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Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
Photo: Oleg Strugorianu
Aliona Shkrum
“I consider splitting this ministry a mistake”
Ms. Aliona, what will change if the Ministry of Development is split into two ministries? Especially considering it’s time to prepare for winter.
I consider splitting this ministry a mistake. At least because, before the heating season, before winter, we need the best possible coordination. You shouldn’t make changes that throw us off track. However, the government and parliament have already made that decision. I hope the two ministers will carry out the split quickly. Usually it takes up to 90 days, and we don’t even have 20. We all have to spend the winter in this country. How fast and how well the decisions are worked out will determine what the winter will be like.
What is the key challenge for the newly created ministries?
Both ministers now need to engage to the maximum and work ten times harder than if the ministry remained unified.
We saw the overall picture because we were responsible for regions and communities, housing, utilities, reconstruction and transport. We saw population movement on Ukrzaliznytsia, we saw problem spots, competition between different modes of transport, and chose how best to proceed. If there is a quality railway in a certain direction that we protected, then you don’t need to build a road there and open new bus routes. Strategically we saw the situation in the regions: which can cope, which cannot, who needs reinforcement, who needs help, where grants are needed and where loans are needed.
Now this will be divided. One minister will see the picture in regions and communities and local self-government as fully as possible, and the other will handle reconstruction, even though all reconstruction happens in communities and regions. I hope they will work together, and the prime minister will coordinate this, because many things will still be impossible without his help. However, that coordination will be much more complicated.
Photo: facebook/Ministry for Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine
A residential quarter on the site of a destroyed military town in Hostomel, July 2026.
How to split international programs, we don’t know yet. But there’s no point in whining, because the decision has been made, parliament voted. You have to grit your teeth and work.
Read also: Koretskyi’s government without Fedorov and Sybiga, protests with cardboard signs and disappointment in Servant of the People
How are things being handed over in the ministries after the appointment of new leadership? Is there continuity of the policies developed?
There is a bad tradition in Ukrainian politics: when a successor comes and you are dismissed — that’s it, documents are taken, your people are taken, everything is locked up, shredded, nothing is handed over. The attitude is: let them figure it out themselves, because we figured it out ourselves. During wartime you absolutely cannot do that, because it will lead to catastrophe.
When we arrived at the ministry, we couldn’t find and had to recreate some official documents: they had been lost or taken by someone. It was also difficult because after Oleksandr Kubrakov left, the ministry was without a minister for six months. There was no budget, no “transition book.” Donors didn’t want to communicate or sign anything new.
Now we are handing the ministry over in good condition. I gave both ministers the same information — they will divide it themselves. I gave the same information to the prime minister and his team, especially the things where the head of government’s help is needed.
How stable a foundation for early recovery has been formed? Which areas should the state prioritize, given that reconstruction will now be handled by two ministries?
We talk about reconstruction as a citizen need when a road, bridge, port infrastructure, schools, hospitals, kindergartens, housing are destroyed.
Photo: Zoryana Stelmakh
At the site of a shelling of an apartment building in Kyiv, 14 May 2026.
We have a colossal figure for housing destruction. If people have nowhere to live, they will first stay a bit with friends or relatives, and then they will go to Poland or Germany and not return. From the very start of the war it was important for us to tell all partners that you cannot wait until the war ends and only then start reconstruction. Because we will lose a colossal number of people — not six or seven million IDPs, but half of Ukraine. If in Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv, Chernihiv regions we do not restore housing, roads, bridges, heating and water supply, people will not be able to stay there, and that is exactly what Russia wants. Semi-empty cities are much easier to seize.
For us it was a priority to explain that we will restore all of this even under missile strikes. We will rebuild Kharkiv region at 30 kilometers from Russia because people need to be able to live there, rent apartments, pay taxes, develop businesses, open cafes — even now. They need insurance, cheap business loans, compensation via “eVidnovlennya” for damaged housing so they can repair it themselves and rebuild it with state money. We need that money. There is little of it in the state budget — it’s all going to the army — so we need it from donor countries.
“We restored loan programs, secured new grant agreements and for the first time spoke about the possibility of private investment”
How is Ukraine getting money for reconstruction? Who provides it?
