Olga Stefanishyna: The White House Only Gains from Our Ambassador’s Absence in Washington

Ukrainian-American relations are experiencing perhaps the greatest crisis since the notorious falling-out between Volodymyr Zelensky and Donald Trump in the Oval Office in February 2025. After Kyiv seemed to have managed to reestablish cooperation with Washington, the impulsive American leader again resorted to brutal pressure on Ukraine while simultaneously negotiating with Vladimir Putin. On top of the scandalous “diesel deal,” which surprised not only Ukrainians and Europeans but even Trump’s own associates, the White House added a number of measures painful for Ukraine – restricting intelligence sharing, slowing Starlink, and delaying already paid-for missiles for Patriot and NASAMS systems.

At the same time, despite such a serious crisis, there is still no Ukrainian ambassador in Washington. The previous ambassador – former Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration and former Minister of Justice Olga Stefanishyna – resigned at the beginning of August “due to personal circumstances.” Stefanishyna does not hide that those circumstances were a criminal case under investigation by anti-corruption agencies related to abuses during her time at the Justice Ministry: it concerns suspicion of illegal enrichment of almost 14 million UAH and failure to declare assets.

Stefanishyna comments on the details of the criminal proceedings cautiously, emphasizing that the case is private in nature and not related to the performance of her official duties. She speaks much more readily about what is happening now in relations between Kyiv and Washington. In an interview with Hlavkom, Stefanishyna explains why it is so difficult for Ukraine to work with the Trump administration, what the absence of a Ukrainian ambassador in Washington threatens, and what Ukraine can expect from the midterm Congressional elections taking place in a few days.

“We lack a trusting, systemic channel of communication with the American authorities”

You have not been Ukraine’s ambassador to the U.S. for more than two months, so you can freely assess the current state of relations between the countries. How do you explain the latest crisis in Kyiv–Washington relations? Is this a situational escalation tied to U.S. elections, or a manifestation of a deeper problem?

Indeed, it is hard to view the situation as anything other than clearly crisis-level and critical for Ukraine. Today the White House administration certainly knows Ukraine’s most critical needs on which our survival depends in terms of American assistance. We are talking about early warning information regarding ballistic threats, access to satellite technologies like Starlink, and the regular receipt of weapons through the PURL mechanism (purchase of American arms by Europeans – Hlavkom). In the American administration’s reasoning, these are three pressure points on Ukraine within renewed diplomatic efforts.

But I would like to shift the emphasis a bit. Despite the current critical situation, throughout nearly two years of this presidential term we managed to maneuver and secure both intelligence sharing and access to technologies, and an established procurement system for American weapons. Two years ago, in light of the previous crisis in relations, that would have been considered almost impossible. Escalations occurred constantly, but only now is this combined with concrete U.S. steps toward the Russian Federation.

I would remind you that we ourselves called on the United States to resume the negotiation process and diplomatic efforts. Unfortunately, today we observe how the U.S. government presents this resumption of diplomacy – through threats to Ukraine and steps toward Russia. This scenario is facing strong resistance from members of both parties in Congress and the expert community, so it is becoming increasingly difficult to defend and justify the correctness of this course. Public opinion polls in the U.S. clearly show that Americans are on Ukraine’s side.

Can we expect the situation to improve for us after the midterm elections to Congress? Or is this already a long-term story?

After the midterms, the balance of power in the House of Representatives is likely to shift somewhat. That will allow us to breathe a little easier in the sense that we will understand the balance of checks and balances has leveled somewhat and that Congress will be able to play a more active role in Ukraine policy. At the same time, the end of the midterms will begin the preparation for the presidential campaign – for both Democrats and Republicans.

So if there is any respite, it will be very brief. And I would not expect any significant decisions. The fight during the presidential campaign could be even more aggressive than we see now before the midterms. Therefore we must prepare for any scenarios.

Could Ukraine at the very start of this deterioration in relations with the U.S. have avoided it or at least prevented its escalation?

