“We already have substations that withstood direct missile hits.” A farewell interview with the head of the Recovery Agency

The calendar shows early August. That means there are roughly three months left until the start of the heating season. Recently President Volodymyr Zelensky expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of regions’ resilience plan implementation. In turn, the new prime minister, Serhiy Koretskyi, instructed the responsible ministries and services to correct the situation on the ground where winter preparations are lagging.

Meanwhile, Russian missile strikes on Ukraine continue. The Ukrainian capital is experiencing ballistic terror again; it went through a very difficult previous winter. The occupiers continue to deliver deadly strikes with weapons that Ukraine’s air defenses cannot intercept. However, critical infrastructure has not yet suffered significant damage. There are no power outages in the capital; Kyiv residents continue their normal lives.

However, this situation evidently won’t last long. According to the head of the State Agency for Recovery and Infrastructure Development, Serhiy Sukhomlyn, the cold season, especially the winter months, will be difficult. He says the authorities already understand which critical facilities need to be protected as a priority. In some places, construction work—for example, protecting large transformer substations (which ordinarily would take two years to complete)—is now being carried out in three shifts and is expected to be finished by November this year.

In response to a clarifying question from Glavkom about how the government transition (change of cabinet and elimination of certain ministries) affects the pace of protective works, Mr. Sukhomlyn answered optimistically: everything is under control, he said.

At the same time, Serhiy Sukhomlyn himself is also leaving his post as head of the Recovery Agency. This personnel decision has already raised questions among experts. First, is it wise to change the reconstruction overseer in the middle of preparations for winter? Second, Sukhomlyn is leaving the post without a trail of scandals or investigations, even though the reconstruction topic is prone to corruption.

“Believe me: whether I’m here (in the post — Glavkom) or not, the builders know their work and will get everything done on time. I don’t see risks to implementing the Resilience Plan directly by the Recovery Agency,” Sukhomlyn told Glavkom on Saturday morning, as the capital was recovering from a difficult night.

Near the end of summer we talk with Mr. Sukhomlyn about the country’s resilience reserve, as it has to endure the critical months that begin with the first cold weather.

“Protecting Kyiv is very important to the president”

It is no secret that Russia plans to intensify attacks on Ukraine’s energy sector, critical infrastructure, and strategic depots before winter. Experts and politicians predict the hardest winter since the start of the war, so everyone should prepare for the worst-case scenario. The missile strike on Kyiv on the night of 1 August once again confirmed that air defenses are not coping with enemy ballistic missiles. Of the 27 launched ballistic missiles, only one was shot down. In these conditions, what is the state of protection for the country’s energy facilities?

I agree that this winter will be tougher than the last. Why? Last year our air defenses were strong enough and had an appropriate stock of missiles to shoot down enemy targets. Although that resource was limited, the military shot down both ballistic and cruise missiles. Today nearly all enemy missiles that fly in hit either residential buildings or critical energy infrastructure facilities.

At the same time, I want to emphasize: the authorities, together with contracting organizations, have done a large amount of work on energy protection. For example, the Recovery Agency’s project to protect energy facilities, started in December 2025, was completed in May. It covered more than 130 facilities in frontline territories. A few facilities remain to be finished—those either under construction or that will not be built at all because they are too close (15–20 kilometers) to the front line. It’s simply impossible to carry out work there, as the kill zone is quite large.

In total, over 95% of energy protection facilities were built within four to five months. And that was under winter shelling.

Clarification: you mean arranging shelters for substations?

Substations. This also concerns water utility facilities, large district heating companies, and boiler houses in frontline cities.

The protection that was built—can it withstand attacks by Shaheds or even missiles? If missiles, which ones?

No. This is all at the Shahed level of protection—against direct drone strikes. However, today we can already say that some substations have withstood dozens of direct Shahed hits and continue to operate stably. We have substations that withstood direct hits from two cruise missiles.

