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Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
The ceasefire in Oleksky appears not to have been a step toward a broader truce, and humanitarian agreements do not guarantee that Russia will stop using them for its own interests. At the same time, negotiations between Washington and Moscow could create new risks for Ukraine—up to behind-the-scenes decisions about its future.
Diplomat Vadym Prystaiko, in an exclusive interview for 24 Channel, explained why the key to a ceasefire remains in Putin’s hands, what role Melania Trump could play in this process, and whether Ukraine has real prospects of joining NATO.
What lies behind the local ceasefire in Oleksky
Let’s start with the localized ceasefire in Oleksky, which operated from 27 October to 1 November. It was the longest such ceasefire since the start of the full-scale invasion, and both sides adhered to it. Can this experience be scaled to other front-line areas?
First, I don’t want to seem ungrateful to all the partners who contributed to making this happen. This is really a serious event. There is a moment here to realize that this humanitarian initiative is very commendable, and it is good that it happened.
But on the other hand, we cannot afford to fall into euphoria. Something may follow this, or nothing may follow. Or worse, as with the Minsk Process: we had about twenty different peace initiatives of this kind, where a ceasefire was announced, including a ceasefire along the entire front line. And, unfortunately, it did not always translate into something further.
I hope that the lessons from our past experience are taken into account, and this is only the first step toward a network of such local ceasefires that theoretically could develop into a continually active situation.
Full version of the conversation: watch the video
Could such local agreements become the first step toward a broader ceasefire?
Yes. You are just formulating what diplomats call confidence-building measures. When the sides are entrenched in war, confrontation, aggression, and killings for obvious reasons, it is hard to imagine that they can trust each other enough to stop killing at a local point. And these steps are the first.
There is a whole science about how to restore trust between the warring sides. It is not always ideal for the side that has become a victim of aggression, as we have. Because as a result of such agreements, it seems both sides become equally positive.
You know how recently Vitkoff called Putin a humanitarian. That’s exactly the situation where we can end up in an uncomfortable story, when we are forced to stay silent about something so that such ceasefires continue, so as not to anger those who have done so much to make them possible. For example, the First Lady.
Why did the Russians agree to these localized ceasefires?
Clearly, it is no secret that on the third the election campaign begins. And, you know, perhaps this is not entirely fair to the American side, but from the United States’ point of view, for Russia it costs nothing to throw such a bone, a trifle.
So was this a kind of handout?
A handout that costs her nothing. But we see that Putin is quite purposeful, efficient, and disciplined, taking step by step actions to keep Trump in the warm bath of Russo-American relations.
There is a special person who travels and talks about trillion-dollar economic projects, tunnels under Alaska, and so on. There are people who say: look, perhaps we will soon move toward you. There are people who remind that Putin himself sends regards to the First Lady, thanks her for certain humanitarian initiatives that were unclear at the time. Now, please, a humanitarian initiative.
If Russians had a First Lady, they would probably want to show this themselves. But since she doesn’t exist and in the absence of other options, they chose the best for themselves, presenting the American side with a humanitarian image. They did not offer it to the First Lady of Ukraine, did they?
Whose initiative was it—Russia’s or the United States? Did Moscow seek to involve Melania Trump?
Each of these people contributed to the tragic situation that has developed in this town. The question is that the key to a ceasefire, unfortunately, lies in Putin’s office, not ours.
The idea of stopping fire from the Ukrainian side we have already discussed; we understand where it leads. It is not working.
But the Russians can afford to pause the fire for a couple of days in order to demonstrate that they are humanitarians, especially to their own people. So this decision has many facets. But far more important now is that for Russia it costs the minimum.
Hostilities can resume with the next intensity, perhaps even greater. Moreover, you saw how deftly they maneuvered in terms of public relations, presenting the relocation of Ukrainians who went not toward Ukraine, but toward Russia. This is a very painful issue. But we are here, we are not going anywhere. This is the reality we must acknowledge and simply understand for ourselves and our partners, and explain.
Did Russia become partially the winner in the cognitive warfare around Oleksky? Russian propaganda media presented events as if all evacuees went to Russia, and Ukraine was shelling them. Who won this battle for the truth?
