Diplomacy at Long Range: Ukraine’s Indo-Pacific Course

From North Korean munitions for Russia to Japanese technology and Australian support — the Indo-Pacific region increasingly affects Ukraine’s resilience. How can Kyiv weaken the aggressor’s resource base, strengthen partnerships, and open new economic opportunities?

This article will attempt to outline Ukraine’s policy priorities in the region and paths to turn diplomatic agreements into concrete defense, trade, and technological results.

(continued) — turning diplomatic agreements into concrete defense, trade, and technological results.

The Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions

The importance of the Indo-Pacific region for Ukraine is defined by its impact on the material capacities of both sides of the war. North Korea supplies Russia with arms and manpower, Chinese suppliers help sustain its defense production, and Asian energy buyers provide export revenues. At the same time, Japan and Australia have already integrated support for Ukraine into their own security policies. These links are documented in international monitoring reports, energy statistics, and intergovernmental documents, for example in the MSMT report, the Washington Declaration of NATO, the EIA analysis, the Ukrainian-Japanese agreement, and in an Australian government statement.

For Kyiv, this means its policy in the region must directly contribute to Ukraine’s defensive resilience. Its effectiveness should be evaluated by three criteria: how much it restricts Russia’s access to resources, how it expands support for Kyiv, and how it creates economic and technological ties capable of outlasting the war.

At the same time, the link between European and Asian security should not be turned into an assertion that war in Asia is inevitable if Ukraine is defeated. Decisions to use force depend on the local military balance, domestic politics, and the expected reaction of allies. Ukrainian experience influences those calculations: it allows assessment of the effectiveness of sanctions, the endurance of international coalitions, and the capacities of a state defending itself against a stronger adversary. It is through such mechanisms that the consequences of the war extend beyond Europe.

Signing of the Agreement on Support for Ukraine and Cooperation between the Government of Japan and Ukraine, 13 June 2024 year

DPRK: countering military cooperation with Russia

The North Korean direction differs from other regional relations by the DPRK’s direct involvement in the war against Ukraine. In the first report of the Multilateral Monitoring Sanctions Taskforce — MSMT, published 29 May 2025 year — citing information from participant states, it noted the transfer to Russia of more than 20 thousand containers with munitions and related materials since September 2023. The report also mentions the deployment of more than 11 thousand North Korean personnel in late 2024. These are estimates for the period covered by the document and should not be presented as current cumulative totals.

The significance of these supplies lies in their ability to offset Russia’s resource constraints. External deliveries of munitions allow Russia to maintain the intensity of combat, while the involvement of additional personnel expands the Russian command’s options. Therefore, Ukrainian policy toward the DPRK should be linked to a concrete objective: raising the cost and complexity of sustaining the Russian military.

Opportunities for international pressure, however, are limited. 28 March 2024 year Russia blocked the renewal of the UN expert panel’s mandate that monitored enforcement of sanctions against the DPRK. That did not abolish the sanctions themselves but weakened the mechanism for monitoring them. The MSMT created in October 2024 became a separate multilateral response to this problem. Thus, a strategy built mainly on awaiting new UN Security Council decisions will depend on the consent of the state that benefits from the violations.

A practical Ukrainian contribution could be systematic documentation of the weapons used, their components, and the supply chains involved. Such materials are needed for sanction decisions, export investigations, and establishing responsibility for specific crimes. A realistic goal is to complicate the activities of intermediaries and access to international financial and transport services. Promising to completely cut off cooperation between two neighboring states solely through sanctions would be unjustified.

Fragments of the missiles that struck Kharkiv on 7 February 2024 year are North Korean HVASON 11GA missiles (KN-23).

Reverse transfers also require attention. The MSMT report contains information on Russian assistance to North Korean air defense and assessments regarding transfers of electronic warfare equipment. This provides grounds to speak of increased DPRK military capabilities. Claims about transfers of nuclear or submarine technologies, however, require separate evidence and cannot be inferred automatically from military partnership.

