Did Poroshenko Understand Yanukovych's Mistakes?

Did Poroshenko understand Yanukovych's mistakes?

At all times and under every political regime, one of the most important factors shaping the image of a country's leader has been his personnel policy. The ability to form an effective and functioning team, political intuition, and the ability to recognize a given official's potential determine both the results of the authorities' work and the image of the head of state. Therefore, the appointment of heads of regional state administrations in Ukraine should be the exclusive prerogative of the President, not his advisors or the leadership of the Presidential Administration.

It is hard today to find a region where people are satisfied with the authorities. There are both objective and subjective reasons for such attitudes toward local authorities. If the former do not depend on the positions or wishes of regional leaders of Ukraine, the latter—subjective reasons—reflect their inner “self,” the high-ranking official’s personal character, which shapes public opinion and the corresponding attitude toward the authorities in general and toward the President of Ukraine in particular. In addition, the ability of the head of a regional administration to find common ground with citizens, implement social, investment, cultural, and other projects, and pursue a policy of modernization and development affects both the level of social tension in society and people's willingness to accept unpopular reforms, provided their rights and freedoms are not infringed.

Time shows that there really are officials in Ukraine who live for their regions. Among the most successful regional state administration heads are Oleg Synyutka (Lviv region), Volodymyr Hunchyk (Volyn region), Valeriy Koroviy (Vinnytsia region), and Mikheil Saakashvili (Odesa region). This does not mean they achieved everything planned or that living standards rose dramatically in a few months. However, they work and try to change the system, which is especially important amid widespread distrust and disappointment.

As for the outsiders of local politics, the names to mention include Oleksandr Korniychuk (Khmelnytskyi region), Valeriy Kulych (Chernihiv region), Mykola Klochko (Sumy region), and Yuriy Tkachenko (Cherkasy region). These people failed to understand a simple truth: a pre-Maidan Ukrainian official has no right to be part of post-revolutionary Ukraine. Hiding behind the presidential party’s brand and using rhetoric of “hurrah-patriotism,” they continue to live and act according to the harsh and cynical rules of the post-Soviet clan-oligarchic system.

Take, for example, the worst of the worst—the head of Cherkasy region, Yuriy Tkachenko (according to the latest ranking of regional state administration heads by the publication Delovaya Stolitsa, Yuriy Tkachenko was recognized as the worst head of an RSA).

Appointed to the position on 15 March 2014 by the quota of the UDAR party, in almost two and a half years of his turbulent activity, Mr. Tkachenko has turned Cherkasy region into a depressed area of Ukraine. Today Cherkasy region has one of the lowest birth rates, the highest infant mortality rate under one year, the largest reduction in the number of full-time employees, and the biggest drop in construction rates.

Despite all these problems, Yuriy Tkachenko decided to test the level of social tension in Cherkasy region by manipulating public sentiments and implementing the classic scheme of “Ukrainian nepotism,” where every brother-in-law or close associate must take his place beside the governor's throne.

An analysis of Yuriy Tkachenko’s tactics suggests he is trying to build his own business using his office and relying on close relatives. The main resource the governor targeted is land. Near the village of Stepanky in Cherkasy district, a group associated with Tkachenko (including his blood brother Dmytro) effectively seized 200 hectares of land. It is worth noting that for several months in that district 33 ATO participants have been unsuccessfully trying to obtain land. In addition, in the village of Bilozirya, the son of the wife’s sister of Yuriy Tkachenko, Oleksandr Borys, received 180 hectares of land for farming. As a result, a few days ago there was a clash between local residents and the security personnel and employees of a company close to Tkachenko. The villagers prevented the governor’s representatives from cultivating the land and, with high probability, will leave no chance to harvest the crops. Time will tell how it turns out. But today we can note a number of negative trends that threaten to become nationwide.

First, the short-sighted policies of post-Soviet–type officials completely undermine the national projects and reforms of the President of Ukraine. People at the local level do not care how Kyiv lives. They see how the authorities behave in their specific village, township, or city. And it is the local politicians who are the face of the authorities and the president for hundreds of thousands and millions of Ukrainians.

Second, the unwillingness to change one’s worldview and the attempt to enrich oneself at others' expense breeds class hatred. This, in turn, carries the risk of social uprisings, like Koliivshchyna, Vradiivka, or the situation of American farmers in the 30-era, vividly described by Nobel laureate John Steinbeck in his immortal work The Grapes of Wrath. In other words, oligarchic ambitions and corrupt schemes of officials threaten Ukraine with the spread of socialist and communist ideas, which enemies of our state will exploit. After all, when a peasant is deprived of his land, he becomes a desperate person with nothing left to lose.

The approaching autumn complicates the situation further, when the issue of high utility tariffs for the population will become especially acute.

And third, the President's team can both exalt him and topple him from the political Olympus. In the understanding of the average Ukrainian everything is quite simple—if the President's person is like that, then the Head of State himself is no better than his subordinate. And that brings us back to Yanukovych’s times, when the 'legitimate' one’s unwillingness to be involved in regional life and to keep a finger on the pulse of state affairs allowed the country to be robbed, destroyed, and sold at the auction of greed and cynicism, only for him to later flee with the loot, abandoning both his people and his homeland.

I do not think that Petro Poroshenko failed to understand Viktor Yanukovych's mistakes.

I hope he will not repeat them.

Serhiy POSTOLOVSKYI