Faces of the Galushchenko Group

Faces of the Galushchenko Group

After Andriy Yermak was appointed head of the Presidential Office at the beginning of 2020, a reshuffle of top managers began in Ukraine’s main energy institutions.

The Bankova is confidently moving the energy sector into manual control. First Energoatom, then the Ministry of Energy, then the NRCERU, the Guaranteed Buyer, the Market Operator. In recent days they attacked the Operator of the Gas Transmission System of Ukraine and a takeover of Ukrenergo is expected. Fortunately, the evil is more than personalized, and it’s time to show its face, writes ZN.

In all these stories the influence of Herman Galushchenko is obvious; he came into the energy sector with people from Andriy Derkach. And now he enjoys the unquestioned trust of the Presidential Office in the person of Andriy Yermak and his deputies Oleg Tatarov and Rostyslav Shurma.

The link between Derkach and Herman Galushchenko

Professional lawyer Herman Galushchenko became vice president of NAEC Energoatom in the spring of 2020, shortly after Andriy Yermak replaced Andriy Bohdan as head of the Presidential Office and Denys Shmyhal's government replaced that of Andriy Honcharuk.

This was not Galushchenko’s first stint in nuclear energy. Officially he had already worked as director of legal support at NAEC in 2013–2014. At that time the head of Energoatom was Mykyta Kostiantynov. In turn, Kostiantynov was a vice president of NAEC in 2005–2006 when the state company was led by Andriy Derkach. After the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 Kostiantynov fled Ukraine and went to work for Rosatom. According to the SBU, Derkach was recruited by Russian intelligence in the same period.

Along with Galushchenko in 2020 Oleg Boyarintsev entered Energoatom; from 2002 to 2019 he was an assistant to People’s Deputy Andriy Derkach. Boyarintsev initially became chief consultant in the NAEC president’s office and later Energoatom’s director of personnel. So today he oversees all appointments in the state company’s main office. At the start of the Russian invasion in March 2022 the SBU suspected Boyarintsev of treason and detained him near the Rivne NPP. But this detention did not even lead to his dismissal.

Thus, Derkach’s influence on Energoatom’s staffing was so obvious that in 2021 even Yuriy Vitrenko, who was then acting energy minister, spoke about it: “Derkach simply historically influences Energoatom. He has many people there. And I know that for sure.”

Andriy Derkach

Who is Andriy Derkach

Derkach is now known as a traitor to the Motherland, allegedly recruited by Russian special services only in 2016. During Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s time he and Servant of the People member Oleksandr Dubinsky released recordings of conversations between Petro Poroshenko and Joe Biden into the information space that were intended to discredit the two presidents and stoke anti-American sentiments in Ukrainian society.

However, this activity of Derkach turned out to be a failure. Galushchenko publicly stated that his connection to Derkach was fake. As a result, Derkach was marginalized to the role of a landowner in Hlukhivshchyna in the border area of the Sumy region, where he hid before being charged with treason.

He was previously a very influential player in Ukrainian politics. Andriy Derkach is the son of SBU head Leonid Derkach, who led the security service in 1998–2002. It was then that Georgiy Gongadze was killed and the scandal over the tapping of President Leonid Kuchma (“the Melnychenko tapes”) erupted.

Andriy was the godfather of Yuriy Lutsenko (former prosecutor general and interior minister) and David Zhvania (former MP and supplier of Russian fuel to Energoatom, who defected to serve Russia before the invasion and was killed near Zaporizhzhia).

Derkach’s daughter is the wife of the son of Volodymyr Lytvyn, the long-time head of the Verkhovna Rada and presidential administration (also from the time of Gongadze’s murder). The brother of Derkach’s wife is married to the daughter of Russian oligarch Kostiantyn Hryhoryshyn.

During the first Orange Revolution in 2004 Derkach wore an orange scarf as one of the key players of the Socialist Party, which joined the ruling coalition. This allowed him in 2005–2006, with the permission of President Viktor Yushchenko, to become head of Energoatom. Officially Herman Galushchenko then worked in Yushchenko’s presidential secretariat. Rumor has it he already provided legal services to the nuclear sector then, but there is no official confirmation.

Other members of Herman Galushchenko’s group

Two years after Herman Galushchenko’s return, key positions in the state energy sector were filled by managers associated with or loyal to Galushchenko.

Kostiantyn Ushchapovskyi was appointed head of the National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Utilities (NERC) two days before the Russian invasion, replacing Valeriy Tarasyuk, who left under pressure from the Presidential Office. Previously he had been an adviser to the minister, Galushchenko.

Ushchapovskyi over his career worked in many state structures, including Ukrenergo and Energoatom. His wife Valeriia Ushchapovska owned a share in the company Energospecremont. Her partners in that company were Hryhoriy and Ivan Plachkov, also well-known figures in the energy market at the turn of the century.

