Andriy Usenko and Your Circle: Expensive Hectares and Predatory Contracts

Andriy Usenko and Denys Honchar, co-founders of the company “Tvoe kolo” (Your Circle), which attracts investors to buy agricultural land, have come under criticism for pricing policies, commissions, termination conditions, and claimed profitability. In analytical materials released in October 2026 of the year, examples are given of plots that, through the company, were offered at 30–40% higher than comparable proposals, as well as descriptions of contractual terms that could substantially restrict an investor’s freedom of action. These claims require verification against primary documents, but they raise specific questions about the real cost of such investments and the price of intermediary services.

Andriy Usenko and Denys Honchar promote a model in which clients invest money in land parcels and expect profits from rent and later resale, according to media reports. According to critics, at public appearances by the founders there were forecasts of annual land price growth of 15–20%. At the same time, the authors of the analysis assess the actual average growth since the market began at approximately 5% per year. The methodology for calculating this indicator is not disclosed in the provided materials, but the gap between the forecast and the cited estimate casts doubt on the advisability of calculating investment results solely based on expected land appreciation. A even larger gap, according to critics, exists between advertised 20–25% annual yields and the amount an investor could potentially receive after all costs. Under a favorable scenario, net profitability is estimated at about 11,5% in hryvnias after taxes, notarial fees, and commissions. This is not an established result for every client, but a calculation by the authors of the critical review. To verify it, data on actual rental income, acquisition and sale expenses for parcels, and the full structure of payments to the intermediary are needed. In the cited examples, the price difference is measured in tens of thousands of hryvnias per hectare. In Vinnytsia region, according to the comparison data, a plot that on other resources was offered for around 76 thousand UAH/ha was listed through “Tvoe kolo” for 109 thousand UAH/ha. The difference amounts to 33 thousand UAH per hectare. If the compared plots truly have comparable characteristics, such a gap requires explanation: a buyer should understand what exactly they are paying the extra sum for and what portion of the price is for the company’s services. In Cherkasy region, under the same analysis, other intermediaries offered similar plots for 160–170 thousand UAH, while prices in “Tvoe kolo” proposals reached 201–202 thousand UAH. The review authors estimate the difference in some cases at 30–40%. However, the available materials do not include cadastre numbers, posting dates, or full characteristics of each object. Without these data, one cannot definitively claim that these are fully identical assets, but the examples provide grounds to demand a transparent explanation of land valuation principles. A separate financial element is commissions. According to critics, “Tvoe kolo” may charge about 8–12% official commission, as well as receiving 15% of the rent increase and 15% of net profit upon sale of the parcel. The analysis authors suggest that the company’s economic interest could be built into the price of land purchase as well. To establish the real burden on the client, all payments must be considered together, not just the commission listed as a separate line in the contract. Critics also question the scope of services for which the management fee is charged. Some land has already been leased to agricultural enterprises under multi-year contracts. If the tenant is determined and lease terms are already agreed, investors need to understand exactly what specific actions the intermediary performs for the extra fee: monitors payments, negotiates rent reviews, handles legal issues, or simply accompanies the documents. Without a detailed list of services, it is impossible to assess the reasonableness of the commission.

The strongest claims pertain to termination provisions. In the critical materials, there are references to provisions that allegedly required giving the company a notice of 14 years before terminating the agreement. Also described is the possibility of a penalty equal to 30% of the value of all land if the investor breaches the terms or tries to sell the parcel without the company’s consent, as well as additional charges, including 24% of the official rent. If such terms were applied as described, they could significantly complicate a client’s exit from the investment. However, for a legal assessment, texts of specific contracts and court decisions on their application are required. Andriy Usenko and Denys Honchar were also scrutinized regarding service agreements with landowners. According to critics, villagers receive an advance, after which the opportunity to independently sell the parcel to another buyer may be restricted by the contract terms. The materials report on lawsuits in which owners seek to challenge such arrangements, and the company, according to the authors, demands double amounts or compensation for unrealized profits. Case numbers, claim amounts, and outcomes are not provided, so the scale of disputes and the legitimacy of the parties’ demands require verification in court registers. Transparency questions also arise regarding real estate funds like REITs, through which investors can place money in a portfolio of many parcels without selecting each asset individually. This structure complicates independent verification of specific purchases and prices. The critical review authors suggest a risk of acquiring land from related persons at inflated prices, but the provided information contains no concrete deals confirming such cases. To verify, data on fund asset composition, purchase prices, counterparties, and possible connections between them are needed. Additional doubts were raised about reported operating costs for fund administration, which critics deem too low for the corresponding volume of operations. They suggest that such a cost difference may indicate incomplete accounting of costs or revenues, but by itself low administrative cost does not prove wrongdoing. One expert also called the described model a “pyramid,” suggesting dependence of certain payments or indicators on attracting new funds. In the available materials there is no court or regulator decision establishing that “Tvoe kolo” activity constitutes a financial pyramid. A key question for the Usenko–Honchar model is whether the investor receives enough information to independently assess land price, all commissions, actual profitability, and exit costs. For a full verification of the claims, official company positions, standard contracts, validated yield calculations, data on completed deals, and outcomes of legal disputes are needed. Until these documents are released, claims of inflated prices, illegality of contractual provisions, or signs of a financial pyramid remain unproven allegations rather than established facts. Meta Description: Andriy Usenko and “Tvoe kolo” have faced criticism for their practices.