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Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
Investment banker, well-known political commentator and blogger Serhiy Fursa gave a wide-ranging interview to the 24 Channel, in which he analyzed the consequences for Russia of Ukraine’s long-range sanctions.
In a conversation with journalist Daryna Trunova, the expert explained in detail how strikes on Russian refineries, Wildberries warehouses, and the "shadow fleet" affect the Russian economy, domestic sentiments, and the Kremlin’s overall ability to wage war.
Separately, Daryna Trunova and Serhiy Fursa discussed the maritime blockade in the Black and Azov seas, possible consequences for Ukraine, prospects for new U.S. sanctions, and the risks of autumn-winter escalation.
Read the text version of Serhiy Fursa’s long interview on the 24 Channel.
Strikes on Russian refineries and economic consequences
There were fires in Tatarstan recently, and now one of the largest refineries in Orsk is burning. Over the weekend there were the Syzran and Ilsk refineries. And allegedly due to unscheduled repairs, exports of petroleum products from Russia have fallen to a ten-year low. But this is not the end, experts predict. It may continue to decline. So oil companies will have to increase exports of unrefined oil. In short, how do all these strikes on refineries affect Russians? They’re already saying there are lines at their gas stations again. But I’d like to understand how much money they’re losing and how this affects their ability to wage war?
This brings the exhaustion of the Russian economy closer. There is no direct effect: you strike, they suffer losses, it’s over. The effect is that strikes on Wildberries and on refineries ultimately fall on the Russian budget. And that leads to the need to print more rubles.
They’ve now reached the stage where only the printing press helps them. The more they print, the faster a potential economic crisis arrives or the existing one intensifies.
Plus, when we talk about the gasoline issue, they are now actively importing gasoline. Imported gasoline, of course, leads to higher domestic prices that had previously been subsidized. Rising prices fuel inflation, which is also structurally very important. High inflation in Russia is what most exhausts the economy.
So there is an indirect effect. The direct effect is, of course, nice for us to see: seeing it burn, seeing the lines is satisfying. But another element of indirect impact is sentiment. In fact, the economy is mostly about sentiment. When sentiment is negative, it affects further economic development. Because if you expect things to be bad, you take actions that bring that bad outcome closer.
If you represent a business, and in Russia businesses now feel it will be bad, you cut costs, cut investment programs, sometimes cut staff, don’t make investments, which prevents the economy from growing. Plus, people are actively taking money out of the country. This now applies to both individuals and businesses. The last year has record figures for capital outflows by both businesses and people.
Yes, yesterday our National Bank began currency liberalization. One of Ukrainians' favorite activities is investing in stock markets in some civilized countries. That was blocked for the last few years due to limits on capital outflows. Now it will become easier. Russians are also moving money to so-called brokerage companies that allow investing, and on average they are now withdrawing maybe five hundred million dollars a month. This is also an indicator of worsening sentiment.
And the lines, the strikes, the whining on TV that something burned somewhere — all this reinforces negative sentiment in Russia, negative sentiment in the Russian economy, which also helps us because it contributes to the exhaustion of the economy.
Watch Serhiy Fursa’s interview — video:
Wildberries: fires, logistics, and impact on GDP
I also want to go into more detail about Wildberries. Warehouses near Voronezh burned. One of the largest — 156 thousand square meters — burned down, hopefully completely. But to sum up in less than a month, Wildberries’ warehouses have burned or been destroyed by about half, which is one and a half million square meters. Losses are estimated in the tens of billions, at least rubles. But we understand this affects logistics. They’re already saying Wildberries might move to Kazakhstan. Does this affect Russians’ sentiment more or the economy specifically, and will people buy less clothing and other goods? How will this affect them going forward?
Mostly it affects sentiment. The impact, even if you remove all of Wildberries, on the economy might be about 0,03 percent of GDP. Is there an effect? Yes. Could it cause a major economic catastrophe or collapse by itself? No, it cannot.
But again, it accelerates money printing. It creates that negative sentiment we just talked about.