Yuriy Vlasenko is the first deputy and right-hand man of Minister Galushchenko. He worked for many years at NERC. According to a source, it was Vlasenko who forced Ukrenergo’s chairman Volodymyr Kudrytsky in December 2021 to submit to the supervisory board a proposal to dismiss two board members, Andriy Nemirovskyi and Maksym Yurkov, in order to replace them with the minister’s people (about Hapon and Olefir below). After this spring’s synchronization with the European system, Vlasenko was to oversee Galushchenko’s orders to distribute Ukrenergo’s revenues from the sale of cross-border transit rights to six firms.

Ministry of Energy of Ukraine (Minenergo) / Facebook

Farid Safarov — deputy minister of energy, responsible for the sector’s digital transformation. He is called the minister’s hand that signs the necessary documents when professional lawyer Galushchenko doesn’t bother. For example, it was Safarov who signed a letter on the absence of a conflict of interest for another deputy minister, Mykola Kolesnyk, for appointment as head of the Operator of the Gas Transmission System of Ukraine. Such an appointment contradicts corporate governance principles. UGTS Operator has a European certificate of independence, so its head cannot be a government official who currently runs the sector.

Mykola Kolesnyk worked for many years in the ministry directorate that handles international relations. Under Safarov’s patronage, Galushchenko advanced him up the career ladder to deputy minister. Kolesnyk was pushed by the “Galushchenko group” team for the position of head of the UGTS Operator using a series of illegal decisions, but they gave up only after public exposure.

Ministry of Energy of Ukraine (Minenergo) / Facebook

Dmytro Olefir was fired from Ukrenergo several years ago; he is now an adviser to Galushchenko. He was one of two candidates that Galushchenko tried to appoint to Ukrenergo’s board in December 2021 and January 2022.

Yuriy Hapon — the second unsuccessful Galushchenko candidate for the Ukrenergo board. An SBU officer specializing in economic security, he is not an energy specialist and owes his career to Andriy Derkach’s father, Leonid (head of the SBU in Leonid Kuchma’s times).

Petro Kotin — head of Energoatom, essentially controlled by Galushchenko. People with Russian passports and close ties to Russia work under him. He was known for vehemently opposing an IAEA mission to the Zaporizhia NPP until August, and changed his rhetoric only after public statements by Andriy Yermak. He staunchly defends detained SBU subordinate Oleg Boyarintsev, about whose work he refused to speak at a parliamentary committee meeting. Boyarintsev, of course, was also formerly part of Derkach’s team.

Ministry of Energy of Ukraine (Minenergo) / Facebook

Valerii Polshkov — the former head of procurement at Ukrenergo, was dismissed earlier by Vsevolod Kovalchuk. During Yanukovych’s time he handled Chornomornaftohaz tenders known for non-market prices. In 2020 he planned to become Energoatom’s vice president for procurement, but instead became adviser to NERC head Kostiantyn Ushchapovskyi. His task is detailed knowledge of tender-splitting schemes and passing on “the right” signals from Galushchenko to contractors of various companies where Minenergo is a shareholder.

Andriy Pylypenko headed the state enterprise Guaranteed Buyer in December 2021. Before that he worked as a lawyer at Khmelnytskoblenergo. The previous head of the Guaranteed Buyer, Kostiantyn Petrykovets, was fired for refusing to “carry out illegal instructions from government representatives regarding settlements with renewable energy producers.” The government denied Petrykovets’ claims.

Oleksandr Havva became head of the state enterprise Market Operator in December 2021, which is responsible for organizing electricity trading. Before his appointment he was an adviser to Minister Galushchenko. His wife Daryna Havva works in the energy committee of the Verkhovna Rada.

Not fit for the army, but enough for a criminal cadre group. What does such a usurpation of the entire sector threaten?

Locally — banal schemes such as the deal already described around the UGTS Operator for 3 billion hryvnias, driving Energoatom to bankruptcy, or transferring the Chornobyl NPP administration under their control. DT.UA has already analyzed the results of this group’s work: Ukraine approached the most difficult heating season in history without money to cover tariffs for the population, without gas to ensure a comfortable season, and with coal reserves unknown to anyone. This is very dangerous even in normal conditions, let alone now, on the brink of an unpredictable heating season during which it would also be desirable to replenish stocks for future winters.

Globally — manual control of the entire sector, which will siphon the last money from it, pushing toward a large-scale payment crisis. The main problem is that we may lose the unique chance to rid the energy sector of the influence of oligarchs, who felt comfortable there since Kuchma’s redistribution of property. This year is the first when they do not have the decisive vote in decision-making. But this could be the year when people vested with state powers become the new oligarchs. And integration into the EU can be forgotten. Instead a new endless cycle of accumulating money and fighting new groups will begin…

skelet.info