So everything is being built with a rather large margin of strength. Primarily to be resilient to Shahed strikes. Clearly, you could build protection against missiles too, but that would take much longer and cost many times more.

How would you assess the protection of the country’s energy facilities today, as of early August—2026?

It is much better than last winter. I’d note that back in February, when I repeatedly attended meetings, the president emphasized that preparations for the next winter were necessary. At that time a community resilience program was developed, which must be implemented across four parameters by the start of the heating season or by the end of the year, depending on project complexity. That will greatly strengthen cities’ ability to get through the heating season and ensure the functioning of all communal services.

Let’s return to analyzing regional Resilience Plans. Do the authorities have an understanding of how to protect branches and warehouses of Nova Poshta—a large private operator suffering huge losses from the loss of its network, including in frontline territories?

That’s not our responsibility. But in my view, engineering protection for such large facilities is inefficient. It would cost tens of times more than the branches or terminals themselves. That’s billions of hryvnias for one large terminal. On average, at least two years of construction. And protection from a direct hit by a ballistic missile wouldn’t save it anyway.

The president constantly emphasizes: the capital needs help

As a representative of the Coordination Center for implementing comprehensive resilience plans for regions and individual cities, created by the Cabinet, tell us what is really happening with implementation of these plans? What factors are slowing the work?

Actually, when people talk about implementing resilience plans and cite a figure of about 40%, they mean specifically the construction of protection facilities. You should understand that this protection began to be built in April this year. Prior to that, in March, there was a meeting of the Headquarters, and the government allocated the first funds for contracting the work.

The pace of implementing regional resilience plans varies. Frontline regions sometimes have better completion rates than some rear regions. Clearly, western regions have far fewer facilities to build. You can’t compare, for example, Zakarpattia region in terms of the number of facilities with Kharkiv region.

Another point: many regions lack the appropriate experience (rapidly constructing shelters for energy facilities—Glavkom). During the winter the State Recovery Agency took over this function. As of today, the Agency physically cannot build the hundreds and hundreds of facilities included in regional resilience plans. (That’s why local authorities hold tenders and seek contracting organizations themselves—Glavkom.)

By the way, the Recovery Agency has been instructed to build protection for Ukrenergo’s large substations—these are 330 and 750 kV. We also need to protect about 20 priority substations in Kyiv. For example, by state monitoring data, at the end of July the level of work completion by the Agency, if we take the 110 kV electrical substations in Kyiv, was 67%. Some works are due to be delivered in August. The rest—we’ll close in September. So our institution has no problems with accomplishing the protection construction task in Kyiv.

These are what the protected 110 kV electrical substations in Kyiv look like, which the Recovery Agency supervised

photo provided by Serhiy Sukhomlyn

I’ll add: in spring I had a personal conversation with the president about protecting the capital. Kyiv is very important to him. He constantly stresses that “the capital must be helped.” Then Volodymyr Zelensky asked: “How much time do you need to build 330 in Kyiv?”

I replied: “Mr. President, a normal construction period is two years. But we plan to do it in one year.”

The head of state said: “You don’t have, we don’t have that much time. The protection must be ready by the end of this autumn.”

We are now building these facilities in three shifts. There is hope that we will finish them in Kyiv by the end of November. That would be a record.

Is state budget funding sufficient for these works? What percentage of the need did the Cabinet allocate by the end of July—2026?

Initially the Cabinet allocated a relatively small amount—about 30% of the required volume. That was needed so regions and the Agency could hold tenders and procurements and immediately start work afterward.

After voting on budget amendments, the Verkhovna Rada allocated 40 billion hryvnias for implementing resilience plans across the country. These funds are now being distributed, and according to the funding schedule they will be transferred to spending units. Accordingly, the implementation of regional resilience plans will be co-financed.

There are several deadlines. One is September. For some projects—by the start of the heating season; for others (more complex structures)—the work must be completed by the end of the year.

So are those 40 billion enough? Or will there be additional funding?

