Is There Life Outside the Rada? How Non-Parliamentary Forces Enter the Season

Is There Life Outside the Rada? How Non-Parliamentary Forces Enter the Season

What parties that only dream of getting into the Rada have planned for the fall

Members of the Verkhovna Rada, whose new session starts this week, need to pass a whole bunch of reforms, a high-profile law on the occupied territories, make a number of personnel appointments, and much more. At the same time, extra-parliamentary parties are preparing for the new political season – regular elections are still far off, but many are beginning their electoral campaigns now. Potential voters must be courted in advance. Judging by recent polls, this is working best for an absolute newcomer – the Za Zhyttia party of MPs Vadym Rabynovych and Yevhen Murayev, who split from the Opposition Bloc, and the perennial hopeful Anatoliy Hrytsenko with his Civil Position. Various surveys give these forces about 6–8% among those who intend to vote – that is, they more or less safely clear the electoral threshold. Among other non-parliamentary forces that have theoretical chances to do so are Svoboda, which is joining efforts with the Right Sector and the National Corps created on the basis of Azov. Glavkom tried to figure out whether there is life outside parliament and what parties that only dream of getting into it have planned for the fall.

Rabynovych’s Politics

Of course, the biggest phenomenon during the inter-election lull is the ratings of Za Zhyttia. At the same time, the project created on the basis of Rabynovych’s former party Center is absolutely virtual. But the deputy’s activity in the media space and a powerful information weapon in the form of the NewsOne TV channel (they like to invite Rabynovych and Murayev and appear on 112) led to an impressive, if so far virtual, result. Za Zhyttia actively exploited the fertile “utility tariff” theme, and last winter was remembered for a multi-day party under the windows of the National Bank demanding the dismissal of its then head Valeriya Hontareva. The resignation never came, but they wrapped up the operation as quickly as they launched it – such events are costly for organizers, who, according to many accounts, paid demonstrators and even did not let them leave the site until they had “worked their shift.” There were strong suspicions that Rabynovych and Murayev were kindly allowed to be so disruptive in the city center by authorities on Bankova Street to drown out protests by more serious political forces like Batkivshchyna. In any case, the TV image was created, a new brand was introduced, and it climbed rapidly.

The Za Zhyttia voter, who advocates peace at any price and is quite indulgent toward Russia, is primarily those who once voted for the Opposition Bloc and became disappointed by its spinelessness, or who after the Maidan didn’t vote at all as a protest. Plus Rabynovych’s loose tongue attracts supporters of populism of all stripes. The Opposition Bloc, whose faction Rabynovych still has not left despite an informal split, understands the electoral threat from Za Zhyttia and loudly calls it a Bankova project created to dilute the opposition field. If that’s true, the presidential technologists deserve applause. Now the notorious Putin ally Viktor Medvedchuk has clearly set his sights on the new project, and with his resources Rabynovych could gain even greater wings.

Another party currently above the threshold is Civil Position, which has a longer history. Former defense minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko, despite being out of parliament and having very modest media exposure, somehow manages to retain his small but loyal electorate and increase support among those disillusioned with both the current authorities and the opposition. Hrytsenko told Glavkom that he constantly travels the regions and believes it is too early to talk about protest actions in the fall: “We must give the authorities a chance not to make mistakes. If they do make mistakes – they will immediately hear our voice and see our action. When there is an attempt to introduce a land market in the Rada or grant special status to Donbas, of course, together with other political forces we will take to the streets. Likewise, we will stand in solidarity to support Mikheil Saakashvili and his return to Ukraine.”

“Samopomich,” the Movement of New Forces, the European Party, Democratic Alliance, Strength of the People, People’s Control – Hrytsenko lists the forces he is in constant contact with and whose campaign staffs he coordinates. However, except for parliamentary Samopomich, the ratings of the others are within the margin of error.

The head of People’s Control, majoritarian MP from Lviv Dmytro Dobrodomov, apparently understanding the illusory independent prospects of his political force, calls for unification in one form or another: “We are in constant contact with other democratic forces. The session opens – first there will be a heated consideration of three key reforms and we will watch the authorities’ next moves. If they try to raise the issue of land reform – of course, we will hold protest actions. If they try to push through a pension reform in this form – there will be corresponding actions. Plus the heating season is ahead and we need to see what will happen with tariffs… In general, you need to react much more actively than with mere statements and speeches.”

