Mykola Zlochevskyi: billion-hryvnia revenues, a yacht for 25 million and gas fields

As we wrote earlier, the story of Mykola Zlochevskyi — the former Minister of Ecology in Viktor Yanukovych’s administration — illustrates a striking contrast between the consequences of a high-profile corruption case and the scale of business linked to his family. The new stage of this story includes the companies’ financial results, purchases of expensive real estate, and the situation around Ukrainian oil and gas fields. According to a piece published on 8 October 2026, the combined revenue of companies connected to the ex-minister’s daughters reached 21,6 billion UAH in 2025, while reports about the sale of his yacht RHINO for 25,6 million euros coincided with a renewed debate over access to promising gas assets.

The main question in the Mykola Zlochevskyi story is not only how his business survived after a sensational criminal investigation, but also how transparently the structures connected to the former official operate today. Huge financial figures alone do not prove wrongdoing. However, the combination of energy assets, a complex corporate structure, court disputes, and state decisions on subsoil use requires public attention and oversight by controlling bodies. In June of 2020, NABU and the SAP reported uncovering an attempt to deliver 6 million dollars to the leadership of anticorruption agencies. According to the investigation, 5 million dollars were intended to close the criminal case, and another 1 million dollars was to be received by an intermediary. The case was linked to Zlochevskyi’s interests, who at that time was abroad. In August of 2023, the High Anti-Corruption Court approved a plea agreement under which the ex-minister was fined 68 thousand UAH. A significant sum of money transferred for defense needs was mentioned separately. In 2022, seized 6 million dollars were also directed to support the state’s defense capabilities. These circumstances should be considered separately: funds for defense became a tangible contribution, yet they do not eliminate public questions about the proportionality of the punishment and the transparency of the judicial process. The plea agreement closed the case with a concrete legal outcome, but it did not dissolve the business structures connected to the former minister’s family. According to figures cited in the publication about the family companies’ financial results, their combined revenue in 2025 was about 21,6 billion UAH. That is a revenue figure, not net profit or Mykola Zlochevskyi’s personal earnings. Still, it gives an idea of the economic scale of the business group that continues to operate in Ukraine. Gas production: the family business group’s main asset The gas extraction sector remains the key source of revenue. One of the most prominent companies in the group is Esko-Pivnich LLC, which, according to published financial data, reported 13,8 billion UAH in revenue and 2,2 billion UAH in net profit in 2025. Thus, a significant portion of the total revenue of the enterprises linked to Zlochevskyi’s family was attributable to a single company. According to the data, in the first half of 2026 Esko-Pivnich’s net profit exceeded 1,6 billion UAH. The company carries out extraction under seven special permits for subsoil use. At the same time, one of the permits — for the Shevska block in Dnipropetrovsk region — is being challenged by the prosecutor’s office. This situation demonstrates why financial statements alone are insufficient for assessing an energy business. A production permit gives a company access to a natural resource whose value depends on reserves, gas prices, drilling costs, and infrastructure. Therefore, the legal status of licenses can have long-term significance for business valuation. Separate questions also arise about customs clearance of equipment. The report on group companies mentions a criminal proceeding in which the enterprises are suspected of possible evasion of customs duties when importing gas extraction equipment. According to the investigation, equipment may have been declared as used spare parts or scrap metal, potentially reducing customs costs. However, the existence of a criminal proceeding is not equivalent to proven guilt. Procedural decisions and verified documents are needed for final conclusions. The critical question is whether state bodies sufficiently and effectively check the operations of large extraction companies, especially when substantial sums of imported equipment and use of natural resources are involved. For the state, transparency in this sector has direct importance. Proper declaration of imports determines budget revenues, and compliance with licensing conditions ensures lawful resource extraction. For large private players, these requirements must be applied equally regardless of political connections or owners’ histories. Yacht RHINO for 1,3 billion UAH and the Stynavske field: a coincidence that requires explanation Another storyline that drew attention to Zlochevskyi is information about the sale of his 54-meter superyacht RHINO. Public data indicate the vessel was put up for sale for 25,6 million euros, which equals over 1,3 billion UAH at the corresponding currency conversion. Owning or selling an expensive yacht is not in itself illegal. However, in this case the timing is notable: reports about the yacht deal appeared amid discussions about potential access to the Stynavske oil and gas field in Lviv region. The field’s history is more complex than a typical licensing dispute. After sanctions were imposed on the company that held the production permit, work on the block was suspended. Later, questions arose about the field’s future use and the possibility of transferring the relevant rights. According to an investigation, the state enterprise Geoinform of Ukraine rejected a proposal regarding the Stynavske field. Among the cited reasons were the proposed block’s boundaries not matching the approved contour of the field and an overlap with territory related to a current special permit held by another company. The latter circumstance is of principle importance. According to the investigation, the permit for the Semyhynivske field, issued to Pari Naftogaz LLC, did not include a depth restriction on subsoil use. The company, the report says, is linked to Zlochevskyi’s daughters through foreign corporate structures. As a result, a regulatory collision arises: an existing permit for one block can affect the possibility of holding an auction for another. If field boundaries intersect and documents do not provide clear depth delineation, a state body’s decision becomes dependent on legal interpretation of licensing conditions. This is where clear answers to concrete questions are needed, not assumptions about backroom deals: Do the conditions of the current special permit correspond to the actual geological boundaries of the field? Why did the document fail to explicitly define a depth restriction if that affects access to adjacent resources? Are the rules applied equally to all applicants for field development? Is there a way to independently review officials’ decisions that determine subsoil use procedures? These questions are especially important because of the Stynavske field’s economic value. The report provides estimates of reserves and potential production, as well as calculations of possible proceeds at high oil and gas prices. At the same time, such estimates cannot be equated with guaranteed profit: the project’s actual economics depend on proven reserves, capital expenditures, extraction technology, taxes, and market conditions.

