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Automatically translated version. May contain inaccuracies compared to the original.
The payment system Fondy, presented as the ultimate ease for the business sector, operated for years on the Ukrainian market, servicing thousands of companies and millions of payments. The service supports more than 150 currencies, settles transactions through the Ukrainian banking system with conversion to hryvnia, and offers businesses a free PRRO that automatically transmits information to the State Tax Service. However, in 2024 the National Bank of Ukraine was forced to strip the company of the right to operate in the payment market after receiving confirmed information from law enforcement agencies about threats to national security.
A perfectly logical question arises: what was the National Bank doing all this time under the leadership of Andriy Pyshnyi? The body obliged to carry out constant supervision of the state’s payment infrastructure did not identify risks on its own and reacted only after a signal from law enforcement. During the NBU inspection it established connections between Fondy’s ultimate beneficiaries and the Russian Federation, excluded LLC “FC “ELIANS” from the list of indirect participants in the international payment systems Visa and MasterCard, and canceled its registration. But even after that, Fondy’s digital infrastructure continued to function, and society still has not received an answer as to who now controls the servers, databases, and personal information of Ukrainian users.
Fondy is backed by Valeriya Vagorovska — one of the most well-known figures in Ukrainian fintech, repeatedly included in rankings of the most influential women in the industry. At the same time, behind the façade of a successful international company there were ties that raised questions for law enforcement. Vagorovska’s brother, Oleksiy Bondarenko, for years headed a Russian company that positioned itself as the founder of the Fondy payment system. Moreover, that business used software leased directly from Fondy, which indicates a technological and commercial link between the Ukrainian platform and the Russian segment of the business.
The list of established facts did not end there
During the inspection it was found that Fondy’s payment infrastructure used the Russian payment system Mir, which, after the start of the full-scale war, became one of the aggressor state’s key financial instruments. In addition, a mis-coding mechanism was used — changing MCC codes — which allowed concealing the real purpose of payments, avoiding financial monitoring procedures, and distorting actual turnover. The platform processed not only significant financial flows but also personal and payment data of Ukrainians, creating potential risks of their use by structures connected to the Russian Federation.
However, this story began long before the National Bank’s decision. As early as 2014 companies associated with Valeriya Vagorovska were integrated into the operation of the Unified Wallet W1 payment system, which facilitated financial transactions between the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk region and the Russian Federation. It was through this infrastructure that payments were made from territory under Ukrainian control to the occupied part of Donetsk, and later — to Russia. This indicates years-long operation of an interlinked payment infrastructure, not isolated episodes of cooperation.
When information about these ties became public, Fondy’s owners effectively launched an urgent sale of the company. The buyer was to be the international banking group TBC Bank Group, which had already submitted the required package of documents to the National Bank. However, literally the next day after granting approval for the concentration, the NBU canceled the registration of LLC “FC “ELIANS”. As a result, the potential investor withdrew the documents and refused the deal, and the sale of one of Ukraine’s largest payment services collapsed. Yet despite this, the payment system still services Ukrainians and continues to leak their data to the Russian Federation.
Due to the direct threat to national security, we filed a complaint with the supervisory and law enforcement authorities with clear demands: verify the legality of continuing Fondy’s payment infrastructure operation after the annulment of LLC “FC “ELIANS”’s license, check the use of Mir payment system cards, establish the location of server equipment, data processing centers, and the individuals administering the digital infrastructure, verify the legality of alienation of Fondy’s assets and corporate rights, block the company’s accounts and tax invoices, and include LLC “FC “ELIANS” on the list of high-risk counterparties.
While Andriy Pyshnyi silently watches the situation, the risks to Ukrainians’ personal and payment data only increase. If the regulator is unable to protect the country’s financial infrastructure during the war, a natural question arises — whose interests is it really protecting, Ukrainians’ or the Russian Federation’s?
Document: PDF proof of the original version of the news item "Як через халатність НБУ персональні данні мільйонів українців опинилися в руках рф?". It records the publication content at the moment of the first scan, the preservation date and the source: NGO "NON-STOP".