Just as Russian strikes on Ukrainian logistics cannot lead to hyperinflation, famine, and panics, strikes on things like this cannot collapse the economy. They can lead to losses for specific businesses, but their effect on GDP dynamics is very slow and moderate.
Maritime blockade: the Black and Azov seas and consequences for Ukraine
Regarding operation "MoLoChKa," which is taking place at sea. The commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces says that in less than a month they damaged 218 vessels of the Russian shadow fleet, of which 134 were in the Azov Sea and 84 in the Black Sea. Russians are also reducing the amount of grain they export. For example, in July Russian grain exports fell by almost forty percent. How does this maritime blockade affect them? And what consequences could it lead to? Then I’ll ask about consequences for us, for Ukraine.
For us this is a more painful story. Our attacks on their ports and on the Azov Sea provoked Russian attacks on ports (a new wave, — 24 Channel). Something that had not happened for a long time. And here we are somewhat on the losing side, because now the entire big delta is blocked, and for our economy this is a much more painful blow than for Russia.
So here we can only hope that, with Turkey’s moderation, the situation at sea and with ports can be de-escalated, because in this confrontation we suffer much more. The only plus is that the whole world also suffers, because both we and the Russians are large exporters. Right now our exports suffer more, but that’s beside the point.
A certain amount of agricultural production isn’t reaching the world market. This reinforces negative price trends on the global food market, which are additionally being exacerbated by El Niño. This year is a record El Niño in 150 years, and so on. That will negatively affect harvests in certain regions near the ocean.
Stocks from previous years, including our grain, should somewhat compensate for this situation. But now, given problems with our exports, Russia’s exports, and El Niño together, prices have already reached record levels since 2023 and will probably continue to rise. That is why Turkey and other countries of the world, including the Global South and those who are Russia’s customers, very much want this port blockade not to continue.
After all, this affects not only agricultural products for us but also metallurgists to a large extent. Farmers can hold back harvests and export gradually. Metallurgists have constant flow: they produce every day and must export every day. When ports are closed, this has a very strong impact.
Who among our partners do you think can help us with this? Could China intervene? Turkey is obviously interested. Will Europeans help, or are such calls not very vocal yet? We only hear at UN Security Council meetings that this provokes hunger. But what next? Will they do anything to help?
Processes have already begun. Turkey is moderating here. Who stands behind Turkey? China and India first and foremost — each about one and a half billion people. Both China and India depend heavily on food imports and food prices, so they are interested.
But that’s a general interest. No one is interested in rising food prices, because inflation is one of the biggest challenges in the developed world, in America and in Europe.
In recent years the world has been experiencing a cost-of-living crisis, when the cost of living rose sharply due to inflation, which was provoked by years of money printing and then COVID.
So this is now a very sensitive issue for all countries. I think there may be pressure, and over time, not immediately of course, we could get some result.
Ihor Lutsenko proposed striking in the Baltic Sea at Russian ships there and cutting off maritime routes, which would also lead to budget shortfalls for Russia. What do you think of that? If, for example, there were some ceasefire, then most likely we also wouldn’t strike in the Baltic, and that would be part of such negotiations?
I think it’s a fantasy. The accessibility of Baltic ports is a different story.
Also understand why we were so successful in the Azov and Black seas? Starlink works. No Ukrainian Starlink will work over the Baltics.
Although, of course, we expect such a decision from the Americans. Maybe something will move in that direction.
But if it’s not there, then we should not fantasize. Those are dangerous fantasies that create overly high expectations.
I also want to ask about the Caspian Sea. Information has appeared that Ukraine agreed not to strike tankers carrying Kazakh oil and their infrastructure. Bloomberg writes that according to this agreement, vessels should not be under Ukrainian sanctions, should not carry Russian oil, and should not belong to Russian individuals or legal entities. Why did we agree to this? Did the Americans push us to do so? And can one claim that Kazakh oil is only their oil and not Russian?
