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Is there a free center-left niche in Ukraine and can Kharkiv’s mayor occupy it? Kharkiv mayor Ihor Terekhov is showing strong results in social polls. However, moving from the regional to the national level entails many challenges. Read about how realistic the chances are for a hypothetical Terekhov party to enter parliament, whether center-left projects have prospects in Ukraine, and how he might move beyond an eastern niche — in the RBC-Ukraine piece. Main points: Rating situation: Kharkiv mayor Ihor Terekhov topped the KMIS survey by net trust (52%), and his potential project ranks third in the ratings. Winter factor: His popularity benefited from a favorable contrast with Kyiv in preparing the city for an extremely harsh winter 2025–2026 years. Scale change: Despite declining a government post, Terekhov’s team is preparing to enter national politics. Key risks: The political force risks being confined to an eastern niche and the absence of a genuine left political niche. The prolonged absence of elections in Ukraine, on the one hand, has frozen the political system. On the other hand, these extraordinary times give new leaders in various fields of Ukrainian life a chance to emerge. Primarily, of course, military leaders. During the large-scale war with Russia many commanders have appeared whose names, a few years ago, meant nothing or almost nothing to the general public. In the future, if they wish, some of these leaders could convert public trust into political capital and try their hand in presidential or at least parliamentary elections. In the purely civilian sector, political elevators work noticeably worse. In particular, during the large war there are virtually no examples of regional leaders rising to national leadership (though even before the war, apart from a few cases, such examples were rare). At the same time, one of the positive side effects planned during the decentralization reform some years ago was precisely to enable such upward mobility — in the spirit of many European countries, large and small, where a successful city mayor or regional leader often later takes a place in national politics. What numbers does Terekhov’s project have? According to various sociological surveys, among locally known figures of national scale stands Kharkiv mayor Ihor Terekhov. A KMIS survey conducted in May–June this year even gave him first place by net trust among Ukrainians from all the figures offered in the questionnaire — 52% trust versus 19% distrust (compared with the previous KMIS survey in January, these figures improved by a few percentage points). Another survey by SOCIS in March gave the hypothetical political project led by Terekhov third place in parliamentary voting intentions — 13,7% among those who will vote and have decided on their preferred party (after the hypothetical parties of Zaluzhnyi and Budanov). Ihor Terekhov in Kharkiv (photo: Terekhov’s Facebook page) The key factor that increased Terekhov’s recognition and trust is obvious even without deep sociological analysis — an extremely difficult winter 2025–26. It was especially hard for Kyiv, where systematic Russian attacks on the energy infrastructure coincided with inadequate city preparedness for such a crisis and an overall unbalanced capital governance system, as RBC-Ukraine wrote in detail. Read also: Two powers in Kyiv. What’s happening behind the scenes in the struggle between Bankova and Klitschko before winter Against this backdrop, Kharkiv — arguably the Ukrainian city most comparable to Kyiv by many parameters — appeared far better prepared for the challenges. Also due to its proximity to the front: Kharkiv is several dozen kilometers from Russian positions, whereas Kyiv is, after all, a rear city. Thus, an involuntary comparison of Kyiv’s and Kharkiv’s leadership favored the latter. Transition to the national level The media, including RBC-Ukraine, have written a lot in recent years about the short bench of reserves in the current ruling team. That personnel shortage became evident again during the summer government reshuffle. Sources told RBC-Ukraine that the authorities considered bringing in outside managers, including Kharkiv mayor Terekhov, who might have been offered a government seat. In particular, after President Zelensky announced the upcoming resignation of Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko, he immediately held a series of show meetings with several figures — including Terekhov. Media and social networks interpreted this as a kind of casting call for the vacant prime minister post. The president had held similar meetings with photo posts on Telegram after firing the previous head of his Office. One invitee then — GUR chief Kyrylo Budanov — later indeed took a post on Bankova. By analogy, Terekhov began to be seriously discussed as a possible contender for prime minister or another Cabinet post. However, he stayed in Kharkiv — for fairly obvious reasons. Without a personal base in the Verkhovna Rada (and Terekhov had nowhere to get one), any head of government is doomed to remain in a suspended state. His room for maneuver is inherently limited, and regular conflicts between a prime minister, deputy prime minister, or minister and a populist-oriented parliamentary corps are inevitable. Moreover, since no end to the war — and therefore no immediate elections — is in sight, a sudden shift from local to central politics could become a political false start. Almost certainly such a move would not be understood primarily by Kharkiv residents themselves. Still, according to sources close to Terekhov cited by RBC-Ukraine, the mayor’s planning horizons are not limited to municipal politics. His team is seriously aiming to move into national politics, eyeing the effectively vacant center-left niche in Ukraine. A free niche After 2014 year, with the first wave of Russian aggression, virtually all parties that used “left” in their names or positioned themselves as leftist were subjected to public