What Is Happening in Ukraine’s Church Life During the War and Why the Authorities Protect the Russian Church

What is happening in Ukraine’s church life during the war and why the authorities protect the Russian church

As a result of Russian aggression, the UOC-MP is being torn apart by internal contradictions: some priests want independence and are outraged by Patriarch Kirill. Yet the higher clergy are writhing like snakes on a frying pan to invent arguments for why they must remain under the control of fascist Moscow.

The last two years, coinciding with Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s presidency, seemed destined to permanently change trends begun during Petro Poroshenko’s time. The new authorities reliably buried any talk of creating a single autocephalous church in Ukraine. Moreover, for the first time in six years the top state posts were occupied by people connected to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. No one expected anything else, notes the publication TEXTY.

With the emergence of the OCU, changes in church life became visible to the naked eye. Since the December Unification Council 2018, the number of transfers from the UOC (MP) to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine recognized by world Orthodoxy grew like yeast. Thus in January 2019 152 parishes transferred, in February — 243. But literally within a month the trend sharply reversed and by May 2019 there was only one transfer. Probably not surprising if you recall that it was in May of that year that the country was headed by a new president — Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Soon the situation began to partly resemble what happened under Viktor Yanukovych: reports appeared about high-ranking officials attending services in UOC-MP churches, while at the same time there were reports of difficulties re-registering communities into the OCU. Some Russian propagandists, long unseen here, began visiting Kyiv and for some reason showed great interest in the religious life of the neighboring country.

But everything changed very sharply on 24 February 2022 — and of course the cause of those changes was Russian rockets and shells that rained down on the heads of Ukrainian faithful. A major war began, and with it major changes in the country’s church life. The number of parish transfers from the UOC-MP to the OCU again rose sharply. If in February 2022 there had been only one such transfer, then in March — 54, in April — 104, and in May — 229 transfers.

At the same time, it is worth remembering that the total number of UOC-MP parishes today is about 11,5 thousand. And the number of OCU communities is about 7.5 thousand. According to Wikipedia, from December 2018 to September 2022 1151 communities moved from the UOC-MP to the OCU.

Masking

All this, of course, intensified already tense relations between the two churches. It also brought longstanding disputes about who exactly should decide on transfers to the fore. The UOC (MP) insists that only active parishioners are responsible for such decisions. But that effectively cuts off from religious life all other faithful who may not attend church every Sunday but still bring their donations. And who are asking more and more uncomfortable questions of their priests.

Against this backdrop, on 27 May the UOC-MP held a Council that adopted a new Statute of the church. According to it, the decisions of the Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church are no longer mandatory for the UOC; the head of the UOC is no longer a member of the ROC Synod; and the UOC no longer commemorates the ROC Patriarch as its “lord.” However, the Council still failed to condemn the position of ROC Patriarch Kirill (Gundyaev). The Statute itself also refers to a charter of Patriarch Alexy, which clearly states: “Ukrainian Orthodox Church united through our Russian Orthodox Church with the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church…”. This phrase emphasizes the UOC’s connection to world Orthodoxy precisely through the Russian Orthodox Church.

Then other odd things happened with that Council decision — first and foremost that the new Statute was not published on the UOC-MP’s official resources. The public could read its text only by applying to the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience. In other words, the Statute was supposedly adopted, there are some decisions, but where to read them — that’s a problem.

This, essentially, mirrors the whole situation with the UOC (MP). Some priests stopped commemorating Kirill, and others still do. That is why critics of the UOC (MP) continue to argue that a real movement “away from Moscow” has not even begun.

Dmytro Horiovey, scholar of religion, director of the NGO “Center for Religious Security”

— We see that the Kremlin uses the UOC-MP as an instrument of “soft power.” Of course, we cannot say that all 90% of its priests are collaborators; there are few open agents among them, but others also operate in a stream that undermines Ukrainians’ national identity. They preach a certain cosmopolitanism — supposedly it doesn’t matter what nationality you are, the main thing is to believe in God and be humble. In an ordinary world there is nothing wrong with that; many religious organizations preach cosmopolitanism. But when the issue is a war for national identity, for symbols and historical heritage — those who undermine national identity effectively become accomplices to the crime.