Yes, you can. And for me the question is why we agreed to this when we were striking Kazakh oil and American companies exporting it? That was very disadvantageous for us and had no logical explanation. Maybe the SBU just didn’t sort it out: something sails — we strike. But that’s the only explanation.
Because it’s not in our interest to strike at other countries that sell oil, since we are interested in cheap oil. When we strike a Russian tanker, that’s clear. But with Kazakh tankers it’s a completely different story, so it had no explanation from the start why we did it.
Winter, air defense, ballistic missiles, and the likelihood of a ceasefire
I can’t not discuss winter, which we discuss constantly, almost daily. We need to prepare, we still don’t have Patriot missiles, it’s hard for us to shoot down Russian ballistic missiles. Do you think there could really be a decisive battle this fall before a harsh winter for us and maybe a harsh winter in the Russian Federation? Because Zelensky also said we will try to make their conditions during winter unbearable. Will there really be escalation from both sides now to then meet at some conditional ceasefire? Or do you not expect any ceasefire at all?
No, of course, there will be no ceasefire in the near future. All the more so because our ability to strike Russian energy facilities is much lower than Russia’s striking ability, so it’s not comparable.
Don’t think we can somehow ruin winter for Russians in Moscow or St. Petersburg. That won’t happen, so let’s drop those foolish expectations.
Regarding a decisive battle — we constantly hear about decisive battles. There will be no decisive battles for now. It’s a war of attrition, and the Russians are, of course, escalating. But they are dipping into reserves, spending far more missiles than they produce. In the near future they will again take a pause, and then they will probably carry out a winter escalation, because they see winter as their advantage.
There is no motivation for Putin to negotiate before winter, because he thinks winter will be a big challenge for us and not for him.
What will winter be like? Much depends on the weather, really. We can only hope for a standard winter — a winter of the global warming era, climate change era — and not like last year with severe frosts. Much will depend on the weather.
Also, with electricity it’s much better than with heating. We need to understand this is a very segmented story. It’s about Kyiv, not all of Ukraine. There is Kyiv and some cities closer to the front, closer to the Russian Federation. There it may be very uncomfortable in terms of winter heating if there are significant strikes.
At the same time, our power generation facilities are often beyond the reach of Russian missiles, and the Russians can only affect electrical logistics. We now see that cruise missiles and "Shaheds" are practically shot down, and anything beyond that radius of about five hundred kilometers, the probability that the Russians will hit something successfully is very low.
So there may be problems in some cities like Kyiv with heating. And it all depends on the weather. We must prepare for a very difficult winter and be ready for it, certainly. At the same time, we should not despair. We just need to be mentally prepared.
And I’ll remind you that last week there were four very hot days, and we passed them without outages. By the way, Denys Shmyhal mentioned this too, that it can be considered an achievement and a success that we got through it without power cuts.
New U.S. sanctions against Russia and Iran
A bill on new sanctions against Russia and Iran has already been introduced in the House of Representatives. Then, of course, if everyone votes, Trump would have to sign it. Do you think these sanctions will significantly affect the Russian Federation? Or should they have been adopted several years ago to be effective?
Better late than never. So if they are adopted — yes, they will have an effect. Let’s see how they work.
Again, there are no magical sanctions that you switch on and the Russian economy shuts down. But people often don’t understand that sanctions work, even those already in place, and many have been imposed. You simply cannot compare Russia’s current capabilities with what they would be without sanctions. They would be very different opponents.
So additional sanctions are always a plus.
This again ties back to how we started: about exhausting the Russian economy, that it’s a rather long-term process, but they themselves are doing everything to make it start and proceed.
And the faster this process goes, the sooner Russia will lose the ability to wage war. These U.S. sanctions will contribute to speeding up that process.
This interview was shortened and edited for audience clarity.
Document: PDF proof of the original version of the news item "Ніякого перемир'я та ніяких вирішальних битв найближчим часом не буде: інтерв'ю Сергія Фурси". It records the publication content at the moment of the first scan, the preservation date and the source: Channel 24.