There is a formed, not very public but effective donor platform. Members of the donor platform are all countries that have given us at least a billion dollars or at least 1% of GDP. Countries that gave slightly less than a billion are observers. This is a platform for communication between the prime minister, the minister and their deputies with partners about the most important matters.
At the start we had almost exclusively loan money left from previous years. There wasn’t much, and some loan programs were stopped. We said they need to be restored. It’s hard to repay loans now, but there are regions, communities and the state that can give guarantees that we will repay those loans.
Photo: Oleg Strugorianu
Aliona Shkrum and Olha Aivazovska
We also found many grants. The Japanese, for example, gave a large amount for communities — for reconstruction, heating, cogeneration units, getting through the winter. There are other programs that include a mix of loans and grants. And there are private investments. We needed to use all of that.
Private investments are only beginning now. We made a leap from the start of the war, when all partner states and business expected the war to end and thought they would come in when there were no Russian drones and missiles. That happens in an ideal world, but we see that the war may not end so quickly, and we need to keep people and rebuild the economy now.
We restored loan programs, obtained new grant agreements. At each conference we signed 20–30 new agreements that need to be “unpacked.”
For the first time we attracted private investments into reconstruction through risk insurance. If you are a large honest European business, you probably won’t want to enter Ukraine unless someone insures your war risks. Now that possibility exists. We achieved that European companies will have war risks insured, and now we need to give them projects to invest in.
We worked on all these processes for the last 600 days so that all four mechanisms — grants, loans, combinations of them and private investments — could come to us. To convince partners that reconstruction must start now, not later. This work took more than a month at the level of the president, the prime minister and our ministry.
Read also: Weapons here and now. The international conference on Ukraine’s recovery in Gdansk buried illusions about “post-war reconstruction”
Not all partners yet agree with this. South Korea froze everything and is not participating in Ukraine’s reconstruction, waiting for the war to end. But Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and a few other states have given the most money relative to their GDP. They are learning from us, taking our technologies, asking to be taught how to protect critical infrastructure. They are close to Russia and know what Putin is, so they invest most in our recovery.
Photo: facebook/Kyivvodokanal
Equipment from the Danish company Novafos for repairing water supply systems, a charitable donation to Kyivvodokanal.
How does the state form a list of strategic reconstruction projects that require external financing?
Minregion together with specialists from the World Bank, the European Union and the UN prepared five reports on all damages and needs for reconstruction. For three months we collected information and assessed all damage in every sector: from culture to private business, transport, solar panels, monuments, schools, shelters and so on. We assessed damage and the need for funds. World Bank experts even calculate lost income, taxes, and company profits.
This report is the most important document everyone relies on because it is trusted. There is a concrete figure calculated by experts who have done this before in the Gaza sector, former Yugoslav countries after the war, Yemen and many other countries.
If we are given 588 billion dollars now, we can almost entirely restore what was damaged. How big or small is this sum? It’s about 25 times more than the damages in all the former Yugoslav countries after the war. And our war is still ongoing; destruction increases daily.
Read also: Refused to live on graves. For the first time in Kyiv victims will receive money instead of rebuilding destroyed housing
If we are given 300 billion dollars of frozen Russian assets, we will close a bit more than half of the damages. Then, say, 150 billion we can close with loans and grants. We will repay loans over 30 years. Maybe someday we will ask to write off part of them — other states have done that too.
By the way, loans are cheapest when other states give them directly. For example, I was responsible for agreements with Italy — loans at 0% for 30 years. And the European Investment Bank, which is common for the EU, gives loans at 3,5% for 25–30 years, and the first 7–10 years can be concessional, when you almost don’t pay down the principal, only interest. Those are the best loans in the world.
But there still remains a portion of needs we don’t know how to close, even if all Russian assets are transferred to us. That’s why we say: “We need private investments.” Since the most destroyed items are housing, infrastructure, roads, ports, logistics, water supply and networks, those are things we will not privatize. We haven’t decided to privatize all water utilities or ports. That’s definitely not the time.