I don’t think much depended on us in this case. But certainly there is a lack of trusting, systemic communication with the American authorities that we feel today.

Usually having contacts at various levels in the White House, the National Security Council, and the State Department (even if they are not top-level contacts at the level of cabinet members) gives an understanding of what is happening and what is planned and when. I remember when a “peace plan” of 28 points appeared last year, its public reception was one thing, but from my contacts I understood that it was not a plan followed by the American and Russian sides but rather a request to Russia to lay out all its expectations. So it wasn’t treasonous, but because of the lack of insight there was not a full picture of what was happening.

Maybe we Ukrainians simply do not want or cannot admit that a large part of the American government believes that bringing Russia closer is safer than completely pushing it into China’s arms. And that influence group is actively working.

President Zelensky did not demand my resignation

Is the lack of communication with the American authorities in part a consequence of the absence of a Ukrainian ambassador after your resignation?

The ambassador is not the sole figure who entirely handles the American file. But his absence, of course, is felt. I also want to point out that, besides the ambassador, there has been no Ukrainian defense attaché in the U.S. for almost a year.

There have also been changes within our Ministry of Defense. The previous leadership of the Defense Ministry had working contacts at the Pentagon. Those have been preserved, but there is no dialogue at the level of personal relations with the U.S. deputy defense secretaries and evidently with the secretary himself. And that is noticeable.

Is the White House currently blocking attempts at dialogue or is Kyiv simply not active enough in this regard?

It is a question of how you build policy. For example, my first meeting with Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby began with him stating directly: Ukraine is not a geographic priority that belongs to U.S. interests. Accordingly, that conversation could have ended there, but that is the basis with which you have to decide how to work. It’s not about what American officials or influential people want or don’t want. We are at war, and everything we want from the United States equals our country’s survival. For that you need to seek every route through official and unofficial contacts. Believe me: as a state we have unofficial instruments of influence on American policy that are sufficient and even far greater than those of some European countries that have a diplomatic presence in Washington.

That includes the diaspora, large powerful organizations that influence senators and congressmembers from relevant states. It includes American business, think tanks, religious communities. It includes state-level leaders. It includes simply concerned Americans who have influence or a voice, for example Mark Thiessen. He is a former speechwriter for President Trump, is now a very well-known columnist in America, and feels called to publicly convey messages in support of us. Likewise, newly minted Ukraine supporter Laura Loomer has a large audience. They don’t hold official positions, but they are people who have influence.

There is the media environment, television channels. One of Fox News’s key hosts who knows Ukraine very well has become president of the White House Correspondents’ Association (Jackie Heinrich). Her husband is Congressman Brian Fitzpatrick, who recently made a very powerful statement regarding Ukraine.

We have many such instruments of influence; they simply need to be used daily.

“Trump was sure Ukraine was a file Biden invented”

You previously argued that Trump is not “on Russia’s side,” and his main aim is to stop the war as quickly as possible because he sees himself as a mediator. Has your assessment changed after his recent moves?

He is not on anyone’s side; he plays purely in his own interests. You have to communicate with President Trump through what matters in his own agenda. In fact, with this “diesel deal” the Russians sold air, because it does not lower oil prices or stabilize the U.S. domestic market. It likewise does not broaden his appeal to independents, but it helped cement the traditional MAGA voter. Trump shows he can make deals with anyone in the interest of the U.S., even if they are not America’s friends and the decision is unpopular. And within the presidential administration, that is how the deal was presented in its communications.

Then Trump decided to delay for 60 days the effect of the “Graham law” under the pretext that this gives room for dialogue about a peaceful settlement. Accordingly, for Ukraine this is a signal that during the next 60 days we must make every effort to prove that Russia is not interested in peace talks. We must show that Russia disdains the President of the United States so much that it tilts him with manipulative rhetoric toward decisions that will undermine him back home.

