Want to, but it pricks. Will Poroshenko dare to remove Odesa mayor Trukhanov?

Want to, but it pricks. Will Poroshenko dare to remove Odesa mayor Trukhanov?

23 October, Odesa was “visited on a working trip” by detectives from the capital department of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau. Their targets were Odesa mayor Hennadiy Trukhanov’s office, as well as his apartment and the office of the firm “Rostdorstroy” associated with him.

The searches caused concern among the mayor’s supporters and undisguised delight among his opponents, who saw them as a sign of the imminent downfall of the Odesa city head.

Trukhanov himself, however, did not appear particularly crushed by the searches: he said he was ready to do everything possible to help the detectives, since he himself is primarily interested in establishing the truth.

The idea that Trukhanov might be “thrown out” of the mayor’s chair may seem strange to those familiar with Odesa’s political realities. It is known that Trukhanov and his party “Trust the Deeds” are allies of the BPP both in the city and in the regional council.

So why would Poroshenko weaken his main ally in the region? Especially when this ally enjoys much greater popularity in Odesa than Poroshenko himself?

However, it is possible that in this case we are dealing with one of those paradoxes that drive Ukrainian politics. But — let’s go step by step.

The past and the thoughts

Opponents of Odesa mayor Hennadiy Trukhanov like to reproach him for his “regional” past. Formally, their accusations are correct: in 2010 year Trukhanov headed the Party of Regions faction in the Odesa city council, in 2012 he became a deputy of the Verkhovna Rada from that political force, and so on.

At the same time, it is worth recalling that Trukhanov first entered the Odesa city council on the lists of Volodymyr Lytvyn’s People’s Party in 2005, and he belonged to an informal deputy grouping that supported then-mayor Eduard Hurvits.

That position at the time best matched the interests of Trukhanov and the business group associated with him — businessman Volodymyr Galanternyk and the Odesa–Moscow millionaire Alexander Zhukov, who lives in England.

In 2010, joining the Party of Regions opened a fundamentally new level of prospects for Trukhanov and his partners.

However, the rapidly growing and increasingly powerful Party of Regions never distinguished itself by internal unity either on the all-Ukrainian level or, especially, in Odesa. As a result, after the 2010 elections the Odesa organization of the PR and the party’s deputy factions were constantly torn by complex conflicts between various groups of influence.

In Odesa the main struggle unfolded between mayor Oleksiy Kostusev, governor Eduard Matviychuk and the head of the faction in the city council, later MP, Hennadiy Trukhanov.

At the end of October 2013 the winner in that struggle was determined: it was Trukhanov. Oleksiy Kostusev received from the Presidential Administration “an offer he could not refuse” and submitted his resignation. Eduard Matviychuk was dismissed as governor and transferred to the “personnel reserve” as an advisor to the president.

As a result, Trukhanov became the “main ‘regional’ of Odesa” — and, consequently, the most influential politician in the city.

In February of 2014 membership in the Party of Regions ceased to be a guarantee of influence and, on the contrary, became an obstacle to any political activity. MP Trukhanov without hesitation parted with his “toxic” party card, joining the “European Ukraine” coalition by the end of February.

However, by that time Trukhanov had already become disillusioned with Ukrainian parliamentarism and decided to return to Odesa — the city tied to his key interests.

There is such a party!

After the collapse of the Party of Regions, its members faced the need to find a place in the new political reality. Some preferred to “repaint” themselves and seek a place among the winners — for example, Oleksiy Honcharenko, who had been in the PR since 2005.

Others, on the contrary, decided to build their future careers on opposing the new order — in the ranks of the Opposition Bloc and other political forces of the “anti-Maidan” direction.

Trukhanov took a different path: he decided to conspicuously withdraw from nationwide politics, focusing on strengthening his own influence in Odesa and dealing with purely local issues.

In May 2014 Trukhanov won the “interim” mayoral election. A faction called “Trust the Deeds” (which had been Trukhanov’s campaign slogan since 2012) appeared in the city council. Soon, a party of the same name was created on its basis.

The idea proved successful: many influential people in Odesa rallied under Trukhanov’s banner, for whom politics was a means to resolve their personal matters. “Trust the Deeds” became a safe haven where they could shelter from the upheavals that gripped Ukrainian society. Thanks to this, Trukhanov not only retained the influence he had gained in the political battles of 2010–2013 years, but even multiplied it.

Thus, on the eve of the local elections 2015, which were supposed to consolidate Trukhanov’s and his allies’ dominant position in Odesa, they were concerned about only one thing: that Kyiv would not interfere in Odesa’s affairs.

And they managed to arrange that.

The alliance of the sword and the plowshare

The creation of “Trust the Deeds” proved useful to the Ukrainian authorities, weakening the key competitor in the southeast of the country — the Opposition Bloc.

Indeed, many local politicians who might have joined the Opposition Bloc preferred the calmer “Trust the Deeds,” where one did not have to “clash” with the authorities but could quietly “settle matters.”

