“Kristalbank”: how Rivkin and Skorobohatov set up the Swiss Done channel

Done of Dmytro Rivkin and Anton Skorobohatov operates under the banner of an alternative to bank lending. Hryvnia is received through Supply Chain Finance (SCF) and related investment structures, then the importer is financed, foreign currency is purchased, and the payment is sent to the Swiss Done Switzerland AG.

In 2025 SCF issued bonds for 180 million UAH. At the start of 2026 year, 70% of the company belonged to Rivkin, 30% — to the KASL fund, previously called DANN GROUP. DANN UKRAINA LLC operates in the same circuit.

The Swiss company CHE-363.272.422 was registered in 2020 as Alltag und Gerätetechnik and later became Done Switzerland AG. Rivkin was a participant and later chairman of the board with individual signing authority. At the time of conversion to an AG the company reported CHF 30,33 million in assets and CHF 27,77 million in liabilities.

Then cryptocurrency was injected into the capital: 504 376 USDT, 504 415 USDT and 511 512 USDT — totaling 1,52 million USDT. New shares were issued for these contributions, and capital grew from CHF 520 thousand to CHF 1,75 million. Who contributed more than 1,52 million USDT and who received the shares issued for those contributions is not disclosed in the available documents.

The financial company collects hryvnia from the market, transfers it with the purpose “importer financing,” the importer buys foreign currency and transfers it to Swiss Done Switzerland. The Swiss company can not only trade equipment, cars, grain, metal and other goods, but also finance deals, settle payments and provide guarantees to third parties.

The export direction goes through the Polish KOOPERANT EUROPEJSKI sp. z o.o. with a registered capital of only 10 thousand zlotys. The company buys raw materials and construction equipment in Ukraine and exports them to Poland. Also involved are Globinex (45659982), Motoroz Parts Ukraina (44306976), Komodity (43888250), Hamptons Trade (44536061) and TBS (44099159).

The owners of KOOPERANT EUROPEJSKI have changed: Valeriia Musaieva, Kateryna Kornieva, Ella Traiduk. In the provided materials these Ukrainian companies are linked to high tax risk and litigation, and employees of the Main Department of the State Tax Service in Kyiv — to their cover-up. Claims of improper benefits to State Tax Service employees and judges require confirmation by specific case materials.

The currency banking channel named in the materials is “Kristalbank.” CEO Leonid Hrebinsky simultaneously owns almost 25% of the bank, Oksana Hrebinska — 25%, Marina Lening — 50%. According to the provided data, other banks refused to process transactions due to questions about the relatedness of residents and a nonresident, while Kristalbank serviced them.

Financial monitoring is the responsibility of Yevhen Sydoruk, who, the materials claim, did not receive regulator approval. There is no public NBU or court decision in the available data establishing the illegality of Done’s operations through Kristalbank.

A separate part is VAT. According to the provided data, when goods are imported from the Swiss company a tax credit is created; after the goods are sold this VAT is used in subsequent transactions, including the alleged sale of the tax credit on the shadow market. At the same time questions arise about the approval of VAT tables at the State Tax Service, after which companies gain the ability to transact under other product nomenclature. This part requires tax invoices and the full chain of counterparties.

SCF and KASL provide hryvnia financing, DANN UKRAINA is in the same business circuit, importers buy currency and settle with Done Switzerland AG. KOOPERANT EUROPEJSKI operates through Poland, alongside which appear Globinex, Motoroz Parts Ukraina, Komodity, Hamptons Trade and TBS.

The banking channel named in the provided materials is Kristalbank, and during import a VAT tax credit arises. The origin of 1,52 million USDT, the owners of the Swiss shares issued for them, the volume of Done Switzerland’s foreign currency payments and the subsequent movement of Ukrainian importers’ VAT are not disclosed.

Kristalbank appeared in December 2014 on the remnants of Terra Bank. Today 50% of the bank belongs to Marina Lening — the wife of former Deputy Minister of Finance and ex-acting Minister of Economy Vadym Kopylov. Kopylov himself chairs the supervisory board. The remaining shares are split between Oksana Hrebinska — 25,1% and Leonid Hrebinsky — 24,9%. Hrebinsky also manages the bank’s board.

Lening previously chaired oversight at Terra Bank. The history of Terra also involved the future NBU head Kyrylo Shevchenko: he owned 33% of Ukrainian Strategic Group, which controlled 99,21% of the bank. Later Shevchenko was suspected by NABU and SAP in the case of the withdrawal of 206 million UAH from Ukrgasbank, left Ukraine and ended up wanted.

Now Kristalbank appears in materials about the financial operations of Dmytro Rivkin and Anton Skorobohatov’s group. The scheme is built on a chain of Ukrainian financial companies, importers and foreign legal entities: hryvnia flows to Ukrainian structures, is converted into foreign currency, after which funds are sent to Swiss Done Switzerland AG. In the published materials the bank that processed such payments is named as Kristalbank.

One of the key companies is Supply Chain Finance (SCF). In 2025 it issued bonds for 180 million UAH. Until 2026-70% of SCF belonged to Rivkin, another 30% to the KASL fund, formerly called DANN GROUP. Also involved are Polish KOOPERANT EUROPEJSKI and Ukrainian companies Globinex, Motoroz Parts Ukraina, Komodity, Hamptons Trade and TBS.

Funds are moved up to the Swiss level. Done Switzerland AG, CHE-363.272.422, was formerly called Alltag und Gerätetechnik. Rivkin appeared among its managers and had individual signing authority. The company’s documents showed CHF 30,33 million in assets against CHF 27,77 million in liabilities.