Here an uncomfortable question arises: why was Russia able to find the keys to Trump, while Ukraine could not?

One can say much about this, but I’ll remind you of Trump’s statement that Ukraine is a file invented by Biden. Then Trump had very conflicting feelings because it was evidently not true. Especially after the events in the Oval Office, after which European partners rallied behind Ukraine. That triggered huge misunderstanding in the White House.

Obviously Russia claims ownership of the Soviet Union’s legacy, the “Cold War.” It positions itself as a country that influences China and has a strategic partnership with it; as a nuclear power without which global security solutions are impossible. So there is a broader circle of interests. Of course, the tone of American-Russian dialogue can upset us, but it is also important to draw lessons and understand that it changes. This will not last forever.

The American colleagues I talk to do not fully grasp the dangers of the current rhetoric, but they understand that the midterms and presidential elections will happen and much will change. We must think about how to preserve positions critical to us without turning them into levers of pressure and blackmail by America to crush Ukraine.

My first meeting with the U.S. deputy defense secretary began with him telling me directly: Ukraine is not a priority…

How unified is Trump’s team on Ukraine? Who can be called our conditional friends in his circle through whom we could influence decision-making in our favor?

There are many such people in both the inner and outer circles of Trump’s entourage. A large number of congressmembers aren’t champions of public support for Ukraine, but they can pick up the phone and make the right calls. There are many such people in the White House, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, the State Department, the Department of Energy…

These people do not plead with the U.S. president to ‘go all in for Ukraine.’ But they make daily decisions: granting Ukraine permissions for weapons deliveries, software, preparing support for the restoration of our energy system. These people prevent the State Department from being used for games and sanction removals. I’d like to remind you that the sanctions on Russia that are being lifted or receive exceptions today were imposed by the U.S. Treasury, not the State Department.

There is talk of a meeting of U.S., Chinese, and Russian leaders supposedly planned during the APEC summit in Shenzhen in November. What could be the consequences of such a meeting for Ukraine?

I think the U.S. president will be more oriented toward bilateral communication with the Chinese leader. The bilateral agenda is much broader, and I’m not sure Russia is an equal partner in that format.

But if the conversation is about ending the war in Ukraine, it is hard to do without Russia.

It’s not a given that Ukraine will be a priority in that dialogue.

In peace proposals promoted by the American side there are questions about Russia’s future relations with Europe, up to restoring economic integration through gas transit. How seriously could Europeans take such proposals? They dismiss them now, but to what compromise might they be ready?

Those proposals definitely do not look serious because American special envoys are conducting these negotiations with Moscow. But even such rhetoric can unsettle Europe from within. I think that is one of Russia’s aims – possibly along the way to grab some more “gifts” in the form of frozen assets, sanction relaxations, or restored economic cooperation. Even if none of those goals are achieved, it will at least destabilize Europe and generate debates – among right-wing radical forces participating actively in electoral processes (for example in France, Germany) and other opposition groups that may be fueled by these messages.

Numerous meetings of U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff with Putin have in no way brought the end of the war in Ukraine closer. But the Americans have not lost hope of persuading the aggressor to make peace

photo: Getty Images

European conditions for ending the war have long been defined and voted on unanimously by all EU countries – territorial integrity, Ukrainian sovereignty, Ukraine’s membership in the European Union. When these demands and security guarantees are met, only then can we speak about any other stages.

If the U.S. reduces support for Ukraine or effectively steps back from the role of our partner, what can Europe compensate for and what can it not?

Europe can compensate for everything; the question is only time, which we do not have now. And the lives of people that will be lost because of the conscious choices of certain political leaders.

“We must strive to codify norms concerning Ukraine’s security in American legislation”

How much could a negative result for Trump in Senate and House races limit his policy toward Ukraine? For example, there is information that Republicans (even not Democrats) are already threatening to block the Pentagon budget if Trump doesn’t increase pressure on Russia.

