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Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
For a slow weekend read in the dark (start).
On the eve of the fifth winter of Russia's full-scale invasion, a slowly taking root idea in Ukrainian society and abroad is the one the Ukrainian side has been promoting at various levels for at least 2020 year (I cannot judge earlier, as I have not observed from within). Namely: the conflict between Russia and Ukraine does not have a solution in a bilateral format.
More precisely: in the bilateral plane, under the current political regime in Moscow, there is no decision acceptable for Ukraine. Not even one that could be interpreted as the “lesser evil.”
A bad decision — even today — does not require outsiders. But then there will be bad consequences not only for Ukraine. That is, to fight even for the “lesser evil,” there must be a broader perimeter. And a positive agenda.
The problem is that to build a broad perimeter you need a clear idea of the interests of potential participants, without illusions. Unfortunately, Ukraine is not very good at this.
Reason: the basic strategic mindset — curiosity — has been deactivated. At some point, a curious mind, a wide horizon, and restlessness began to be viewed as deviation or even as a sign of unreliability.
As a result, the broad masses have lost the ability to critically understand the world beyond the horizon. The space began to be filled by villains of three kinds.
First, ideologically constrained individuals who shape the image of external actors, relying exclusively on the drives of their inner world, often quite impoverished.
Second, this is the “expert Talibanism,” superficial opportunists ready to repeat any mainstream nonsense.
Third, this is agents of external influence who impose on Ukraine a matrix of perception that does not correspond to Ukrainian interests. The term “cognitive warfare” in everyday use has been around for about 10 years. But it is exactly that, just not named so before.
Ultimately, a distorted picture is formed in categories of “these are the good ones, and these are the bad ones” instead of a more or less sober assessment based on a mutual comparison of interests.
If these trends persist, two scenarios are most likely, both bad.
Either Russia manages to push the war and settlement into bilateral frames (for example, when internal problems overwhelm partners). And then there will be trouble.
Or, after Ukraine contains the current wave of pressure, Ukrainian interests will be sacrificed in a broad context with a high likelihood of renewed aggression in the near future.
To win in the current arrangement both in the tactical segment and in the long term, it is necessary to adjust the optics.
First, we urgently need a “Dima Komarov,” who, with great flourish (able to choose words), will tell not only about exotic foods but also about a broad range of interests. Enlightening the citizens. I am not joking.
In ancient times, the analogue during a short period was the young Oleksandr Tkachenko with his “Afterword.” Of course, taking into account modern media capabilities. And citizens of Ukraine should pay for this, without external help.
Now is not the worst conjuncture for education: millions of Ukrainians are abroad, they receive information about what lives in the countries that hosted them at various levels, without intermediaries. These hints must be learned and general knowledge formed. We have niche platforms with good product, but they drown in information slag.
Second, we need to gather, train, and then cultivate, nurture, develop, and defend (!) people with country studies training, so that they work in the interests of Ukrainian society through state institutions.
The situation where the ambassador to the United States is sought through a notice is a vivid example of unacceptable. The inability to combine high-quality people with public service is a sentence to the built system.
At any cost we need, if not deep, then at least some state, corporate interest, ambitions and personal benefits that will be directly linked to Ukraine's success.
Everything will not work out quickly; one must show curiosity. By the way, let's look at Israel, because there is something to feed on (more to come).
Document: PDF proof of the original version of the news item "Виграти на довгій дистанції: чого Україні бракує для стратегічного мислення". It records the publication content at the moment of the first scan, the preservation date and the source: ZmiOne.