Additional funds will be needed. But to complete approximately 90% of the current projects, 40 billion hryvnias should be enough. That would mean that by the heating season all municipal enterprises and all critical elements would have large-capacity backup generators. That would mean all critical elements would be protected with a second layer of protection. It would mean that heat from large CHPs, in case they are hit, will be supplied via block-modular boiler houses and decentralized switching to other boiler houses. In other words, the system would operate without large CHPs. And the cogeneration being installed in these cities across Ukraine will fully cover the needs of the city’s critical infrastructure.

It’s important to explain: resilience plans are not only protection of energy facilities. They include connecting cogeneration units, purchasing and installing new ones; generators; distributed heat generation; and much more. There are separate state-funded projects on water supply, because some cities have a single water intake and if it’s hit the city could be left without water.

Recently the head of the Kharkiv Regional Military Administration, Oleh Syniehubov, announced an “umbrella” protection against FPV drones over Kharkiv. How effective will that be?

It should work, but I can’t make any details public. We are also studying the experience that exists in frontline regional military administrations. They can implement solutions much faster and see the problems more clearly.

How will the reform of the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine (being renamed the Ministry for Recovery, Infrastructure, and Transport of Ukraine) affect the implementation of Resilience Plans? Will funding be suspended?

No, it won’t be suspended. The Cabinet decided to avoid financing delays. In fact, the legal successor is the new Ministry of Infrastructure, and implementation will be carried out by that ministry. The process of creating the new ministry is ongoing. So there is effectively no problem.

“Kyiv residents don’t care about the criminal case against a department head. They need heat”

Kyiv City Council deputy Maksym Nefyodov reported that the capital has implemented only 6% of the measures envisaged by the Resilience Plan. According to the councilman, the main reason for delays is the reluctance of responsible implementers to use allocated funds because they fear criminal proceedings. Do you agree with Nefyodov? Or is the real reason something else?

I think 6% is a fair assessment. At the same time, Kyiv is trying and doing a lot to correct the situation. The point is that other million-plus cities have been dealing with this issue all four years of the war. Kyiv only took it up systematically in the last year.

At the central government level there is close communication with the capital’s authorities about building protection and decentralizing the heating system in the CHP-4 zone, etc. But at lower levels (heads of municipal enterprises, department chiefs at the Kyiv City State Administration) there are officials who sometimes do not want to take responsibility and implement a project because of the threat of new criminal cases. By the way, the Recovery Agency is also under close law enforcement scrutiny.

Therefore, I am convinced the city authorities must take responsibility. Because on the scales: a criminal case or heat in Kyiv. Agree: ordinary Kyiv residents don’t care about a criminal case against a department head. They need Kyiv to be warm.

So is this about delays in announcing the tenders needed for protection?

The state has simplified all procedures as much as possible. Former Vice Prime Minister Oleksiy Kuleba was the initiator of, I think, five changes connected to the public procurement system. Now everything is much simplified and you can conduct procedures very quickly. What’s needed here are people who can take responsibility.

Million-plus cities have been dealing with protection issues all four years of the war. Kyiv only took it up systematically in the last year.

You said you talked a lot with the president about protecting the capital. So what is the city government headed by Mayor Vitali Klitschko doing? Is he communicating with the central authorities?

I want to say that frontline cities such as Kryvyi Rih, Dnipro, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and also regional military administrations, carry out protection works for critical infrastructure independently. The state’s role is to ensure stable funding.

Kyiv is a different situation. The city said it cannot, on its own, secure a large number of facilities and asked the state for help. The state said: okay, the city will build half of the protection facilities and the Recovery Agency will build the other half.

A few words about CHP-4 (Last winter the Darnytsia Combined Heat and Power Plant (CHP-4), which provided heat to about 500 thousand Kyiv residents on the Left Bank, was completely destroyed by Russian missile strikes—Glavkom). It is destroyed by 90% and in fact no longer operated. Its restoration is being handled by the owners themselves—it’s a private plant. We have nothing to do with that.