Of course, Congress will gain certain levers of restraint. We can be sure, if we work on this constantly, that defense appropriations in the U.S. will include provisions that make it impossible to suspend intelligence sharing or limit the speed of Starlinks. After the midterms there will be an opportunity to lay those “anchors” into budgetary and defense legislation and in special acts that will prevent pressure on Ukraine. We cannot influence Trump’s public rhetoric or foreign policy vision, but we can protect ourselves from being forced into capitulation through threats. We must push for codifying norms concerning Ukraine’s security into American law regardless of midterm outcomes and not wait two months for the new Congress to be sworn in.

No decisions that are critical to Ukraine’s survival should be made without Congressional approval, a public report by members of the U.S. government, the Pentagon, or intelligence briefings in the Senate. These provisions are not unique to Ukraine; they already apply to other countries.

How much does Ukraine still enjoy bipartisan support in the U.S.?

It definitely remains. The adoption of the so-called “Graham law” is evidence of that. The late Lindsey probably didn’t imagine its passage in the way it happened, but he made this life’s work possible, and the law received unquestionable bipartisan support, although it also caused conflicts and quarrels within the Republican Party.

Olga Stefanishyna with the late Senator Lindsey Graham – the author of the bill on strong sanctions against Russia, which was adopted after his death

photo: Facebook/Olga Stefanishyna

In the House and Senate the situation is roughly like our parliament with its single-party majority: the vast majority of the heads of relevant committees (defense, budget, finance, energy) are Republicans. During my time as ambassador, and even now at the level of these committees no decisions regarding Ukraine were blocked. Support remains, but today we already need to work with the senators and congressmembers who will remain in Congress regardless of the midterm results, even if they are not visible in public support for Ukraine.

From the current rhetoric of our president it seems he has already bet on a Democratic victory in these midterms. Isn’t that premature, given there was a negative precedent before the presidential election and Trump’s current attitude toward Ukraine has roots from that time?

I do not yet have that feeling, but making such bets is 100% a mistaken strategy. Because those you bet on, if they win, will never appreciate it, but their opponents will remember it forever. We have made many such mistakes.

Regarding rhetoric, Trump should be criticized and must be criticized. At the same time we cannot play American politics; we don’t have the time or capacity for that. In my vocabulary there are no words like “offense” or “disappointment.” As a person you can feel that, but not as an official.

You say it’s not in your vocabulary, but it is in Trump’s.

Well, that’s what he’s like – we work with that. I can be depressed at home alone — yesterday there were four air raid alerts and it all looks bleak. But we must preserve American support and prevent it from being used as a lever to pressure Ukraine.

The relationship between Volodymyr Zelensky and Donald Trump resembles a roller coaster. Periods of warming alternate with sharp cooling

photo: Getty Images

You told of how while you were ambassador the U.S. reminded Ukraine of American interests tied to Russian infrastructure – in particular, the export of Kazakh oil through Novorossiysk involving Exxon and Chevron. Then it was possible to agree on how to avoid strikes on vessels important to Americans. How wide a field of compromise does Ukraine have now when U.S. interests openly contradict our security interests?

Ukraine’s current strikes on Russian refineries are an instrument of pressure to move toward an energy truce. But now there is the U.S. fuel crisis created by the start of operations in Iran. The U.S. government on the eve of elections cannot openly acknowledge the link between the two events. Therefore we must create a critical mass of communications in the U.S. so that this topic becomes toxic: you cannot destroy Ukrainians while buying into Russian manipulations. We must separate Ukraine from the problem of rising fuel prices.

Trump should be criticized and must be criticized

Trump’s feverishness and inconsistency are well known. But our presidential Office’s foreign policy often appears rather spontaneous and even impulsive, which some of our ambassadors lament off the record. Have there been cases when, as ambassador, you learned about an important visit or a key decision taken in Kyiv after the fact?