We see a striking difference between the Moscow Patriarchate in Russia and in Ukraine. The Moscow Patriarchate in Russia supports its state and people and works to strengthen Russian national identity. The Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine says identity isn’t important; you must be kind and humble. The Moscow Patriarchate in Russia supports mobilization and calls to go and kill Ukrainians; that same patriarchate in Ukraine convinces people not to resist. Not everyone, of course, but some do say that.

Representatives of the UOC-MP can claim their pro-Ukrainian position as much as they like. But we do not see discovered collaborators in the UOC-MP held accountable by the church.

Indeed, accusations of collaborationism are among the most serious leveled at UOC (MP) clergy. While many priests of that church actually help civilians and Ukrainian fighters, talks of collaboration specifically by UOC-MP priests continue. TEXTY decided to investigate this question.

Collaborators

It should be emphasized that staying in occupied territory with one’s flock and conducting services is not a crime. As reports from the ground show, in occupied areas there have been — and in some places still are — not only UOC (MP) priests but also clergy of the Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic churches, and sometimes even clergy of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

But there is a key difference in their status and the status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. If the activities of the first were at their own risk — a private initiative — the UOC-MP proved to be a fully legitimate structure in the eyes of the Russian occupiers.

TEXTY sought to learn how this unfolded in occupied Kherson region from Oles Kobets, executive director of the public organization Association of the Ukrainian Peacekeeping School. Before the occupation he worked on civil society issues in Kherson.

"When the aggression began on 24 February, the clergy behaved quite differently. Many Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic priests left in the early days of the war. Some of them lacked Ukrainian citizenship — for example Polish priests — so of course they tried to leave occupied territory as soon as possible. OCU priests mostly stayed in the early days, at least until the story with OCU priest Serhiy Chudinovych, whom the occupiers detained and abused (though he later managed to leave). That incident became the impetus after which OCU priests began to leave occupied territories more actively."

As for the UOC (MP), its leadership — Metropolitan Ioan (Siopko) of Kherson and Tavria — has been in Kyiv since mid-June; I’ve heard little about Metropolitan Filaret (Zverev) of Nova Kakhovka and Henichesk. I generally don’t have information about explicitly pro-Russian views held by the local UOC-MP leadership. Again, it is hard to speak about this because they have not publicly taken a clear position.

But, for example, a clear pro-Russian stance is held by UOC-MP priest Gennadiy Shkil from Hola Prystan. He openly supports the occupation and the war. The clergyman appears in propaganda videos of VTV-Plus, which works for the occupiers.

An excerpt from Gennadiy Shkil’s Telegram channel. The priest is the author of a number of outrageous statements that not only clearly show his collaborationism but are effectively attempts to justify the occupiers’ crimes against humanity.

But we also have other cases regarding this confession — in one village near Kherson a UOC-MP clergyman buried a territorial defense fighter. The occupation administration learned about this, searched him and humiliated him. So the situation is not black and white.

Overall I would call the UOC (MP)’s behavior in occupied territories hybrid. Obviously, we cannot accuse the leadership of the Kherson diocese of collaboration because it left. There is no mass collaboration of priests in parishes either, so it’s a hybrid phenomenon — somewhere it exists, somewhere it does not.

But the part of the UOC (MP) that remained in occupied territories is legitimate in the eyes of the occupiers. In occupied territories, modeled on Russian patterns, UOC-MP clergy are invited to various ceremonies.

For example, on 9 May in Kherson a prayer service took place on the Alley of Glory for those who fell in World War II, attended by UOC-MP clergy. The service was held against the backdrop of an occupier military vehicle with “Z” insignia.

It is also obvious that the top of the local collaborationist administration were parishioners or sympathizers of the UOC-MP. I did not see among them Protestants, Catholics, or supporters of the OCU. In particular, the well-known collaborator Saldo, during whose mayoralty the Assumption Cathedral in Kherson was restored — at considerable expense.

Today we do not see an official position from the leaders, the hierarchs of the UOC-MP, nor their official statements. Therefore we cannot say whether they are truly a Ukrainian church or merely opportunists. I would very much like to see some decree from the UOC-MP leadership banning service by priests who cooperate with the occupiers. In Orthodoxy there is a term — “prohibition from serving.” That is, Shkil should have been prohibited from serving for his open support of the aggressor. But they do not do this."

But the list of collaborating UOC-MP priests is not limited to Kherson region. Let’s go through the most notorious among them — those everyone knows about.

