Cypriot schemes and Russian scripts: did Netpeak and Ringostat of Borodatiuk really fully exit the Russian market?

In the realities of full-scale war, the concept of business hygiene has ceased to be a matter of reputation alone and has become an important element of national security. Any economic cooperation with Russia today is direct participation in financing the enemy’s war machine. Every kopek of taxes paid into the aggressor’s budget is transformed into rockets that destroy Ukrainian cities. Ukrainian IT giant Netpeak Group, from the orbit of businessman Artem Borodatiuk, publicly condemned the aggression and announced its exit from the Russian and Belarusian markets in March 2022. But does that claim correspond to reality?

StopKor analysts investigated open sources and analyzed data from official registries. They found a number of facts that may signal an incomplete exit of Borodatiuk’s structures from the Russian market after 24 February 2022.

Netpeak Group is a group of more than 25 IT companies, founded and led by CEO Artem Borodatiuk. According to LIGA.net, as of last year its clients included well-known Ukrainian and international businesses: monobank, Samsung, Uber, Peugeot and others.

At the same time, in July the Telegram channel of the detective bureau Absolution Leaks published a series of posts drawing attention to the history of Artem Borodatiuk’s business cooperation with Russian companies prior to 2022, as well as to the entrepreneur’s public image as a member of the Presidential Council for Business Support.

Notably, Artem Borodatiuk himself publicly confirms membership in the Presidential Council for Business Support and emphasizes that Netpeak Group’s cooperation with the state is pro bono — he discussed this in an interview with the Kyiv Post in April 2025. That removes questions about proximity to the authorities — it is public and not hidden.

But that does not remove a separate question that is crucial for society during a full-scale war: did the business structures connected to Borodatiuk truly sever ties with the aggressor-country’s market completely, as officially claimed?

“We stopped working with Russia”: statement from 9 March 2022

On 9 March 2022 Netpeak Group publicly announced that the agencies Netpeak and Inweb had ceased cooperation with clients from Russia and Belarus, and that the services Serpstat, Ringostat, Netpeak Software and AcademyOcean had frozen accounts of users from the aggressor countries — according to the company’s official statement, which was also cited by AIN.ua. This statement became the starting point for fact-checking.

Despite the above statements about exiting Russia, a key Russian entity of the group seemed to demonstrate surprising viability. A number of legal and financial “traces” point to this.

Trace No. 1: an accredited Netpeak branch that operated in Russia since 2012

The open registry of the Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation for accredited branches of foreign legal entities contains an entry for the Branch of LLC “NETPIK”, which operated in Russia from 27.04.2012 to 27.04.2015 and was headed by Dmytro Piskaryov. The Russian form of presence was defined as “branch of a foreign legal person,” and the foreign entity was listed as the Ukrainian LLC “NETPIK” (code 37184690).

The data are confirmed by the official FNS registry and FNS open data. This is very important in the context of what happened next.

A separate entry was found for another legal entity, LLC “KONSALT PROFESHINAL” (TIN 7717793878). Analysis of Russian registries revealed a telling detail: on 21 April 2022 — two months after the start of the full-scale invasion — the company changed its name from LLC “NETPIK” to its current name.

Rebranding or an attempt to mask a likely Ukrainian origin of the business to preserve presence on the aggressor’s market?

This legal entity was liquidated only in 30.01.2023 — almost a year after Netpeak Group’s announcement of ceasing operations in Russia. The data are confirmed by company cards on RBC Companies and in the SPARK-Interfax database.

According to financial data from FNS open registries, compiled on reputation.ru and list-org.com, this company increased revenue from 413 thousand rubles to over 109 million rubles in 2014–2021, and the total net profit for the reporting period exceeded 32,8 million rubles. The company paid at least 23,127 million rubles in taxes and mandatory payments to the Russian budget in 2017–2022, of which 9 054 rubles were paid in 2022 — already during the full-scale invasion (data for 2022 come from the archived FNS open data package).

The sum is not that large by IT industry standards, but the fact remains: a company associated with a Ukrainian entrepreneur continued to exist and be listed as a taxpayer in the aggressor country’s budget for almost a year after it began its full-scale aggression against Ukraine.

Notably, according to the Russian site ALLSEO, the founder of the group, Artem Borodatiuk, remained for a long time the general director of the company with the Netpeaik.Ru website.

Trace No. 2: Ringostat and its Russian “double”

The most sensitive discovery concerns the product Ringostat — a call-tracking and end-to-end analytics service that Netpeak/FRACTAL publicly positions as its own Ukrainian development.

Because while “Netpik,” judging by indicators, was apparently being prepared for closure, another group project — the call-tracking service Ringostat — on the contrary showed financial growth. Its operations in Russia, according to the Fractal site, were provided by LLC “Performance Profi,” later renamed LLC “KONSALT PLUS” (TIN 7708393658).

According to List-Org, the historical founder of the Russian LLC “Konsalt Plus” (formerly “Performance Profi”) from 28.01.2021 to 22.03.2023 was Dmytro Piskaryov — the same person who earlier headed Netpeak’s Russian branch.

