Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
On the Verge of Cyberwar: How M.E.Doc Monopolized the Accounting Reporting Market
Market experts believe the likelihood of a second wave of the virus is very high.
As a result of the cyberattack on 27 June, when the virus infected hundreds of thousands of computers across the country through the M.E.Doc accounting program, many companies are still dealing with the consequences. At the same time, there is a strong possibility that this attack was only reconnaissance and the real cyberwar is still ahead.
The development of the virus cost at least $300 thousand
Experts unanimously warn about the consequences of the next viral attack. Microsoft Ukraine’s CTO Mykhailo Shmelev said as early as 30 June that the infection occurred more than 200 days earlier and those who created this virus are unlikely to stop at just the first wave of attacks. The head of the parliamentary committee on informatization and communications, MP Oleksandr Danchenko, expressed the view that these are only the initial “childish” manifestations of the virus embedded in M.E.Doc updates and aimed specifically at the state of Ukraine. He believes that other countries received only the “splashes” of this viral assault. Expert estimates put the cost of developing and implementing such an attack from 300 thousand to several million dollars.
To date no one knows exactly which viruses were distributed through M.E.Doc software and how many of them are in a “sleep” mode waiting for their moment.
ESET experts (one of the most authoritative organizations for analyzing malware threats — ed.) in their detailed report of 4 July 2017 recorded the following conclusions: “As our analysis shows, this was a carefully planned and well-executed operation. We assume the attackers had access to the M.E.Doc application source code. They had time to study the code and include a very stealthy and clever backdoor.”
“Leaky” software
The key point of these conclusions is the assumption that such a backdoor (that is, a “back door,” which in programmer slang is called a “hole”) could only have been created by specialists who had access to the source code of M.E.Doc programs. In other words, the operation was deliberate and internal. This assumption should be a very alarming signal for all security services responsible for Ukraine’s cybersecurity. It is not only that information disappeared from the computers of hundreds of thousands of accountant-users. And not even that Boryspil airport, Nova Poshta and many banks were halted. It turns out that M.E.Doc (and the affiliated LLC Intellect-Service) control many critically important services within the State Fiscal Service itself.
First, the software for the Register of Tax Invoices is the work of these very “sweet” companies. The amount of abuse and theft through manipulation of the Register of Tax Invoices has caused the state multimillion losses, and “leaky” software is an ideal tool for such manipulations because it allows attackers to hide traces of interference.
Second, the software for receiving reporting documents from taxpayers, which specialists call the “gateway,” was developed by M.E.Doc. And, as practice shows, it is fully controlled by that company’s specialists. More precisely, by a single specialist. This is the only expert who has access to the gateway software and can change its operation at any second. He can also stop the resource’s operation, block all reporting operators except M.E.Doc itself, or make changes to the report processing procedures and notify no one about them, of course, except his own M.E.Doc program.
Three days of downtime
Such monopolization of access and control over the reporting-receipt software is very dangerous for the work of the SFS. For example, starting on 19 June, SFS report reception was completely stopped and did not resume for several days. Over three days, from 19 to 21 June, the situation in the SFS reached a “boiling point,” and accountants’ nerves were once again on edge. But no one within the SFS structure could determine the cause or fix the situation.
Apparently, the SFS has neither documentation, nor source code, nor intellectual property rights for the so-called “gateway.” Otherwise one cannot explain the fact that the gateway’s operation was restored only after a specialist from M.E.Doc arrived and fixed the malfunction in a few hours. Although the cause of the gateway software failure was never established.
One cannot fail to note the strange coincidence of the three-day gateway outage with another event — the suspension from duty of the head of the SFS IT department, Dmytro Lukianov. This information protection specialist, who previously worked at the National Bank, maintains long-standing ties with Serhiy Lynnyk — owner of LLC Intellect-Service.
Lukianov and Lynnyk repeatedly appeared together at various expert panels and visited state bodies — for example, to meetings with the chair of the Verkhovna Rada committee on tax and customs policy, Nina Yuzhanina. In those instances, Lynnyk always played the leading role, with Lukianov supporting him.
Monopoly in accounting reporting
The gateway stopping precisely when Dmytro Lukianov was suspended from his position but not dismissed from the SFS is a good reason to prove Lukianov’s value without exposing him to blame. After all, restoring the loyal Lukianov to the key position of head of the SFS IT department is the most reliable way to preserve Intellect-Service’s monopoly control of the gateway.
In fact, this incident with the three-day gateway stoppage showed: in the current operational scheme, Intellect-Service can dictate its rules to both the SFS and taxpayers. The monopoly right to manage the only reporting-receipt gateway provides broad opportunities to control the situation overall.
And if those behind embedding viruses into M.E.Doc software really have access to this product’s source code, the malicious potential of using such widespread software could be colossal.
In the first stage end-user programs were infected. In the second, attackers can target the software installed within the SFS itself.
Based on the above, the possibility of “prying open a crack” in software inside the SFS via the gateway software is the simplest two-step trick for an enemy intelligence service. Then hackers would enter SFS databases, then all databases connected to the SFS of central government bodies, and gain real levers of control over the situation — from data substitution to complete destruction.
How M.E.Doc squeezed out competitors
For this scenario, hackers and enemy intelligence services must obtain as much information as possible about the gateway’s structure and ways of interacting with it. Considering that M.E.Doc software, which includes the gateway inside the SFS, is built on archaic tools and the protection even of Intellect-Service’s own servers is absolutely leaky, this development is more than likely.
Another aspect to consider is the competitive struggle for the reporting market. Until now, M.E.Doc suppressed all competitors precisely by virtue of its monopolistic ability to influence the reporting-receipt gateway within the SFS. Any of the reporting operators (Sonata, I-Fin, E-doc and others) can provide numerous examples when their clients’ reports were delayed at the gateway level, while M.E.Doc clients’ reports were successfully and timely accepted by the gateway.
Six months ago the situation changed dramatically: amendments were made to the Tax Code that predetermined the emergence of the electronic taxpayer cabinet — a cloud service that could become a direct and free competitor to M.E.Doc.
“M.E.Doc” against creating the taxpayer cabinet
This became a significant threat to M.E.Doc. Therefore Intellect-Service is making every effort to prevent the creation of a modern taxpayer cabinet and to discredit everyone working on it inside and outside the SFS. In such a situation, spreading viruses from the SFS electronic cabinet is a very effective competitive tactic that could become the second wave of a viral attack. This scenario is quite likely, since the electronic taxpayer cabinet uses the same gateway that is fully controlled by Intellect-Service.
Therefore the situation requires urgent, highly qualified action by the security services and cyber police in cooperation with leading domestic and global cyber defense companies. Our state cannot be held hostage by the financial interests of a single company and the low qualifications of its developers who create insecure software.
Ultimately, this is a national security issue that should be considered at the level of the National Security Council.
kp.ua
Document: PDF proof of the original version of the news item "На пороге кибервойны: как M.E.Doc монополизировал рынок бухгалтерской отчетности". It records the publication content at the moment of the first scan, the preservation date and the source: ANTIKOR.