Assessment is formed based on expectations. If you look from inside Ukraine, the unconditional victory is the saved lives. You can tell yourself that any losses, even if they were media-driven, are not worth the lives saved.
Every person who, while saving lives, went toward Russia or the occupied territories—whatever the reasons—is, without a doubt, a cold splash in the face for us and a reminder that we do not entirely understand the situation.
But again, I want to say: in this particular case we have no choice. We must save lives. The issue of PR is very important, but not primary. We could anticipate what steps would come from the Russian side.
We could have, as is usually done in such cases, determined the number of media from both sides. They agree that it will be no less and no more, exactly ten or one state channel. So all of this could have been, and probably should have been, considered. But again I want to say: in such a difficult situation, the leadership of the process remains with the side that conducts the aggression, i.e., currently Russia.
Could Putin begin offering such localized ceasefires on different front-line sections to use them for his own interests and obtain a tacit green light from Trump to continue the aggression?
By the way, when I said to take advantage, I meant purely from a PR standpoint. You saw the movement of troops, the delivery of ammunition, provisions. That is what we fought against. And the side that becomes a victim of aggression always, honestly, suffers losses—PR losses as well as military ones. They are not strategic, because our soldiers understand this.
But sometimes the military also need to be heeded on humanitarian issues. For example, the no less difficult issue of exchanging prisoners. Obviously, we very much want to exchange prisoners. Moreover, our weakness is that we value the life of each soldier more.
As a society we suffer; we call on our leadership. People are in the streets demanding Azovstal prisoners be released. It seems that the Ukrainian authorities are held responsible for why they are still in Russian jails. We are victims. We simply need to try to find the best exit from the worst situation.
The role of Melania Trump, the Pope, and humanitarian intermediaries
Is involving the First Lady of the United States in a localized ceasefire in a foreign war a historical precedent?
Well, I can say that involvement of first ladies is not new. Moreover, for example, in Ukraine there are also first ladies’ summits, where, of course, a significant portion of attention is given to various humanitarian issues. And obviously, due to the war, Ukrainian issues are included.
But such involvement of spouses is an old story, as is involvement of royal families. For instance, it is known that Queen Elizabeth II participated in military actions, serving as a driver of a medical vehicle. So for the elite it is important to show that they are part of the tragedy, part of the people.
This allows societies to better understand the elites; elites to better understand society and feel their involvement. And ultimately, decisions are made by the military.
You cannot sit in some azure castle high up on a hill and be detached from the nightmare happening on the front, making decisions without considering all, even humanitarian, aspects. It’s not just a war of shells and tanks.
What I’m observing now is a war waged in people’s minds. Russians cannot defeat us on the battlefield, we see that. And therefore steps like these now—look, it turns out that not only the wife of the American leader, not only the Pope, but Putin is a humanitarian.
But I do not see a narrative working about the Ukrainian president being a great humanitarian. There is a narrative in Ukraine that we are forced to stop fire to pull these people out. But this is not part of the widely known global narrative.
Could Melania Trump’s statement that this initiative can pave the way to peace indicate a more active role on her part?
We understand that our task is not to make Melania Trump more active, but her husband, right? And if everyone understands this, and Melania understands it, and her husband understands it, then he understands that through her involvement in these events, everyone will expect the next steps from the United States.
Agreeing that she will lead this process, it is not so important whether her private adviser actually did this. It is generally normal for this administration for external, effective managers to be involved, without full powers.
But, unfortunately, they resolve only local problems. This is the danger of what you ask: could this become a systemic campaign? It is hard to expect that this will evolve into something bigger if the task is a one-off event, involving effective but incidental people. The price of such questions is very high because you are not playing for the long term.
Don’t you think: well, what about a year from now—how many more towns like Oleksky? How many more people need to be evacuated from Oleksky or other towns? What resources are needed? Do we pool resources because this has to be on TV screens? Or do we plan to resettle these people?
