Who in the Verkhovna Rada is for and who is against banning the Moscow Church in Ukraine?

Who in the Verkhovna Rada is for and who is against banning the Moscow Church in Ukraine?

Arithmetic for the speaker: is parliament ready to put an end to Russian Orthodoxy in Ukraine.

The first episode of the epic titled “The Verkhovna Rada Bans the UOC-MP” could be shown already at one of the upcoming plenary weeks. At least, it has already been announced that 226+ signatures of those willing to vote to resolve this issue have been collected. That takes away the parliament leadership’s and the single-party majority’s arguments about a lack of votes that have been voiced all this time. Notably, the appearance of signatures on the appeal to the chair of the Verkhovna Rada was in fact a response to a statement by Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk—unexpected even for the “Servants”—that there was not enough support in parliament to ban the Moscow church. Stefanchuk, however, left room to retreat, remarking that work on this issue was underway inside factions, in particular within Servant of the People. And that work ultimately produced results.

The newspaper Glavcom obtained a list of deputies who agreed to support the ban on the Moscow Church.

As of 5 October we indeed counted 225 such MPs. Note that some surnames appear twice on the list, but Glavcom counted them only once. Interestingly, among the signatories of the appeal to Stefanchuk are… Stefanchuk himself and his “right hand,” First Deputy Speaker Oleksandr Korniienko. The Holos and European Solidarity factions signed the appeal in full, while Servant of the People could not even reach 150 votes. The For the Future and Trust groups split in half, as did Batkivshchyna – its leader Yulia Tymoshenko has so far refrained from demonstrating her position on sensitive church matters.

Servant of the People

Dunda O.

Pidlasa R.

Natalukha D.

Bardina M.

Tsyba T.

Danutsa O.

Kolisnyk A.

Ionushas S.

Kunytskyi O.

Herman D.

Nahaievskyi A.

Zabloitskyi M.

Khomenko O.

Mulyk R.

Herasyimenko I.

Kozyr S.

Kriachko M.

Pashkovskyi M.

Hryshchuk R.

Tistyk R.

Klochko A.

Zhuppanyn A.

Mezentseva M.

Pushkarenko A.

Shuliak O.

Marikovskyi O.

Halaiuchuk V.

Sanchenko O.

Voitsekhovskyi V.

Kovalov A.

Kalaur I.

Kravchuk Ye.

Poturaiev M.

Kinzburzka V.

Lichman H.

Yaremenko B.

Nahorniak S.

Tarasenko T.

Kostiukh A.

Hurin D.

Saliychuk O.

Babak S.

Chornyi D.

Tret’iakova H.

Kachura O.

Mykhailyuk H.

Shypailo O.

Cherniev Ye.

Strikharskyi A.

Bezugla M.

Merezhko O.

Koval O.

Rublov V.

Hryshchenko T.

Aliksiichuk O.

Proshchuk E.

Korolenko-Usova V.

Nalotov D.

Zub V.

Mykysha D.

Laba M.

Lyubota D.

Kuznetsov O.

Zaslavskyi Yu.

Bezgin V.

Kostiuk D.

Strunevych V.

Sterniichuk V.

Bohdanets A.

Kryvosheiev I.

Bohutska Ye.

Virastyuk V.

Ovchynnykova Yu.

Bobliakh A.

Mokan V.

Zakharchenko V.

Vasiuk O.

Huzenko M.

Fris I.

Matusievych O.

Zahoruiko A.

Vasyliv I.

Mandzii S.

Bondarenko O.

Litvinov O.

Arseniuk O.

Podhorna V.

Hevko V.

Venislavskyi F.

Horeniuk O.

Yanchenko T.

Petruniak Ye.

Bulakh L.

Nikitina M.

Bozhyk V.

Vasylevska-Smahliuk O.

Mazurashu H.

Zavitnevych O.

Sova O.

Pavlish P.

Kamelchuk Yu.

Bondar H.

Yunakov I.

Purtova A.

Shvets S.

Kitsak B.

Bakumov O.

Hryvko S.

Zhmereneckyi O.

Dyrdin M.

Shynkarenko I.

Krasov O.

Skrypka T.

Ustenko O.

Tymofiichuk V.

Ostapenko A.

Yurash S.

Borzova I.

Stefanchuk M.

Kisel Yu.

Murdii I.

Zdebskyi Yu.

Berezyn M.

Marusiak O.

Marchuk I.

Kuzminykh S.

Kabanov O.

Kreidenko V.

Vatras V.

Horbenko R.

Kryvoruchkina O.

Fedienko O.

Zadorozhnyi A.

Vahner V.

Ivanov V.

European Solidarity

Honcharenko O.

Yuzhanina N.

Syumar V.

Fedyna S.

Syniutka O.

Chyihoz A.

Dzhemilev M.