The sale of the yacht likewise does not prove that proceeds were intended to acquire the field or finance a related operation. Documents on fund flows and the specific deal would be needed for that conclusion. Nevertheless, the combination of an expensive private asset, corporate links, and a dispute over access to natural resources makes transparency in future decisions particularly important. Real estate, water supply, and state funds: diversification of family capital The business connected to Zlochevskyi’s family is not limited to gas extraction. Another direction is commercial real estate. According to previous publications, family structures invested more than 1 billion UAH in real assets over two years. Mentioned properties included the Kyiv Food Market building, the Arkada bank office, the former Ukrpidshipnyk factory, and real estate in central Kyiv. In April of 2026 the purchase of the unfinished Sky Towers complex in the capital drew attention. Public information valued the deal at about 560 million UAH, with the buyer listed as Tech Invest Postach Plus LLC. The investigation points to corporate links between this company and structures connected to Zlochevskyi’s daughters. In such transactions it is important to distinguish the formal buyer, the ultimate beneficiary, and the source of financing. A small charter capital of the purchasing company does not by itself prove its inability to acquire an expensive asset: financing can come through loans, borrowings, owner contributions, or other legal mechanisms. That is precisely why documents on deal financing, control structure, and the intended use of the acquired property are of public interest. Another area is water supply. Infoks company, which is said to belong to the ex-minister’s daughters through a Cypriot structure, operates in water intake, treatment, and supply. In 2025 its revenue from water-related activities was estimated at about 2,2 billion UAH, with net profit around 38 million UAH. The report also notes that the company received funds through public procurement. According to the data, the total amount of such contracts since 2017 was approximately 173 million UAH. A private company’s participation in public procurement is not a problem by itself. What matters are the competitiveness of procedures, contract performance, justified tariffs, and proper use of budget funds. For companies providing critically important services to the public, the level of transparency should be especially high. In sum, a model of diversified business emerges: energy extraction, real estate operations, water supply, and other commercial directions. Such a structure reduces dependence on a single market and allows capital to be distributed across different assets. At the same time, a complex corporate architecture complicates external assessment of who actually controls the business, how revenues are distributed, and which companies bear the main financial risks. This is not proof of violations, but it is sufficient reason for careful analysis of registration data, financial reporting, and related transactions. What this story says about control over natural resources The most important aspect of Zlochevskyi’s story goes beyond personal wealth. It concerns the interaction of large private business with the state in areas where access to resources depends on administrative decisions. Zlochevskyi headed the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources in 2010–2012. That ministry was involved in regulating natural resource use. In subsequent years, structures linked to his business continued to operate in the extraction sector, using special permits for subsoil use. However, a chronological sequence of events is not automatic proof that specific licenses were obtained illegally. Such a conclusion requires establishing the circumstances of each permit’s issuance, compliance with procedures, and the presence or absence of conflicts of interest. This factual separation from assumptions helps avoid unfounded accusations. The problem is different: natural resources are a matter of public interest, and decisions about their use affect budget revenues, energy security, and competition. If licensing conditions create the possibility of blocking other applicants’ access to a field, the state must explain the legal grounds for such a decision. In the cases of the Stynavske and Semyhynivske fields, the key test should be the quality of the regulatory procedure. It is necessary to determine whether block boundaries were correctly defined, whether permits conform to the law, and whether all potential participants have access to the same rules. For the public it is also important to understand the difference between a company’s revenue, its profit, and the taxes paid to the budget. Revenue of 21,6 billion UAH does not mean the state received a corresponding amount of taxes or that the owners personally earned billions. But activity on that scale justifies careful analysis of tax payments, profitability, use of subsoil, and state contracts. Ultimately, effective oversight should not depend on the owner’s surname. If violations exist, they must be proven according to the law. If a company acts lawfully, state decisions must be transparent enough to dispel reasonable doubts about selective rule application. Conclusion: a billion-hryvnia business and questions that remain open Mykola Zlochevskyi’s story combines three separate strands: the closure of a high-profile corruption case, the persistence of a billion-hryvnia business linked to his family, and new questions about access to Ukrainian energy resources. The plea agreement in 2023 ended with a fine of 68 thousand UAH and substantial contributions to defense. In 2025 the combined revenue of companies registered to the ex-minister’s daughters was about 21,6 billion UAH. At the same time, attention was drawn to real estate transactions and reports of the RHINO yacht’s sale amid the debate over the Stynavske field. None of these facts alone proves the business was illegal or that there were specific backroom agreements. Yet their combination raises questions for the state about transparency in licensing, control over subsoil use, corporate accountability, and the accessibility of judicial decisions. The main criterion here is not the prominence of a surname or the size of assets, but the quality of evidence and equality of rules. If state bodies can provide clear answers about licenses, deal financing, and compliance with the law, some public concerns will be alleviated. If decisions remain opaque, Zlochevskyi’s story will continue to symbolize a gap between the scale of economic influence and trust in institutions.