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Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
Russia created a network of specialized bases for launching strike drones against Ukraine, where drones, munitions, and equipment are housed in shelters and at dispersed positions from one another. Ukrainian forces regularly attack these sites, but the Russians restore damaged infrastructure and continue increasing the number of launches.
This is written by Oboronka based on research conducted jointly with the GEOINT project Cyberborosno.
At the start of the full-scale use of Shahed drones, Russia launched them mainly from military airfields. The first Iranian drones received in the autumn 2022 year arrived ready for use, so it was enough to prepare launch positions for their deployment.
For this, runways were used from which the drones launched using launchers mounted, among other things, on pickups and trucks. At first the drone was accelerated by a solid-fuel booster, after which it continued flight on a piston engine.
The first known positions were located at airfields in occupied Crimea, and in the Bryansk and Kursk regions. Later Russia expanded the geography of launches, using Cape Chauda, Yeisk, Primorsko-Akhtersk, Seshcha, and the Balaklava district.
When Russia established its own production of drones, the available airfields became insufficient. The domestically produced Geran had to be assembled, tested, stored, and prepared for flights, so garages, warehouses, and underground storages began to be built near launch positions.
Subsequently, separate complexes appeared, designed specifically for servicing and mass launches of drones. The largest of them is located near Tsimbulovo in the Oryol region of Russia, approximately 180 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.
Construction of the complex began in August 2024 year, and the main facilities were completed by February 2025. Its area covers about five square kilometers. According to researchers, there are 387 garages and 26 underground storages.
The base also has runways, stationary launchers, fuel depots, navigational and radio-technical equipment. Operation is powered by solar panels and diesel generators, and the complex is protected by air defense and electronic warfare measures.
Garages and storages are located at a distance from one another and protected by earthen mounds. Such planning reduces the risk that an explosion at one site would destroy neighboring structures.
According to OSINT analyst Dnipro Osint with the pseudonym Garbuz, Tsimbulovo became the first large Russian base whose infrastructure was created from the outset specifically for storing, servicing, and launching drones.
The complex was built with excess capacity. At the end of 2024 year, when Ukrainian intelligence assessed Russian Shahed drone production at about two thousand units per month, the base could simultaneously accommodate up to three thousand warheads and hundreds of drones.
In 2026 year the Russians expanded Tsimbulovo. New hangars, warehouses, and larger launchers for the jet Geranei-4 and Geranei-5 appeared on the territory, which can also launch from vehicles.
According to satellite images researchers counted 23 launchers at the base. Russians plan to complete four more launchers for jet drones, as well as 83 garages and storages.
Another large site operates on the territory of the ruined Donetsk airport, about 50 kilometers from the front line. From there Russians launch drones both at front-line areas and deep into Ukraine.
Other main launch positions are located in Bryansk, Rostov, Smolensk and Oryol regions, Krasnodar Krai, and the occupied Crimea. They are smaller than Tsimbulovo but have similar infrastructure.
Overall at the main Russian bases researchers counted at least 63 launchers. On these sites, hundreds of drones and tens of thousands of warheads can be stored.
Ukrainian forces began striking known Shahed launch locations in 2024 year. Among the first targets were a depot near Balaklava and a base near Yeisk.
After the strike on Balaklava, Russians stopped using that position for launches. The attack on Yeisk became one of the few cases where the effects of damage reflected on the frequency of Russian air strikes: after it, Russia did not launch Shahed drones toward Ukraine for 48 days.
Tsimbulovo was attacked again during construction. 26 December 2024 year at least three Storm Shadow missiles hit the facility between Tsimbulovo and Rudnevo. According to ASTRA, two Russian servicemen were killed, seven more hospitalized.
Approximately a month later the complex was attacked again with Storm Shadow and SCALP missiles. Then the Ukrainian General Staff announced the destruction of more than 200 Shaheds.
The Donetsk airport infrastructure also regularly suffers strikes. Because of the proximity to the front, Ukrainian units can attack launch positions, equipment, and other facilities there, including with FPV drones.
However, it is difficult to fully disable these bases. Garbuz explains that Russians hide fuel supplies and warheads under concrete and earth layers. Conventional strike drones often cannot pierce such shelters.
Even if ammunition explodes inside a storage, protective structures may not allow fragments to reach neighboring warehouses and trigger a chain detonation. Damaged facilities are relatively quickly restored, and Donetsk airport continues to expand despite constant attacks.
Because of this, Ukrainian forces focus not only on destroying structures but also on disrupting the launches themselves. Officer 1 of the 1st Separate Center of the Dip-Drone Forces with the call sign Falco explained that prolonged disruption of launch positions reduces the number of drones in the air and eases the task for Ukrainian air defense.
Among the targets for such strikes are launchers and garages. They remain in place, but the effectiveness of an attack depends, among other things, on whether drones or explosives are inside.
Over the last two years Ukrainian strikes on drone ports have become more frequent. In addition to Tsimbulovo and Donetsk airport, the Defense Forces attacked facilities near Nably, Gvardeyskoye, Primorsko-Akhtersk and other settlements.
During the attack on Tsimbulovo in 21 September, satellite images recorded two hits in a bunker with warheads. One was accompanied by penetration inside, the other — an explosion on the surface. Separately, drones near launchers were also struck.
Ukrainian forces also attack relays and stations through which Russians control Gerans and decoy drones Gerbera. Attacks on such facilities were reported in Trubchevsk, Zalizny Port, Skadovsk, Chornomorske, and Olenivka.
Especially challenging targets remain the operators of the launches. According to Falco, they spend little time near the launchers, and their training requires resources. The loss of such specialists complicates operation of the launch units.
Not only Russian military personnel are involved in launches, but also workers from the Alabuga enterprise. In internal documents released by the Molfar Intelligence Institute, there are complaints from staff about the danger of working at launch positions.
After one of the shellings, part of the workers expressed a desire to quit not only from launch pads but from the enterprise as a whole. According to the released documents, management threatened them with violence and forced them to return to work.
Falco believes that lasting disruption of Russian bases requires constant strikes. At the same time he emphasizes that planning operations should take into account the measures the opponent takes to protect its facilities.
22 September, the Ukrainian General Staff reported damage to three munitions depots near Tsimbulovo. Meanwhile satellite images recorded at least five new Alabuga production buildings.
Russia is also increasing the use of reactive Geranei-4 and Geranei-5. According to researchers, during August alone Russian troops deployed more than 2800 of these devices, with some drones launched toward Ukraine immediately after manufacture.
Document: PDF proof of the original version of the news item "Росія сховала тисячі «Шахедів» у підземних бункерах: чому удари ЗСУ не зупиняють запуски". It records the publication content at the moment of the first scan, the preservation date and the source: Expert.
