Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
The cost of war: what it takes to sustain the separatists. In the eastern regions, at least $3 million is spent daily on militants
“Mercenaries do not work for an idea. Blocking the flow of money to them could ‘disperse’ separatist sentiments in the East,” emphasized one military expert who asked to remain unnamed. The SBU, the Interior Ministry, and the State Border Guard Service periodically report seizures of valuable “cargo” brought in from the territory of the Russian Federation and Crimea. This week traffic police of the Interior Ministry detained Russian citizens at the Izyum checkpoint with 200 000 hryvnias. In mid-May the SBU blocked a bank account from which they tried to transfer 3,93 million hryvnias “for preparing mass riots and terrorist acts.”
In April the State Border Guard Service detained residents of Sevastopol who were transporting about 5 million hryvnias from Crimea to eastern Ukraine in suitcases with false bottoms. A few days earlier the SBU detained “couriers” with 1,8 million hryvnias. According to the agency, the money was intended to support demonstrations in eastern Ukraine. Overall, according to the Information Resistance group, after some channels were cut off in May funding from Russia was significantly reduced.
However, significant “investments” continue to come from within Ukraine. One of the places from which cash is taken away, the source believes, is the Sviatohirsk Lavra. The monastery grounds, which the media lately more often call a “saboteur base,” are not blockaded. Were there attempts to do so? Interior Minister Arsen Avakov left this question unanswered.
The amounts intercepted by security agencies are only a small part of the militants’ real funding. Just two months of supporting the military conflict in the East of the country cost more than $248 million. The calculation included minimal amounts for the main expense items: payment for the “work” of militants, participation in local “protester” actions, arms supply, and maintenance of sabotage training bases.
Payment for the “work” of militants
Calculating the exact number of mercenaries who constantly cross the border is practically impossible today. By a rough estimate from Oleksiy Melnyk, director of the Foreign Policy and International Security Programs at the Razumkov Center, about 5000 foreign “tourists” crossed the border. Among them are Kadyrovtsy, Cossacks, mercenaries, members of Crimean “Alpha” and “Berkut.” To their numbers must be added local separatists.
“Their composition is very heterogeneous. The territory bordering Russia is filled with civil organizations that have been sponsored by the Russian side for years,” says Dmitry Zolotukhin, ideologue of the Razvedka.in.ua project. “One must also consider semi-criminal organizations (security structures) headed by local ‘authorities.’ They can participate in the conflict either voluntarily or by order of the owners of such security firms.”
According to advisor to the Minister of Internal Affairs Anton Herashchenko, last week there were “up to 10 thousand terrorists” already operating in the East. This week in an interview with Forbes the head of the Ukrainian Association of Gun Owners, Heorhiy Uchaikin, estimated the number of militants at 15-20 thousand.
Photo GettyImages/fotobank.ua
According to advisor to the minister of internal affairs Stanislav Rechynskyi, they are paid about $300 per day. However, payment for a Kadyrovtsy fighter and a local thug-militiaman differs significantly. Also, of course, the rates differ between ordinary fighters and their commanders. Former head of the foreign intelligence service Mykola Malomuzh believes that Ihor Hirkin (call sign “Strelok”) receives several tens of thousands of dollars per month. “I think corruption exists among the militants too. Probably not all the money reaches the rank-and-file,” Melnyk believes.
If we assume that on average the militiamen are “credited” about $200, then sustaining the current 15 000 militants costs $3 million per day. By rough estimates, since the beginning of April, taking into account the growth of militia detachments, they have been paid at least $45 million. To this sum must be added bonuses for kidnappings, murders, downed helicopters and other “beneficial activity in the name of the idea.”
According to an expert who asked to remain unnamed, mercenaries take “jobs” only after receiving an advance. The concern is not unfounded. “All combatants on the side of the separatists are outside the law,” Melnyk says. Anything can be done to them, including being ‘taken out’ by their own. It is appropriate to recall that many local militiamen, unlike their Russian “colleagues,” often go into battle without body armor. Afterwards this video of “brutally shot peaceful protesters” is widely broadcast on Russian channels.
