The shadow “alliance” of Dnipro: how Vitaliy Kryvoruchko ended up at the center of stories about call centers, business, and ties to Kamil Prymakov

In Dnipro’s investigations of recent years, former and current security officials more and more frequently appear alongside names of businessmen and politicians. One of the most notable figures in this storyline is Vitaliy Viktorovych Kryvoruchko, former first deputy head of the Security Service of Ukraine Directorate in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

In Dnipro’s investigations of recent years, former and current security officials more and more frequently appear alongside names of businessmen and politicians. One of the most notable figures in this storyline is Vitaliy Viktorovych Kryvoruchko, the former first deputy head of the Security Service of Ukraine Administration in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

His career in the security service ended after the Revolution of Dignity and the lustration processes. But Kryvoruchko did not disappear from public life. On the contrary, his name began to appear in materials about business, local politics, energy, and possible ties to Dnipro call centers.

Vitaliy Kryvoruchko

Journalists especially frequently mention him in the context of relations with Dnipro City Council deputy Kamil Prymakov. As of autumn 2026, it is no longer about individual acquaintances but about an entire system of intersections: former security officers, business structures, family ties, a luxurious lifestyle, and companies created even during the full-scale war.

Career in the SBU and events 2014 year

During Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency, Vitaliy Kryvoruchko held one of the key posts in the regional SBU administration — he was the first deputy head of the Security Service of Ukraine in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

His name was also mentioned in materials about events from the winter 2013–2014 years in Dnipro. In a series of journalistic publications Kryvoruchko was linked to coordinating the security bloc during the standoff around the Dnipropetrovsk Regional State Administration in January 2014. During clashes with protesters, both law enforcement officers and groups of so‑called “titushki” acted, and dozens of people were injured.

However, when it comes to personal responsibility of specific officials for those events, it is important to separate political assessments and journalistic statements from facts established by investigation or court. After a change of power, Kryvoruchko’s career in the SBU ended, and his name fell under the scope of anti-corruption laws.

Later he tried to enter public politics. In 2015 year he was linked to the project “Revival,” and in 2020 he tried to run already for another political force. Yet a full political career did not materialize.

After the SBU: business and new ties

After leaving the service Kryvoruchko gradually moved from the public sphere to the business environment. It was precisely during this period that his name began to appear more often alongside Kamil Prymakov.

Journalistic materials describe Kryvoruchko as a person with wide connections in security structures and regional business, who could act as an informal partner or intermediary in matters where contacts with the law enforcement system were especially important.

One of the themes around which the most questions arose are so‑called “offices,” i.e., fraudulent call centers. Dnipro has long been referenced as one of the centers of such business. The structures involve employees who call people in Ukraine and abroad, posing as bank, investment company, or cryptocurrency platform staff, and try to gain access to victims’ money.

Such business requires premises, technical infrastructure, a large workforce, banking accounts, and constant movement of funds. Therefore journalists repeatedly asked: how could such noticeable networks operate for years without being confronted by the system’s law enforcement?

Father and son Kryvoruchko

The family Kryvoruchko draws particular attention in this story. Vitaliy Kryvoruchko himself has many years of experience in the SBU and a broad network of contacts formed during service.

Anton Kryvoruchko, Vitaliy’s son, also works in the SBU

His son Anton Kryvoruchko, according to several media outlets, also built a career within the Security Service of Ukraine. This fact in itself does not indicate any violations. Yet the combination of the father’s established connections and the son’s access to the current law enforcement system became the basis for numerous assumptions in journalistic investigations. Such a configuration could give the family access to internal information and help business partners avoid problems with law enforcement.

Luxurious lifestyle and questions about income

Another area of journalistic focus is the family’s lifestyle. In 2024–2026 years, media analyzed the public pages of Anton Kryvoruchko’s wife — Daryna Danilova. In photos and videos one could see trips abroad, upscale hotels, designer clothing and accessories. Journalists identified Hermès Birkin bags, Dior items, and other luxury-brand items whose value can reach tens of thousands of euros.

Luxurious lifestyle of the family for many years

Publications also mentioned trips to Austria, Italy, Dubai, France, and Croatia after the start of the full-scale war. A costly wardrobe or travel alone is not proof of illegal income. The question arises when the lifestyle greatly exceeds the officially understood level of income of the person or their family.

In‑law’s business, Darya’s money, or father and son’s money?

According to journalists, part of the family business is tied to selling premium cosmetics through stores in large shopping centers in Dnipro and Kyiv. Formally this business is registered to relatives. So the key question here is simple: do the family’s legal incomes account for the level of their expenses?

New interest — energy sector

In 2026 year Vitaliy Kryvoruchko’s business history gained another direction — energy. According to open registries and journalistic materials, during the year new legal entities connected with the energy sector were registered.

Publications also suggested that the development of these companies could have occurred with the participation of capital or business ties of Kamil Prymakov. The fact that new companies and old personal connections among their participants appeared simultaneously does not prove the existence of a joint financial scheme.

However, here one can talk about a concrete direction for verification: the ownership structure of companies, their sources of financing, movement of funds, related persons and contracts. Especially if we are talking about a sector that has strategic importance during the war.

Why does Kryvoruchko’s story raise so many questions?

The problem in this story is not that a former SBU employee, after leaving, went into business. That is perfectly legal. The problem arises from the combination of several factors: a past in the security services and long-standing contacts in the law enforcement environment on the one hand, and proximity to local politicians and businesspeople on the other.

Added to this are publications about possible ties to call centers, the family’s luxurious lifestyle, and new business projects in strategic sectors. Each of these elements on its own could have a perfectly legal explanation. But when they are put together, it is natural to question whether competent authorities have checked it—not on the level of rumors or political statements, but legally: through movement of funds, corporate connections, declarations, banking operations, and potential conflicts of interest.

And the key question remains the same: does a system exist in Dnipro where old links in the security services, political influence, and private business mutually shield each other—and if so, why has it not become the subject of a full investigation yet?