a possible coup involving security services and the military.

It could become a reality if Russia suffers a serious military defeat or if it becomes obvious that prolonging the war only multiplies losses and does not bring the desired result.

Prigozhin showed the direction a scenario for forceful dismantling of the current Russian state could take. A military coup or even the forcible removal of Putin does not look inevitable now, but such events may become possible when Russia faces very serious, primarily economic, problems.

One should not forget Russia’s internal contradictions related to ideology, national questions and religion. Xenophobia, hatred of other religions and humiliation of representatives of other nationalities can sooner or later play a role.

I would not expect a rapid collapse of Russia. Rather it is a slow decay of the system that could eventually reach a bifurcation point—a moment when a certain explosion or crisis triggers its collapse.

Whether this happens quickly or slowly is another question. But in my opinion, the process will be long, and its horizon may be measured in decades.

This interview was shortened, corrected, and edited for better audience understanding.