Saakashvili’s Breakthrough

However, how exactly to react more actively is formulated very vaguely by numerous opposition leaders. They are equally vague when talking about formats of unification. For example, there were long talks about an alliance between Democratic Alliance and Saakashvili’s possible movement. But now they are two separate columns. Moreover, Democratic Alliance failed to unite even with the tiny and kindred Spirit of Strength, although talks about that circulated actively last year. Co-chair of Democratic Alliance Vasyl Hatsko says that the next priority for his force will be attracting potential allies who are currently outside political parties and stay away from them.

“We have defined the circle of political allies – these are Samopomich, the Movement of New Forces, Civil Position,” Hatsko lists. “If elections are held – presidential or parliamentary – this coordination will be very close. Going to elections with ten political forces is suicide that will prolong the life of the corrupt system.” Among the topics now key for the opposition, the Democratic Alliance leader names creating an Anti-Corruption Court, abolishing parliamentary immunity, passing an impeachment law, changing the electoral system, renewing the Central Election Commission, and depoliticizing law enforcement agencies.

Democratic Alliance and the Movement of New Forces are already holding joint actions – for example, in front of the SBU against monopolization of the autogas market, which has recently skyrocketed in price. Saakashvili’s movement, despite its currently weak ratings, undoubtedly has potential – the decision to strip Mikheil of Ukrainian citizenship on Bankova drew particular attention to this force. Saakashvili and his supporters plan to stage a show regarding his return to Ukraine on 10 September, despite border guards threatening not to let the Georgian ex-president in due to the annulment of his Ukrainian passport. A sizable contingent is expected to land to meet Saakashvili, since representatives of many political forces have declared their support. Former adviser to the interior minister Illia Kiva in his manner has already promised to shoot everyone who plans to come that day to the Krakivets checkpoint. Earlier Oleg Lyashko called to shoot to impress those who try to violate the state border.

Saakashvili’s movement, despite its currently weak ratings, undoubtedly has potential – the decision to strip Mikheil of Ukrainian citizenship on Bankova drew particular attention to this force.

By the degree of criticism of the authorities, personally of Poroshenko and his close circle, the Movement of New Forces could even compete with Batkivshchyna, which is so far the most vociferous critic of the president. Not for nothing did political scientists close to Bankova warn that Saakashvili was preparing mass protest actions for the fall, effectively playing into Putin’s hands. A kind of another “loose bolt” in action. But if Saakashvili still fails to break into Ukraine, the prospects for the movement’s further existence without the leader’s physical presence look uncertain.

Right Wing Forces

On the right flank, as already noted, Svoboda clearly leads – its hypothetical union with Right Sector and the National Corps would allow them to add those percentage points that were missing in 2014. The three parties have already signed the “National Manifesto” and announced a new round of action against Russian business in the fall.

“Svoboda has no division into political seasons and off-seasons,” says one of the few sitting MPs from that force, Andriy Illienko. “In the fall the campaign for the newly created united territorial communities begins and our candidates will take part in the elections. In the coming weeks there will be a party congress where we will determine further tactics. Plus, of course, in the fall we will launch the announced campaign against Russian business. And traditionally on 14 October – on the day of the founding of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Pokrova holiday – we will hold a powerful action in Kyiv. All details will be formulated at the party congress.”

The National Corps, associated with Interior Minister Arsen Avakov, was remembered for blocking the entrances and exits to the Verkhovna Rada during the last plenary week of the previous session, demanding positive votes to strip immunity from five deputies. Such a show of force surprised even many of Avakov’s associates who found themselves trapped. It will be interesting to see whether the National Corps will resort to that “technology” again. Former BPP deputy, now unaffiliated Oleg Petrenko, who joined the National Corps, assumes yes: “You will definitely see us again under the Verkhovna Rada if the authorities cross the red lines we wrote in our manifesto – sale of land, raising the retirement age, tinkering with the law on occupied territories, and so on. We will not allow crossing these red lines, including with direct action under the walls of the Verkhovna Rada. The political season will certainly begin with severe turbulence, and there will be many occasions for active passionate people to express their stance.”

On the right flank Svoboda clearly leads – its hypothetical union with Right Sector and the National Corps would allow them to add those percentage points that were missing in 2014.