One of the honorary places can be given to Metropolitan Yelysei (Ivanov) of Izyum and Kupiansk, who not only took part in various occupier events but even managed to bless the chief gauleiter of Kharkiv region, Vitaliy Ganchev. After Ukrainian forces advanced and liberated Kharkiv region, the metropolitan disappeared, but as it turned out only briefly. Soon he resurfaced in Russia, in Belgorod. The UOC-MP leadership should have suspended the metropolitan from duties, but we have seen no public assessment of the collaborator’s actions.

He faces real competition from another church superior, Metropolitan Panteleimon (Povorozniuk), now of Luhansk and Alchevsk. This high-ranking clergyman — or someone very like him — appeared during a live broadcast in the Kremlin where Russia’s illegal annexation of occupied Ukrainian territories was announced.

TEXTY were unable to find any official information about law enforcement reaction to the activity of these metropolitans in occupied territories. The Prosecutor General’s Office told the outlet that they do not publish such information.

“Doves” of peace

But beyond outright collaborators there are other figures who might be called “diplomats.” They seem not to express the interests of the “russkiy mir” and even mourn innocent victims in their sermons, yet they advance a line that would evidently please Russian occupiers.

Here is what Zaporizhzhia Metropolitan Luka writes on his Telegram channel: “When I hear proud words that ‘slaves will not enter heaven,’ I remember the words of the Virgin Mary spoken to the Archangel Gabriel: ‘I am the Lord’s servant.’ <..> Without humility a person can have only one title — slave of the devil. The definition of this slavery is as follows: ‘A person — that sounds proud.’ That is what brought us to the brink of nuclear war.”

In effect the metropolitan skillfully elevates the discourse above the Russian-Ukrainian war and begins to philosophize about supposedly universal matters, but in reality he criticizes Ukrainian resistance as an attempt to turn people into slaves. Previously on the same Telegram channel he compared Ukraine under aggression to the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah. Although after the bombings of Zaporizhzhia he wrote that the crimes of those bombing his city cannot be justified. Yet he has never once used the word “Russians.”

Another UOC-MP church superior “outside politics” is the abbot of the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, Pavel (Lebid). An audio recording allegedly of Father Pavel scolding a priest who criticized Russian leader Vladimir Putin was recently published on social media. So far no one has authenticated the voice on the recording, although people who have heard Pavel in person say the voice is very similar. And if you look at history a bit, there is nothing surprising in the abbot’s position.

The fact is that Pavel (Lebid), like many other metropolitans of this church, may have a personal opinion about Putin. At one time the Russian dictator visited the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra and even personally awarded many UOC (MP) leaders.

Metropolitan and abbot of Kyiv Pechersk Lavra Pavel (Lebid), Vladimir Putin and head of the Russian Orthodox Church Kirill.

Internal opposition

Andriy Pinchuk, a priest from Dnipropetrovsk region, UOC (MP), volunteer, initiator of a clergy appeal to the heads of the Eastern Churches calling for Patriarch Kirill to be brought before an international ecclesiastical tribunal

Father Andriy at the start of our conversation immediately objects to the use of the suffix MP in the abbreviation of his church — the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. According to him, “the UOC today is in a canonical vacuum; it has no status and claims independence.”

Father Andriy believes his church largely broke ties with the Moscow Patriarchate after the May Council’s decisions:

— This Council can truly be called revolutionary. I’m sure time will show it as historic. I spoke with many priests and bishops — no one expected such progressive and anti-Moscow Council decisions. All those decisions — about not commemorating Kirill (during services — ed.), about performing chrismations independently, about establishing parishes abroad — they were all agreed upon.

Only one decision, very important to me personally, was not adopted at the Council. That was the decision to condemn Kirill’s position. There was an extremely fierce struggle over it. Some very loudly defended Gundyaev.

But we must understand that we cannot implement all these decisions at once; we need time. For example, it is impossible to simultaneously replace all antimensia (the consecrated cloth with a sewn-in particle of a saint’s relics used for serving; effectively a priest’s document confirming his authority to serve — ed.). On every antimension in every church the blessing of Patriarch Kirill is written. So now 10 thousand such antimensia need to be replaced. But last week many antimensia were already consecrated that do not mention Kirill.