South Korea: a shared threat and limits to convergence

Moscow–Pyongyang cooperation creates a concrete basis for Ukraine–Korea security dialogue. Ukraine gains information on the use of North Korean arms and troop training in a real war. For Seoul, these data can complement its own assessments of the adversary: technical characteristics of systems alone do not explain their reliability, modes of use, and adaptation to combat conditions.

However, a shared threat does not guarantee identical political choices. Ukrainian diplomacy must take into account Seoul’s counterargument: more active support for Kyiv could prompt additional Russian assistance to Pyongyang. The response should be a comparison of the risks of both options, including the consequences of unobstructed development of Russian–North Korean cooperation.

An industrial basis for dialogue is significant. According to SIPRI, in 2021–2025 years South Korea accounted for 47% of Poland’s imports of major types of weaponry. This indicator reflects the volume of transfers by SIPRI methodology, not the share of contract value. It demonstrates the scale of already established ties between the Korean defense industry and the European market, though it does not prove available production capacity for Ukraine.

Presentation of the K-NIFV IFV at the Seoul ADEX exhibition 2025. K-NIFV (Korean Next Infantry Fighting Vehicle) is a next-generation South Korean infantry fighting vehicle from Hanwha, developed taking into account lessons from the contemporary Russo-Ukrainian war.

Therefore, cooperation should be built in stages. The first level could be regular consultations, technical study of DPRK weapons, and joint threat assessments. Next could be projects in infrastructure protection, demining, communications, and counter-UAS. Larger defense programs will require separate political decisions, financing, and coordination of export conditions.

China: influence on Russian production and Ukrainian dependencies

In relations with China, Ukraine faces a dual task: limiting support to Russia’s war economy while preserving the possibility of mutually beneficial cooperation.

Trade illustrates the scale of this duality. According to the National Institute for Strategic Studies, in 2025 year trade with China amounted to nearly 21 billion USD, or 16,8% of Ukraine’s external trade in goods. At the same time, Ukrainian imports from the PRC reached 19,2 billion USD, according to the State Customs Service’s year-end summaries. Machinery, equipment, and transport accounted for 69,8% of commodity imports from China, as noted in the NISS study.

From this ratio follows that economic interdependence is asymmetric: for Ukraine the Chinese direction primarily supplies a significant volume of necessary deliveries, while Ukraine’s ability to influence Beijing through its own demand is limited. Therefore, trade policy should aim to expand export opportunities and gradually reduce dependence on specific suppliers, aligning these tasks with the needs of Ukrainian production.

In the Washington Declaration of 10 July 2024 year NATO states called the PRC a decisive factor in enabling Russia’s war, linking this assessment to extensive support for Russia’s defense-industrial base and transfers of dual-use products. This is the Alliance’s official collective assessment; it does not substitute for proving the role of each specific company.

At the level of specific suppliers Ukrainian diplomacy can be most concrete. The demand “stop supporting Russia” needs to be turned into documented questions: what equipment did a particular company supply, through which intermediaries, for what production, and with what involvement of financial institutions. The presence of a foreign component in Russian weaponry is grounds for investigation, but by itself does not prove a manufacturer’s conscious supply to the Russian defense industry.

Putin and Xi Jinping exchange folders after signing documents in the Kremlin, 8 May 2025 year

The goal of such work is to create measurable commercial risks for the companies involved. Ukrainian materials will carry more weight if used by partners capable of restricting violators’ access to financial services, technologies, and major markets. This requires ongoing coordination of sanctions and export decisions.

At the same time, critical domestic dependencies should be reduced. According to the International Energy Agency, in 2024 year China produced about 94% of the world’s output of sintered permanent magnets in the rare-earth production chain considered by the agency. Concentration at the processing and component-manufacturing stages means that having deposits outside the PRC does not automatically ensure independent supply of finished products.

For Ukraine, this is an argument for auditing components on which defense production depends. Diversification should begin with items whose cut-off would halt an entire production line. Those require alternative manufacturers, verified substitutes, and economically justified stockpiles. A blanket rejection of Chinese products without ready alternatives could raise costs and worsen supply for Ukraine’s own forces.