I became ambassador after five years in government. I met the full-scale invasion as deputy prime minister, and the president and I have gone through a lot together. He is an extremely active person: he has a very lively mind, listens to many people, and is ready for unexpected, surprising, asymmetrical decisions. I always tried to use the full arsenal of my connections and capabilities to amplify him.

I attended almost all the meetings the president held with American partners. If meetings took place in Europe, I also knew, through my European contacts, what happened, who met whom, and what was discussed.

I always had direct contact with the president and the negotiating team — Kyrylo Budanov, Serhiy Kyslytsia. So I cannot say there were information restrictions.

Were there times when the president’s public remarks complicated your work or required urgent corrective action?

His activity only helped. I even told Volodymyr Oleksandrovych that any interview, public communication, or successful bilateral meeting opens all doors. I saw it as my task that those making decisions in Kyiv have the full picture before they make them. To understand whether some public communication will harm or push toward decisions. It’s important to choose who to communicate with at a specific moment – senators, congressmembers, when to request a call with the U.S. president, when to give a TV interview. These are not random events. For that reason I even devised a format where I daily informed about the overall picture of events in the U.S., and depending on that we could understand where to amplify or, perhaps, reduce Ukraine’s presence in the media.

This function of monitoring the internal context, in my view, is greatly undervalued. I would have developed it now if I had decided to continue this work.

Former Ukrainian ambassador to the U.S. Olga Stefanishyna: “Zelensky’s activity opened all doors”

photo: Office of the President

Did the president often ignore your advice? And how do you assess that now, during this crisis with the U.S., he is actively giving interviews on American platforms, some of them not very complimentary toward Trump?

In any crisis it is important to be able to convey truthful information and narrow the field for manipulation. Media presence, now that we are again at the center of public debate in the U.S., is important.

We already mentioned that after your resignation a new Ukrainian ambassador to the U.S. has not been appointed, which certainly does not help bilateral communication. Various names have been mentioned for the post – Dmytro Kuleba, Rustem Umerov, Yuliia Svyrydenko, Pavlo Palisa… Even Arseniy Yatseniuk’s name circulates now because he has become very active in the information space. Why, in your view, is it so difficult to find a person able to work with the current American administration? Is the pause connected to other reasons?

I think there are enough decent candidates, but the question of the ambassador to the U.S. is to some extent our domestic political issue. The president, choosing this person, must also look at how it will be perceived in the media and publicly in our country. We have a lot of experts and pseudo-experts who will discuss it, so the president is somewhat limited in maneuver.

In my opinion, the next ambassador should be someone who can gain access to the American administration. Whether that person should be publicly active is something the president must determine.

My activity as ambassador reflected the priorities and vision we agreed on with him before my departure to Washington: maximum media presence and establishing contacts with the core of the U.S. president’s team. Perhaps now other requirements will prevail.

As far as I know, there is no single agreed candidate yet. And in conditions where rhetoric from the U.S. toward Ukraine is harsh and threats are serious, the American side only benefits from our ambassador’s absence in Washington. Simply put, there is no one to demand meetings with U.S. top officials. Yes, an ambassador can be refused, but that refusal is recorded and noted in reports. The level of communication, both public and private, significantly decreases, and access to people who can influence the situation becomes substantially more complicated. Isolated meetings are not relationship-building; our American partners must understand with whom they will be working.

President Zelensky is ready for unexpected, surprising, asymmetrical decisions

What kind of ambassador could immediately immerse themselves in the current labyrinth between Kyiv and Washington? Should they be media-savvy and public, or a backroom player? What background should this person have?

I would not set strict limits. But I think it’s very important that there be no questions about this person’s political ambitions or jealousies. Around anyone who goes to America, conspiratorial theories start to be built immediately.

The future ambassador must be resistant to star-struck behavior, must speak impeccable English, and must be respected. Washington is not only the White House and the Oval Office; you must work daily with a great number of different people. Thus, it should be somebody who already has a positive track record or achievements, not necessarily in diplomacy.