Father Andriy admits that his church faces many global challenges. He belongs to the wing of UOC-MP priests who genuinely want to distance their church from Russia as much as possible. This is the main reason he initiated the move to hold a church tribunal against Patriarch Kirill.

— I was the initiator, — says Father Andriy. — But I consulted beforehand with some priests and laypeople whose opinions matter to me — they shared my pain and my desire to initiate this appeal.

According to him, the ecclesiastical tribunal would be a gathering of the heads of five churches: Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, Cyprus and Jerusalem. This format allows judging the head of any church because within it he is usually unaccountable, as there are no mechanisms to judge him.

— So far this appeal has gathered more than 400 signatures of clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in priestly rank. There are no laypeople and also no bishops. If even one bishop had signed, the appeal would have had a completely different resonance. But even the bishops who supported the appeal have not yet signed it, — Father Andriy laments.

He explains the reason as follows:

— All churches in the Soviet space have very strong corporate solidarity that clergy adhere to even when it is criminal. This legacy comes from imperial and Soviet times. If a bishop sees certain things are not in the spirit of Christianity and church tradition and understands he must speak out, but at the same time sees other bishops won’t support him — he will remain silent.

At the same time, he says, “many UOC bishops during the war changed their position about dialogue with the OCU and about whether we need a move toward UOC independence. This movement has only strengthened; I would call it ‘as quickly and as far from Moscow as possible.’”

— Of course, there are problems with the decision not to commemorate Kirill, — Father Andriy admits. — There are pro-Russian parishes and pro-Russian dioceses that still deliberately commemorate Patriarch Kirill or even expel priests who do not. But you must understand the movement for church independence has already begun and is gaining momentum, and the movement to restore relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate is also underway.

The UOC is a very heterogeneous religious organization. It is too large to be united on all issues. Give it time; the movement has started. You must understand the UOC has a very large share of honest, good, and pro-Ukrainian priests. They constantly ask, speak and demand that church leadership move toward independence from Moscow.

The UOC has a church court. I think it should begin ecclesiastical legal proceedings for collaborationism against clergy, stripping such priests of rank and monasticism. Clean out those Augean stables and get rid of the ‘russkymir’ baggage.

And we desperately need help today. So that collaborating priests sit on the bench of the accused, so those who now hinder the UOC’s move toward a single independent church are restrained. And if the church itself cannot do this, let the state restrain them and neutralize such things. The state can do it, if there is will.

It’s hard not to agree with Father Andriy’s words, and to sympathize with his vision and optimism. But there is one nuance. Today only 400 priests have signed the appeal to bring Patriarch Kirill to an ecclesiastical tribunal. That is from a church numbering about 11,5 thousand clergy. And no bishops have signed. Perhaps most priests believe that Patriarch Kirill, who effectively declared a true orthodox “gazavat” against Ukrainians when he said that the deaths of occupiers in Ukraine “wash away all sins,” does not deserve a trial? The answer to this and many other questions remains suspended in the air.

Spiritual brothers

Back in Soviet times, reliable contacts developed between ROC clergy and the KGB, and with independence these strange relationships grew into strong ties between the UOC-MP leadership and former communists who became authorities.

This symbiosis reached its peak under President Yanukovych — strong links formed between senior officials and pro-government oligarchs on the one hand and the UOC-MP on the other.

19 January 2014. Festive service in the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra. In the photo Prime Minister Mykola Azarov and then-President Viktor Yanukovych. Behind them peeks a smiling Vadym Novynskyi.

Prime Minister Mykola Azarov and then-President Viktor Yanukovych. Behind them peeks a smiling Vadym Novynskyi. They are sprinkled with holy water by UOC-MP Metropolitan of Boryspil and Brovary Antoni (Pakanich).

This photo is significant — the service was led by the UOC-MP’s chief of affairs, Metropolitan Antoni (Pakanich) of Boryspil and Brovary. This native of Zakarpattia initially tied his fate to the imperial capital Moscow. He studied at the Moscow Theological Seminary, later graduated from the Moscow Theological Academy, began teaching there, received the rank of hegumen. And then in 2002 he asked to be sent to the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, where he began a rapid career in Ukraine. Its peak so far was his appointment in 2012 to the effectively second-highest position in the church hierarchy as chief of affairs of the UOC (MP).

One can assume that a platform like the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, and a high post, gave this not accidental guest from Moscow the chance to establish many influential acquaintances and useful connections.