Whatever thousands arrive, we cannot allow them to live in very modest conditions, even with limited financial means. Perhaps we should also talk with our European partners, recognizing how this will be used for PR by the enemy.
Let’s create conditions, a showcase, however you like. In short, this is a very complex job. One front is to work with the humanitarian feelings of Melania Trump and her husband, and with the group of people who support them before the elections. It’s obvious why all this is happening.
Is this also a strategy to play on President Trump’s ego?
Most of what is happening now, this spectacle, has only one viewer. That viewer sits in the White House.
Trump, Iran, the “diesel deal,” and transactional diplomacy
Could a new US military campaign against Iran again divert Washington’s attention from Ukraine?
Unfortunately, the most powerful country cannot stay on the sidelines. And all sides around it try to pull it to their side. They say Ukraine is getting drawn in. Trump himself criticizes us directly.
By the way, if you listen to Trump, he says fairly understandable things and often tells the truth that we simply cannot grasp, but which is absolutely correct. He says that Ukraine tried to drag Biden into its game. Obviously.
Our task was to have strong partners. We cannot buy the United States; we were forced to drag the whole country, but there is nothing wrong with that. Churchill tried to drag the United States into the war because he knew Britain could not defeat Hitler alone, and he achieved it. The same must be done now.
Tucker Carlson stated that the United States could strike Iran with nuclear weapons. If Trump restarts a full-scale military campaign against that country, will Ukraine be forgotten again?
First, Ukraine was never at the top of the expectations of this administration from the very beginning. The sense that Ukraine must be saved from the enemy, from the occupier, was not even an overarching idea of the entire administration.
Moreover, the stories that the United States gave Ukraine 350 billions and got nothing in return are simply painful to Ukrainian ears. Especially for those who understand that when the Soviet Union collapsed, we were trying to build democracy, even not in the European sense as we now understand, but in a presidential model of the United States.
And therefore distraction from anything—especially Iran—is happening at the expense of the Ukrainian issue. I’ll tell you more: looking at the screens now and seeing how effectively the Russians have used Melania Trump, I would not be surprised if the Iranian side does the same, reminding of the humanitarian catastrophe caused by bombardments in Iran.
Every war brings suffering. If a side can reach voters’ heads, it will resemble the Vietnam War for the United States. Then, under pressure from domestic circumstances, they had to withdraw. A smaller country could defeat a larger one only because public opinion at home grew that our war is unjust, inhumane, and so on.
How does Trump perceive a possible diesel deal with Putin and lifting sanctions? Does he not understand its political significance or does he knowingly take the side of Russia?
I think it’s not that he misreads it. The problem is that we misread him. The Trump who spoke about both sides of the conflict and all his words—we should simply have been ready. It would not be a diesel deal; it would be a potash deal with Belarus. Do you think that is better? The word “Russia” resonates with us more than “Belarus.”
And in reality, what they are ready to ask to lift sanctions on potash fertilizers because they need them—that is something we must understand. For us that is a certain step toward maturity. Some in Ukraine constantly remind that we live in a world of imagined forces that move the world, and we must face hard reality.
In this hard reality, our interests, as it turns out, do not play a major role for Trump.
But the idea that our president cares, seeks a ‘diesel,’ works for him. Countries sitting on this fuel will use this moment. This is Russia’s last attempt to maximize its political influence through oil. If there is no oil, Russia becomes a great desert.
You just noted all these perks that the Americans offer the Russians. Steve Vitkoff and Jared Kushner consider themselves professional unconventional diplomats—diplomats without portfolios, education, or experience. Let’s discuss their attitude toward Vladimir Putin. How often are such approaches like flattery used in negotiations to satisfy the other side? Do they work with Russians, or do they treat them as friends? Is there a strong transnational chemistry between them?
It’s hard to say whether there is, for example, interpersonal chemistry with Dmitriev and Kushner. Maybe. I won’t claim either way. Do they play, understanding that they need it? Obviously too. It would be worse if they did not play, right?