Photo: Oleg Strugorianu
Aliona Shkrum
For the first time we started public-private partnerships. When an investor comes in, the state remains the owner of the asset and transfers it for management. For example, concession of port terminals. We are not ready to sell strategic infrastructure but are ready to give it into management on a competitive basis to those who pay more.
That’s how the largest and best ports in the world operate, because a private operator is more efficient. We prepared arguments for the prime minister and the president for a long time. It wasn’t obvious that now was the time to start these concessions. But we decided to try and launched the first concession of the container terminal of the port of Chornomorsk.
Depending on the success of this case, we will be able to start more investments: in water supply, utilities, roads. If we don’t have money for these investments, and private companies do and can manage them better, that’s great.
“There are many investors in the world, but they don’t enter Ukraine because they are afraid and don’t see concrete projects”
Why was the Chornomorsk terminal chosen as the first public-private partnership project?
Four of the world’s ten largest operators officially applied for the concession of the container terminal and are in the competition process. If they enter, it will be a security factor for Russia. It’s one thing to bomb Ukrainian ships and terminals, another to bomb the terminals of the world’s largest operators. Especially if companies that receive different concessions come from different continents: someone from Europe, someone from the Arab world, someone from America.
It was important for us to test whether such operators would even participate in the tender. We set criteria, say we will transfer this terminal for management for 40 years, but we require that companies not lay off people for 5–10 years and invest about 150 million euros. Ukraine doesn’t have that money now. And we require loading the terminal. The mandatory minimum is 200 thousand containers per year, but in reality the port could handle a million.
Read also: Ports under lock, grain in sleeves. What will the economic consequences of a war of attrition be
Photo: Oleg Strugorianu
Aliona Shkrum and Olha Aivazovska
This terminal was chosen not only because it is deep-water. Ten years ago 50% of the country’s container shipments passed through it; now — zero. Because of complicated logistics, but mostly because of lack of money and investments. It’s old, not modernized, so it needs investment to work.
Allocate 100 million dollars from the state budget? We simply don’t have it. Taking a loan is also hard, and then a very strong manager would be needed, while the state has limited capacity to manage such projects. So it’s better to take a top port operator who has containers, knows how to do it, and is ready to invest billions.
What interest do investors have in rebuilding bridges and roads? Won’t they become toll roads?
Public-private partnership does not necessarily mean toll roads. There is an example from Poland. When the state cannot take a large billion-dollar loan — and we cannot take such a loan now, the state budget can’t handle it — you can competitively attract a company that offers the best conditions for reconstructing a road to a port or checkpoint and that will maintain it without making it toll. And we will pay the billion over many years. So the company comes in like a huge bank in the road maintenance sector. In Poland the state paid the money over ten years, but the roads did not become toll roads.
Are private investments possible in the social sphere, where not only reconstruction but also increased energy efficiency is needed?
On the objects we rebuild we immediately install solar panels and thus ensure energy efficiency — for example, in kindergartens. That one-time investment is expensive: you need to install pumps, a heating unit, networks, solar panels. It would be simpler to rebuild without that, but the investment pays back in two to three years, especially now when we have blackouts.
The mayor of Ternopil submitted one of the kindergartens to our program and took a loan to ensure energy efficiency. When it was −15° outside during a blackout, the temperature inside the facility dropped by only 1°, and children could stay there because it was warm. Nearby kindergartens were unsuitable: they lost heat through windows and old pumps.
Photo: ternopilcity.gov.ua
Thermal modernization works at kindergarten No. 1 in Ternopil, May 2026.
Such an investment can also be made by private companies — pay a few million dollars once, and then the kindergarten, the mayor and the community repay them in small installments over 10 years.
“Artificial intelligence can show where reinforcement is most needed”
How is prioritization of reconstruction projects from the state budget formed?
We don’t have a single pool of money to choose what to finance. There are three thousand projects from different sectors and programs.
When I came to the ministry, they had A3-format Excel sheets. For every meeting — different tables, for every project — different sheets with a lot of numbers. The first thing that came to mind was to digitize, not keep them in such spreadsheets, and put them on the map of Ukraine to see our portfolio as a state, since the ministry handled 90% of all reconstruction. Besides us, MinEconomy, private business and the energy sector participate in reconstruction.