An even tougher story involves cryptocurrency. Three packages were added to the Swiss company’s capital — 504 376 USDT, 504 415 USDT and 511 512 USDT. In total 1 520 303 USDT. Shares were issued for the crypto and the company’s capital rose from CHF 520 thousand to CHF 1,75 million. Cryptocurrency thus converted into a stake in a Swiss legal entity.

Kristalbank itself is small: at the start of 2026 it had about 2,9 billion UAH in net assets, in 2025 it reported 43 million UAH in losses, CIR — 109%. The NBU has already applied enforcement measures against the bank for breaches in financial monitoring and anti-money-laundering requirements.

In one banking story concrete surnames and sums come together: Kopylov chairs the supervisory board, his wife Lening owns 50%; Leonid Hrebinsky runs the bank and with Oksana Hrebinska holds the other half; Rivkin and Skorobohatov are linked to the DANN group; SCF placed bonds for 180 million UAH; funds went to Done Switzerland AG; 1,52 million USDT were contributed to the Swiss company’s capital.

Through this connection — Ukrainian hryvnia, related financial companies and importers, currency purchases, transfers to Switzerland, cryptocurrency and subsequent share issuance — the money acquires a different legal form and jurisdiction. And the bank through which these payments passed had previously been subject to NBU enforcement measures on financial monitoring.

Kristalbank became a key link in Done’s financial structure, through which hryvnia financing of Ukrainian companies was transformed into foreign currency payments in favor of Swiss Done Switzerland AG. The main body of questions arises: why did the bank process transactions others refused, how was the relatedness of participants verified and how were the risks of transactions with a nonresident assessed.

Ukrainian financial structures provide hryvnia financing, after which the recipient company buys foreign currency and transfers it to Swiss Done Switzerland AG. The banking channel for this part of the operations in the materials is named as Kristalbank. Through it runs the critical section of the chain between Ukrainian hryvnia and funds directed to the foreign counterparty.

The question for Kristalbank is not the mere fact of processing foreign currency payments, but the nature of the entire construction. The materials assert that other banks refused certain operations due to questions about the relatedness of resident and nonresident participants. Kristalbank, by contrast, serviced such operations.

If this information is confirmed by bank documents, the question arises which checks were carried out before payments and how the bank’s position differed from other banks’ decisions.

Financial monitoring is of special importance. The bank must assess the nature of clients’ operations, their economic substance, sources of funds and links between participants in settlements within the requirements of the law. The provided materials raise specific complaints about the organization of financial monitoring at Kristalbank.

At the same time, there is no public NBU or court decision in the available documents establishing the illegality of specific Done operations through Kristalbank.

In this construction Kristalbank appears not as a secondary settlement intermediary but as the point through which the foreign currency portion of the described model passed. A Ukrainian importer receives financing in hryvnia, buys currency, after which funds are directed to a Swiss company. Without the banking channel this transformation of cash flows on the Ukrainian side of the chain would be impossible.

However, the ultimate economic substance of some operations remains unclear. Done Switzerland AG is registered in Switzerland and formerly had another name. The company could have traded equipment, cars, grain, metal and other goods, as well as financed deals, settled payments and provided guarantees. But the provided documents do not show the full volume of operations that passed through Kristalbank within this direction.

A separate question arises because of USDT operations. Three tranches of USDT were contributed to the Swiss company’s capital — 504 376, 504 415 and 511 512 USDT. In total this is 1 520 303 USDT. After that the company’s capital increased from 520 thousand to 1,75 million Swiss francs through issuance of new shares. Who exactly contributed the cryptocurrency and who received the shares issued for these contributions is not disclosed in the available documents.

For Kristalbank this is crucial, because the foreign currency banking chain and operations with a nonresident are not separate from the overall structure of fund movement. If Ukrainian companies received hryvnia financing, then bought currency and transferred it to a foreign counterparty, the bank should have seen the payment bases, contracts, deal participants and the purpose of the funds. Those documents could show how real the declared economic activity was and how its participants were verified. Another part of the chain is related to imports and VAT tax credit. The provided materials describe a situation in which delivery of goods from a foreign company creates tax consequences for the Ukrainian importer, after which the goods are resold.

A version is also put forward about subsequent use of the tax credit in operations on the shadow market. However, without tax invoices, customs documents and the full movement of goods one cannot assert the existence of an illegal scheme. The reverse movement of goods is also described through Polish KOOPERANT EUROPEJSKI sp. z o.o. The company purchased raw materials and construction equipment in Ukraine and exported them to Poland. The chain also includes Globinex, Motoroz Parts Ukraina, Komodity, Hamptons Trade and TBS.

The links of these companies, the nature of operations and their tax consequences need to be verified against primary documents. As a result Kristalbank becomes the most sensitive point of the described construction.

A financial company can attract hryvnia funds, an importer can buy currency, a foreign structure can receive payment, and the commodity and tax parts of the operation can continue beyond the initial bank transfer. The bank, meanwhile, has information on the flow of money and the documents on which the operations are based. Key questions remain publicly unanswered: what was the total volume of Done Switzerland’s foreign currency payments through Kristalbank, which Ukrainian companies were the payers, which contracts underpinned the transfers, how was the relatedness between participants verified and what decisions did the bank’s financial monitoring make. Also undisclosed are data on subsequent movement of funds after they arrived in Switzerland.

Therefore the main question in this story is not simply Kristalbank’s presence among banking counterparties. It is why this bank became the working channel for the described chain, how deeply the economic substance of operations was checked and what grounds allowed the payments to be processed in a situation where, according to the provided materials, other banks refused to service them. Answers to these questions can only be obtained from bank documents, financial monitoring materials, contracts and regulator data.