Is there chemistry with our leadership? There is less, but not because we are unable to detect it; sometimes we could use a bit more. Do you remember what happened in the White House. It could have been played differently, but the matter is that at the core this is something completely different. In this case, Ukraine is like a heavy burden, a suitcase without a handle that cannot be dropped because public opinion and American voters are on this country’s side.
You cannot renounce Ukraine. But this chemistry is also missing because there are not many components, particularly economic. What could they get from the Ukrainians? That unfortunate deal on resource sharing.
Which, by the way, no one implemented.
Well, this was clear to everyone except those who concluded it. First of all. Second, I will honestly tell you that competing over mineral resources, when there are two options for Americans—Russia or Ukraine—it's hard for us. Russia obviously has simply a larger stock of mineral resources. And if no one really intends to extract resources in Ukraine or Russia, then the argument that we have more in Siberia looks more convincing.
No one intends to verify this. If we as a society had a somewhat deeper memory, we would remind ourselves of previous American agreements on shale gas production. Americans wanted to enter the market. There were two fields we stopped at. And in general nothing happened. With corrupt bureaucratic methods we killed both projects. So this kind of economic interest for Ukraine never materialized.
Russians are no less corrupt, and probably even more so than Ukraine, no less bureaucratic, perhaps even more. But the dollar or ruble signs in the heads of businessmen like Kushner and Vitkoff play a bigger role than the opportunities we tell them about.
We have moved on to business deals. Let’s discuss what the Americans are offering the Russians. These are phenomenal things: 100 billions of dollars from European frozen assets that Europeans say they will never give to Russia. Americans are ready to pay this money simply for energy the ceasefire, not for a full end to the war. Also on the table are Lukoil’s foreign assets that could transfer to the orbit of President Trump and the people negotiating, joint business projects in the Arctic on mineral resources, and perhaps a future resumption of air travel. Don’t you think that the Americans in this poker game started showing all their cards even before the match began?
That is your assessment, and it is close to mine. In Ukraine it is prevailing. Indeed: instead of pushing hard and then letting go, the Americans chose another path—to grease the wheels, perhaps then everything will move faster. History will tell which choice was correct.
If Americans, as a result of this tactic, achieve success, we will all say it was successful. We won’t even know what would have happened if Americans helped suffocate the Russian economy as the Soviet Union once did.
We know exactly what happened then: the Soviet Union collapsed. Unfortunately, few in society—not only Ukrainian but also American—will remind Trump of his own words. Russia, the same, only now he offers us even more to buy. This has been tried many times.
Merkel tried to tie Russians to the West with so many important links. They simply do not understand that this is not in current Russia’s interest. Current Russia does not care about this, Putin does not care.
Perhaps, someday it would have worked against a different Russia. But now this is a stage of escalating escalation. You can counter it with sanctions. It could help Ukraine survive, so that Russian society understands: Ukraine has gone west.
Possible meeting of Zelensky, Trump, and Putin: chances and dangers
Let’s also discuss a meeting of the leaders. Many are talking about it now. The G20 summit in Miami. Trump wants to see Volodymyr Zelensky and Vladimir Putin.
Not exactly true. He did not say that he wants to see them. He said, “Well, why not? I’ll invite them.”
The Atlantic writes that this is a dream. He sleeps and dreams of bringing together the two leaders of the warring sides.
Perhaps, but to be fair documentarily, when asked by a journalist, “Will you invite him?”, he replied: “Well, why not? Why not a good idea?” He did not himself come up with the initiative, right? “I want President Zelensky to come, so I invite him to the G20.”
But still. For instance, can you imagine such a meeting format? Because Trump earlier suggested they might not be in the same room, in separate rooms. How could this look, and do you expect it could happen in the short or mid term?
It could definitely happen. If President Lukashenko gathered four presidents in the presidential palace in Minsk, including Hollande and Merkel, then it could.
Could this happen soon? It could happen as soon as Putin wants it. Because for obvious reasons we want it yesterday.
From Putin’s perspective, he does not want to agree to any meeting that could lead to any cessation of hostilities until he can secure minimal gains on the front.
He understands that during such a conversation President Zelensky will also make demands. Most likely, he will insist that today’s contact line is where everyone must stop.