As a result, the Opposition Bloc in Odesa lost many strong players. It was obvious that in the elections “Trust the Deeds” would similarly draw a significant share of potential voters — former Party of Regions voters who also perceived Trukhanov as “one of their own.”

Thus the idea of an informal agreement between “Trust the Deeds” and the Presidential Administration was born: Kyiv guarantees non-interference in Odesa’s affairs to Trukhanov, and in return he promises the country’s leadership political loyalty, stable governability in Odesa, and help in fighting the “oppositionists.”

The deal proved mutually beneficial. Trukhanov got the post of mayor, the largest faction in the city council and 12 out of 84 deputy mandates in the regional council. The Poroshenko Bloc, which received rather modest results for a ruling party (14 out of 64 seats in the city council and 22 out of 84 in the regional council), still managed to form “coalitions” in both councils.

BPP representative Anatoliy Urbansky headed the regional council, and “Poroshenko man” Potapsky became the city council secretary.

Odesa became for a long time the main stronghold of Poroshenko’s regime in southern Ukraine. And Trukhanov received a carte blanche for any measures at the city level. The parties could be quite satisfied with each other, and such a useful alliance seemed destined for a long life.

However, in Ukrainian politics not everything happens according to the dictates of common sense.

Dangerous rise

During the three years Trukhanov has spent in the mayor’s chair, his popularity has grown significantly, which is, to put it mildly, atypical for Ukraine.

In May 2014 Trukhanov became mayor with 43,5% of the vote. In October 2015 he received 51,3% of the vote. A study by the Socis center conducted in June 2017 gave Trukhanov 55,9% of potential voters’ support.

A third municipal poll by the Rating group in 2017 showed: 65% of Odesans evaluate the mayor’s work positively, while only 11% view his activity negatively.

By the way, in this respect the Odesa mayor outranked the mayors of all large Ukrainian cities except Kharkiv: in Lviv only 46% are satisfied with their mayor, in Dnipro 42% support their city head, and in Kyiv only 31%.

The secret of Trukhanov’s popularity is simple: from the first days in office he focused on implementing concrete infrastructure projects that are impossible to miss.

A brand-new Istanbul Park, a modern shopping and entertainment zone at Stara Square, significant improvements in the city electric transport system — the number and scale of improvements to the urban environment are impressive.

True, skeptics and critics constantly point out that behind the attractive facade of Trukhanov’s administration lie far less appealing things. Contracts for improvement works are mainly won by the same firms associated with the mayor or his circle. Moreover, often the “improvement” becomes a pretext for covert privatization of city property and land — as happened with Stara Square or the Central Alley in Arcadia.

The skeptics’ accusations, of course, are not unfounded, but all this does not particularly impress the townspeople. That “authorities steal” is no secret, and in the times of Kostusev, Hurvits or Bodelan Odesa residents heard no fewer exposés of that sort. Yet any comparison of Trukhanov with his predecessors turns out to be in his favor.

“Maybe he steals, but he also does a lot for the city!” — the mayor’s sympathizers insist.

It would seem that Trukhanov’s growing popularity among Odesans should only increase his “value” as an ally in the eyes of Kyiv.

But that is exactly the problem: everything turned out the other way around.

Shadows thicken

On Bankova Street they have long been watching Trukhanov’s rising popularity and influence with jealous concern. In a situation where Poroshenko’s and his political force’s own ratings show a steady downward trend, the successes of the Odesa mayor cannot but prompt the guarantor of the Constitution and his circle to the most unpleasant reflections.

Yes, for now Trukhanov’s rating — thanks to the alliance between the Duma and Bankova — strengthens the president’s positions in Odesa. But what if one day Trukhanov decides that he no longer needs Poroshenko?

And the main thing: what if Trukhanov does this at the most inopportune moment, throwing, for example, his authority behind another presidential candidate?

Poroshenko is not known for sentimentality when it comes to political alliances: almost everyone with whom he made them sooner or later received a painful blow from the head of state. Igor Kolomoisky, Mikheil Saakashvili, and Arseniy Yatsenyuk can tell a lot about that.

And the fact that this has not happened to Trukhanov so far is most likely explained by the Administration’s inability to see a way to preserve control over Odesa without him. At least — for now.

Moreover, not everyone in the president’s inner circle approves of the alliance with Trukhanov. For example, prosecutor general Yuriy Lutsenko, who is in Poroshenko’s close circle, is friends with ex-mayor Eduard Hurvits and, of course, would prefer to see Hurvits rather than Trukhanov in the mayor’s chair.

However, until now the growing antipathy toward Trukhanov manifested itself mainly in petty spitefulness — like the story of granting Kyiv, not Odesa, the right to hold Eurovision. As long as Trukhanov’s positions in Odesa are considered solid on Bankova, this will likely remain the case. But once they weaken — everything may change.

Interestingly, Odesa opponents of Trukhanov understand this perfectly well. That is why most of their actions are conceived and carried out not so much to influence the situation in Odesa as to show Kyiv: Trukhanov is not as strong as he seems.

And who knows, perhaps the moment has come when Bankova actually believed that?

