Back
Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
Two weeks before Armenia's parliamentary elections, Rospotrebnadzor suddenly found that the mineral water "Jermuk," as well as Armenian wines and brandies, did not meet Russian standards. Around the same time Reuters reported a Kremlin plan to spend about 50 million dollars to bring 100 thousand Armenian voters from Russia to vote against Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
That did not stop Pashinyan: his party won by more than a twofold margin. However, Armenia is just one example. Russia used similar tactics in Georgia and Moldova, and the conditions for them are always the same: many political projects built around individual personalities instead of genuine parties, and the role of geopolitics in campaigns that crowds out all other issues. Read more in an exclusive column for 24 Channel.
This was discussed last week in Yerevan at a workshop of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and the Democracy Development Foundation (DDF), where the Chesno Movement presented its own research.
The poverty of political choice
It may seem that Armenian voters had plenty to choose from. In June 2026, parliamentary elections featured the ruling "Civil Contract," several opposition blocs and parties. Yet only three forces passed into parliament, each of which is the project of a single surname.
"Civil Contract" is Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's party. "Strong Armenia" is a bloc that formed around Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who was arrested in the summer of 2025 on "public calls to seize power." The "Hayastan" bloc is the project of former president Robert Kocharyan, who governed the country until 2008.
According to official CEC results, "Civil Contract" received 49,7% of the vote, "Strong Armenia" 23,3%, and "Hayastan" 9,9%. Pashinyan retained a majority (64 seats out of 105), but did not secure a two-thirds constitutional majority.
The Chesno Movement, together with analytics firm Spectra Data, analyzed more than 425 thousand posts from nearly 200 Armenian Telegram channels over the six months before the elections.
A large portion of the "public opinion" was inorganic. One in every seven posts turned out to be a verbatim copy published simultaneously on several channels—often within minutes of each other. The language used was closely tied to the topics of the posts. Almost always Russian was used for international politics, the war in Ukraine, the "threat of the West" and the benefits of friendship with Moscow. Direct attacks on Pashinyan, however, were published primarily in Armenian.
When they couldn't damage the prime minister's ratings, the focus shifted to the legitimacy of the elections themselves. On election day the number of coordinated posts quadrupled—to about 3,5 thousand identical posts per day. Dozens of channels synchronously published a "parallel count" that allegedly showed the opposition winning.
Separately, pro-Russian channels promoted the "Georgian model": supposedly Georgia, by rejecting "Brussels' advice," saved its economy.
Georgia and Moldova: two scenarios
In October 2024 the Georgian Dream party received 54% of the vote—contrary to independent exit polls that predicted a victory for the pro-Western opposition. Then-president Salome Zourabichvili said that recognizing these results would mean recognizing Russian interference. A month later Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced the suspension of EU accession talks until the end of 2028.
Moldova showed the opposite example. In the September 2025 parliamentary elections the pro-European PAS party won 50,2% of the vote and retained a majority—55 seats out of 101. And this despite unprecedented levels of interference.
According to Moldovan police, via Russia's Promsvyazbank tens of millions of dollars reached more than 138 thousand people—about 10% of the active electorate. On election day government sites suffered a massive cyberattack, and several political forces linked to fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor were removed from the race over suspicions of illegal financing.
But it's still too early to celebrate. The pro-Russian "Patriotic Block" received over 24% of the vote, and PAS's lead proved minimal. What will happen in the next elections remains an open question.
And what about Ukraine?
Under martial law in Ukraine, elections are not held. But that does not mean politicians are not preparing for them. In just the first half of 2026, Ukrainian pages on Facebook and Instagram spent over 430 thousand dollars—almost 20 million hryvnias—on political and social advertising.
Among those advertising are politicians with openly pro-Russian pasts. For example, MP Oleksandr Feldman, a former member of the banned OPZZh faction, spent nearly a quarter of a million hryvnias on Meta advertising in six months, mostly on posts in Russian. The NGO "Peace. Development. Stability." promotes Yuri Boyko's video appeals in Russian about the "lawlessness of the TSK" and the need to end the war as soon as possible.
The Chesno Movement appealed to the language ombudsperson, and it worked. In September Olena Ivanovska fined Feldman and the head of the NGO "Peace. Development. Stability." 5100 hryvnias each. Although the amount is symbolic, this is the first known precedent of the state reacting to Russian-language political advertising.
At the same time, attention should be paid to the themes of Ukrainian politicians' advertising. Top advertisers, such as Poltava's first deputy mayor Valeriy Parkhomenko, talk about shelters, roads, transport and community clean-up days in courtyards.
Even pro-Russian politicians appeal to poverty, bread prices and mobilization rather than to "friendship with Moscow." Geopolitics in Ukrainian politicians' advertising has become more of an exception. Former environment minister Ihor Shevchenko pushes some arguments against Ukraine's EU accession, but he remains more of a marginal figure.
The reason is simple: there is a consensus in Ukrainian society about a European course. According to the Razumkov Center, in February 2026, 83% of Ukrainians supported EU accession, while only 11% were opposed.
That is why future elections in Ukraine will likely look different from those in Armenia or Georgia. The question "West or Russia" is already closed for the majority of voters because of the Russian invasion; therefore, competition will shift to domestic politics: the economy, reconstruction, reintegration of veterans, and corruption.
However, Russia should not be underestimated. Even if elections take place after martial law ends, the Kremlin will certainly not stop its hybrid war. For now, Russia's efforts are directed at elections in EU countries.
Document: PDF proof of the original version of the news item "Щупальця Кремля: як Росія втручається у вибори сусідніх країн і до чого готуватися Україні". It records the publication content at the moment of the first scan, the preservation date and the source: Channel 24.