The product tied to the details of this Russian company (TIN 7708393658) was historically hosted on ringostat.com, as seen from an archived copy of the contacts page on Netpeak.ru and a profile on fractal.partners.

This Russian legal entity continued financial activity after 2022. According to official FNS registries (2022, 2023, 2024), the company transferred at least 5,07 million rubles to the Russian budgets and funds in 2022, and in total for 2021–2025 years — at least 9,718 million rubles.

Revenue data and details also match the company card on B2B.house: the company’s legal address until December 2023 was the same Ulansky Lane in Moscow that appears in project descriptions of Ringostat on Russian professional sites eto-razvod.ru and resize-web.ru. This company was liquidated only in 14.05.2025.

Such sums are hard to write off as “frozen accounts.” This is a probable sign of large-scale commercial activity in the heart of the aggressor country. Moreover, one of the group’s key top managers, Dmytro Piskaryov, remained the official founder of “Konsalt Plus” with a 100% stake until 22 March 2023. This contradicts public statements about a complete break with Russia in February–March 2022.

Additional analysis of connections around LLC “KONSALT PLUS” shows that related Russian companies exist with typical risk indicators: they were likely created to legalize funds, have short lifespans, were liquidated or removed from the Unified State Register of Legal Entities for unreliable information, have minimal employee numbers, self-ownership of shares, frequent participant changes, and a combination of unrelated OKVEDs. This network includes IT/software companies (AGILE, ONLINE DEALER), companies trading computer/electronic equipment (MAGNETIC, ALTEK) and companies in video surveillance/security systems (VIDEOGLAZ CENTER).

Accordingly, we assume that the activities of all these companies could also have filled the Russian budget.

Trace No. 4: 29,3% of Ringostat sites are from Russia, as of 2026

StopKor analysts also checked a purely technical trail — independent of any corporate documents. According to the international site technology analysis service BuiltWith, as of 2026 Ringostat is used on 1 701 “live” sites, and BuiltWith attributes 498 of them to Russia — about 29,3% of the entire base, the second largest market for Ringostat after Ukraine. Practically every third site with the Ringostat script is Russian.

This is confirmed by the technical trace: connection codes to script.ringostat.com were found, in particular, on sharlot.ru, expertproperty.ru and omnicomm.pro. In addition, the product has working integrations with CRM systems that are most popular on the Russian and CIS market — Bitrix24 and amoCRM/Kommo — as detailed in the service’s own knowledge base: integration with Bitrix24 and integration with amoCRM.

Notably, Ringostat itself in 2024 publicly urged Ukrainian clients on its website to refuse these CRMs as “Russian or masked as neutral” — i.e., the product is technically configured to work with the very market the company publicly warns others about.

The Cypriot circuit: who could benefit?

The corporate structure of Artem Borodatiuk’s businesses is extensive and, according to YouControl, includes legal entities in Ukraine, Cyprus, Estonia, Poland, the UK and Kazakhstan.

Particular attention deserves the Cypriot A.B. Digital Horizon Syndicate Limited (registration number HE 451879) — according to the Cyprus Companies Register, its director is Anna Rossidu and its secretary is Pantelis Vorkas.

The law firm Michael Vorkas & Partners, associated with the company secretary, publicly lists among its practice areas work with Russian corporations and wealthy Russians (Russian HNWI).

Anna Rossidu appears as a nominee director in hundreds of companies on both the Ukrainian and Russian markets — a common Cypriot service model that in itself is not illegal but can create an opaque picture regarding the real beneficiaries.

What does this mean legally?

The discovered combination of circumstances — historical presence in Russia, late liquidation of related Russian legal entities, continued tax payments to the aggressor’s budget after 24.02.2022, and still active technical presence of the product on the Russian market — requires qualified legal evaluation.

If it is confirmed that structures in Artem Borodatiuk’s orbit, after 22 February 2022, effectively continued to do business in Russia and fill its budget with taxes, such actions could have signs of grave crimes against the foundations of Ukraine’s national security:

Art. 111-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Aiding the aggressor state) — due to supporting Russia’s economic potential.

Art. 110-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Financing actions committed with the aim of changing Ukraine’s territorial borders).

Art. 258-5 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Financing terrorism) — since taxes are paid into the budget of a state recognized as a sponsor of terrorism.

Art. 209 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Legalization of proceeds obtained by criminal means) — due to the use of convoluted offshore schemes.

We emphasize: this is only the editorial team’s preliminary assessment based on facts uncovered by our analysts, not a suspicion or accusation — the question of whether a crime has been committed, and especially the guilt of specific individuals, can be decided only by competent law enforcement and regulatory authorities following checks of the discovered facts.

The StopKor editorial team is preparing corresponding appeals to the SBU’s Economic Security Bureau, the State Labor Service and the State Tax Service requesting an official legal assessment of the discovered facts: to verify the real state of corporate ties of Netpeak/FRACTAL and Ringostat with Russia after 24.02.2022, and to establish the circle of people who made decisions regarding the activities of the related Russian legal entities.

Our goal is to answer a simple question that millions of Ukrainians who pay defense taxes have the right to ask: did the business that publicly claims to have left the aggressor state’s market actually do so? And if not, will there be accountability?