Lopushanskyi A.

Kniazevych R.

Zinkevych Ya.

Herashchenko I.

Ionova M.

Pavlenko R.

Poroshenko P.

Klympush-Tsintsadze I.

Herasimov A.

Bondar M.

Vyatrovych V.

Kniazhytskyi M.

Nykorak I.

Savrasov M.

Kubiv S.

Friz I.

Ariev V.

Parubii A.

Velychkovych M.

Aleksieiev S.

Holos

Klymenko Yu.

Vasylchenko H.

Kostenko R.

Bobrovska S.

Lozynskyi R.

Zhelezniak Ya.

Khlapuk M.

Yurchyshyn Ya.

Osadchuk A.

Stefanyshyna O.

Ustynova O.

Rutsyshyn Ya.

Vasylenko L.

Pipa N.

Rudyk K.

Rakhmanin S.

Sovsun I.

Tsabal V.

Sharaskyn A.

Makarov O.

Batkivshchyna

Nalyvaichenko V.

Volynets M.

Kyrylenko I.

Yevtushok S.

Ivchenko V.

Kabachenko V.

Meidych O.

Krulko I.

Kucherenko O.

Tsymbaliuk M.

Soboliev S.

Shkrum A.

For the Future

Huz I.

Batenko T.

Dubnevych Ya.

Konstiantkevych I.

Baloga V.

Hereha O.

Rudyk S.

Yurchyshyn P.

Palytsia I.

Chaikivskyi I.

Trust

Bilozir L.

Kucher M.

Bakunets P.

Lyushniak M.

Kit A.

Prykhodko B.

Kulinich O.

Poliak V.

Minko S.

Ivanchuk A. (deceased)

Lunchenko V.

Non-affiliated

Bondar V.

Buymister L.

Leros H.

Kondratiuk O.

Socha R.

Savchuk O.

Tyshchenko M.

Torokhtii B.

Stefanchuk R.

Korniienko O.

One of the initiators of collecting signatures among the Servants of the People, Oleksandr Aliksiichuk, claims that the actual number of signatories to the appeal to Stefanchuk is 240. Many MPs joined this “flash mob” at the last moment, and another 19 expressed a desire to put their signature after the appeal had already been registered in the Apparatus of the Verkhovna Rada. Thus the total number of parliamentarians ready to support one of the draft laws to ban the Russian Orthodox Church and its affiliated representations in Ukraine is 259.

A greeting from the SBU

To speed up MPs’ decisions, even the Security Service intervened in this sensitive process in recent days. As Glavcom reported, the special service appealed to the Verkhovna Rada with a proposal to expand the list of grounds for banning religious organizations through the courts. SBU Head Vasyl Maliuk proposes either by a separate law or during revision of already registered draft laws to supplement the list of such grounds.

If the Criminal Code currently defines collaborationist activity as a “deadly sin” for clergymen, then under the SBU proposal religious organizations could be banned if their high-ranking representatives are found to be involved in starting, conducting, and propagandizing war, preparing terrorist acts, genocide, and other wartime crimes.

The SBU asserts that the activity of the Russian Orthodox Church on Ukrainian territory is directed at supporting Russia’s armed aggression, implementing Russia’s genocidal policies, and deporting Ukrainians. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, pre-trial investigation of 65 criminal proceedings regarding 65 clergymen of the UOC-MP has been carried out, including against 15 hierarchs, some of whom are the legal heads of religious organizations – administrations, monasteries, centers, etc. So there are plenty of reasons to apply the newly proposed norms to ban the branch of the Russian church in Ukraine.

Now it’s up to the Verkhovna Rada, which has already taken a step in this direction. The corresponding draft law No. 10126 “On Amendments to Article 16 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations’ ” was registered by the chairman of the Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy, Mykyta Poturaiev.

“The SBU people have run out of patience,” Poturaiev tells Glavcom. “Now I want to see those deputies who will not want to vote to ban religious organizations associated with murderers and occupiers. That will no longer be a joke but direct sabotage of counterintelligence activities. How can anyone in the Verkhovna Rada now dare to block the special services’ fight against real enemies and traitors? These SBU proposals were worked out in concrete practice and are built on their experience. When this draft law appeared, some people already ‘ran around and broke into a sweat,’ because it is truly dangerous for them.”

Lost under the cloth

At the moment it is very likely that the “Maliuk” draft law will not be advanced separately, but the changes proposed by the special services will be introduced as amendments to the government draft law No. 8371 “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding the Activities in Ukraine of Religious Organizations.” Of course, if the latter is finally adopted as a basis.

This long-suffering document was developed at the request of the president, who as far back as last December (!) implemented the National Security and Defense Council’s decision to ban the activities in Ukraine of religious organizations affiliated with centers of influence in Russia. It does not explicitly mention the UOC-MP, but it is clear which church in the Ukrainian ecclesiastical spectrum is most likely to fall under the criterion of subordination to Moscow.