Arseniy Petrovych appealed to me when he was prime minister and does so now. I think he is a very wise person and will no longer trade off for ratings or the like. He wants to serve the country and save it. So if his candidacy is indeed being considered, that would be good.

(In a comment to Hlavkom on 27 October President Zelensky did not confirm rumors about considering Arseniy Yatseniuk’s candidacy for ambassador to the U.S. – Hlavkom)

You were first appointed to the U.S. as a special representative for cooperation, and only a month later as ambassador. Could the same scheme be used for your successor?

There is an American saying: do whatever works. If to maintain a constant link between the president and everyone dealing with the American file this position is needed, then it should exist.

When the post of Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration was introduced in government (before President Zelensky), its logic was not to conduct foreign policy, step on the foreign minister’s toes, or travel European capitals. The deputy prime minister was to coordinate various institutions on the path to European integration. Perhaps a position like that of a special representative could help concentrate efforts inside Ukraine for working with American partners – from state and non-state sectors. From that perspective, such an option could be promising.

We have a Foreign Ministry with hundreds of diplomats. We have a parliament, a government with a “mineral deal,” a large and good embassy in Washington, a negotiating team. There are many resources; we must manage them and show that all Ukrainians think the same and seek U.S. support.

By the way, regarding the minerals agreement. Former deputy director of the international law department at the Justice Ministry Mykola Yurlov claims that you insisted on speeding up the signing of this agreement and concluded it did not require parliamentary ratification. Why did you hurry to conclude it and do you think the expected political benefits justified the step? Because the document is signed and the crisis in our relations with the U.S. has returned.

This agreement played its role at the beginning of our relations with Trump’s team. If you set aside the emotional-political component and the rather aggressive negotiations that preceded it, it is effectively the first economic intergovernmental agreement signed between Ukraine and the U.S. since Ukraine restored its independence. At that time it helped in a certain way to stabilize relations after the Oval Office events. Another matter is that the agreement was rewritten by 100% during the negotiation process because the first draft we saw was, frankly, epically tragicomic.

However, besides playing a certain role, the agreement has huge future potential. Currently the funds allocated to the fund (the Investment Fund for Ukraine’s Reconstruction – Hlavkom) are too small for the kinds of investments that could enter Ukraine and insufficient for large American industrial players. But the agreement’s potential is large, if, God willing, better times come for Ukraine after the war or even during it. We must continue promoting this agreement and work with major American industries. It should be a full political priority.

Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko and the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury signed an agreement on joint extraction of minerals in April 2025. It helped normalize ties between the countries but has not yet become operational

photo: press service of the Ministry of Economy

“Decisions on the prosecutor general competition must be made cautiously. In the next parliament everything could change”

The U.S. was a temporary stage in your career; most of it has been tied to European integration. Moreover, your American chapter, especially its finale, turned out rather ambiguous. After it, where do you see yourself next – will you return to the European direction?

I liked the American chapter a lot. It was very interesting. But I will definitely not return in this political cycle to any positions nor accept any offers to be an advisor – full-time or ad hoc.

But I will definitely remain in the public space because I maintain many ties and contacts in America and Europe. You don’t necessarily need a mandate or status to influence something.

I would like to develop all these contacts further, but that will take time.

Some of the European integration requirements of our international donors and creditors, which the Verkhovna Rada passes with great difficulty, were put in place during your time in government. To what extent does what parliament passes today correspond to what was intended back then?

For partners, the reforms we carry out must meet several criteria: protect their interests and give a sense that our institutions work. Partners are not obliged to care about our citizens or trust in our courts; they can only facilitate that.