anathematization. The reason is obvious — almost all of them turned out to be traitors or at least pro-Russian collaborators, helping the enemy in practical or at least informational warfare against Ukraine. Many once-strong projects, like the Socialist or Progressive Socialist parties, were marginalized and left the political arena long before 2014. Not to mention that many of these and numerous other left projects exploited leftist rhetoric while actually serving as political tools for various financial-industrial groups. Terekhov at the site of a Russian strike (photo: Getty Images) However, after this self-purging of the left flank, the corresponding political demand did not disappear. Almost all Ukrainian parties that position themselves as right or center-right (and, for example, join related alliances at the pan-European level) have continued to exploit leftist narratives in practice — without admitting this to voters, most of whom are rather distant from political theory. At the same time, the concept of a left party is not inherently anti-Ukrainian or pro-Russian. Evidence of this is numerous left-leaning parties in power in many developed Western countries. Many of them take a critical stance toward the aggressor country, and center-left governments have supported Ukraine for years. So “left” does not automatically mean communist, Stalinist, or pro-Russian — although that stereotype has indeed taken deep root in mass consciousness and, to be fair, has some basis. Center-leftists or strong managers? Overall, Terekhov’s potential political force, with appropriate positioning, could occupy the left political niche. But in reality it’s not that simple. There is and will not be any purely left niche in the Ukrainian electoral space. There is a niche of social populism. But to achieve results in this niche you will need budget funds, which will be in deep deficit after the war, and positions in central government to obtain those funds, — political scientist Volodymyr Fesenko told RBC-Ukraine. Fesenko believes Terekhov’s party would be situated not in the left but rather in the eastern electoral niche — which limits its electoral potential. Similar arguments were made to RBC-Ukraine by Rating Sociological Group director Oleksii Antypovych. On one hand, it’s about orientation to the electorate of the South and East. Regarding value orientations — it’s what was once called strong managerialism. This is complemented by an emphasis on being a frontline region, on self-defense, the ability to speak different languages while being for Ukraine, and on reviving the country and its regions in particular, he told the outlet. According to Antypovych, this is primarily about local patriotism and strong local authorities like Terekhov, and about focusing on internal resources of Ukraine — region, community, city, etc. How electorally attractive is this niche? The simple answer: attractive, and promising in terms of passing into parliament, the sociologist noted. At the same time, he warns of significant voter flow — both toward Volodymyr Zelensky’s supporters and other non-military projects like Yuliia Tymoshenko’s Fatherland and Dmytro Razumkov’s project. Overall, Antypovych stresses it is too early to talk about any electoral prospects for a project because the timing and circumstances in which Ukrainians will decide their electoral sympathies remain unclear. Fesenko issues a similar caveat. At the moment this hypothetical party has a chance to pass the electoral threshold and bring a small faction into the future Verkhovna Rada, he told the outlet, emphasizing that this reflects the situation as it stands now, and after the war the situation could well worsen. Elections will show Aside from uncertainty about when and under what conditions elections might be held and the resource base of some participants, there are factors that could work in favor of a potential Terekhov project. Notably, Russian aggression has also dealt a terrible blow to the welfare of millions of Ukrainians. During full-scale war many are willing to endure material hardship, understanding the reasons. After the war, socioeconomic issues will certainly come to the fore. Ihor Terekhov (photo: Getty Images) Furthermore, historical experience shows polls often err and election results bring surprises — especially when public space is dominated by narratives that leave little room for alternative views or push them to the margins. For example, the long-standing image of postwar Ukraine as a “steel porcupine” or a European Israel — a highly militarized country where all spheres of life are subordinated to preparation for future confrontations — is widespread. Yet after the war it may turn out that not all Ukrainians fully share that vision of postwar development. There could arise demand for a more socially liberal model — while continuing to strengthen defense capabilities, no sensible politician would dismiss such a need. So although the electoral prospects of a potential political project led by Terekhov are quite clear, such a party would still have to overcome serious challenges. In particular, it would need to position itself beyond the conditional eastern niche, appealing to issues common to residents of both Kharkiv and Uzhhorod. This task is somewhat eased by the fact that many inhabitants of the South and East — the regions closest to the front — have relocated over the years of the war to central and western Ukraine. Accordingly, that eastern niche of potential electorate moved with them. Moreover, the party must maintain strong media work, because even now, in a non-electoral period, the Ukrainian information space is oversaturated. One can imagine what it will look like when the final political embargoes are lifted.
Document: PDF proof of the original version of the news item ""Феномен Терехова": чому мер Харкова очолив рейтинги довіри та яке в нього політичне майбутнє". It records the publication content at the moment of the first scan, the preservation date and the source: RBC-Ukraine.
