Kolomoisky, “Normandy” and the risks of turbo-mode: what worries the West most about Ukraine

Kolomoisky, “Normandy” and the risks of turbo-mode: what worries the West most about Ukraine

What will Volodymyr Zelensky’s “Plan B” be if talks in Paris fail?

How reliable are the reforms being passed in turbo-mode? What will the president’s position be if a Ukrainian court finds that the nationalization of PrivatBank was illegal?

What influence does Kolomoisky have on the president? Is the issue of Crimea on the agenda?

These are precisely the questions European colleagues put to Ukrainian officials and experts. General answers no longer satisfy anyone. Long abstract presentations neither.

5 December saw the conference “Ukraine: Great Expectations” in London, organized jointly by the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” and Chatham House.

Given that just two weeks earlier, with a full house at the same Chatham House, Prime Minister Oleksiy Honcharuk had spoken, 250 attendees at the new “Ukrainian” event (many of whom represented investment companies and banks, some of which even paid to participate) confirm that interest in Ukraine has not waned.

The most quoted speech in the media was, of course, that of the president’s aide Andriy Yermak — a person whose name has appeared in international press in recent months and who rarely speaks publicly.

But deputies Sviatoslav Vakarchuk and Vadym Halaychuk, Deputy Minister of Economic Development Taras Kachka and Deputy Minister of Defense Alina Frolova, among others, drew no less interest (and even more questions) from the audience.

“The Kolomoisky elephant” is already in the room

Among all the questions raised at both the public event and closed meetings, one name came up most often.

Yes, of course, it was about Ihor Kolomoisky.

Moreover, the future of PrivatBank, the oligarch himself, and his role in Ukrainian affairs is seen by Western partners primarily as a political issue rather than an economic one.

General responses — that Ukraine will treat all oligarchs the same and they must not influence state policy — are not accepted. Investors want to hear a concrete position specifically on the “Privat” case, and preferably from the president.

The question of PrivatBank’s future and Kolomoisky’s role in Ukraine remains key for foreign business, the European Commission, and Ukraine’s Western creditors.

Deputy Minister of Economic Development and Trade Taras Kachka anticipated this and began by saying he was ready to talk “about the elephant in the room — Mr. Kolomoisky.”

Although Kachka emphasized that the government is actively pursuing all court cases against the former owner of PrivatBank (in Ukraine and abroad), that the government needs international support on this issue, and that the media pay more attention to Kolomoisky’s small victories than to the government’s actions — this did not convince everyone.

EBRD Vice President Alan Pillu stressed that “perception matters, so we must stop sending different messages from different members of the government.”

“We need to be clear about what will happen if a Ukrainian court one day decides that the nationalization was carried out improperly for technical reasons,” Pillu said.

In addition, international donors want to see progress in recovering 5,5 billion that were siphoned from “Privat,” as well as in related criminal cases, noting that cases against other banks are moving faster than the one involving “Privat.”

Attitudes toward turbo-mode

The land market is the second most important topic. The overall impression: the land reform is welcome. Still, there were cautions about transparency of the processes, protection of small farmers, and lack of proper public discussion of the issues.

Foreigners are also most interested in judicial reform, the fight against corruption, and the adoption of legislation necessary to implement the EU Association Agreement.

The phrase “crazy photocopier” has not yet entered the British lexicon, but they are already familiar with the word “turbo-mode.”

Opinions differ. While Katharina Materneva, Deputy Director-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations at the European Commission, believes a breakthrough was made last year and that legislation needed to push reforms forward has finally been adopted, her Ukrainian counterparts — Sviatoslav Vakarchuk and Olga Aivazovska from the NGO Opora — were more reserved and drew attention to the details of recent reforms, where the risks lie.

Taras Kachka tried to argue that under the previous parliament most discussions were aimed at delaying reforms, and now officials, he said, know these debates by heart because they already took part in them and therefore no longer need them.

This approach did not win much enthusiasm in the hall, as it suggests a possible disregard not only for the opposition but for any criticism.

Member of Parliament Vadym Halaychuk, defending the Verkhovna Rada’s pace of work, assured that the ruling party “is ready to lose in the ratings but to implement reforms.” But, as Vakarchuk stressed in response (and as many mentioned in the corridors), the new team’s focus on short-term results and quick wins leaves open the question of a strategic vision of the consequences of its actions, decisions and statements.

On the positive side, both Katharina Materneva and Alan Pillu assured that Ukraine is among the top priorities of their organizations.

If Pillu emphasized that for 2020 year Ukraine has been among the top-3 countries for the EBRD and that they are ready next year to invest more 1 billion euros in Ukraine, then Materneva said the new European Commission team assures they are Ukraine’s biggest supporters, but friends who are willing to criticize.

Is Ukraine more resilient today?

Although one panel posed that very question, attendees were much more concerned about what has changed in Ukraine after the Trump scandal and how to react to the recent remarks by the French president about Russia.

As British analyst James Sherr noted, for the first time in five years there is a possibility that Normandy format partners may turn away from Ukraine because they are occupied with their own affairs.

Foreigners are also keen to know what Ukraine will do if the Russians make gas talks conditional on progress in Donbas, and whether oligarchs with business interests in Russia are part of a hybrid threat.

Many were surprised that Andriy Yermak did not speak about Crimea in his presentation.

Thus Deputy Minister of Defense Alina Frolova had to reassure experts that Ukraine not only does not intend to give up Crimea, but is closely monitoring the militarization of the peninsula and the Sea of Azov and is discussing, given limited resources, the possibility of creating with NATO partners a regional joint early-warning system.

And while Frolova emphasized that after the delay in US assistance it became clear that Ukraine can rely only on its own forces, the British side appeared much more optimistic.

As Martin Harris, Director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia at the UK Foreign Office, assured, “we support Ukraine’s security because it supports our security.”

The UK Foreign Office representative stressed that today we are no longer talking exclusively about Ukrainian resilience; we are talking about global resilience against hybrid threats, and NATO countries need to think about how we can collectively, together with Ukraine, become more resilient.

Of course, the Salisbury incident, which in Britain is called nothing less than a “chemical attack,” was an important driving factor in perceptions of how far Moscow might go.

Today British experts increasingly talk about cybersecurity, where “Russia uses Ukraine as a laboratory for its actions,” about the need to build resilience in the economy, media sector and democracy, since Russia does not create problems but exploits the weak spots of Western countries.

It is encouraging that on specific security and resilience-building issues the British consider Ukraine can be an example, so there is great potential for exchange of experience. At the same time they are ready to continue supporting the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and Brexit, they say, will not hinder that.

Returning to international relations, conference participants from many European countries were worried that foreign policy is not a priority for either the president or the new political parties.

In 2019 year Ukraine reduced its diplomatic activity and put little trust in its diplomats.

Read the full article on EuroPravda

Hanna SHELEST