Dmytro Yarosh’s Dia did not join the three nationalist forces. “Aside from signing a memorandum of cooperation in certain areas, there is no joint work there,” believes Yarosh’s close associate Andriy Sharaskin (Bohema). “There was no talk of unification and I don’t think there will be. Besides, this combination itself is a bit strange.”

Sharaskin sees Dia’s next plans this way: “We continue to defend our land. Our key tasks are mobilization, patriotic and volunteer work. The external enemy and aggressor is issue №1. We will also support bills on territorial defense, on self-defense, leveling the discriminatory law on the status of combatants. If parliament does not understand this, of course we will mobilize large numbers of people, but with a positive agenda.”

The Ukrop party also targets the ultrapatriotic electorate and has already built a fairly extensive structure and acquired substantial factions in many local councils. In the Dnipro city council, for example, despite all conflicts and perturbations, Ukrop’s faction is a key part of the majority. However, at the national level things are not so rosy – the party’s rating is about 1%.

Hennadiy Korban, who once “fussed” about his influence on the party, according to Ukrop members now almost does not interfere in party life after the party control commission, which is to respond to possible conflicts, was headed personally by Ihor Kolomoisky. The oligarch’s deputy on that commission, sitting MP Vitaliy Kupriy, describes Ukrop’s plans for the fall this way: “We are concerned about what initiatives will come from the Presidential Administration regarding regulation of the situation in Donbas. If there is again an attempt to grant special status, we, as last time, will strongly act to prevent it. We have also planned to support the movement for civilized customs clearance of used European cars and we support the protest action on 6 September near the Verkhovna Rada. In addition, we have information about large volumes of diesel fuel smuggling linked to Mr. Medvedchuk. If the Tax Service does not stop it, we may picket regional stations where petroleum products arrive on fictitious documents.”

Kupriy emphasizes that despite former harsh criticism of Saakashvili’s activities, now Ukrop and personally Kolomoisky support him: “Everyone dissatisfied with the current authorities is our situational partner.”

New Lefts

On the left flank, which was left orphaned after the Communist Party was driven out, there is some revival. Thus the moss-covered Socialist Party was unexpectedly headed by the aforementioned scandalous Illia Kiva, but it is still unclear how the new flamboyant leader intends to revive that corpse.

The empty niche is also being sought by the Socialists project of former “regionals” Leonid Kozhara and Oleksiy Plotnikov. The party even spared no money for billboards congratulating Kozhara on Independence Day. One of the Socialists’ tenets is a change of foreign policy vector, since “nobody in the European Union is waiting for us,” so Kozhara and Plotnikov count on part of the anti-West electorate of their former party.

“The party leadership will travel the regions – that’s what we can afford, especially under the current undemocratic regime. We do not plan street actions,” Kozhara shares his plans. “Plus we continue the process of uniting left forces. There were negotiations with the SPU, but it’s now somewhat unclear – the party’s legal body has been seized by raiders. We are interested in members of other parties (‘Respublika’, ‘Spravedlyvist’, Socialist Youth Congress) becoming members of ours.”

Kozhara counts on part of the anti-West electorate.

Kozhara is convinced that of the 63% of the electorate that is undecided, half would gladly give their votes to the left parties: “The poorer the society, the more demand for such forces will grow.”

Glavkom also managed to speak with the former hegemon of the “left sector,” Petro Symonenko. The banned Communist Party did not run in 2014, and in local elections participated under the name New State.

Symonenko insists that the Communist Party’s ban is not in force now: “We are still not banned, Europe supported us – the European Court of Human Rights has already accepted two of our submissions on gross violations of human rights and freedoms in Ukraine. In the Ukrainian Court of Appeal our case has been pending for more than a year, and it was decided that until the Constitutional Court considers deputies’ submission on the unconstitutionality of the decommunization law, the appeal proceedings are suspended. Now our main task is to convey to everyone what charlatan regime they brought to power and what this will lead to in the near future.”

Struggle against the hateful regime is, of course, a big goal, but in the fall real tests of strength for non-parliamentary parties will be more down-to-earth tasks. Already on 3 September a new cycle of elections to the newly created united territorial communities begins, where local projects such as Nash Krai, the Agrarian Party and others have chances.

Pavlo Vuiets, Glavkom