Why Poroshenko Accumulates Conflicts

Why Poroshenko Accumulates Conflicts

President of peace. That is how Petro Poroshenko positioned himself during his inauguration 2014 year.

In his first speech before taking office the new president laid out the main points of a peace plan that was supposed to end the Russian–Ukrainian war. At least in Donbas, "Ukrainian Realities" report with reference to pravda.com.ua.

Ultimately Poroshenko's plan formed the basis of the Minsk agreements, but instead of ending the conflict in eastern Ukraine it turned it into a constantly smoldering focal point of tension. Although, it must be admitted, it potentially saved tens of thousands of lives that would have been impossible to avoid in an open war.

Overall, the classic saying "a cold peace is better than a hot war" most accurately fits the president's tactics in resolving the main conflict that fell to him during his first term.

But in almost two and a half years that Poroshenko has sat in the main office on Bankova Street, he has also managed to get involved in several wars on the "internal front." And although here he faces no opponent at the level of Russian President Vladimir Putin, most of these conflicts have also become chronic.

Unable to win quickly, Poroshenko prefers to "preserve" the situation and exhaust his opponents.

On the eve of the midpoint of his presidency, Ukrainska Pravda decided to recall Poroshenko’s most illustrative "frozen" conflicts on the "internal front."

Constitutional Court

Immediately after the change of power in 2014 year, parliament adopted a resolution stating that in 2010 year Constitutional Court judges allowed Viktor Yanukovych to usurp power. Deputies decided that the judges had violated their oath and must be dismissed. The Rada even replaced its quota in the Constitutional Court and urged the Congress of Judges and the president to do the same.

However problems arose. At that time deputies could appeal to the president, but that was an appeal to the future. After Yanukovych's flight, the duties of the head of state were temporarily performed by then parliamentary speaker Oleksandr Turchynov with the prefix "acting." And only the president can replace a quota in the Constitutional Court, with no "acting" authority allowed.

When the country elected Poroshenko president, he could have replaced the Constitutional Court judges, but he did not. It's one thing, as a deputy, to ask the president to dismiss everyone (and Poroshenko voted for the mentioned resolution), and quite another — once becoming president — to heed your own call.

The Constitutional Court judges could still have been useful to Poroshenko.

And it's not about special sympathies or sentimentality toward the president. Quite the opposite. Virtually all the "old" judges were on his hook, which made them, if not docile, then very "attentive" to the president's position.

Some of the judges were implicated in the criminal case about Yanukovych's usurpation of power, which the Prosecutor General's Office initiated — an agency that since Maidan has already had its fourth head. But the continuity of Poroshenko's "crony tradition" allows him to rely on that office as "his own." This gives grounds for talk that Bankova can quite influence how actively SBU investigators will "take an interest" in the Constitutional Court judges.

In addition, Constitutional Court chairman Yuriy Baulin, so to speak, is approaching retirement. Next spring he will be able to retire with a clear conscience and lifelong maintenance. For the president, the ability to dismiss the head of the Constitutional Court at any moment without severance pay is a serious argument to be "heard."

And for Poroshenko, who began systematic constitutional reform, this issue is of extreme importance. Changes to the fundamental law regarding the judiciary and decentralization with a "special regime" for certain areas of the east had to receive the Constitutional Court's approval.

When the country elected Poroshenko president, he could have replaced the Constitutional Court judges, but he did not. TSN.UA

Moreover, when the Minsk process stalled and the procedure required final adoption of changes regarding Donbas, it was the Constitutional Court that rescued the authorities and allowed postponement of that decision.

But the "controlled" mode of the Constitutional Court played a cruel trick on Poroshenko as well. When the Supreme Court and former Regionals challenged the lustration law in the Constitutional Court, all the public negativity and outrage fell not on them but on the president. Because why have Yanukovych's judges still not been dismissed and are instead considering the constitutionality of lustration?

Now, when Poroshenko's judicial reform came into force on 1 October, the situation risks taking another interesting turn.

First, the concept of "violation of the oath" disappears from judicial practice. So now Poroshenko simply will not be able to dismiss judges under that formulation.

Second, even if the Prosecutor General's Office proves the guilt of Constitutional Court judges in the usurpation case, arresting them will be quite problematic. The reform stipulates that a Constitutional Court judge can be held accountable only with the consent of the Constitutional Court itself.

And while everyone is pondering how the situation will develop, the Supreme Court has already managed to challenge the newly launched judicial reform in the Constitutional Court. And that petition will be reviewed by judges, six of whom allowed Yanukovych to usurp power.

