About “Russian tanks in Luhansk” in 2017 year: Ukrainian intelligence is losing the information war to Russian security services

About “Russian tanks in Luhansk” in 2017 year: Ukrainian intelligence is losing the information war to Russian security services

The planting of the fake about Russian tanks in Luhansk in November 2017 and the disinformation directed at Ukraine’s top military-political leadership were a planned provocation by Russia’s security services. In this context, Ukrainian society must monitor the activities of the domestic intelligence community, demand reporting, and expect real results.

I note that the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (GUR MO) inadequately controls the operational situation in the occupied territories. This allows Russian security services to carry out controlled information drops into Ukrainian media and to misinform the Ukrainian authorities. As a clear example, I will cite the fake about “Russian tanks in Luhansk.”

Recall that, according to media reports, in November 2017 a tank column allegedly entered occupied Luhansk from the territory of Russia. The route of movement was even named – Krasnodon district of Luhansk region.

21 November 2017 an emergency meeting of the National Security and Defense Council’s Military Cabinet was reported in the Ukrainian press.

It was reported that Poroshenko held an extraordinary meeting of the Military Cabinet of the National Security and Defense Council because of the escalation in Luhansk.

As stated in a post on the Presidential Administration’s website, Poroshenko heard reports on recent events from the present heads of law enforcement agencies, namely: SBU head V. Hrytsak and GUR MO head V. Burba regarding the illegal crossing of the Ukrainian border by Russian tanks in Krasnodon district of Luhansk region.

“Due to an increase in the number of Russian military personnel, as well as the activation of mercenaries, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are ready for any development of events to guarantee the safety of the civilian population,” Poroshenko said at the time.

Following the meeting, Poroshenko instructed the Ukrainian representative in the JCCC to intensify cooperation with the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to inform Ukraine’s Western allies.

So where did the information about the illegal crossing of the Ukrainian border by Russian tanks in Krasnodon district of Luhansk region come from?

The thing is, the day before a video appeared showing a column of armored vehicles passing. However, that column was moving from occupied Donetsk through Perevalsk district of Luhansk region.

In other words, these are completely different directions.

22 November 2017 on the air of 5 channel (at that time the “presidential” channel) I stated that, according to the analytical department of the Civic Initiative “Prava Sprava,” the information about the illegal crossing of the Ukrainian border by Russian tanks in Krasnodon district of Luhansk region does not correspond to reality.

What was the reaction of officials? That same day the spokesperson of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine for the ATO, Andriy Lysenko, said that indeed the information about the presence of a tank column was not confirmed.

Lysenko noted that columns of military equipment with personnel and armored personnel carriers were recorded near Luhansk.

“The information about tanks that allegedly entered was not confirmed. The fact is that in and around Luhansk there is already plenty of this equipment. We are monitoring the situation; reconnaissance is being conducted, including aerial,” he added.

So the tanks supposedly were there, but they were not. Yet a meeting of the National Security and Defense Council’s Military Cabinet took place, at which the head of state demanded strengthened cooperation with our Western partners and accordingly asked them to react to the passage of armored vehicles from Russia’s territory.

Imagine the surprise of Western partners who learned the next day that there were, it turns out, no tanks. The point is that, in a strange way, the GUR of the Ministry of Defense and the SBU misinformed the President of Ukraine. Accordingly, President Poroshenko, based on the report by GUR MO head V. Burba, in turn misinformed Western partners, appealing to them to intervene in this situation.

The information about tanks in Luhansk turned out to be a Russian fake.

It turned out that the column was moving from Donetsk region. The thing is, on the territory of occupied Perevalsk district there is the settlement of Buhaivka, where the standard training ground of the so-called 2-th army corps of the occupation forces is located.

At one time the analytical department of the Civic Initiative “Prava Sprava” reported that in 2015 a military training center for militants was created near the village of Buhaivka. Coordinates of the training ground: 48°25′22”N (48.422702) longitude 38°53′60”E (38.89998). Over the past year engineering works were carried out at the training ground to set up the training center. In particular, new checkpoints and towers (48.406708, 38.882554) were built, and tank firing targets were recently constructed.

The point is that at that time on the standard training ground near the settlement of Buhaivka, the next battalion-tactical exercises of the 2-th army corps were taking place. This armored equipment, recorded by an unknown operator, participated in those exercises. That is precisely what I stated on the air of 5 channel.

The claim is that, in order to misinform Ukraine’s top military-political leadership, Russia’s security services carried out a so-called “controlled leak.” That is, they released a video online and, through “useful idiots” such as Butusov and Co. in Ukrainian media — there is also the term “drain buckets” — spread panic-inducing information.

This information snowballed and subsequently reached government structures.

But why didn’t the GUR MO properly verify the information about “tanks in Luhansk”?

It is also interesting that, according to media claims, the OSCE then supposedly confirmed the presence of armed men and armored vehicles on the streets of Luhansk. But in fact OSCE reports referred to the placement of armored vehicles near one specific building – the so-called “ministry of internal affairs” of the terrorists.

It was at that time in Luhansk that a so-called coup against Plotnitsky – the then leader of the terrorists – was taking place. Then Kornet barricaded himself in the “MVS” building. But in Ukrainian media, Russian security services promoted the information that Russia supposedly gave Plotnitsky a final carte blanche.

In particular, “Ukrayinska Pravda,” citing Russia’s RBC, reported that the Kremlin did not intend to take radical steps or change the leadership of the “LPR” for now. “He (Plotnitsky) was given one last chance to rebuild the system — but now without internal squabbles, scandalous attempts, and killings,” UP journalists claimed.

I wonder why Ukrainian media have become a channel through which Russia constantly injects disinformation? Why have they effectively become an instrument of the informational war of Russia’s security services?

The level of GUR MO’s awareness of the military-political situation in the occupied territories during Burba’s tenure was unacceptably low. The example cited clearly demonstrates the complete lack of掌握 by GUR MO head V. Burba of the operational situation in ORDLO.

Notably, for the disinformation of the country’s top military-political leadership, by Presidential Decree of Ukraine Poroshenko No. 322/2018 “On conferring military ranks” the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Lieutenant General Burba Vasyl Vasyliovych, was awarded the rank of colonel general.

Recall, Vasyl Vasyliovych Burba (1978) is a colonel general of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (2016—2020).

During the Revolution of Dignity he held the position of head of the 2-th “K” department of the SBU Main Directorate. According to media reports, he worked with sources of funding for the “Antimaidan.” According to documents published by Hennadiy Moskal, he was one of the executors of the “Boomerang” and “Khyvlia” plans, by which the Interior Ministry and SBU tried to “clean up” the Euromaidan in February 2014.

19 November 2021 head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (2016–2020 years) Vasyl Burba stated that the order to postpone the operation to capture the “Wagner” fighters in July 2020 was given by the President of Ukraine, as he was told by the head of the Presidential Office Andriy Yermak.

Bellingcat did not find evidence that the head of the Presidential Office of Ukraine A. Yermak called the self-proclaimed president of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko to warn him about the arrival in the country of fighters from the Wagner PMC.

During the press marathon on 26 November President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the former head of the Main Intelligence Directorate Vasyl Burba is disclosing secret information about the special operation concerning the “Wagner” fighters, thereby breaking the law.

Additionally, according to V. Zelensky, Burba is a person of the previous head of state Petro Poroshenko, “an adventurer and a swindler” who wanted to discredit him.