“Peaceful” protesters
A separate expense item is payment for so-called demonstrators. According to Dmitry Tymchuk, coordinator of the Information Resistance group, some local residents left without work do not disdain this way of earning. Rates vary: from 400 hryvnias for blocking troops to 1 000 hryvnias for participating in a “human shield.”
By very approximate estimates, at least 10 000 people have been involved during the conflict in the East. At most 20% of them demonstrated for free — for an idea. Taking the minimally offered amounts into account, the “work” of demonstrators cost about $300 000.
The cost of weapons
According to the SBU, from March to May 877 units of weapons, 1,055 million rounds of ammunition, over 322 kg of explosives, 1169 grenades, mines, etc., were seized. “How much weaponry the mercenaries have is not even known to their leadership,” a source says.
According to Valentyn Badrak, director of the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies, a single fighter typically has an automatic rifle or sniper rifle, a single-use grenade launcher (for example, an RPO “Shmel”), a night vision scope, two magazines of ammunition, two hand grenades — an F1 (defensive) and an RGD-5 (offensive), two to three grenades for an under-barrel grenade launcher. Per squad (7 people) — one reusable rocket launcher (RPG-7). A detachment (equivalent to a company of 80-100 people) is usually equipped with two to three portable anti-tank missile systems (like the “Fagot”), two to three surface-to-air missile systems, one automatic grenade launcher (AGS-17 or AGS-30) and a heavy machine gun (DSHK).
Photo GettyImages/fotobank.ua
The valuation of this armament depends on many factors: how many rounds are fired per day, how often single-use grenade launchers are used, at what price heavy weapons were “allocated,” etc.
By approximate estimates of Heorhiy Uchaikin, currently 15-20 thousand militants in the conflict zone have at their disposal at least 200 thousand pieces of light small arms. At average black-market prices, that is $400 million. It is important to consider that a lot of weapons reached the militants for free — by looting police, SBU, and military units. According to Uchaikin’s estimate, about 50-60% of the weapons are of Russian origin. Melnyk concurs: “Security service personnel have repeatedly recorded serial numbers and markings indicating weapons that were not present in Ukraine.” Based on these rough data, Russian weapons can be valued at least $200 million. The cost of ammunition, grenades, and heavy weaponry is not included in this calculation.
Also, according to the Information Resistance group, militants are equipped with weapons seized by Russian forces in Crimea. “On the peninsula our forces left several million units of Ukrainian weapons. They have already been recorded in the East,” Uchaikin comments. Polish military experts recognized their MANPADS Grom, which had been sold to Georgia and “seized” by Russians in 2008.
The experts’ findings are also confirmed by numerous video testimonies showing use of “non-Ukrainian” weapons. For example, AK-100 rifles. By claiming no involvement in sustaining the armed conflict, the Russian authorities trap themselves. If weapons that are on the army’s balance or were “seized” in past conflicts are not issued with the consent of security leadership, then Ukrainian peaceful protesters would periodically be robbing Russian military units. It would be logical to expect that the Russian side would immediately demand Ukraine return the stolen items and arrest those who committed the crime. So far Russia demands the opposite — to stop the ATO, the goal of which is to stop criminals.
Uchaikin believes the amount of weapons will only increase: “Not far from Artemivsk, in the salt mines of Soledar, there are large warehouses of effectively ‘unaccounted-for’ small arms — from 5 to 15 million units. There is no reliable information yet whether they have been seized. But I have already seen photographs of militants with weapons from these warehouses.”
Maintaining sabotage training bases
According to Ukrainian intelligence, saboteurs are trained at a military base near Rostov-on-Don before being sent into Ukraine. National Security and Defense Council Secretary Andriy Parubiy believes that up to one thousand militants are at the base. Maintaining such a “school” may cost up to $40 000 per day (only instructor pay, consumables, and food were considered). It turns out that in the last two months about $2,4 million went to training militants.
“All this money could have been directed to developing sectors more important for Russians — health care, education, road quality, etc.,” Melnyk summarizes. But it seems their needs are considered last.
Forbes
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