Japan: turning political support into long-term capacities

Japan has grounds to occupy a central place in Ukraine’s regional strategy. The Agreement on Support for Ukraine and Cooperation of 13 June 2024 year recorded more than 12 billion USD of aid already provided and pledged since March 2022, including support of 4,5 billion USD in 2024 year. These sums should not be equated with funds already transferred. The document also enshrined a long-term framework for interaction in security, reconstruction, and reform.

At the same time, the trade component remains distinctly asymmetric. According to UN Comtrade data cited by Trading Economics, in 2024 year Ukraine exported to Japan goods worth 37,88 million USD and imported from Japan goods worth 948,26 million USD. Their total is about 986,1 million USD in trade turnover, but Ukrainian exports covered only about 4% of imports. Over half of Japanese deliveries were transport vehicles; optical and medical instruments also featured prominently.

In 2024 year aluminum held the top position in the list of Ukrainian exports to Japan.

Thus, the scale of political support has not yet translated into a commensurate presence of Ukrainian goods in the Japanese market. Practical tasks could include helping Ukrainian companies with certification, finding distributors, and entering Japanese supply chains. At the same time, procurement of Japanese equipment for reconstruction should be linked to training Ukrainian specialists, local servicing, and, where economically justified, localization of certain production operations.

Kyiv’s next task is to turn this framework into programs with clear results for both sides. Ukraine can offer experience in protecting energy infrastructure, rebuilding infrastructure under fire, and rapid adaptation of unmanned systems. But the value of such experience depends on its systematization. A partner needs validated data, testing methodologies, training materials, and an understanding of which solutions can be applied in its conditions.

For Japan, the distinction of operational theaters matters. A solution effective on the Ukrainian front will not necessarily work over long maritime distances or in island-defense conditions. Therefore, a promising field of cooperation is joint testing and adaptation of technologies to different environments.

The legal framework has also changed. After rule revisions in 2023 and 2024 years, the Japanese government 21 April 2026 year again updated the Three Principles on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and the rules for their application. Individual screening of transfers and end-use controls remain. Therefore, opportunities for cooperation must be defined under current rules and the parameters of each specific project.

Practical starting points could include several programs: robotic demining, protection of energy facilities, resilient communications, and components for unmanned systems. Each requires identified customers, financing, intellectual property protection regimes, and testing procedures. Labeling a product as “dual-use” alone does not resolve permission issues.

For Japanese business, Ukraine’s offer should also include management of wartime risks: insurance, phased investment, protection of production data, and capacity reservation. Without this, even a politically supported project may remain a memorandum.

Australia: building on an existing defense partnership

Australia should be considered a distinct priority. In a government statement of 19 June 2026 year, total support for Ukraine, including announced commitments, exceeded 1,8 billion Australian dollars, of which more than 1,6 billion was military assistance. The document also confirmed participation in training Ukrainian forces and financing procurements through the PURL mechanism.

President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese signed a bilateral security agreement, discussed energy and humanitarian support for Ukraine, and cooperation on unmanned systems. 23 September 2026 year

Trade ties also deserve a separate place in this partnership. According to Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in 2025 year bilateral trade in goods and services amounted to 611 million Australian dollars: Australian exports to Ukraine — 521,7 million, and imports from Ukraine — 89,3 million. This figure covers services and is presented in Australian dollars, so it should not be directly compared with partners’ trade turnover in US dollars. For Kyiv, a practical priority could be expanding Ukrainian deliveries through long-term contracts, working with local distributors, and joint technological services. That would give economic interaction its own basis, able to sustain the partnership outside aid programs.

This creates a basis for shifting from discrete packages to predictable multi-year programs. Ukraine’s interest lies in stable financing, training, and capacity support that require long-term planning. Australia’s interest could be systematic access to generalized lessons of modern war and the results of deployed equipment.

Possible next areas include joint research on countering drones and resilience of military logistics. The choice of specific programs should be based on the needs of both defense ministries so cooperation does not remain a general exchange of experience.

Southeast Asia: tailored proposals for different partners

Southeast Asia cannot be treated as a single political interlocutor. A telling example is Singapore’s decision, announced 5 March 2022 year, to impose financial and export restrictions on Russia. It creates a concrete basis for dialogue on control of operations and countering circumvention of restrictions.