The course of that complaint's review will show whether, having made the Constitutional Court more independent, Poroshenko himself has not lost control over it.

Central Election Commission

Updating the Central Election Commission is a symbol of how one can outplay everyone, including oneself.

The current CEC composition has not been supposed to work for more than two years now. The mandates of almost all its members expired long ago.

Deputies are supposed to reappoint the CEC composition. For that the president needs to review their proposals and form a list of new members. The head of state must choose from the people officially proposed to him by parliamentary factions.

The procedure is generally clear and simple. However it took the president almost two years to execute it, during which parliamentary and local elections, by-elections to the Rada and even the first elections of united territorial communities occurred. After each of them Bankova promised to update the CEC, yet, as they say, Okhendovsky is still there.

And even when at the beginning of June Poroshenko managed to submit a proposal regarding the CEC to the Rada, the temptation to control the commission proved too great for his team.

At first Bankova decided to test a scheme with a "presidential quota." They argued that Poroshenko took responsibility for renewing the country, so he has the moral right to appoint several independent people of serious authority to the CEC. They even cited a legal provision stating that the president "takes into account" the factions' proposals, but no one restricts him to only them.

The current CEC composition has not been supposed to work for more than two years now. TSN.UA

No one in the Rada appreciated such a maneuver, and the same people who told Ukrainska Pravda about the "presidential quota" began actively opposing the idea.

But even when choosing candidates among those proposed by factions, Poroshenko encountered difficulties. He categorically refused to appoint any of the current CEC members to the new commission. Some in the political scene saw this as a desire not to let Andriy Mahera, a candidate from the People’s Front, into the Central Election Commission.

Instead, one former CEC chair told Ukrainska Pravda that the president's requirement was actually directed more against CEC chair Mykhailo Okhendovsky, whom Poroshenko allegedly promised the same post in the new composition.

Poroshenko's insistence caused a conflict with the Batkivshchyna and Opposition Bloc factions, which respectively nominated Zhanna Usenko-Chorna and Okhendovsky. If the Opposition Bloc was still ready to submit someone else, Tymoshenko categorically refused to replace her candidate.

In the end neither Batkivshchyna nor the Opposition Bloc saw their people in Poroshenko's submission. Nor did Lyashko's Radicals, who by the time of submission had already left the coalition.

Bankova wanted to manage without them and play a rather elegant scheme. Since the coalition narrowed to two participants, those two should divide all influence in the CEC. In the president's submission six candidates were from BPP and three from the People’s Front.

To encourage a "constructive opposition" in the form of Samopomich, one spot in the list was given to it. Poroshenko included another candidate from the de facto coalition partner group Revival.

The last two positions were meant to secure the remaining votes in the Rada so that the decision would pass, and to create an effect of broad representation of political players in the new CEC.

Election issues are handled by the first deputy head of the Presidential Administration Vitaliy Kovalchuk, and in the CEC renewal scheme one recognizes the hand of this particular craftsman. Theoretically, control over the Central Election Commission would be ensured, all "partners" remembered, and votes for the decision should have been sufficient.

Had the decision, as planned, immediately reached the floor and gone to a vote "on the spot," it would certainly have passed. And the opposition would have nothing to do but point to prior practice and the Venice Commission's decision that all parliamentary factions should be represented in the CEC. They should be represented, but there would no longer be seats available.

But the president was let down by his partners. The People’s Front got tangled in its candidates. Officially the faction submitted Mahera and Hanna Onyshchenko, who had returned to work in the Cabinet. Poroshenko asked them to replace those candidates, and the People’s Front proposed other nominees, which the president included in his submission. But instead of seeking votes for them, People’s Front speakers began to declare that they had not submitted any new candidates and were waiting for Mahera to be included.

When Samopomich saw in the submission the People’s Front candidate Roman Greba, who replaced Mahera, it refused to vote because Greba turned out to be involved in a scandal around NACP.

Poroshenko asked the People’s Front to find a replacement for that candidate, but the People’s Front took offense that Samopomich was deciding the fate of their quota.

In short, Bankova's elegant scheme ran up against real Ukrainian politics and stalled.

Parliamentary speaker Andriy Parubiy promised to hold consultations and find a solution, but he too proved powerless. The factions ignored by the president returned to the negotiations, and the issue of updating the CEC got hopelessly stuck. It was already impossible to resolve it within the Rada.

So Parubiy had no choice but to ask Poroshenko to submit a new proposal to the Rada. As those close to the speaker admit, without including all factions in the submission the issue was unlikely to pass the parliamentary hall.