Among them was apparently the modest deacon and Ukrainian oligarch of Russian origin Vadym Novynskyi. And if we believe investigative materials, that acquaintance was quite productive. According to investigators, during Yanukovych’s time Novynskyi was involved in the kidnapping and detention of Archbishop Drabynko to force Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan) to renounce the throne. And by Yanukovych’s decision they allegedly planned to put in his place the metropolitan, the Zakarpattian-Muscovite Antoni (Pakanich).

This case lasted 5 years and was eventually closed in 2019. Perhaps it helped that Novynskyi had a really professional and competent lawyer — Oleh Tatarov. His abilities and acumen proved so invaluable and deep that he took a worthy post as deputy head of the Office of the President under Zelenskyy. And for the case’s figures everything ended well. Novynskyi kept his influence and ties in the church, and Antoni kept his post under the new church leader, Metropolitan Onufriy. He continued to comment quite actively on church life inside the country, chiefly to Russian media.

For example, in October 2021 Antoni gave lengthy interviews to media belonging to the Russian Orthodox Church in which there are, among other things, veiled obsequious references to the Russian authorities: “Our communities continue to function in Crimea as communities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Against the backdrop of their normal life activity, the situation in many other eparchies stands out as a contrast.” (By “other eparchies” is meant eparchies in the non-occupied part of Ukraine, where conflicts with the OCU occur — ed.)

Deacon Vadym Novynskyi, Metropolitan Onufriy, Metropolitan Antoni (Pakanich)

A telling fact about Antoni’s influence and current views is that preparation for the May Council was carried out without him, although this is precisely the work the chief of affairs should do. Apparently the Council organizers were so afraid of their own administrator that they decided to do everything themselves. By the way, Novynskyi participated in the mentioned May Synod, where he reportedly opposed attempts to adopt a decision condemning Patriarch Kirill. Apparently his voice really carries weight for the church leadership if such a decision was not adopted.

The state

There is a third, invisibly present actor in this story. It is the state. Or rather, its absence.

The state’s involvement in the country’s religious life today is chaotic, episodic and extremely destructive. Where its intervention is needed, it is absent; where it should stay away it suddenly appears and begins strange, unnecessary activity.

There is a state body directly responsible for state policy in the religious sphere: the State Service for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience and its head Olena Bohdan, around whom scandals constantly arise.

From the OCU side one can hear accusations of her bias, and UOC-MP resources can quote her when convenient.

Just recently, on 18 October, the OCU Synod issued a statement that “in communications from the leadership of the body that should in the religious sphere protect Ukraine from Russian hybrid aggression, narratives systematically sound that are fully consonant with Moscow Patriarchate propaganda stamps. In particular, this is the accusation of ‘church seizures,’ calling a religious association that has only 4% public support the ‘largest,’ attempting to present statements of meetings of this association, which to date have not been fully published officially, as an alleged real decision to terminate this structure’s subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate, etc.”

Indeed, if you look at Bohdan’s statements, in many cases they echo those of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. This primarily concerns the interpretation of a community’s right to legally transfer from one confession to another and who should be considered a community.

Ms. Bohdan clearly and unequivocally states in this context that the right belongs precisely to the religious community. Thus her statements fully coincide with the UOC-MP’s. Another sensitive topic where Bohdan’s views echo the UOC-MP’s is service in the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra. Ms. Bohdan, like representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate, quite plainly says that UOC-MP representatives have more grounds to serve in that shrine. “Has anyone asked how many monks of the OCU are in Kyiv? Fewer than 50. And how many monks are in the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra — that’s the UOC? Over 200. Overall in the residence at the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra — about 600 people, including seminarians and academy lecturers,” the head of the State Service for Ethnic Policy said.

Such a stance by a state official naturally provoked sharp criticism from the OCU. “For more than four months, for various formal reasons, the registration of the charter of the Holy Assumption Kyiv Pechersk Lavra as part of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine has been postponed. Meanwhile the head of the service responsible for state-church relations makes public comments that discredit the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and defend the existing monopoly of the Moscow Patriarchate structure on services in the Ukrainian shrine,” the OCU Synod said.

At the same time, the State Service for Ethnic Policy has completely distanced itself from such sensitive issues as collaborationism among clergy and their unethical behavior.