Embassy of Ukraine in Singapore

Singapore’s economic role should also be assessed through opportunities for Ukrainian businesses to reach other regional markets. The Ukrainian embassy highlights it as a platform for working with ASEAN. Alongside direct exports, Ukraine’s offer could include cooperation with trading companies on selling food, organizing shipments, and financing contracts. In that case, effectiveness should be measured not only by bilateral trade but by the volume of Ukrainian goods that find buyers in third countries through these commercial links. That would concretize the economic content of Ukraine’s presence in Singapore.

For the Philippines, maritime security is a promising theme. However, analogies with Ukraine require precision. The arbitration decision of 12 July 2016 year concerned maritime rights and the application of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; it did not determine sovereignty over islands nor delimit boundaries. Ukrainian support for its implementation can be based on defending legal mechanisms for dispute resolution.

Practical cooperation with Manila could begin with port protection, unmanned systems, and preparation for disruptions of communications and supply. Proposals should take into account that countering coercion below the threshold of open war requires different measures than destroying military targets in full-scale combat.

The trade dimension of relations with the Philippines has a distinct agro-food basis. In a State Service for Food Safety and Consumer Protection statement of 26 March 2026 year, promotion of Ukrainian grains, berries, fruits, and vegetables was reported, along with agreed access for poultry meat, processed poultry products, and pork. At the date of the statement, procedures for meat products were still ongoing, so this direction should be seen as work to expand exports.

Head of the State Service for Food Safety Serhiy Tkachuk met with the Philippines’ Secretary of Trade and Industry Maria Cristina A. Roco to discuss development of bilateral trade and economic cooperation in the agro-industrial sector and expanding the presence of Ukrainian products in the Philippine market. 26 March 2026 year

For Ukrainian diplomacy the concrete task that follows is to accompany the agreement of requirements, accreditation of producers, and establishment of contacts with buyers. Combining this work with reliable maritime logistics would tie Manila’s trade interest to Ukrainian proposals on port and supply security.

Regarding Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand it is advisable first to identify a few projects in each country with confirmed demand. For testing one could propose directions in food logistics, agricultural processing, demining, infrastructure resilience, and technical maintenance of equipment. Final selection requires analysis of procurement plans, local partners, and competitors. A list of Ukrainian competencies alone does not prove the existence of a market.

For Indonesia and Vietnam trade ties already provide a material basis for this approach. According to the Indonesian ambassador to Ukraine cited by Interfax-Ukraine, in 2024 year bilateral trade amounted to 785,1 million USD, rising by 43,3%; main flows included Ukrainian grain and Indonesian palm oil, margarine, and coffee. In relations with Vietnam the Ukrainian embassy reports trade of 1,161 billion USD in 2025 year. At the same time, data for 2024 year show a significant volume of Ukrainian imports from Vietnam — 620,21 million USD.

These figures suggest different emphases: with Jakarta it makes sense to strengthen food contracts and logistics, while with Hanoi — alongside procurement, expand the presence of Ukrainian manufacturers so trade growth creates opportunities for both sides.

In relations with Malaysia and Thailand it is also worth building on existing exchange. According to the Malaysian government, in January–September 2024 year trade with Ukraine amounted to 640,33 million Malaysian ringgits, up 151,2% versus the same period of 2023 year. The first meeting of the joint trade committee on 1 November 2024 year covered agricultural trade, palm oil, aerospace technologies, and medical devices. Trade turnover with Thailand in 2024 year exceeded 449 million USD, according to the Ukrainian embassy citing the State Customs Service; Ukraine had a trade deficit.

For both directions a practical continuation could be agreeing conditions for access of Ukrainian food products, finding processing contracts, and assessing opportunities for industrial cooperation. Such a sequence allows testing demand before allocating resources to large programs.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba during a visit to Cambodia signed an Instrument of Accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia at the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh. November 2022 year

The institutional basis of relations already exists: 10 November 2022 year Ukraine signed the instrument of accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. The task is to fill this interaction with regular consultations and sectoral programs. Accession to the treaty itself is not equivalent to obtaining ASEAN dialogue partner status.