Obviously, this does not suit Putin, so he will drag it out until he either realizes it will never happen and they must sit down to bargain, or, by sacrificing the life of the remaining forces he has, he will achieve this result and then agree.
And what do we hope for regarding this leaders’ level meeting? Could it be another empty gesture?
That is a great question. And will Trump force Putin to give something, not us?
I constantly remind that there is a fruit theory—the lowest hanging fruit. In English: low-hanging fruit. It means it is easier to reach an agreement or something if you pick the closest one.
And in this case, at these talks, it could happen that Ukraine itself becomes that fruit hanging the lowest from the tree. To achieve progress, the American president might consider who is easier to convince: Putin or to push Ukraine.
What we will not give you: Patriot missiles, we will block Starlink, we will take back residual data, and so on. And more: to Russia, we will dangle various perks, as you call them.
I fear that our focus on this one particular meeting could play a very bad joke on us.
And do we have the power to counter such knee-jerk coercion when we are pressed specifically, for example, when Elon Musk, one of the most influential people in the world, a billionaire who has the greatest power over us with Starlink, speaks against us publicly, when J.D. Vance is against us, when Trump takes Russia’s side? Who else in the White House remains not against us? Is it Redcliffe, Rubio?
I don’t think these people can stand up and say that they are on Ukraine’s side, right? Or in meetings held behind closed doors, would Rubio stand up there, bang his fist on the table, and say, “I will not allow Ukraine to be given up.”
Yes, probably that doesn’t work, because he has his own political interests in which Ukraine plays an important but not the main role. So we can only concern ourselves with our own fate.
In this context I would like to believe that, as we are discussing now, similarly in high offices on Bankova or elsewhere people sit and think that we use this as bargaining chip. That we put on the table what everyone contributes to the table and tries to trade with.
What is our moment, what would we agree to? Our compromise line where exactly does it run? President Zelensky sometimes says that we are ready to stop where we are. Ready in what sense?
Is this a military decision because these towns are defensive? Is it a political decision because we understand that if we go further, we will be pressured, seeing that we bow to pressure? Is it an economic readiness, because we still have the strength to resist, and soon there won’t be, if we do not agree?
I only pray that we work this out clearly, and we do not leave everything to charisma, awkwardness, media luck, or world pressure. I don’t think Putin will be that concerned.
Our arguments must, unfortunately, be very similar to his. That no, you cannot defeat us militarily, we have proven it and we will prove it again. No, behind us stands a people who understand how complex everything is.
That unity, supported by our partners who are not just partners but provide more than sixty percent of the budget, who have money, power, and political influence around the world. If you gather all this and someone among us can see the whole picture, then we have strength to resist.
Our argument should be our red lines, which we will concede one by one. We can give up this line if we reach, say, a ceasefire for a year and so on. This is an extremely complex diplomatic task. I hope it is being done.
That is exactly Vitkoff, Kushner—Americans—proposing different formulas. A demilitarized zone on both sides. But the key question is which side will it run toward? Some administration under Trump, a quasi-legal formula for Donbas, some partial withdrawal of forces on our side and on the Russian side. There are many such formulas. But in your view, how could our starting and final positions in negotiations look?
I won’t even venture now. For that, we would need substantially more data, for example about our military resilience. Maybe I misjudge how able our Armed Forces are to hold. I think they are able to hold now. I base this on that, but I may be wrong.
On the other hand, I don’t know the state of the Ukrainian economy, the state we are in. For example, looking at the faces of our ministers, at the expressions of people who, willingly or unwillingly, reveal anxiety and concern, you begin to think that perhaps the situation is even worse.
Maybe not. Maybe European partners will go toward us and say that this is a decisive moment. And let’s say, all right, three hundred billion, let’s persuade Belgium that there is nothing to fear in the future, and in one step show Russia that now three hundred billion will go not only to help Ukraine but also to weapons they sorely lack.
It’s not that we have weak cards. No, the cards are just spread across different hands.