A Ukrainian IT company, Sigma, helped us. They presented the project at the Gdansk conference. The database has 68 programs, and for each you can see how objects were chosen. Most of this information is needed in the DREAM system. We selected objects for most programs through this system. Communities entered objects, set priorities, applied for contests, and we and the bank selected projects to implement.
These funds are cheaper than intergovernmental agreements with European banks. We signed and ratified many such agreements, but not only we choose. Banks also choose — through a transparent procedure. The last agreement during my time at the ministry was for 100 million euros for water supply and sewage.
Communities and municipal enterprises could apply. The only restriction was that the settlement must have at least ten thousand residents. Applications were submitted for 600 million euros.
With the sector experts and the bank we developed evaluation criteria. If an application and documents were prepared within the last two years, it gets more points than if they are outdated. If there are many IDPs — more points, if it’s a frontline region — also more. That forms a transparent list, and those with the most points get the money.
Photo: Oleg Strugorianu
Aliona Shkrum
Did you forecast migration for reconstruction planning?
No. We tried to communicate with the Ministry of Education to understand which school, according to the reform, receives the most children. We want to make one big school in a district that has energy efficiency, good teachers, large classes, install solar panels, build a kitchen and a shelter. That’s our priority. The same with hospitals. The Ministry of Health tells us: “This is the main base hospital, it’s a priority,” and we take that into account. As for migration, how the front will move, how many people we have now and how many there will be, we would like to know, but we don’t have that data.
Is artificial intelligence applied to determine priority objects?
At the Gdansk conference we presented for the first time a preliminary prototype of a system in which AI allows assessment of a region’s resilience: heating, backup power, how much generation exists and how much is needed, what physical protection is in place and how much more is needed. Now you can assess this not from meetings or coordination headquarters but by giving data access to AI. It will show where reinforcement is most needed and produce a resilience index for the region.
The index shows that some regions worked excellently, while others, including Kyiv, are in a difficult situation. I didn’t see a plan for Kyiv. That shocked me because I’m a Kyiv resident. The winter was very hard; we all remember it.
We created a prototype with the American company Palantir — one of the largest forecasting firms in the world. I hope this process will continue because there are no analogues in the world.
Why did the volume of reconstruction commitments declared by international partners fall from 70 to 10 billion euros between the London conference and this year’s in Gdansk? Were expectations inflated at first, and are estimates now more pragmatic?
Standing on stage and announcing that there will be 10 billion over the next ten years is one thing, and signing specific agreements is another.
At the start there were many promises. Then when it came to money, it turned out some weren’t ready to give many grants. Although countries like Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia gave a lot relative to their GDP. The most, by the way, was Estonia.
Photo: ua.urc-international.com/
At the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC 2026) in Gdansk, 25 June 2026.
Some are ready to give loans, but the European Commission and the EU are very bureaucratic. For every euro of loans they give us, it’s not enough to have just our state budget guarantee; we also need their guarantees. We constantly criticized them for being very slow: we signed an agreement and they couldn’t provide guarantees under it for six months. We could have already rebuilt several schools, but the money only reached the treasury now.
The states that retooled to fast wartime rails for our recovery and their own defense are Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and maybe a few others. Others didn’t retool, like the European Commission.
Recently there was a forum in Brussels on civil protection. Commissioner Aja Ljabib started working on this seriously. They are thinking about how to prepare for defense or at least drone strikes. Some states, notably Finland and Sweden, came to see us, studied everything and already handed each mayor a flyer about what to do in case of war. Some countries refuse to talk or think about it.
The same with money. At first they were emotionally ready to help, but then a lot of bureaucracy emerged. Now our figures may seem smaller, but real money for reconstruction is coming in more and we’ve also learned what to do.
“Do you know how many programs Kyiv applied to? None”
How are large cities preparing for winter?
When we made the resilience index, we took into account that there are cities like Kyiv that it’s simply impossible to prepare normally because the system is very centralized. Hit one CHP plant and it’s broken — it can take three years to restore. There are cities, like Chernihiv and Cherkasy, that didn’t have a CHP and have decentralized systems. It’s easier for them.
