Kulbit of Trump: why the US withdrew promises on missiles for the Patriot and what Kyiv should do

Another shift in Donald Trump’s rhetoric wiped out hopes for rapid deliveries of missiles for the Patriot and for transferring manufacturing technology to Ukraine. While the White House cites depleted stockpiles, Kyiv must immediately build a strategy to defend its skies. Journalist Korotko pro examined why this happened, what hidden motives lie behind the White House’s refusal, and what alternative solutions Ukraine has right now.

From grand promises to a blunt refusal

Before Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s July visit to Washington, Donald Trump’s rhetoric seemed highly pro‑Ukrainian. According to The Wall Street Journal, the American president began publicly praising the Ukrainian military. And at the July NATO summit in Ankara, Trump directly promised on camera to transfer technologies and licenses for producing interceptors for the Patriot air defense system, while also endorsing strikes deep into Russia. Against that backdrop, the Ukrainian team traveled to the White House with a clear plan: after the “Coalition of the Willing” meeting 13 in July and the Washington visit 28 in July, to announce a request for 300 Patriot interceptors.

However, just three days after Zelenskyy’s visit all the promises evaporated. Trump publicly renounced the idea of transferring the technologies, calling them too secret, and officially rejected the request for 300 missiles. The White House pointed to Pentagon arsenals being drained by the conflict with Iran, where the US has already spent about half of its Patriot stock. Trump put the final stamp on it on 6 August at a briefing, shifting blame for the depleted stockpiles onto Joe Biden, and when asked about the deaths of peaceful Ukrainians shrugged cynically—saying the ocean separates the US from this conflict.

Why Trump turned around by 180 degrees

There may be a whole complex of reasons: from another attempt to coerce Kyiv toward peace by stripping it of powerful “trumps” to psychological factors experts call Trump’s “irrational affinity” for Putin.

So you cannot rule out a psychological factor in Trump and his subconscious attraction to authoritarian leaders. He perceives Vladimir Putin not as a dictator but as a “tough and smart player” who challenged the world order. In Trump’s understanding courting the Kremlin is more an agreement between equals, while he relegates Ukraine to the “third tier” of countries. The refusal to provide missiles became a covert bow to Moscow to demonstrate willingness to make concessions at Kyiv’s expense.

Recall that Trump previously said Kyiv had no “trumps” against Russia. And when those trumps materialized as successful drone strikes on Russian rear areas, Trump did not allow those strikes to be strengthened with Patriot missiles. It is possible this was a cynical calculation: destruction of Ukrainian infrastructure by Russian attacks might force Volodymyr Zelenskyy to be more conciliatory to Russia’s demands and to give up occupied territories.

But there may be another reason—rigid US economic protectionism. Arms giants Lockheed Martin and Raytheon opposed transferring licenses to Ukraine so as not to lose control over secret technologies and billion‑dollar contracts. At the same time, American military leaders may have persuaded Trump that amid escalation in the Middle East sending scarce interceptors to Kyiv would critically weaken US own security.

Trump’s swings send a harsh signal to act

The White House’s refusal is not a death sentence for Ukrainian air defense, but a hard call to action. Ukraine has repeatedly found asymmetric ways out of dead ends. Now the country’s leadership needs to reformat logistics and place bets on technological independence.

For example, moving air defense to a European standard. America is not the monopoly in antimissile systems. The Franco‑Italian SAMP/T system is a direct analogue of the Patriot. Thus Kyiv needs to intensify negotiations with Paris and Rome as much as possible. European leaders have a vital interest in stopping Russian missiles from reaching EU borders.

Next, Kyiv needs to step up an Asian vector for air defense systems. South Korea and Japan have the most powerful defense industries and advanced air defense technologies (for example, the KM‑SAM system). Seoul and Tokyo are deeply worried about a military alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang. Kyiv should use diplomatic channels to procure radars, optics, and microchips there, bypassing American bans.

Ukraine itself must also act preemptively inside Russia—incinerating Russian ballistic systems on the ground before launch. Shifting the war to Russian airfields will force the Russian air force to move deeper into the country, reducing strike intensity and depriving the enemy of the ability to use guided aerial bombs. So another of Trump’s somersaults is neither a catastrophe nor a reason to panic. On the contrary, it is a powerful incentive to discard illusions. Reliance on European systems, Asian components, and Ukraine’s own defense industry gives Kyiv a chance to protect its skies independently.

Expert opinions

Vitaliy Kulyk, international affairs expert:

- Trump now faces a brutal electoral deadline—the midterm congressional elections are less than three months away. He needs to present himself as an ultra‑strong leader and sell quick results to voters. That’s why he uses a “carrot and stick” tactic: first praising Kyiv to appease pro‑Ukraine Americans, then striking hard to placate the MAGA base.

The first round of peace talks could begin as early as September. Any minimal movement there Trump will present to Americans as “almost peace” for electoral triumph. Trump simply lacks real levers to influence Putin right now, so he puts pressure on Kyiv. No Patriot missiles means Ukraine becomes more vulnerable to Russian ballistic missiles. Therefore, by Trump’s measures, Volodymyr Zelenskyy should be more conciliatory in negotiations with Moscow.

Oleksandr Kovalenko, military expert:

- “Trump’s swing” is no reason to panic; we’ve had far worse situations. In the years 2022–2023 we had nothing to shoot down ballistic missiles with, yet we held on and stabilized the front. Now we have every opportunity to defend the sky ourselves. We can and must strengthen our passive and active defenses.

Kyiv is already negotiating with Paris and Rome to localize production in Ukraine of Aster‑30 missiles for SAMP/T systems (a direct analogue of the Patriot). At the same time, work must be accelerated to bring the domestic air defense system Freya to combat readiness and to scale up its production with European assistance. It is also necessary to push for diversification of interceptor supplies via Japan and South Korea, circumventing their strict legislation. That is about passive defense.

As for active, hard defense—we must begin a total hunt for Russian Iskander launchers, carrier aircraft for Zircon and Onyx missiles, and even burn out Russian factories and depots on the ground before launches.

After the destruction of Russian military factories, Moscow would immediately seek to diversify production through Beijing, which is ready to replace absolutely everything for Russia. Therefore it is critically important for Kyiv to intensify diplomatic efforts to cut off supplies of electronics and dual‑use products to the Russian defense industry.