"A Different Form" of Ukraine, According to Trump: Which New Territorial Borders Are Being Discussed?

Territorial questions remain the main stumbling block on the path to a potential ceasefire in Russia's war against Ukraine. On the eve of trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi, where Donald Trump's statements about a “reshaping of Ukraine” poured oil on the fire, journalist Korotko studied Kyiv, Washington, and Moscow positions, and analyzed which international scenarios — from Korean to Japanese — could theoretically be discussed.

The United States' rejection of its commitments under the Budapest Memorandum.

Trump's formulations clearly point to a change in the actual or legal borders of Ukraine. Since Trump speaks of nearing a deal ahead of the trilateral summit in Abu Dhabi (planned for 10–11 November), the change of the “form” could also involve such a concession: a renunciation and loss of control over the occupied regions. Under it, the country's geographical borders would shrink by exactly as much as Russia has occupied at that moment. In other words, it concerns renouncing Ukraine's territorial integrity as of 1991.

And in his words, Trump effectively signals that the United States is renouncing its internationally recognized legal obligations under the Budapest Memorandum, according to which the United States was a guarantor of Ukraine's territorial integrity as of 1991.

Ukraine is ready to talk at the leader level.

So far, Ukraine has categorically refused to discuss any questions of ceding territory. It is even impossible according to the Constitution itself. Article 2 of the Basic Law states: Ukraine is a unitary state, and its territory within existing borders is recognized as whole and inviolable.

Article 17 defines the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity as the state's most important function and the duty of all Ukrainian people. Article 73 notes that any questions about changing Ukraine's territory are to be resolved exclusively by a nationwide referendum. No state body (neither the president nor the parliament) has the right to unilaterally decide to alienate lands.

At the same time, according to Article 157, the Constitution of Ukraine cannot be amended in wartime or in a state of emergency if such changes are aimed at eliminating independence or violating the state's territorial integrity.

But now the negotiations are at an impasse. Kyiv has already dropped the taboo on discussing territory and moved exclusively to direct leader-level talks. “We are also ready to discuss territories, but at the leader level... Russia ties the issue of territories to the end of the war... But for this, meetings at the appropriate level are needed,” said President Volodymyr Zelensky.

Foreign Minister of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba emphasized: “Zelensky is ready to discuss the most difficult and delicate issues, including territorial,” in order to give negotiations a new quality at a personal meeting with Putin.

Russia continues to press its line of “reality on the ground.”

For Moscow, the red line is recognition by Ukraine and the West of the ‘realities on the ground.’ Russia has entrenched in its constitution the annexation of Crimea and the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions. Moscow’s demand is full control over these regions (including regional centers not yet occupied at that moment, such as Zaporizhzhia and Kherson) and an officially legal renunciation by Kyiv of them.

Three examples of geopolitical solutions.

A direct and internationally legally enshrined renunciation of territory is impossible and illegal. Therefore, theoretically, alternative international-legal formats with precedents in international geopolitics could be discussed. All of them are choices of the “best of the worst.”

The first is de facto “freeze” without de jure recognition (the “Korean scenario”). In this case a ceasefire line is fixed along the line of contact. A demilitarized zone under international observers is created. Ukraine does not recognize the territory as Russian. In documents it is marked as “temporarily occupied.” The border becomes a fortified demarcation line (like 38—a parallel between the DPRK and South Korea).

Second — the “Japanese option.” After World War II Japan lost control of the Southern Kurils (Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and Habomai), occupied by the USSR. But it never recognized and does not recognize Russia’s sovereignty over these islands, officially calling them its “Northern Territories.” The absence of a peace treaty did not prevent Tokyo and Moscow from developing economic, trade, and diplomatic relations for decades.

For Ukraine, this is the most acceptable compromise among the bad options. The ceasefire agreement could state that the parties undertake to resolve the territorial dispute exclusively by diplomatic means in the future, without the use of force. Kyiv retains a legal claim to the borders of 1991 as a reference for textbooks, cards, and international organizations, but agrees to peaceful coexistence and cessation of hostilities under current realities.

Third option — delayed status (“Hong Kong format” or the “Saara scenario”). The legal status of the occupied territories is “frozen” for a fixed term (for example, for 20, 50 or 99 years). During this time the territories remain under Russian control (or under a UN mandate), and after the term expires a legitimate international referendum under UN auspices should be held. This option is unlikely due to the Kremlin’s hard stance demanding recognition “here and now.”

Ukraine will categorically not agree to a “clear legal fixation of renunciation of territories.” The most likely outcome of Trump’s pressure is a “Japanese” or “Korean” scenario: a demilitarized zone appears, the front line is fixed, and a long-term diplomatic status quo is established, whereby Ukraine recognizes de facto loss of control but preserves de jure sovereignty.

Expert opinion.

Volodymyr Fesenko, political scientist:

- All of these options do not suit Ukraine at all. Japan lost the war with the USSR, lost the Kuriles, and there is still no peace treaty. Korean demilitarization came after the end of hostilities. Regarding Ukraine, there will be a completely different specificity. If there is one, it will be the Ukraine-specific scenario with its own specifics.

Practically, Trump’s words can be ignored — they are just words. And Zelensky’s suggestion of the possibility to discuss territorial issues at a leaders’ meeting is only a tactical maneuver, like many others. It is a way to lure Putin into such negotiations.

Realistically, both sides stand on diametrically opposite positions, and an agreement here is fundamentally impossible. De facto we are ready for a ceasefire along the front line, which means an unspecified period during which part of our territory will be under Russian control. But we will never legally recognize these territories as Russian.

An agreement is possible only on technical issues — discussing troop numbers along the front line, linguistic and religious questions. The last two for us would be an ideal option.