So when the whole discussion about the rule of law is reduced only to meeting certain benchmarks, it is sad. Dialogue (including financial) with European partners would be much easier if we had our own vision of these reforms. For example, the competition for the prosecutor general. Perhaps that decision has ripened now, but it is not certain it will be relevant in the next political cycle. Our current parliament has one large faction that formed a majority. In the next convocation that will not be the case — there will be a coalition, and the question of electing the prosecutor general by parliament will look entirely different. Therefore decisions now must be made cautiously, with a long-term perspective.

The current Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration, Vsevolod Chenstov, claims there is no prosecutor general competition in our European integration obligations…

Even if this obligation is not in the cluster, if parliament or the government believes that this step reflects the position of active parts of civil society, it should be considered. If it will add to trust in Ukraine, it should be done regardless of whether it’s in the “roadmap.” But again – I consider this a situational decision.

I generally do not think that negotiations on the set of documents on which we have financial commitments were conducted fairly and in Ukraine’s interests. But these commitments must be fulfilled because they are already an element of the country’s survival.

Some decisions that were great and effective at a certain stage worked. But nothing lasts forever. The anti-corruption infrastructure worked as a project – it is the right arrangement of the law enforcement system that has to perform certain tasks. But the entire law enforcement system must develop. Approaches and decisions made in 2014 cannot fully answer the situation and challenges of 2026.

Until the state offers its own vision, we will keep putting bandages on a gunshot wound. So decisions must be made but with the understanding that rule of law is not equal to a certain amount of billions received in the budget.

You say some commitments to partners should not have been taken. Which ones, for example?

I would not like to pedal that topic. I certainly know what I’m talking about, but there are enough toxic public commentators who will use this against me, including in the criminal proceedings now related to me personally. But later I will be ready to talk about it.

Why then, as one of the leading negotiators, did you turn a blind eye to these commitments that were unfavorable to Ukraine?

All the terms in my area of responsibility were discussed and agreed. I did not take on unfavorable or unrealistic commitments.

“We do not have many well-trained negotiators and people willing to take responsibility”

Which decisions you supported while in government do you now think need to be revisited?

I regret that in some matters I did not take a sufficiently active position. For example, I did not always join negotiations with the IMF on financing conditions, although that process was directly linked to European integration. I think that if we had had better coordination in that direction, we might have made fewer situational changes.

For example, today we have a large number of separate independent institutions, separate law enforcement agencies, separate regulators. They have a very specific constitutional status. This is, among other things, a consequence of a lack of internal coordination and the absence of an overall plan. But we were always in a hurry because we worked in constant crisis conditions.

How ready are our partners to distinguish objective wartime difficulties from political unwillingness to fulfill agreements?

Partners always see that. We do not have many polished negotiators and people willing to take responsibility. And usually from our negotiators it can be seen that they want to distance themselves from uncomfortable questions.

Do not expect that in the IMF headquarters sits some John Smith who aches over what happens inside Ukraine. He cares that he must conclude an agreement that will ensure Ukraine’s financing and stability while protecting his own reputation. And when some Ukrainian deputies “foam at the mouth” insisting they are always for the best reforms, all those manipulations are easily read.

Do you see a danger that all these euro-integration and “euro-money” projects are adopted by the Verkhovna Rada more “for the checkbox,” while their practical implementation will be problematic?

That is obvious. All the rhetoric around legislation that falls under the Ukraine Facility or IMF obligations boils down to finding a way to vote the laws to get the money. None of the people affected by these laws are actual leaders in advancing them. Accordingly, there will not be huge enthusiasm for implementation. It will proceed the same way as their adoption.

How do you assess the parliament’s ability in this convocation to pass most of the European integration package?

We are only at the beginning of that path and there are traps along the way.

Trap one: any active pro-European agenda and transition to European regulation activates protectionist circles – some deputies and business that want protection. And the more actively you, as negotiator, push positions, the more these circles oppose you.

Trap two: the state apparatus’s inability to produce quality legislation breeds the narrative that “Europeans are bad,” “directives are bad,” “regulations are not translated into Ukrainian,” etc.