At the same time we saw differences in how cities prepare. We are not a ministry that put all cities under military dictatorship. We work within decentralization. So we must gather information from the mayor, heads of enterprises and water utilities. They must say how much money and how many generators they need. In winter we held morning meetings every day. That’s how we understood priorities. For example, Mykolaiv had almost nothing — so all generators and capacities were needed there.
Photo: Sienkevych Online
Mykolaiv received 226 diesel heaters and 8 generators.
As a state we must help by giving generators, donors, loans, grants, budget programs, or throwing money from the reserve fund. But they themselves must calculate and tell us their needs. The minister of reconstruction won’t come to every city and manage it. That’s the mayor’s job.
Frontline Kharkiv applied to all possible loan and grant programs. They won some and couldn’t take others because they couldn’t repay that kind of loan. We looked for ways for them to get loans and helped write applications.
In Lviv, Mr. Sadovyi has been mayor for a long time. He’s experienced and has many international resources. We have programs where half of the top ten by score are in Lviv. He knows how to do it, he’s super active, he seeks and applies.
Do you know how many programs Kyiv applied to? None.
Read also: Will Kyiv have heat this winter? A big conversation with Petro Panteleiev about policy, money and technical solutions for the resilience plan
What challenges does the capital face preparing for the next heating season?
Kyiv has money and capabilities, but it needs someone who will sit down, make a project, give instructions, say: “I need this project, this loan for water, we need something else.”
During the winter I met with Mr. Klitschko and we procured many generators from the European Commission specifically for Kyiv because it was in the worst situation. The generators we secured from the French also arrived. But you also need to be able to install them quickly and set priorities. It’s hard, but we cannot do this work instead of Kyiv.
Photo: EPA/UPG
The Darnytska thermal power plant in Kyiv destroyed by Russian strikes, 4 February 2026.
When we considered the worst-case scenario — and I think you should do that — we were ready to evacuate people free of charge, via “Diia” requests, to temporary accommodation with compensation. We analyzed how many places have hot water and heating and how much money that would require. It turned out to be about 250 million hryvnias, no more.
When we considered evacuation, Kyiv residents themselves said: don’t. I went to points of resilience on the left bank. In one I was with EU Ambassador Kataryna Maternova. After talking, we found people didn’t intend to leave. They said: “How long? Two weeks? We’ll wait it out. We’ll wait until the next generators arrive.”
We had never seen such destruction of critical infrastructure before. Now we already understand what it is. For a whole year we built physical protection, did calculations, received one of the EU tranches for resilience plans, so we should be better prepared. I hope Kyiv will use the time remaining as best as possible.
Should the government jointly with local self-government intensify communication about opportunities for condominium associations (OSBB), not delaying this until October?
Our people are much stronger than we think, but they demand truth. You must speak honestly with them. You must say: if the situation worsens and Russia continues strikes, for a city like Kyiv it’s impossible to build a perfect alternative heating and power system. But it is possible to close certain gaps.
We have many energy-efficiency programs. We launched the “SvitloDIM” program — an OSBB or a management company installs a generator for an elevator and water systems. The Energy Efficiency Fund, which I also coordinated, allows OSBBs to receive solar panels. The OSBB must vote for it and pay only 30%, while 70% is covered by the state. If 10 thousand houses do this, Kyiv will be a completely different city.
Photo: kyiv1.com
Solar panels on the roof of OSBB ‘Khudozhnyk’ in Kyiv.
The state provides options, we prepare for a bad situation and will help, but everyone must engage — from the mayor to people in OSBBs. My colleague who worked on energy efficiency couldn’t create an OSBB in her own building. That’s also a problem: some people are not ready or willing to take responsibility.
When will Kyiv have enough shelters? What solutions are possible?
The ministry had three early recovery programs under which local authorities can apply through the DREAM system and receive a grant for shelters.
Kyiv is a priority. Whether they used it or not, I don’t know. I’m not ready to say how many shelters were built and how many are still needed.
The Recovery Agency developed an experimental innovation — mobile shelters that are ten times cheaper to create than building or restoring permanent ones. A mobile shelter already exists in Borodianka — a town that was 80% destroyed and was comprehensively rebuilt. I recommend going there to see it.