Do they coordinate such a policy with the President’s Office? It is hard to answer, as no evidence confirming or denying such influences has been published. But it is worth recalling that one of the deputies of the head of the President’s Office is citizen Tatarov, the same lawyer of the church oligarch Novynskyi.

Overall, today’s authorities do not have a systemic approach to the religious issue. It is more likely attempts by individual officials to influence church life with varying degrees of success.

Recently a letter from Yuriy Palagniuk, deputy head of the SBU Main Directorate in Kyiv and Kyiv region, to local authorities became public. It urged explanatory work among the public to prevent participation in meetings of religious communities to transfer from the UOC to the OCU. According to Kyiv SBU leadership, such transfers “create preconditions for destabilizing the socio-political situation in Kyiv and the region.” But after public outcry Palagniuk was suspended.

At the same time, the state recently began to pressure UOC (MP) leaders. For example, the abbot of the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra Pavel (Lebid) was held at the border for several hours; he was supposedly traveling to Moldova for medical tests. Border guards carefully inspected his luggage and then he continued on his way. It should be remembered that Moldova, until recently at least, was actively visited by both Ukrainian and Russian church figures and can be used as a platform for meetings and communications. The mentioned search of the previously “untouchable” metropolitan may signal attempts by Ukrainian authorities to send certain signals to the UOC-MP church leadership.

It was also reported that a search took place at the residence of Metropolitan Ionafan of Tulchyn and Bratslav. It was conducted as part of a case under article 161 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (violation of equality of citizens depending on their race, nationality, religion, disability and other characteristics). No details of the case are known; UOC (MP) representatives say the metropolitan appears in it as a witness.

Another interesting case — UOC-MP communication with Russian prisoners of war. For some reason, one of the law enforcement agencies organized a special operation: bringing Russian prisoners to the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra to speak with Metropolitan Onufriy.

The meeting was rather odd — Metropolitan Onufriy wished the captive occupiers “health and that the Lord return you to your homeland…”. He also said the war could be stopped not by force of arms, not by human truth, but by God’s love. Many noted his phrase “it turned out the way it turned out,” which Onufriy used to characterize the present Russian aggression against Ukraine, but his next phrase was no less striking: “may the Lord give our rulers (!) courage, intelligence, wisdom to find that word of love that can stop all evil.”

Thus he placed on the same rung Volodymyr Zelenskyy — the head of the country attacked — and Putin — the actual perpetrator of the aggression. It remains unclear what practical effect the meeting’s organizers expected.

But the not entirely clear role of the UOC-MP in the matter of Russian prisoners is not limited to this. Many journalists remember the characteristic image of an interpreter from Ukrainian into Russian for a convicted Russian war criminal, dressed in the distinctive clothing of this confession’s faithful.

Unfortunately, the interpreter did not answer journalists’ questions about whom exactly she represented in that court.

Amorphousness

The UOC (MP) cannot rid itself of the negative baggage tied to some of its priests remaining in the aura of the “russkiy mir.” It does not matter whether this is open collaborationism or a neutral stance that in today’s situation clearly plays against Ukrainian interests.

Internal traditions and rules are too strong, and the voice of honest people remains unheard — especially when many of the church’s leaders sympathize with ‘russkomir’ ideas. To this is added the old “friendship” of church leadership with dubious oligarchs.

The lack of sufficient internal strength in the church to fight its own ills, plus the state’s paralysis or chaotic attempts to do something to please lobbying groups, create an effect where people simply do not see their future with it and try to move to the OCU. This is the basis of conflicts that occur almost daily across the country. And there are no prerequisites for their end.

One can talk as much as one likes about the rights of religious communities, that transfers to the OCU were staged by politicians or corrupt priests. But according to surveys, 54% of Ukrainians identify with the OCU and only 4% with the UOC-MP. Thus most Orthodox Ukrainians say they want not an amorphous church where above a decent priest sits a metropolitan-collaborator, where some collect volunteer aid for fighters on the front and others say the war is bad; but a Ukrainian church where the intentions of the flock, of ordinary priests and of church leadership coincide, where true unity exists.

At TEXTY we see no need to create yet another independent Orthodox church. The most logical development is a mass transfer of communities to the OCU and criminal prosecution of collaborators and agents who have deeply entrenched themselves in the UOC-MP.

Yevheniia Drozdova, Andriy Harasym; published in TEXTY