For the region as a whole Ukrainian arguments should combine support for sovereignty with interlocutors’ practical interests. Demanding alignment through confrontation with major powers can narrow cooperation space. A concrete proposal on port security or reliable food supplies creates more opportunities for sustained engagement.

India: separating energy, defense, and political logic

In relations with India it is necessary to distinguish several types of ties with Russia. Oil purchases, operation of Russian equipment, and diplomatic interaction have different incentives and different possibilities for change.

Ukraine’s own trade interests in India remain significant. According to the Ukrainian Embassy in India, in 2025 year trade amounted to 2,61 billion USD, and Ukrainian exports — 857 million USD. About two-thirds of Ukrainian deliveries were sunflower oil; among imports from India the embassy highlights mineral fuel, petroleum products, and pharmaceuticals.

Thus, bilateral economic interaction matters both for Ukrainian agro-processing and for domestic market supply. At the same time, concentration of exports in a single commodity makes revenues sensitive to prices, competition, and maritime transport disruptions. Therefore, Ukrainian strategy could combine consolidating positions in vegetable oil markets with expanding the range of exports and cooperation in processing. The origin of imported petroleum products requires separate attention due to India’s purchases of Russian feedstock.

The scale of the energy factor is significant. According to the US Energy Information Administration, Russian deliveries of crude oil and condensate to India rose roughly from 50 thousand barrels per day in 2020 year to 1,7 million in 2024 year. This shows how important the Indian market became for reorienting Russian exports.

However, Ukraine cannot single-handedly offset India’s economic incentives to buy Russian feedstock. Influence on this direction requires coordinated policy with partners who have weight on energy, financial, and transport markets. Bilateral Ukraine–India dialogue can support such work, but its capabilities should not be overestimated.

In the defense sphere the dynamics are different. According to SIPRI, Russia’s share in India’s imports of major weapons decreased from 70% in 2011–2015 years to 40% in 2021–2025 years. This indicates diversification of new supplies but does not imply a corresponding reduction in dependence of the existing equipment fleet on maintenance and spare parts.

At the MiG-29 production facility in Moscow.

Ukrainian opportunities should be sought in specific segments where production, engineering competencies, and the ability to fulfill a contract remain. The joint Ukraine–India statement of 23 August 2024 year already envisaged development of defense cooperation, including joint projects and production. Further diplomatic work must turn these provisions into technically and financially prepared proposals.

The argument about Russia drawing closer to China can be part of this dialogue, but its persuasiveness should not be taken for granted. New Delhi may view maintaining ties with Moscow as a way to check further Moscow–Beijing rapprochement. Therefore, Ukraine’s offer must have independent practical value — regardless of whether India shares Ukraine’s assessment of Russia–China relations.

How to turn regional priorities into a strategy

Ukraine has limited diplomatic and financial resources and therefore needs sequencing of actions. Japan and Australia provide a basis for deepening already established support. South Korea — for specialized security cooperation. The China direction requires combining dialogue with countering supplies to the Russian defense industry. India and Southeast Asian states — tailored proposals that consider their interests and do not depend on full political alignment with Kyiv.

Implementation requires a limited portfolio of priority projects. Each should include a Ukrainian need, an interested partner, a responsible institution, a funding source, necessary permissions, and an expected result. the MFA should ensure political advancement while defense and economic ministries and enterprises should confirm the proposal’s feasibility.

Special preparation is required to use combat experience. It should be turned into protected research programs, training courses, and joint trials. Cooperation conditions must preserve Ukrainian intellectual property and secure Ukraine a share of future economic benefit. Otherwise, transferring knowledge could strengthen foreign producers without corresponding development of domestic industry.

Effectiveness of such a policy can be measured by funded production volume, the number of critical components with verified alternative supply, completed contracts, and sanction decisions adopted based on Ukrainian evidence. These indicators link diplomatic presence to the country’s security.

The Indo-Pacific direction should become part of Ukraine’s overall foreign policy strategy: helping secure defense, reduce the aggressor’s resource base, and shape long-term economic opportunities. Its weight will be determined by the ability to turn distant partnerships into concrete Ukrainian capabilities.