The Cabinet of Ministers did not wait the two months it had to submit to parliament a draft law that would make the activities of such organizations impossible. The project was registered already in January, received a positive conclusion from the relevant parliamentary committee in February, and won the support of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches.

“Our Committee on Information Policy prepared all draft laws regarding the UOC-MP months ago for consideration, and each time they did not make it onto the agenda,” notes Servant of the People deputy head Yevheniia Kravchuk. “We hope that after collecting 226 signatures they will be considered at the next Rada session. Clearly, the draft prepared by the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience, registered by the Cabinet, has the greatest chance of being supported.”

Hardline advocates of liquidating the UOC-MP are not thrilled with the government variant: they criticize it for excessive softness and difficulty of implementation. It contains no references to the Criminal Code but proposes to give the right to ban religious organizations affiliated with the aggressor state to the central executive body that implements state policy in the sphere of religion, i.e., the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience itself.

That body must conduct an expert assessment of the organization’s subordination in canonical and organizational matters to the center of influence in the aggressor state. Such an expert assessment with a positive conclusion has already been conducted by the State Service. If the law enters into force, the religious organization will be given an appropriate time to eliminate violations, and if it fails to do so the State Service for Ethnopolitics will have the right to file an administrative suit with the court. And then the judiciary will decide the fate of the Moscow Church in Ukraine.

There are certain nuances in this mechanism. For example, the UOC-MP does not exist as a legal entity; there are only thousands of separate parishes and eparchies, so it is unclear to whom exactly the court decision should be applied. Moreover, the entry into force of a court verdict can be delayed indefinitely through appeals. In principle, this story is already familiar: under Poroshenko, the Moscow church, which for many years operated in Ukraine under the brand “UOC,” was obliged by parliamentarians to change its name. As is known, the issue is still being litigated in the courts…

But deputies console themselves that at least the process will be launched. There are also more radical proposals in parliament – for example, draft law No. 8221 promoted by European Solidarity MP Mykola Kniazhytskyi. According to it, the ban of a religious organization that harms national security should happen much faster—simply by law, and not through drawn-out court proceedings.

Buried under the budget

However, for now no other options aside from bringing the government draft law to the floor are being discussed. Even the authors of alternative projects have come to terms with this and are ready to vote for the Cabinet’s No. 8371 despite all its shortcomings. And after 226 signatures have already been collected, the speaker should finally put this issue on the agenda and not relegate it to the end of the agenda as before.

This has not been done so far for several reasons. First, the single-party majority leadership in the persons of Davyd Arakhamiia and Andrii Motovilovets feared a split in the already not wholly unanimous Servant of the People faction, among whose deputies there are enough supporters of the UOC-MP. Aside from openly connected lobbyists like Artem Kultenko and Pavlo Khalimon, the majority contains latent sympathizers of this church from the “Razumkov group” and the “Pavliuk group,” isolated deputies with personal sentiments toward the Moscow Patriarchate, and those who succumbed to the “hypnosis” of the MP’s lobbyists, primarily Kultenko.

The informal main lobbyist of the UOC-MP in the majority, Artem Kultenko (left), managed to find common ground with the head of the Servant of the People faction, Davyd Arakhamiia

The second reason for the UOC-MP’s “untouchability” should be sought in Davyd Arakhamiia’s special relations with the groups Renewal of Ukraine and Platform for Life and Peace. These remnants of the former OPZZh interact very constructively with the Servant of the People leadership and often support the majority when it cannot rely on votes from factions in the “democratic” sector. Although the former OPZZh members condemned Putin’s aggression and severed (at least formally) ties with the odious Putin ally Viktor Medvedchuk, who is building “another Ukraine” from Moscow, the issue of the Russian church remains sensitive for them.

The “friendly team” of OPZZh scattered in different directions, but its leftovers in parliament are still very useful for the authorities

The heat of the budget process, when deputies are mired in thousands of amendments to next year’s state budget, on the one hand complicates the consideration of church issues and, on the other, simplifies it. Arakhamiia and Motovilovets traditionally fear that if the UOC-MP issue even passes the first reading in the chamber, lobbyists of the Moscow church in parliament will begin to sabotage other votes in protest. In addition to the budget and the very controversial issue of military PIT, ahead is the law on politically exposed persons (PEP), which causes fierce resistance from deputies but is a key beacon for providing Ukraine with critically important financial assistance.

“Of course there will be cautions, because the budget is extremely important, without which you cannot count on macro-financial assistance,” says Mykyta Poturaiev, head of the Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy. “And you must clearly understand that if we put a draft law on religious organizations that truly creates some tension in the hall, it is difficult to predict how people who are somehow so worried about one of the churches will behave on other votes.