Cabinet and "dear friends"

To run for a second presidential term, or even to secure a first term in the current power configuration, Poroshenko needs to show results. It seemed that the spring campaign to replace Arseniy Yatsenyuk with Volodymyr Groysman as prime minister was launched for that very purpose.

But during the premiership shuffle it became clear that a "Ukrainian breakthrough" would not happen.

The problems Poroshenko faced when seating his own people in adjacent chairs vividly showed that one should not expect unanimity in the new Cabinet's work. And the government's simple ability to carry out "decisive reforms" remained in question.

Those close to the president admit that more and more questions arise about the new cabinet. The banal lack of English proficiency among most ministers, which no one considered at first, is actually becoming a problem.

The time allotted for negotiations with Western partners remains the same, but because of the need for translation half as many issues can be discussed in that time.

But even with those who speak Ukrainian, it is not easy for Groysman’s government to reach agreements. The situation in the Rada, which should have become the main partner of the new Cabinet, is extremely complicated.

First, in trying at all costs to remove Yatsenyuk, Poroshenko upset the fragile balance that had allowed the government to pass at least some of its proposals through parliament.

During the spring bargaining small factions split off from the coalition, and BPP was left with no allies except the People’s Front. In seeking to reduce Yatsenyuk's party's influence, Poroshenko essentially tied himself and the government even more closely to it.

Vitaliy Kovalchuk and Borys Lozhkin play chess in the Presidential Administration

Moreover, the People’s Front's positions in the Cabinet only strengthened after Yatsenyuk's resignation, even if the main face of that party became Arsen Avakov. The president is now thinking about how to "bring down" the interior minister, but under the current balance of forces that prospect seems too hazy.

Second, disarray is occurring within the president's own faction. Assembled before the elections on the principle "from an oligarch a thread for the president's party," Poroshenko's political force is gradually cracking at the seams.

Some BPP deputies announce plans to create new parties, then Klychko experiences phantom pains about UDAR's former glory, then another Kaplin will emerge.

Only the prudently adopted law on imperative mandate saves BPP from a major exodus. No one is rushing to test its effectiveness after the loss of mandates by Mykola Tomenko and Yehor Firsov.

In short, Poroshenko's Solidarity party lacks solidarity. And this directly affects work with the Cabinet.

No matter how hard Groysman tries to show "what state governance is," he receives no systematic support. As parliamentarians joke, gathering votes for government bills is more often done by Parubiy than by the entire presidential team.

The situation in relations between the government and the Presidential Administration is no better. Poroshenko sent Vitaliy Kovalchuk to communicate with the government, but his conversations with Groysman have not gone well since the cabinet's formation. Initially Kovalchuk tried to "teach" the prime minister, but aside from bickering and a quiet war over control of ministers, nothing came of that effort.

Groysman waited and replied to the "presidential representative" when Poroshenko looked for a new head for his Administration. Lozhkin recommended Kovalchuk for his own post, since in the Administration he is capable of running several dozen projects simultaneously.

But Groysman was one of those who told the president he could not work with that head of the Administration.

Other insiders brought similar messages to Poroshenko. Among them was Serhiy Berezenko, who increasingly covets Kovalchuk's domain — regional policy and elections. Although, as the experience of recent by-elections to the Rada shows, not very successfully. Even Ihor Kononenko came, a figure whose role for the president is already difficult to define.

With such allies in the conflict with Kovalchuk, Groysman managed to block his appointment as head of the Administration. But with such an adversary, the prime minister is unlikely to get a chance to relax.

Everyone, including the president, expected to see Groysman as an obedient executor. But very soon he began showing character, about which Deputy Prime Minister Hennadiy Zubko could tell in detail.

However public perception treats the new prime minister as an instrument in the president's hands. Accordingly, all responsibility for economic troubles falls directly on Poroshenko, rather than being absorbed by the government's "safety valves," as was the case during Yatsenyuk's time.

So either Groysman will start showing rapid results, or by spring Poroshenko will have to distance himself from him. And here it is worth remembering that in April the government’s one-year immunity from dismissal will expire. By then the prime minister will have to demonstrate ingenuity and efficiency.

All conflicts in Poroshenko's inner circle actually did not start yesterday. And with each month they do not diminish.

Judging by the pace at which the president accumulates conflicts, he simply has no other way than to "preserve" them. It is simply unrealistic to resolve them all at once. Although Poroshenko is trying.

It seems he still believes in his ability to wage a war of attrition against a large number of opponents at once. The main thing in such a situation is to remember that with each "frozen" conflict the number of enemies does not decrease. It grows.

Roman Romanyuk