Disposition

It must be said that conditions more favorable than now for dealing with Trukhanov will not appear soon for Poroshenko.

First, the scandal over the fire at the children’s camp “Viktoriya,” which really inflicted considerable damage on the Odesa mayor’s reputation, is still fresh in people’s minds. This fire struck Trukhanov in his most vulnerable place: the reputation of a person who “does a lot for the city.” “He does it, and then children die in what was ‘done’!” opponents can and do say.

Trukhanov can no longer brush off these accusations as easily as he could corruption charges.

Second, if one is to start a procedure to “cut off the head” of Odesa, it should be done now — so that by the time the nationwide elections occur the scandal has already subsided and a new pro-presidential leadership has been firmly established.

In general, the timing is auspicious. Will they in Kyiv decide to take advantage of it? A number of facts suggest they already have.

Activation

At the beginning of October, former Odesa mayor and friend of Yuriy Lutsenko, Eduard Hurvits, returned to Ukraine after a long absence. Later Hurvits was repeatedly seen in the corridors of the Presidential Administration.

5 October, SBU and Prosecutor General’s Office officers conducted searches in the Department of Municipal Property of the Odesa mayor’s office. The reason — suspicions of fraud during the privatization of municipal property.

“Orders were issued by the Odesa city head to transfer for lease to ‘controlled’ legal entities that have signs of fictitiousness a number of non-residential premises and structures owned by the territorial community of Odesa,” the Prosecutor General’s Office explained its actions.

21 October, Eduard Hurvits appears on the air of an Odesa 7 channel controlled by Trukhanov’s main enemy — developer Adnan Kivan. In the interview Hurvits promises citizens early mayoral elections with his participation.

Finally, 23 October detectives from NABU arrive in Odesa and conduct searches in the mayor’s office, at Trukhanov’s residence, and in the office of the firm “Rostdorstroy” associated with him. The searches are connected to the story about the privatization of Odesa airport, as well as alleged violations in tenders for road repairs in Odesa.

The last event, however, looks frankly strange. The airport was privatized back when Kostusev was mayor, and Trukhanov has only an indirect relation to its privatization. So it is not entirely clear what “clues” and “evidence” detectives expected to find at his home in that regard.

It gives the impression that NABU, knowing about the gathering clouds over the Odesa mayor, simply decided to “get involved” in what was happening in order to later attribute part of the credit to itself for Trukhanov’s removal.

However, that is, of course, only a hypothesis.

Trukhanov himself and his closest associates are trying to keep a cheery appearance and insist that nothing critical is happening.

Yet the events increasingly begin to resemble the implementation of a certain sinister (for Trukhanov) plan.

A cunning plan and its associated difficulties

It is easy to imagine a scenario that might have been developed on Bankova: they “terrorize” Trukhanov with the threat of criminal cases, forcing him to resign. Deprived of their leader, the “Trust the Deeds” party disintegrates just as the Party of Regions disintegrated in 2014.

Power in Odesa temporarily passes to the city council secretary — a BPP-elected deputy, Potapsky. Early elections are called, in which the only real candidate becomes Eduard Hurvits, who automatically wins — among other things thanks to the financial and media support of Adnan Kivan.

BPP and part of the deputies from “Trust the Deeds” will habitually reorient toward the new mayor, forming with other, smaller groups a new majority.

The most interesting thing is that this plan could work. However, there are several very important “buts.”

First, Hurvits does not have the best relations with the Odesa organization of the BPP. As is known, it is headed by MP Oleksiy Honcharenko, who has a long-standing, sincere and mutual hatred with Hurvits. And if Honcharenko, for political expediency, can force himself to swallow his emotions and “make up” with a long-time enemy, Hurvits, it seems, is psychologically incapable of doing so.

When the BPP merged with UDAR in 2015, the Odesa “UDAR” members, who were largely Hurvits’s associates and supporters, preferred to hand in their party cards rather than merge with Honcharenko and his people.

In other words, in the event of replacing Trukhanov with Hurvits, the Presidential Administration would almost certainly have to deal with constant conflicts between the “president’s people” in Odesa — and that is not the result they would want to achieve.

Second, it is far from certain that Trukhanov will agree to leave as easily as Kostusev did. On the contrary: a direct “attack” on Trukhanov could provoke a revolt by the Odesa mayor. In that situation a formal or informal coalition between Trukhanov and the president’s opponents would be a quite likely outcome.

Removing Trukhanov from office by force, as they recently removed Mykolaiv mayor Sienkevych, will not work: Trukhanov directly controls 27 out of 64 city council deputies and has colossal influence over at least a dozen more, including several members of the Poroshenko Bloc.

There remains, of course, the option of “physically” removing Trukhanov from the game through his arrest, but Poroshenko would resort to such extreme measures only in a very last resort.

In short, the developing situation is best described by the expression “want to, but it pricks”: the plan’s success promises many benefits, but failure entails too big problems.

Whether Poroshenko will dare to take the risk or prefer to maintain the status quo — time will tell, and quite soon at that.