“In that case you must be fully confident that the other laws that directly ensure the country’s ability to defend itself and keep fighting will still be voted for without problems. Or you must be 100% sure that for laws needed for defense or EU accession you will have opposition votes, and there are no signs of that either—recent votes in the Rada show this. But I hope that the issue of religious organizations will still be brought up, although the situation is difficult. And I am significantly more optimistic than a month ago because there are ‘live’ signatures.”

One active supporter of liquidating the Moscow Patriarchate, Servant of the People MP Oleg Dunda, believes the fears that other votes will be disrupted because of banning the UOC-MP are contrived.

“The idea that we should not put forward such draft laws at all for the sake of success in other votes is wrong,” he is convinced. “I would even say it is a manipulation, and not a very creative one. If you look, most draft laws are voted with more than 250 votes, even close to 300. And I would like to see the deputies who maliciously will not vote for reasonable bills because a ban on the UOC-MP was passed.”

Dunda is confident: if it comes to a vote on the government draft, it will be successful. “Besides the fact that there are already more than 240 signatures, a number of deputies who did not sign will still vote ‘for.’ So there will definitely be more than 250. If this project is put on the agenda as one of the penultimate items so that it might never be reached, you could defer consideration for a year or longer,” the deputy says.

Optimism for fighters against the Kremlin’s favored church is also boosted by… the very adoption of the budget. During this period the Verkhovna Rada achieves maximum deputy mobilization. So one can expect that at least the signatories of the appeal to Stefanchuk will be present in parliament when the desired draft law is considered.

Will they drive the priests underground?

The collection of signatures for the appeal to the speaker was initiated back on 24 August by Holos MP Yulia Klymenko. She managed to involve representatives of all parliamentary factions and groups in the process, except the former OPZZh.

Yulia Klymenko from Holos sent to the speaker’s office two hundred-plus MPs’ signatures to bring the draft law banning the Moscow Church to the floor. At right — Servant of the People MP Oleksandr Aliksiichuk

“In fact, this collection of signatures is not a parliamentary procedure,” Klymenko admits. “This instrument is legally worth nothing, but politically important. We saw that there are at least 240 deputies who appeal to the speaker asking to include in the agenda all draft laws related to banning the Russian church. Of them, about 150 are Servants of the People. And for a long time almost all factions at the coordinators’ council have asked to consider this draft law at least in the first reading, to start the process and normalize it so that situations don’t arise where people on the ground decide everything themselves in not entirely peaceful ways.”

Klymenko points out that the position of parliament and majority leadership is strange given that at least half of Servants of the People are ready to vote for the government project, which the president himself asked to be adopted. “And if two thirds of Ukrainians say that this issue is timely, it should be put on the agenda,” the MP believes. “The same fate of politically exposed persons will affect two thousand people, while the Russian church accounts for 40 million. These are completely different scales of problems. If parliamentary leaders want to play political games—that’s their right—but political games bring political responsibility.”

It’s obvious that at the coordinators’ council next week the initiators of the signature collection will demand that the draft law on banning the Russian church with a center in the aggressor state be placed on the agenda. And given that this idea is supported by more than half of the Servants of the People, another ignoring of this desire by the majority leadership could be construed as usurpation of power within the faction.

Political scientist Volodymyr Fesenko reminds that neither this parliament nor the previous one has done anything to ban the UOC-MP. “Both among deputies and in various state institutions, including the SBU and the Ministry of Defense, there were and are people connected with the Moscow Patriarchate,” the political scientist notes. “This was true during Poroshenko’s presidency and now—and it is not related to party affiliation. I think this is the main factor why the MP has not been touched, plus there are traditional fears that steps in this direction will destabilize the domestic political situation. But already this year, in light of the SBU investigations into certain UOC-MP representatives, it became clear that nothing catastrophic is happening, so this pressure gradually intensified.”

At the same time, the known “Servants” who carry the stigma of lobbyists for the Moscow Church are not very public—they simply refuse to speak openly. You can understand them: they go not only against public sentiment but also against the will of the president and the SBU, which insist that the UOC-MP is a hostile organization. So supporters of Russian Orthodoxy in parliament are left to whisper to colleagues about the allegedly still-great influence of the “largest church” and its flock. They also cite the Venice Commission, which “will not be delighted by attempts of the state to turn individual responsibility of certain collaborators from the Moscow Patriarchate into a collective sin.”

Meanwhile, UOC-MP representatives are already building an active defense strategy on international platforms—in the UN and OSCE. There one can hear their complaints about repression, inciting interfaith enmity, and similar laments. Not to mention that the church of the aggressor state has for years built legal entrenchments inside the country. So the Moscow Church will not simply evaporate from Ukraine just because deputies press buttons, even if that happens. The authorities must prepare for that.