The shelter looks futuristic, like from the movie The Fifth Element. It’s a tube that can hold 50, 10 or 150 people. Such a shelter can be assembled in a few weeks, if necessary even in a week, buried, and later dug up and moved. Inside there’s air conditioning, a TV and a toilet. A person in a wheelchair can descend into it. It’s a cool technology made by Ukrainians. Americans were interested in using them as hotels when they come.
Read also: Underground schools Kyiv-style: Why large-scale construction of anti-radiation shelters doesn’t improve the capital’s situation
War is a constant struggle for time. Russia’s goal is to destroy as much as possible so a large number of people can’t remain here, and our task is to rebuild faster than Russia destroys. We need to do this faster and more innovatively. We cannot just build permanent shelters or only restore the ones we have. Innovative ideas are the future. We found the shelter idea. Ideas to protect Ukrzaliznytsia as well. They can now teach the world how to operate in such a huge catastrophe. We lost more than 200 locomotives, but trains still run. In Europe, believe me, no one would run trains.
Photo: Ukrzaliznytsia
A locomotive damaged by a Russian drone.
To date we have three million housing units destroyed, where a “unit” is an apartment, dormitory or private house. That’s more than all housing in Denmark. In such conditions another country would probably have ceased to exist long ago, been conquered, but not us.
We issued housing certificates. People can apply through “Diia” for loans under the “eVidnovlennya” program. The Energy Efficiency Fund under the “VidnovyDIM” program rebuilt two thousand houses in two years.
Four thousand kilometers of roads were destroyed. That’s like the road to Brussels and a bit back. There was no money in the Road Fund. After winter the roads were in bad condition. We gathered, got money, signed international agreements, and now the road situation has improved. We are a country that pulls together despite everything and is capable of innovative, rapid solutions. We lack coordination, trust in each other and systems.
“It’s bad for a country when people don’t want to join the government”
How to increase the visibility of the government’s work? What affects public trust in it?
The problem is primarily that people don’t want to go into government. Finding assistants at good salaries — not even in public service but on European donor projects — has become critically difficult. If earlier in competitions for positions, for example at the Reform Office where salaries were good, 20 people would compete for a position, now two people who live abroad show up and we can’t hire anyone.
We are very tired; everyone is traumatized in the fifth year of a large war. We need to find the strength to reboot. But it’s bad for a country when people don’t want to go into government. Because they don’t believe, because they’re tired, and because the government is invisible.
The visibility problem is that in peacetime we would publicly announce the opening of each of the three thousand objects after reconstruction. Now for 90% of those objects we didn’t talk. We had the position that it’s better not to say and not get likes than to say and have a strike land there tomorrow. In cities where many objects were completed — new schools, shelters, water utilities, sewage treatment plants — people know about it.
It seems to me that under the leadership of the new prime minister, who is very business- and results-oriented, now is a good moment to reboot all this.
Photo: Oleg Strugorianu
Aliona Shkrum
Read also: How to unlock Ukraine’s trillion-dollar potential
The numbers show that Russia won’t succeed at all. But we need money for this, more international support and aid, and inside — a bit more coordination of action, a bit more of a new coalition, a new social contract: we will overcome this together, one hundred percent. We must try to work together. Everyone in their place must do something. From OSBBs that should apply to available programs to buy generators or install solar panels on their buildings, especially in Kyiv, to mayors who must be held to at least the same standards as the government and MPs when it comes to local affairs, and to those ready to enter public service. If you’re not serving in the military, not performing a critical function, not demining, not a doctor, then you should give some of your resources to local self-government, civic activity or public service. That’s everyone’s contribution.
Should the government communicate more openly with society?
That’s probably the biggest lesson for the government. What would I do differently if I could repeat these 600 days? I would definitely communicate much more.
In the first three months of work I didn’t make a single Facebook post because it was catastrophe after catastrophe. You’re immersed in catastrophe and you don’t have time to breathe. And when you don’t have time to breathe and don’t communicate, you don’t have time to strategize. Because when you communicate to society you make conclusions. That’s what’s missing. I hope this government can do that better.
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