When talking with local authorities, the Recovery Agency proposed creating a decentralized heating system in the CHP-4 zone. They didn’t believe us. Then we did hydraulic calculations and prepared a feasibility study for all facilities in the CHP-4 zone. And today we have already started building protection facilities that we plan to complete by the end of the year.

On their part, Kyiv authorities must do the same regarding CHP-5 and CHP-6. Moreover, the state is ready to provide additional funding.

How many facilities in total are planned to be protected in Kyiv? You say the Agency took half and the city took half...

Dozens. Fewer than a hundred, but between 50 and 100.

“We will protect all gas stations from Russian strikes”

Besides covering energy facilities, what other important state-level issues is the Recovery Agency implementing?

The Recovery Agency is doing many important things. Remember the bridge near the village of Mayaky in Odesa region that suffered significant damage after RF strikes in December 2025? It is key in Bessarabia. After the port infrastructure was hit, the bridge became very important. We carried out its major repair and it’s operational.

In addition, in a week we will open passage over another repaired bridge in Odesa region. It has also been repaired and will now be hard to destroy even with ballistic weapons.

In the second ten days of August a new large checkpoint Bilá Tserkva–Zakarpattia on the border with Romania will be opened. Today logistics via Romania will be important, in particular for delivering fuel and lubricants.

In Odesa region the Recovery Agency is commissioning a repaired bridge that can withstand ballistic strikes

photo from open sources

This year the Russians have methodically begun destroying gas stations in frontline territories and even deeper in the rear. According to OSINT analysts, the occupiers have “knocked out” more than 160 gas stations. Does the state have a strategic vision for protecting gas stations?

You can protect all gas stations. But it will take about half a year, and the cost of such structures will be several times greater than the station itself. And there is no guarantee they will survive a UAV strike.

Instead, the Recovery Agency proposes a solution that can be implemented thanks to Ukrainian factories. The price, I think, will be up to one million hryvnias per gas station. The station will be protected and able to operate without attendants. We will begin testing in frontline territories soon.

Finally, a couple of personnel questions. Glavkom recently learned you are leaving your post as head of the Recovery Agency. Why? Did you discuss this with the new prime minister Serhiy Koretskyi?

Yes, we talked. More than once. My decision to resign stands. The government team has changed. I have worked as head of the Agency for two years at a very intense pace, with huge responsibility and huge challenges… I’ll say this: two weeks ago I asked my HR to count how many unused vacation days I had accumulated in two years. It turned out to be as many as 76 days! During my time at the Recovery Agency I officially had three days of vacation, if I’m not mistaken.

Will your next position be in the civil service or are you going into business?

I hope it won’t be related to civil service.

“In 2005–2006 years my official salary was $40 thousand”

Do you regret moving to Kyiv two years ago? In Zhytomyr you earned a reputation as an effective mayor who ensured the regional center’s energy resilience.

I have never regretted it in my life. It was a conscious choice linked to new development, completely different challenges, tasks, and scale. It also represented personal development for me.

When I became mayor of Zhytomyr I came from successful business. By the way, in 2005–2006 years my official salary was $40 thousand. Becoming mayor, I said: I will work in local government or civil service for 10 years. That term ended in December last year.

Would you agree to work as an unpaid adviser to the prime minister if such an offer came?

If needed, for a certain time—yes.

Have you met the likely candidate to succeed you? Rumor has it that Mariupol’s mayor, Vadym Boychenko, is vying for the post?

There was indeed a meeting in my office; we talked for several hours. I have known Vadym for many years. I know him as a successful mayor; we both participated as mayors of Zhytomyr and Mariupol in the European Union Anti-Corruption Initiative in Ukraine (EUACI).

If the final choice falls on Vadym or another worthy candidate, I am ready to sit beside them for a week, two, or three, showing and transferring affairs, as is done in a civilized world.

By the way, regarding Vadym Boychenko’s candidacy… I’ve already lost some optimism that he will take the post. I no longer see that happening.

Vitalii Taranenko, Glavkom