Europe, NATO, and the coalition of the determined: what could work
Europeans, European allies. The conversation of Alexander Stubb, Norway’s Prime Minister Jonás Garra Støre with Vladimir Putin—an attempt to gain some agency at the negotiating table? Because Europe, as it didn’t want to be seen, is still not wanted at the negotiating table determining the continent’s fate.
It seems to me that it simply depends on how you look at it. If you view it critically, yes, it was actually criticized by Denmark, a neighboring country. Sweden said no one consulted with them.
And on the other hand, perhaps someone from residents of countries where the leaders who represented them thought, oh, look, we are a five-million-strong nation showing strength, Norway, wow.
In this particular case we should simply remind ourselves that after Germany, Norway took on the greatest burden, and it helps us. We should bow and not forget to thank in the morning, evening, and every moment.
If they, even for personal agency, do something, and it seems to us that it could be different, we must close our eyes and remember that partners sometimes have their own political interests. And as long as their interests align with ours, we must not forget that we are partners.
But in your view, will Europe at least have a seat at the final round?
I’m afraid not.
No?
Afraid not.
And who could represent them?
I think Europe will have a seat, but on our side. Just our chair, labeled “Ukraine,” will be European because our position will be formulated under the influence of our European friends.
Somewhere it will be softened under the influence of our European friends who will demand from us a certain diplomatic flexibility. Somewhere it will certainly be strengthened, because you see how Europeans come with money, weapons, political influence anyway.
We need to tell them now that you are at the table already, you are with Ukraine. Do you want it or not, Ukraine is approaching Europe. We will become an EU member. No matter what Rubio says, I believe Ukraine will become a NATO member.
And do you think Ukraine can become a NATO member?
We have no choice, because on this part of the planet there is nothing better than joining the Alliance. There is also the option of the CSTO, if you will, the Tashkent Pact. There isn’t much else in this part of the world.
Why do Russians constantly talk about their security being at risk? Because they understand that they cannot do anything with NATO. It’s like a stone, and they can’t go around it or move it.
NATO is admitting new members. This means only one thing: these members drop out of the CSTO’s future member list. Nothing else.
But precisely the issue of NATO will be at the negotiating table?
It will be. Definitely.
Will there be a formula for strategic partnership NATO plus Ukraine with joint exercises?
Absolutely. A hundred creative variants will be devised. Ukraine will be declared, perhaps, that it will take on obligations that it will not pursue, for a certain period of time, a goal of joining the Alliance as Americans say.
It will probably be necessary to promise that for a certain time we will not pursue the goal. Supporters of this course will tell us: “Ukraine is not wanted.” And I will constantly say that yes, if we say we do not really want it, we won’t be wanted.
It will be an endlessly long game in which the Russians must know that Ukraine is drifting in that direction. It will not succeed in anchoring us.
Crimea, LPR, DPR, Transnistria, Abkhazia, Ossetia—all are options to anchor in a state of uncertainty with the possibility of EU and NATO membership. It worked with us until they seized it. As soon as they seize it and name it for themselves, this anchor for them will be lost.
And these calming forces, or whatever you properly call them, the coalition of the determined countries. Will this coalition remain determined until the end of the negotiating process?
I would remind you that the very term “coalition of the determined” was linked to participation in the Iraq operation, which was devised to allow NATO countries that wanted to help one of their main allies—the United States—to go, but not the entire Alliance.
That is, not where decisions are made unanimously and anyone could block such a decision, but only by those willing to do so outside of the Alliance, while still being formal members.
What France and Britain want to achieve is exactly that idea: recognizing that there are countries—let’s call them by name—Hungary, Slovakia, and a number of others—who for various reasons will block decisions necessary for us in the Alliance.
That is why it was said that we remain steadfast members of the Alliance for collective defense; that is a different story. Our direct involvement in the war in Ukraine is our own personal story. We do not drag the entire Alliance.
This is all, undoubtedly, a political game, but this game allows Russia to understand that no, you did not manage to block key members of the Alliance from helping Ukraine, because they announced that we are capable of moving forward on our own, without waiting for what all thirty-two members will do at a single table in Brussels.
This interview has been shortened, corrected, and edited for better understanding by the audience.
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