The system we created helped involve everyone – business, civil society, deputies, and the government. In reality, this is the only guarantee that a process made up of over 30 negotiation blocks will move forward. The easiest option is to fall into disappointment and declare we don’t need European integration at all. But many people died for a European future during the Revolution of Dignity, and likewise since the full-scale invasion the whole country has fought with its blood for the right to these negotiations.

We have already done all the political work; now we need to do the methodological work. There are a large number of capable, professional people currently in parliament. The current government is qualitatively different from the previous one. The prime minister says he will share this responsibility, and that is important to restore positive dynamics.

“Cases like mine will not encourage people to work in the public sector”

Did you speak with the president before your resignation? Maybe he hinted you should step down or, conversely, asked you to wait?

Of course, I discussed in detail with the president the circumstances that forced me to make that decision. I will not comment on our private conversation, but he did not demand my resignation. At this stage of my life I, unfortunately, cannot combine the ambassador’s work or any political activity with the needs I must address for my family. I mean my children, my parents, and other close people.

And the criminal cases against you clearly played a key role in these special circumstances. On 16 October NABU and SAP completed the pretrial investigation of your case on suspicion of illegal enrichment and false declaration. Previously you noted that in the pretrial process the prosecution’s version always dominates. It has concluded, so can you hint at what your next steps will be regarding your defense?

Indeed, the conclusion of the pretrial investigation means there will be no new extraordinary information – only what is already public. It effectively ended with what was announced when the preventive measure was chosen.

Now lawyers and I are familiarizing ourselves with the materials provided by the investigators, and the case will go to court. It will be a public process. I have nothing to add here, but I want to emphasize that this is more my private matter. It is not related to my performance of official duties in any post and not about the use of budget funds or any improper actions of mine as an official. I hope the court will be open to hearing arguments from me and my defenders. I would not like this case to be dragged out over time. Personally I do not intend to prolong it, and my lawyers have not advised me to.

Olga Stefanishyna assures she does not intend to delay the criminal case against her

photo: Suspilne

But by that logic many cases of illegal enrichment and false declaration could be called “private.” Yours is not unique – many officials and deputies have already been prosecuted under these articles. Have you followed how similar cases developed?

I have followed them, but I also recall the year when changes to the illegal enrichment legislation were adopted. It was hard then to imagine an eight-year prison term for a person whose father bought a storage room of 5 sq. m in a capital residential complex. Obviously, we imagined that this norm would apply to people who amassed large wealth during public service or hid it.

Illegal enrichment implies great wealth, and that is certainly not what I gained during my public service. At least not materially, except in contacts, connections, and what I could do for my state. I think cases like mine definitely won’t encourage people who built their reputations for years to want to go into or return to the public sector.

Currently I have no movement restrictions. I have already traveled abroad and around Ukraine in the last two months. I plan to continue doing so unless additional restrictions are imposed. Regarding the bail, we appealed for its reduction, but the appeal was dismissed; we move on.

This is not the only case in which you are involved. The “Lukash case,” which you say has followed you your whole life, is advancing in court, to put it mildly, sluggishly. Your status as a defendant in that case did not prevent you from entering government or going to the U.S. as ambassador. Is it likely to conclude anytime soon?

That case was initiated so that sanctions could be maintained against the former minister of justice. If I recall correctly, I was 28 or 29 years old at the time. Now I am 40. For me that case has become an illustration of our justice system. While it has been ongoing I have watched how the system of courts and prosecution transformed. I remember coming to a prosecutor for questioning while pregnant; he had the latest MacBook, iPhone, very expensive watch, and Brioni clothes. And he sat there telling me I was a criminal who robbed 2 million UAH from the budget. Evidence of that, by the way, still does not exist. It looked maximally surreal.

That case has survived about a dozen prosecutors general, and these events, sadly, have given a very sad verdict about the system. The case is still being considered, and it is hard to say when it will reach a logical end.

Pavlo Vuiets, Hlavkom